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NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC.

Market Design Working Group Meeting

Michael Ostrovsky and Parag Pathak, Organizers

October 28-29, 2016

SIEPR
Koret-Taube Conference Center
Stanford University
366 Galvez Street
Stanford, CA


Program



Participant List

Friday, October 28

 

 

8:30 am

Continental Breakfast

9:00 am

Darrell Duffie, Stanford University and NBER
Haoxiang Zhu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Size Discovery

Ahmad Peivandi, Georgia State University
Participation and Unbiased Pricing in CDS Settlement Mechanisms

10:30 am

Break

11:00 am

Laura Doval, Yale University
A Theory of Stability in Dynamic Matching Markets

Hugo Hopenhayn, University of California at Los Angeles and NBER
Maryam Saeedi, Carnegie Mellon University
Bidding Dynamics in Auctions

12:30 pm

Lunch

2:00 pm

Christina Aperjis, Power Auctions LLC
Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland
Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado Boulder
Thayer Morrill, North Carolina State University
Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns

Tibor Heumann, Princeton University
Ascending Auctions with Multidimensional Signals

3:30 pm

Break

4:00 pm

John Hatfield, University of Texas at Austin
Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University
Hidden Substitutes

 

Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
Deferred Acceptance Auctions Without Substitutes

5:30 pm

Adjourn

6:30 pm

Dinner
Il Fornaio Restaurant
520 Cowper Street
Palo Alto, CA

Saturday, October 29

 

 

8:30 am

Continental Breakfast

9:00 am

Gabriel Carroll, Stanford University
Ilya Segal, Stanford University
Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities

Songzi Du, Simon Fraser University
Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation

10:30 am

Break

11:00 am

Shengwu Li, Stanford University
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

Marek Pycia, University of California at Los Angeles
Peter Troyan, University of Virginia
Obvious Dominance and Random Priority

12:30 pm

Lunch

2:00 pm

Benjamin Roth, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ran Shorrer, Pennsylvania State University
Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon-Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design

Michal Feldman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Nicole Immorlica, Northwestern University
Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research
Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Microsoft Research
Efficiency Guarantees in Large Markets

3:30 pm

Break

4:00 pm

David Delacretaz, University of Melbourne
Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University
Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford
Refugee Resettlement

 

Tommy Andersson, Lund University
Lars Ehlers,
Université de Montréal
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings

5:30 pm

Adjourn




FORMAT: 
Authors should plan to speak for approximately 30-35 minutes.