Drifting apart: The pricing of assets when the benefits of growth are not shared equally*

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Abstract

A significant fraction of the growth of aggregate market capitalization is due to new firm entry. With incomplete markets, the gains from new firm creation are not shared equally; these gains accrue to a small part of the population, while constituting a risk for the marginal investor who holds a portfolio of existing firms, which face potential displacement by the arriving firms. We propose a simple model to capture these notions. We use the model to develop a simple methodology to measure this displacement risk, which relies on the discrepancy in the growth rates of aggregate dividends and of the gains from the self-financing trading strategy associated with maintaining a market-weighted portfolio. We find that our measure of displacement risk is closely linked to certain cross-sectional asset-pricing phenomena and can explain a sizable fraction of the equity premium. We argue more generally that dispersion in capital income, a source of risk overlooked in representative agent models, has first-order implications for asset pricing.

Keywords: Asset Pricing, Displacement Risk, Equity Premium, Incomplete Markets, Innovation

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1 Introduction

New and young companies are an important source of job creation and economic growth in the American economy (Haltiwanger, 2012). However, the economic rents resulting from new firm entry are not distributed equally in the population, as evidenced by the several rags-to-riches stories of successful entrepreneurs. Further, the creation of new firms does not automatically benefit investors that hold broad market indices. These indices are composed of existing firms, that sometimes are displaced by new firm entry due to creative destruction. This distinction between new and existing firms introduces a wedge between the growth rate of aggregate dividends and those of dividends per share. To illustrate the contribution of new firm entry to aggregate dividend growth, Figure 1 shows that even though aggregate dividends and aggregate consumption share a common trend, dividends-per-share of the S&P 500 follow a markedly slower growth path. The difference in growth rates between aggregate dividends and dividends per share is approximately 2% per year. This discrepancy can be largely attributed to the dilution effect arising every time new companies enter the index.\(^1\)

In this paper, we exploit fluctuations in the gap between aggregate dividends and dividends per share to identify a “displacement” shock — that is, a shock that reallocates profits from existing firms to new firms. We show that the identified displacement shock is negatively correlated with returns to the market portfolio and the returns of value strategies. Further, we show that this displacement shock carries a negative risk premium: firms that have higher than average exposures to the shock earn lower than average returns. Last, we show that this displacement shock can account for a substantial fraction — approximately one-third — of the equity risk premium.

We motivate the empirical exercise using a minimal extension of the standard endowment economy that allows for new firm entry and incomplete markets. The key feature of the model is that the ownership of new firms is randomly allocated to a (small) subset of the population. Importantly, investors cannot sell claims against their future endowment of new firms. As a result, shocks to the relative profitability of new firms lead to the redistribution of wealth from the owners of existing firms to the new entrepreneurs. This wealth redistribution increases the cross-sectional distribution of consumption growth — most households suffer small losses while a lucky few experience large wealth increases. Since marginal utility is convex, the displacement shock leads to increases in the stochastic factor, or equivalently,\(^1\)

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\(^1\)The line labeled “Index Dividends + New Cap” in Figure 1 shows that if we compute the logarithm of the cumulative change in the number of shares of the index that is due to the introduction of new companies and add it to the dividends-per-share series, the resulting series co-trends with both consumption and aggregate NIPA dividends.
**Figure 1:** Real logarithm of S&P 500 dividends per share, real log-aggregate consumption and real log-aggregate dividends. The CPI is used as a deflator for all series. The line “Index Dividends + New Cap” is equal to real log-dividends per share plus the progressive sum of the logarithm of the cumulative change in the number of shares of the index that is due to the introduction of new companies. Sources: R. Shiller’s website, FRED, Personal Dividend Income series, and CRSPSift.

... (text continues)

carries a negative risk premium.

Our theoretical model suggests that the displacement shock is closely related to fluctuations in the index divisor — the number of shares of the market portfolio. Using the model as a guide, we estimate a vector error-correction model to decompose the variation in dividends-per-share into ‘displacement shocks’ — that is, shocks to dividends-per-share resulting from changes in the index — and ‘neutral shocks’ — that is, shocks that affect dividends-per-share but do not affect the constitution of the index. The advantage of the vector-error correction model is that it can explicitly allow for stochastic delays in the introduction of firms into the market index. This advantage allows us to employ different definitions of the market index, even if those do not cover the entire universe of companies traded in the stock market. Consistent with the theory, the identified displacement shocks have a negative and non-trivial impact on the index dividends-per-share, as well as on the returns of the market index and value strategies. These results hold regardless of whether we focus on the entire CRSP universe or on the S&P 500 index.

