IPO Underpricing: Auctions vs. Book Building∗

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July 4, 2007

Abstract

We compare two IPO mechanisms, auctions and book building in one model. We find that because book building discloses more information about a firm, only bad-quality sellers tend to want to use auctions. This adverse selection may minimize auctions or eliminate them altogether which, indeed, is what has happened in most places. Underpricing of IPOs arises under book building but not under auctions, which agrees with the evidence. The evidence also shows a mildly negative relation between price revisions and the underpricing of shares, and this the model generates as well.

1 Introduction

In all stock markets and almost all of the time, IPOs are “underpriced”: When they go public, companies usually offer their shares for less than the public seems to be willing to pay for them. When measured between subscription and the first day of trading, the return that investors experience is positive in virtually every country, and typically averages more than 15 percent in industrialized countries and around 60 percent in emerging markets, Figure 1 shows the average first day returns to IPOs. The returns are not annualized; they are the percentage gain accruing during the first trading day. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001, Ch. 2) summarize the evidence.

The IPO mechanism that predominates in most countries is known as bookbuilding (BB). During BB roadshows are used to elicit bids for the company’s shares at a pre-specified price. More often the not, the shares are (quite understandably) oversubscribed and are somehow rationed. Underpricing is far higher when the book-building mechanism is used than when the company is simply auctioned off. In most markets, including the U.S., auctions are rarely used.

∗We thank Yakov Amihud, Matthias Kredler, Alexander Ljungqvist, Gregg Lewis, and Jay Ritter for comments, and the NSF for support.
†NYU and the University of Chicago, respectively.
“Spinning.”—Evidence shows that the underwriter of an IPO offers the shares and the supernormal returns to his favorite clients, ones with whom he deals with repeatedly, and that this behavior is a part of a “trading favors” equilibrium in the game between the underwriter and these clients. The losers, the story goes on, are (a subset of) the pre-IPO shareholders who could have gotten a better deal. “...the fact that underpricing represents a wealth transfer from the IPO company to investors can give rise to rent-seeking behavior, whereby investors compete for allocations of underpriced stock by offering the underwriter side-payments. Such side-payments could take the form of excessive trading commissions paid on unrelated transactions, an activity that Credit Suisse First Boston was fined $100 million for in 2002. Or investment bankers might allocate underpriced stock to executives at companies in the hope of winning their future investment banking business, a practice known as ‘spinning’. In either case, the underwriter stands to gain from deliberately underpricing the issuer’s stock.” (Ljungqvist 2007, Sec. 3.3). Loughran and Ritter (2004, p. 6) emphasize a conflict of interest between decision-makers and other pre-IPO shareholders.: “Beginning in the 1990s, underwriters set up personal brokerage accounts for venture capitalists and the executives of issuing firms in order to allocate hot IPOs to them. By the end of the decade, this practice, known as spinning, had become commonplace. The purpose of these side payments is to influence the issuer’s choice of lead underwriter. These payments create an incentive to seek, rather than avoid, underwriters with a reputation for severe underpricing.....On April 28, 2003, the “global settlement” between ten top investment banking firms and the NASD, NYSE, SEC, and the states, coordinated by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, imposed a “no spinning” rule that prohibits officers and directors who are in a position to “greatly influence” investment banking decisions from receiving IPO allocations.” This legislation does not prevent the first form of spinning, however, which probably continues. The effect of all these forms of spinning is to raise underpricing in the way that we shall model.

Understanding IPO underpricing therefore requires that we answer two questions:

1. How do the underwriter and his clients manage to collect such large rents from the firm’s original owners and from its final owners?

2. Why do the firm’s original owners choose the BB mechanism and surrender such seemingly large rents? Why don’t they simply auction the firm off and set a reserve price?