We next estimate the risk premium associated with the identified displacement shock.
We form portfolios of firms based on estimated firms’ betas with the displacement shock. The difference between the average returns to the top minus the bottom decile portfolio is approximately -3.5% per year and is statistically significant. Differences in average returns across decile portfolios are fully accounted by differences in risk exposures to the long-short portfolio. Using Fama-Macbeth analysis provides similar results that differences in displacement risk are associated with differences in average returns. In sum, the estimated risk premium associated with displacement shocks is negative and substantial: a pure bet on the displacement shock has a Sharpe Ratio that ranges from -0.76 to -1.45 across specifications, though these numbers are not very precisely estimated ($t$-statistics range from 1.85 to 2.60).

This negative risk premium implies that the displacement shock contributes positively to the equity risk premium — since it is associated with market declines.

In the remaining part of the paper, we quantify the contribution of displacement risk to the equity risk premium. We proceed along two fronts. First, we compute the risk premium of a fictitious market index that has no exposure to the displacement shock. We find that this fictitious portfolio carries a risk premium that is approximately two percentage points lower than the actual market portfolio — or roughly one-third of the equity premium in the 1966 to 2012 period. Second, we present two calibrations of the model that explore the extent to which it can generate a realistic equity premium using conventional parametrization. The first calibration uses the baseline model that features minimal deviations from the endowment economy benchmark. Perhaps surprisingly, this simple model, in which the displacement shock is the only source of aggregate uncertainty, can generate an equity premium of approximately 2% using power utility and a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 10. The second calibration allows for more realistic features — specifically, it allows for labor income that is also displaced. Using a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 10, the extended model can generate a realistic equity premium and a low and smooth risk-free rate.

In sum, our results demonstrate the importance of recognizing the distinction between aggregate dividends and dividends per share. To the extent to which new firm creation is an important source of profit reallocation, it implies that holders of the market portfolio are exposed to additional risks than aggregate economic growth. These additional risks will increase the equity premium relative to the benchmark model with a representative agent and endowment economy. Our paper thus contributes to several strands of the literature.

An extensive literature documents a significant impact of technological progress embodied in new capital vintages on economic growth and fluctuations (see, e.g. Solow, 1960; Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell, 1997; Fisher, 2006). Further, there is significant micro-level evidence documenting vintage effects in the productivity of manufacturing plants. Specifically, Jensen,
McGuckin, and Stiroh (2001) find that the 1992 cohort of new plants was 51% more productive than the 1967 cohort in their respective entry years. This difference persists even after controlling for industry-wide factors and input differences. Technological breakthroughs naturally favor new firms at the expense of incumbents, since new entrants have the highest incentives to implement new technologies. Along these lines, Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001) and Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) provide evidence suggesting that the introduction of IT favored new entrants at the expense of incumbent firms in the early 1970s. We add to this literature by proposing a new measure of the degree of displacement faced by existing firms.

Our theoretical model is closely related to Gărleanu, Kogan, and Panageas (2012) and Kogan, Papanikolaou, and Stoffman (2015), who study the pricing of embodied shocks under incomplete markets. We innovate relative to both papers by proposing a simple model that leads to an attractive empirical measure of displacement affecting existing firms, and show that it carries a significant and negative risk premium. Furthermore, by containing only the minimal deviations from a Lucas Tree economy, our model illustrates analytically how displacement risk enters the stochastic discount factor of financial market participants in a manner similar to Constantinides and Duffie (1996). In addition, even though our model features time separable preferences, it can lead to an equilibrium stochastic discount factor that is similar to the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004). Our model thus serves to illustrate that preferences for early resolution of uncertainty are not necessary for agents to display aversion to long-run risks, therefore mitigating the issues raised by Epstein, Farhi, and Strzalecki (2014). Our modeling strategy is related to Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004) who model directly firm cashflows as shares of aggregate output; we extend their model to allow for new firm creation and vintage effects. Lastly, our work contributes to the voluminous literature that links economic properties of firms to their risk premia.²

An important assumption in our model is that the economic rents that are created by new enterprises are not fully shared with stock market participants. This assumption is in line with Hart and Moore (1994), who show that the inalienability of human capital limits the amount of external finance that can be raised by new ventures. Along these lines, Bolton, Wang, and Yang (2015) characterize a dynamic optimal contract between a risk averse entrepreneur with risky inalienable human capital, and outside investors, and show that the optimal contract leaves the entrepreneur with a significant fraction of the upside

²An incomplete list includes Jermann (1998); Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003); Kogan (2004); Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004); Zhang (2005); Lettau and Wachter (2007); Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010); Santos and Veronesi (2010); Gourio (2011, 2012); Ai, Croce, and Li (2013); Belo, Lin, and Bazdresch (2014); Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014); Kung and Schmid (2015); Ai and Kiku (2013); Favilukis and Lin (2013); Croce (2014); Gărleanu, Panageas, and Yu (2012).
Our model delivers predictions that are consistent with several existing studies. Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002) document that the equity premium and the premium of value stocks over growth stocks is consistent with a stochastic discount factor calculated as the weighted average of individual households marginal rate of substitution. Johnson (2012) finds that financial assets, such as growth stocks, that hedge against increases in inequality earn lower risk premia. Loualiche (2013) shows that firms in industries more vulnerable to new entry earn higher risk premia.

Last, we are not the first to point out the difference between the dividend growth of an index and the growth in dividends per share. For instance, Pastor and Veronesi (2006) recognize this distinction when reconciling the higher than average future profitability of firms listed in the Nasdaq index with the low profitability of the index itself. We use the distinction between aggregate dividends and dividends per share to create a new index of displacement affecting existing firms and to study its asset pricing implications.

2 The Model

To expedite the presentation of the main results, we start with an intentionally stylized model that is a minimal extension of an otherwise standard endowment economy, enriched to allow for the arrival of new firms. In Section 2.1 we introduce the real side of the economy, where we deviate from the endowment economy benchmark by allowing for the creation of new firms. Importantly, the relative profitability of new firms is stochastic, introducing displacement risk. In Section 2.2 we show that this displacement risk can be priced, even in a setting where all consumers are infinitely lived. In Section 2.3 we introduce overlapping generations and allow for displacement of labor income. This extension illustrates that shocks to the likelihood of future displacement are also priced, even though the consumers have time-separable preferences.

The model presented in this section contains the minimal set of assumptions necessary to capture the main ideas and motivate the empirical exercise of the next section. Specifically, we assume that new firm creation is exogenous and requires no resources, there is no capital in production, and firms make profits through a decreasing-returns to scale technology in labor. As we explicitly show in Section A.1 in the Appendix, none of these assumptions is essential for our results.
2.1 Firms

Time is discrete and indexed by $t$. There is an expanding measure of firms, indexed by $(i, s)$ with $i \in [0, 1]$, where $s$ denotes the date at which the firm is created. In what follows, we omit the second index of a firm when it is clear from the context. Firms employ labor using a decreasing-returns-to-scale technology. A firm $(i, s)$ produces output at time $t$ according to

$$y_{t,s}^{(i)} = A_t \left( a_{t,s}^{(i)} \right)^\eta \left( l_{t,s}^{(i)} \right)^{1-\eta},$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $\eta \in (0, 1]$, $a_{t,s}^{(i)}$ captures the relative productivity of a firm (that is, $\sum_{s \leq t} \int_{\epsilon \in [0,1]} a_{s}^{(i)} = 1$), and $l_{t,s}^{(i)}$ is the labor employed. We assume decreasing returns to scale; in Section A.1 we show how monopolistic competition leads to (1). We allow for a neutral technology shock $A_t$ that symmetrically affects all firms, and evolves as

$$\Delta \log A_{t+1} = \mu + \sigma \varepsilon_t,$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where $\varepsilon_t$ are i.i.d. according to some known distribution.

A firm’s output share is related to its relative productivity $a_{t,s}^{(i)}$. Using the fact that, in equilibrium, the marginal product of labor equals the wage, and aggregating across firms, we obtain

$$\frac{y_{t,s}^{(i)}}{Y_t} = a_{t,s}^{(i)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

We make the following assumptions about firms’s relative productivity $a_{t,s}^{(i)}$. First, each period a new set of firms arrive. These new firms, indexed by $i \in [0,1]$, are heterogeneous in their productivity. Specifically, the productivity of a newly arriving firm $i$ satisfies

$$a_{t,t}^{(i)} = (1 - e^{-u_t}) dU_t^i,$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where $u_t$ is a random, non-negative, cohort-specific component, affecting all firms born at the same time; for simplicity, we assume $u$ is independent of $\varepsilon_s$ for all $s$.