To answer Question 1, we assume, as does Barron (1982), that the underwriter (i) has independent information about the market value of the firm, and (ii) has enough bargaining power to take advantage of that information. Assumption (i) is reasonable in that during BB the underwriter’s analysts and accountants study the firm and its business prospects. Assumption (ii) is best discussed after we see the details of the model, but the equilibrium outcome is that the underwriter extracts all
First-day return

Figure 1: QUARTERLY UNDERPRICING OF IPOs IN THE U.S.: 1960-2003

the rents from the firm’s final owners which is reasonable since there typically are many final owners.\(^1\) The firm’s original owners manage to keep some, but certainly not all the rents.

On Question 2, we argue that auctions are minimal or nonexistent because the worst firms would choose the auction mechanism, and that this adverse selection may eliminate auctions altogether. When the underwriter has information about the firm, the BB process can effectively disclose that information to the final owners, and then BB acts as a certification mechanism.\(^2\) This is true in equilibria in which the underwriter’s behavior reveals to the final buyers some or all of his information. This is shown in Section 5 where the basic model is extended to allow the auction option. The model gets support from Kutsuna and Smith (2004) who found that in Japan firms did adversely select into the auction-issuance market precisely because BB allows firms to be valued more accurately while, in turn, requiring a surrender of some rents by the issuer.

Thus, our answer to question 2 does not depend the precise nature of the game between the issuer and the underwriter does not matter. What does matter is that (i) BB reveals information about the quality of the issuer that an auction would not, and (ii) that the issuer loses some of the rents to the underwriter. It does not matter that the underwriter draws rents in the form of the bid-ask spread and not, as in

\(^1\)Consistent with this assumption, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) find that where the underwriter was also a pre-IPO shareholder in the issuing company (which, in their sample, happened in 44% of companies going public), underpricing was significantly lower.

\(^2\)Games in which a truthful-disclosure mechanism is available are discussed by Jovanovic (1982).
Baron (1982) and Biais, Brossaerts and Rochet (2002), in the form of lower sales effort.

The model also has implications about share turnover, or “flipping” that Loughran and Ritter (2007) study. Because the issuer and underwriter do not always come to terms in our model, it also generates failed IPOs – the empirical counterpart is withdrawn IPOs that Dunbar (1998) studies.

Our model differs from Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and similar models for two reasons. First, underpricing arises not because of the need to elicit information from the buyers, but because of the underwriter’s use his private information to capture the rents for himself and for his favored clients. Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002) assume as we do that the underwriter and his clients collude against the issuer. By contrast, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) assume that an underwriter’s interests are not perfectly aligned with his clients and they focus on how the underwriter optimally extracts information from those agents. Second, the resulting surrender of rents for the IPO-ing firm acts to keep the worst firms out of BB, and this adverse selection can destroy the auction market altogether. Any auctions that remain entail less underpricing than does BB. Our explanation contrasts with Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) who argue that since auctions do not generate as much information as BB does, we expect that the easier-to-evaluate firms (rather than the low-quality firms) will opt for auctions.

2 Model

This section studies the relation between the issuer and the underwriter, conditional on the issuer having committed to BB. The choice between BB and auctions will be studied only in Section 5.

Logic of the model—The underwriter is the issuer’s agent, but his interests are different. We shall follow principal-agent theory and assume that the underwriter maximizes his own utility. The issuer knows his own value of keeping the object, but the buyer does not know his own value. The BB process reveals information to the buyer.

The game has 3 players: A buyer (B), a seller (S), and a middleman (M). Player B is the prospective buyer and player S is the firm’s original owner. It is alleged that the underwriter delivers cheap shares to his favored clients in return for their repeat business and so on. We shall not model the relation between the underwriter and his clients but, rather, lump all these agents into a single player that we call M.

Suppose that \( V \sim F[v, \overline{v}] \) and \( U \sim G[u, \overline{u}] \). In addition \( 0 < v < u \). The game is the following: M gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to S. The seller decides whether to sell the object. If he does not sell the game ends. If he sells, M pays the price and resells the objects to B. We assume that B does not know \( u \) and has no signal at all about it (this does not matter, all that we need is that the signal about \( u \) be
imperfect and that B’s posterior have full support on \([u, \bar{u}]\) for all possible realizations of B’s signal.

The game proceeds in the following sequence:

(i) M sees \(u\).
(ii) M makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to S, denoted by \(p(u)\).
(iii) S decides whether to sell the firm.
(iv) If S does not sell the game ends and there is no IPO.
(v) If S sells, M pays him \(p(u)\) and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to B denoted by \(P(u)\).
(vi) B accepts or rejects and the game ends.

The game exhibits IPO underpricing if S and B accept their offers and if \(p < P\). The first-day return then is \((P - p)/p\).³ If S rejects M’s offer, this we shall call a “withdrawn IPO.”

A fullyrevealing equilibrium

In a fullyrevealing equilibrium M’s offer reveals \(u\) to the buyers; in other words \(p\) is a perfect signal of \(u\). Let \(p(u)\) denote the equilibrium price function. If \(p(u)\) is strictly monotone in \(u\), then it is fully revealing. Once he has thus revealed \(u\) to B, since M has all the market power, M can get all the rents from B by setting \(P(u) = u\).

Incentive compatibility of \(p(u)\).—Suppose \(p(u)\) is an equilibrium. Suppose that M observes \(u\) and thinks that instead of \(p(u)\) he should bid \(p(u')\). If \(p(u)\) is M’s maximizing choice, his payoff should be maximized at \(u' = u\). Let

\[ F_u(v) \equiv \Pr(V \leq v \mid u) \]

and let \(f_u(v)\) be the corresponding density. Incentive compatibility requires that

\[ \arg \max_{u'} F_u(p(u')) [u' - p(u')] = u. \] (1)

The first-order condition for this maximization problem is

\[ f_u(p(u')) p'(u') [u' - p(u')] - F_u(p(u')) [1 - p'(u')] = 0, \]

This is necessary but not sufficient. Global concavity in \(u'\) would then be sufficient.⁴

³Since M always ends up selling any shares that he buys, all the shares are resold or, in IPO jargon, “flipped”.
⁴The second-order condition requires that the second derivative in (1) w.r.t. \(u'\) be negative when evaluated at \(u' = u\):

\[
0 \geq (p'f' + fp'') (u - p) + (1 - p') p'f - (1 - p') p'f + F(p) p''
= (p'f' + fp'') (u - p) + F(p) p''
\]
Evaluating the FOC at $u' = u$ and rearranging leads to

$$p'(u) = \frac{F_u(p(u))}{F_u(p(u)) - f_u(p(u)) |u - p(u)|} > 0. \tag{2}$$

**Initial Condition for $p$.**—Suppose $p(u)$ is fully revealing. At $u = u$, if $S$ accepts the offer, $M$’s payoff is $u - p(u)$. If $M$ were to quote a lower price, $B$ would continue to believe that $u = u$, because $u$ is the lowest possible value that $u$ can take on. On the other hand, (2) ensures that if $M$ were to set a higher price, he would be worse off in spite of the fact that $B$ would believe that $u > u$. Hence, at $u = u$, $p$ solves

$$p(u) = \arg \max_p F_u(p)[u - p]. \tag{3}$$

The FOC for this problem is

$$p + \frac{F_u(p)}{f_u(p)} = u. \tag{4}$$

which gives us the initial condition $p(u)$.

**Properties of $p(u)$.**—Since $u - p(u) > 0$, (2) implies that $p' > 1$. Thus $p$ is indeed strictly increasing, i.e., it is invertible and fully revealing. Therefore $p(u)$ gets closer and closer to the 45° degree line. The following is relevant only if $\bar{v} < \infty$ (as will be the case in the example that we shall solve below). While $p$ is everywhere differentiable, if $f_u(\bar{v}) > 0$, $p'$ will have a kink at the point where $p = \bar{v}$. As $u$ rises, and as $p(u) \to \bar{v}$, $p'(u) \to 1/(1 - f_u(\bar{v})(u - \bar{v})) \geq 1$. For $p > \bar{v}$, $f_u(p) = 1$ and (2) reads $p'(u) = 1$, and $p(u) = \bar{v} + u$.