Our formulation in (4) captures the idea that new firm creation leads to wealth reallocation. The shock $u$ is the displacement shock in our model. Further, each existing household $i$ is endowed with a new firm; however not all new firms are equally productive. Here, $dU_t^i$ is a random, non-negative, idiosyncratic productivity component, which is drawn at the time of
the firm’s birth (and remains unchanged thereafter) and satisfies \( \int_{t \in [0,1]} dU_t^i = 1 \).

The productivity of firms created at earlier times \( s < t \) is given by

\[
a_{t,s}^{(i)} = a_{s,s}^{(i)} e^{-\sum_{n=s+1} u_n}.
\]

Combining equations (3) and (4), we see that the total fraction of output produced by the cohort of firms born at time \( t \) is equal to

\[
y_{t,t} = 1 - e^{-u_t}.
\]

Conversely, the fraction of time-\( t \) output due to older firms is \( e^{-u_t} \). Thus, \( u_t \) controls the fraction of output due to newly entering firms: the higher \( u_t \) is, the greater is the contribution of new firms to aggregate output. Since a firm’s profits are proportional to its output — a consequence of the Cobb-Douglas assumption — equation (6) also reflects the share of aggregate profits that accrues to existing firms.

An important feature of our model is the distinction between aggregate dividend growth \( Y_t \), and the growth of the dividends-per-share of the market portfolio. Denoting by \( Y_{t,s}^e \) the dividend at time \( t \) of a value-weighted portfolio of all firms that exist at time \( s \), we have that

\[
\log Y_{t+1,t}^e - \log Y_{t,t}^e = \log Y_{t+1} - \log Y_t - u_{t+1}.
\]

Examining equation (7), we see that the displacement shock \( u \) introduces a discrepancy between the dividend growth of existing firms (the left-hand side) and the aggregate dividend growth, which is given by \( \log Y_{t+1} - \log Y_t \). We exploit this discrepancy to identify the displacement shock in the data.

A straightforward way to express this discrepancy is through the notion of an index divisor. A divisor \( S_t \) captures the number of fictitious “shares” of an index, and its growth rate \( (S_{t+1}/S_t) \) is determined so that

\[
R_{t+1}^{ex} = \frac{P_{t+1}}{S_{t+1}} \frac{S_t}{P_t} = \left( \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \right) \left( \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right),
\]

where \( R_{t+1}^{ex} \) is the ex-dividend gross return on the market-weighted portfolio of all firms in existence at time \( t \) and \( P_t \) represents the aggregate value of the market at time \( t \). By construction, the divisor captures the discrepancy between the (ex-dividend) returns of the
market portfolio and the proportional increase in total market capitalization.

Equations (7) and (8) together imply that changes in the divisor are closely related to the displacement shock: \(^3\)

\[
\log S_{t+1} - \log S_t = u_{t+1}.
\]  

(9)

The reason for the difference between aggregate dividends and dividends-per-share is that aggregate dividends do not constitute the gains of a self-financing strategy. An investor holding the market portfolio needs to pay to acquire new firms that enter the index. To restore the self-financing nature of the strategy, the investor needs to constantly liquidate some of the shares she holds to purchase shares of the new firms. Since the fraction of the index that this investor holds diminishes over time, the dividend growth of such a self-financing strategy falls short of the growth in aggregate dividends.

This distinction between dividends-per-share and aggregate dividends is subtle, but important for asset pricing. A direct implication of (7) is that the dividends-per-share of an index behave differently from aggregate dividends. Indeed, the two variables are not even co-integrated, since \(\log (Y_t/Y_t^c)\) behaves like a random walk with drift. This distinction has direct implications for models with a single representative firm, which imply co-integration between aggregate dividends and aggregate consumption (or output). However, if new firms arrive constantly, then the value of the market portfolio — that is, the value of all firms currently in existence — does not equal the present value of future aggregate dividends. Instead, the market value of existing firms equals the present value of the dividends accruing to the firms currently in existence, or equivalently, it equals the present value of the dividends-per-share of the market index.

In sum, our stylized model links displacement shocks to the discrepancy between aggregate dividends and dividends-per-share. We next examine the equilibrium pricing of these displacement shocks.

\[^3\text{To see this note that}
\]

\[
\log R_{t+1}^e = \log Y_{t+1}^e - \log Y_t^e + \log \left(\frac{P_t}{Y_t^c}\right) - \log \left(\frac{P_t}{Y_t^c}\right) - \log \left(\frac{P_t}{Y_t}\right),
\]

where the first equation follows from the definition of a gross return and the second equation follows from (8). Using the fact that \(\frac{P_t}{Y_t} = \frac{P_t}{Y_t^c}\) and equation (7) leads to (9).
2.2 The pricing of displacement risk

Here, we verify that the displacement risk is priced in our economy and that it can potentially account for a substantial fraction of the equity risk premium. We proceed in two steps. First, we derive the equilibrium stochastic discount factor in a pure endowment economy — that is, we assume that labor is absent from production, $\eta = 1$. Next, we introduce labor and allow households to have finite lives. We show that allowing for the displacement of labor income amplifies the results of our baseline model.