### 2.1 Example 1

Suppose that $u$ and $v$ are uniformly and independently distributed. Let $[v, \bar{v}] = [0, \bar{v}]$ and let $v$ be independent of $u$. Then for all $u$,

$$F_u(v) = v/\bar{v} \text{ and } f_u(v) = 1/\bar{v}.$$  

Denote by $\phi(u)$ that portion of $p$ that does satisfy (2). In terms of this notation, (2) then reads

$$\phi'(u) = \frac{\phi(u)}{2\phi(u) - u} = \frac{1}{2 - \frac{u}{\phi}} \text{ for } u \leq u^*.$$  

The general solution is $\phi = \frac{1}{2} \left(u \pm \sqrt{4C + u^2}\right)$, for some constant $C$. The initial condition (4) now reads, $2\phi = u$ which, together with the general solution allows us
to solve for $C = -\frac{1}{4}u^2$. In that case, however, the requirement that $\phi' > 0$ is met only by the larger root, and therefore

$$\phi(u) = \frac{1}{2} \left( u + \sqrt{u^2 - v^2} \right),$$

which is valid for $u \in [u, u^*]$, where $u^*$ solves $\phi(u^*) = \bar{v}$.

For all $p(u) \geq \bar{v}$, the probability that $S$ accepts the offer is unity, and $M$’s payoff is just $P(u) - p(u) = u - p(u)$. If the equilibrium is to be fully revealing, for $u \geq u^*$ incentive compatibility requires that $M$’s payoff, $u - p(u)$, be constant. Therefore

$$p(u) = \begin{cases} 
\phi(u) & \text{for } u \leq u^*, \\
\bar{v} + (u - u^*) & \text{for } u > u^*, 
\end{cases}$$

or, since $\phi$ is increasing and concave, simply

$$p(u) = \min \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \left( u + \sqrt{u^2 - v^2} \right), \bar{v} + (u - u^*) \right\}. \quad (5)$$

Plotting it at $u = \frac{1}{3}$, which we plot below, together with the 45° line. Then if $\bar{v} = \frac{2}{3}$, $u^*$ solves $\phi(u) = \frac{2}{3}$, i.e., $u^* = 0.71$ and $\phi$ is not valid beyond that point...

The FOC (2) implies that, since $f_u(\bar{v}) = 1/\bar{v}$, where the density becomes 1 the slope of $p$, $p'$, becomes 1.
When \( u = \pi \), \( p < \pi \). This is true in our example plotted in Figure 2: \( u^* = .71 > .66 \). Beyond that point, the profit margin is constant and the probability of sale is one. In the diagram \( p'(u) = 1 \) for \( u > u^* \). Now \( p(u) \) is indeed parallel to the 45° line above \( u^* \), as shown in Figure 2.

### 3 Underpricing

As a percentage of the “morning price”, the first day gain is

\[
m(u) = \frac{u - p(u)}{p(u)}.
\]

This is also the rent that M gets, as a percentage of \( p \). M’s expected rent must is (1).

**Proposition 1**

\( m'(u) < 0 \)

**Proof.** Since by (2) \( p'(u) > 1 \), the numerator in (6) is decreasing and the denominator is increasing. ■

**Corollary 2** \( p(u) \) and \( m(u) \) are negatively related as \( u \) varies.

Let us test Corollary 1 by looking at data on price revisions (before the first day of trading). During BB, prices are revised, presumably in light of new information. During BB, S and M start with an initial price range \([p^L, p^H]\), where \( p^L \) stands for the lowest point in the price range and \( p^H \) for the highest point. However these limits are not real constraints and roughly half of the time they are violated. Roughly one-quarter of the time \( p \) ends up being above \( p^H \) and one quarter of the time \( p \) ends up being below \( p^L \). See tables 6 and 7 of Loughran and Ritter (2007). The point is that a violation is a surprise, and therefore in our model it is an indication of high or low \( u \). The data do not completely support the model; "OP" stands for the offered price. This is \( p(u) \). The Corollary implies that the purple lines should have been tallest. But while they are weakly taller than the white lines, they are not taller than the blue lines. On the other hand, the blue lines are clearly taller than the white lines and this supports the model. To sum up, Corollary 1 implies a negative relation between \( m \) and \( p \), whereas in reality the relation seems to be inverted-U, with only a slight downward trend.

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\(^5\)At \( u \), M’s payoff is \( F(p(u)) [u - p(u)] = \frac{F_p(p(u))}{F(p(u))} \).
Figure 3: First-day return for “low-\(u\)” (purple), “middle-\(u\)” (blue) and “high-\(u\)” (white) IPOs.

Let us return to Example 1 and calculate the implied underpricing. Now for \(u \geq u^*\), (6) reads

\[
m(u) = \frac{u}{\min \left( \frac{1}{2} \left( u + \sqrt{u^2 - \frac{36}{100}} \right), \frac{2}{3} + u - 0.709 \right)} - 1
\]

The blue line is for \(u = \frac{1}{3}\).

Comparative statics with respect to \(u\).—Let’s change \(u\) from 0.33 to 0.6. Such a change represents a (stochastic) rise in B’s willingness to pay, without a corresponding rise in S’s valuation. Therefore the gains to trade rise. Since M gets a fraction of gains, we would expect money on the table to rise as a result of this change. Now

\[
\phi(u) = \frac{1}{2} \left( u + \sqrt{u^2 - \frac{36}{100}} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad u^* = 0.8017
\]

so that

\[
p(u) = \min \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \left( u + \sqrt{u^2 - \frac{36}{100}} \right), \frac{2}{3} + u - 0.8017 \right\}
\]

for \(u \in [0.6, 1]\)

Therefore

\[
\frac{u}{p(u)} - 1 = \frac{u}{\min \left( \frac{1}{2} \left( u + \sqrt{u^2 - \frac{36}{100}} \right), \frac{2}{3} + u - 0.8017 \right)} - 1
\]
Note in this case that
\[
\lim_{u \to u} m(u) = 1
\]
but this seems to be specific to this example.

\[m(u) \begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Money on the table, } m(u) \text{, when } u = 0.333 \text{ (blue line) and when } u = 0.6 \text{ (red line).}
\end{array}
\end{array}
\]

Thus there is more money left on the table, at least for high values of \( u \).

## 4 Auctions vs. BB

The main cost of underpricing is borne by the original owners of the firm. It seems on the face of it that they could have gotten \( u \), but instead settled for \( p(u) \). As Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001, p. 40) observe, given the huge underpricing we see, it is curious that we do not observe a greater shift toward auctions.

Why, then, does S prefer to involve M? Why not simply auction the company off and set the reserve price at \( v \)? Presumably the answer is that all the bad firms would flood in and, knowing this, shareholders would not be willing to pay much. This adverse selection problem could even destroy the auction market altogether. Auctions would work well if \( B \) knew his value \( u \) exactly. But when \( B \) does not know \( u \), and when \( u \) and \( v \) are correlated, then an influx of low-\( v \) sellers into the auction environment would lower the expectation of \( u \) conditional on \( S \) having opted for an auction.

In our model, \( M \) sees \( u \), and his bid allows \( B \) to infer \( u \) exactly, thereby eliminating all uncertainty. More generally, the bid \( p \) would reveal \( M \)'s signal about \( u \). Therefore the BB process survives because it solves the adverse selection problem which would otherwise be present if \( M \) was not involved and if \( S \) and \( B \) were left to their own devices.
The book-building option.—For seller \( v \) let \( \beta(v) \) denote the expected value of signing with a \( M \) and going through the BB process. That is,

\[
\beta(v) \equiv \int \max (p(u, A), v) \, dF_v(u) .
\] (7)

Now \( p(u, A) \) is the price that \( M \) offers \( S \) when \( M \) knows that

\( v \notin A, \)

and where \( A \) is defined below.

The auction option.—For seller \( v \) the expected value of using an auction to IPO and use a reserve price of \( v \) is

\[
\alpha(v) = \int \max (u, v) \, dF_v(u \mid \tilde{v} \in A),
\]

where

\[
A = \{ v \mid \alpha(v) > \beta(v) \} .
\]

### 4.1 Special case

Suppose that

\[
u = v + b,
\]

where \( b \) is a constant.

**BB option.**—Then if \( M \) knows \( u \) he knows \( v \), and therefore \( p(u, A) = u - b = v \). Therefore

\[
\beta(v) \equiv v.
\]

**Auction option.**—In this case the reward is

\[
\alpha(v) = \max (v, p^*),
\]

where \( p^* = E(v + b \mid v \in A) \) is the price that prevails in the auction market, i.e.,

\[
p^* = b + E(\tilde{v} \mid \tilde{v} \in A),
\]

and

\[
A = \{ \tilde{v} \mid \tilde{v} < p^* \} .
\]

The marginal (i.e., indifferent) seller \( \hat{v} \) then satisfies

\[
\hat{v} = p^*.
\]
4.2 Example 2

Let \( v \) be uniform \([0, 1]\). Then \( \hat{v} \) be the marginal seller who satisfies \( \alpha(\hat{v}) = \beta(\hat{v}) \). In that case that

\[ A = [0, \hat{v}] \]

and

\[ E(\hat{v} | \hat{v} < p^*) = \frac{1}{2}\hat{v}. \]

Therefore

\[
p^* = b + \frac{1}{2}\hat{v} = b + \frac{1}{2}p^* = 2b.
\]

The fraction of firms opting for auctions then is \( 2b \).

(i) Since \( b \) is an indicator of demand, we would expect that the fraction auctioned off should be correlated with the stock market.

(ii) Since \( p^* \) is fixed, it could also be regarded as a “fixed-price offer,” as analyzed by Chahine (2002) evidence.

4.3 Evidence on underpricing in Auctions and BB

The extension of our model to include auctioned IPOs (see below) implies no underpricing of auctioned IPOs. Chahine (2002) and Derrien and Womack (2001) study French firms where auctions have been used. Derrien & Womack write

“Relative to the U.S. markets where underwriting has been primarily based on the book building mechanism, the French IPO market gives issuers and their underwriters a choice of mechanisms. This choice is typically made before the preliminary documents announcing the IPO are published, i.e. approximately 2 months before the IPO date. In the 1992-1998 period, three IPO selling mechanisms have been most common in France:

- Offre à prix ferme (OPF), a fixed-price offer,
- Offre à Prix Minimal (OPM), an auction procedure,
- Placement Garanti (PG), similar to the American book building procedure.

The main difference between these three procedures lies in the role of the different actors: OPF and OPM are investor-driven mechanisms, aimed at giving the significant decision making to investors. The market authority (the SBF or Société des Bourses
Françaises) plays a pivotal role in guaranteeing the fairness of these procedures. The book building procedure, on the other hand, gives the central role to the underwriter, who presumably has the best understanding of the market as well as the desire and ability to place the shares in “good” hands.

In our model, OPF and OPM are the same. They should have zero underpricing on average, and no turnover or not much turnover of shares. Consistent with this, Chahine (2002) reports, for the French sample, higher underpricing for BB, and higher turnover of shares.

5 Turnover of shares

In the model so far M resells all the shares he buys immediately, deriving no direct dividend or benefit from the shares other than the capital gain $P - p$. Turnover during day 1 is 100%. The evidence on flipping is in Figure 5. What if M had to keep the shares? It turns out that the equilibrium $p(u)$ would be unique and smaller than the solution to (2), and therefore $m(u)$ would be higher.

5.1 100% flipping, again

This is the same problem as (1), but now we state it a bit differently because it will be easier to compare the two cases with this formulation Let

$$u(p) = \text{the inverse function of } p(u).$$

If we have a monotone $p(u)$ and if that is an equilibrium, then we can equivalently speak of equilibrium in terms of $u(p)$. Then we can re-state (1) as

$$\arg\max_p F_u(p) [u(p) - p] = p(u)$$

The FOC is

$$f_u(p) (u - p) + F_u(p) [u'(p) - 1] = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

5.2 Zero flipping

Suppose instead that M has to keep all the shares. Then the problem is

$$\arg\max_p F_u(p) [u - p] = p(u).$$

The FOC now is

$$f_u(p) (u - p) - F_u(p) = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

Since $u'(p) > 0$, the LHS of (8) is larger than the LHS of (9). Therefore (if both problems are concave), the LHS as a function of $p$ takes longer to cross zero. I.e., it crosses zero at a larger value of $p$. Therefore $m(p)$ is smaller when there is 100% flipping.
5.3 Example 1, again

Let us return to the example of Section 2.1 in which \( v \) was distributed uniformly on \([0, \bar{v}]\). We found that the 100%-flipping solution for \( p(u) \) was given by (5). For the zero-flipping case, (9) now reads

\[
u - 2p = 0,
\]

valid for \( p \leq \bar{v} \), i.e., for \( u \leq 2\bar{v} \). For \( u > 2\bar{v} \), M would then keep \( p \) at \( \bar{v} \) since he is already certain of getting the object. Therefore the solution is

\[
p^{(0)}(u) = \min \left( \frac{u}{2}, \bar{v} \right).
\]

In Figure 4 we now plot \( p(u) \) and \( p^{(0)}(u) \) along with the 45% line (the price that D pays), taking the same parameter values we took in Figure 2: \( u = 0.33, \bar{v} = 0.66 \) and, consequently, \( u^* = 0.71 \).

5.4 Evidence on underpricing and flipping

This is refuted by Table 3 of Loughran and Ritter (2007) and the pattern portrayed in Figure 5.

The assumptions that this section makes about flipping are that M either must sell or, alternatively, must keep the shares that he has acquired from S. In reality,
the decision to sell or not is a choice, and the decision to sell or not may then be correlated with \( u \) and other variables (e.g., the sector of the IPO-ing firm) that our model does not include, but that may vary over IPOs. Therefore, endogenizing the choice to sell may overturn the counterfactual implication that where there is more flipping there is less underpricing.

6 Withdrawn IPOs

The number of withdrawn IPOs is the number of offers that sellers reject. Conditional on \( u \), the probability of a withdrawal is \( 1 - F_u (p[u]) \). Over a period in which there are many IPOs, the fraction withdrawn would be

\[
\int [1 - F_u (p[u])] \, dG (u) .
\]

In a related paper, Lewis (2006) deals with withdrawals of used cars from auctions on eBay and there are some interesting parallels. There are two key differences. First, withdrawing may hurt the company’s prospects of IPO-ing in the future whereas there may be no such effects for a used car selling on eBay. Second, an IPO has a built in certification mechanism (the investment bank which in our model is achieved by
the full revelation of $u$), whereas on eBay Motors there is unmediated disclosure from sellers to potential buyers through the auction webpage.

7 Conclusion

We have compared two IPO mechanisms, auctions and BB, and argued that BB drives out auctions because it discloses more information, leading to adverse selection into the auction market, as evidence from Japan and elsewhere shows. Thus we have explained why auctions are not used much in the market for IPOs. We also showed that the model was consistent with the mildly negative relation that one can observe between price revisions and the underpricing of shares.

References