2.2.1. Consumers and markets

We begin our analysis with the endowment economy benchmark. Specifically, we set $\eta = 1$, so that labor is absent from production and thus consumers receive no labor income.

The economy is populated by infinitely-lived agents, who maximize their expected utility,

$$U_t = E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma},$$

(10)

where $\beta \in (0,1)$ is the subjective discount factor. As in the standard Lucas-tree model, consumers can trade equity claims on existing firms and in a riskless, zero-net-supply bond. Moreover, consumers can trade (zero-net-supply) claims to the realization of the shocks $u_{t+1}$ and the innovation to log ($Y_{t+1}$).

We deviate from the endowment economy benchmark by assuming a market incompleteness. Specifically, at time zero consumers are equally endowed with all firms in existence at that time. However, from that point onward, consumer $i$ receives firm $(i,t)$ at time $t$, i.e., a new firm with productivity proportional to $a_{i,t}$, which is random. Importantly, a key market is missing: consumers cannot enter contracts that are contingent on the realized value of their endowments of firms. This market incompleteness plays a key role in the pricing of displacement shocks.

We make a simplifying assumption to solve the model in closed form. Specifically, we focus on the limiting case in which firm creation generates extreme inequality, in that only a set of measure zero of firms manage to produce non-zero profits; the vast majority of new firms are worthless. This assumption ensures that when making consumption and savings decisions, households attach zero probability to the event they receive a profitable firm. Formally, we assume that, for every $t$, the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks $dU_t^i$ consists exclusively of (random) point masses. Specifically, we assume that $U_t$ is a discrete measure on $[0,1]$, so
that it is an increasing right-continuous, left-limits (RCLL) process that is constant on \([0, 1]\) except on a countable set, where it is discontinuous. Both the magnitudes of the jumps in \(U_t\), and the locations of the points of discontinuity are random. In words, only a set of measure zero of consumers obtain the profitable new firms.

2.2.2. Equilibrium

The definition of equilibrium is standard. An equilibrium is a set of price processes and consumption and asset allocations such that a) consumers maximize their utility \((10)\) over consumption and asset choices subject to a dynamic budget constraint, b) goods market clear, and c) all asset markets clear.

The next proposition constructs an equilibrium and describes its properties.

**Proposition 1** Let \(F_t(i) : [0, 1] \to [0, 1]\) denote the distribution of consumption across individuals. Then there exists an equilibrium in which

\[
F_{t+1}(i) = e^{-u_{t+1}} F_t(i) + (1 - e^{-u_{t+1}}) U_t^i. \tag{11}
\]

The dynamics of a stochastic discount factor \(\xi_t\) that prices all traded assets are given by

\[
\frac{\xi_{t+1}}{\xi_t} = \beta \left( \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \right)^{-\gamma} e^{\gamma u_{t+1}}. \tag{12}
\]

The reasoning behind Proposition 1 rests on two observations. First, the assumption of extreme inequality implies that consumers attach zero probability of receiving a firm. Consequently, conditional on not receiving a firm, all agents’ consumption growths are perfectly aligned:

\[
\beta \left( \frac{c_{t+1}^{(i)}}{c_t^{(i)}} \right)^{-\gamma} = \frac{\xi_{t+1}}{\xi_t}. \tag{13}
\]

However, we note that \((13)\) does not apply to the new rich (NR), that is, consumers that end up receiving a profitable firm. Even though these consumers are a set of measure zero, their share of aggregate consumption is non-trivial.

Second, since no agent’s consumption choice depends on the possibility of receiving a firm in the future, all agents’ have the same consumption-to-wealth ratio. Since households have
no labor income, their wealth consists entirely of claims on existing firms. Their financial wealth is proportional to the share of aggregate profits that accrue to the firms in their portfolios, that is, the share of output accruing to old firms in the economy, $e^{-u_{t+1}}$. As a result, the aggregate consumption of consumers who do not receive new firms equals $e^{-u_{t+1}}Y_{t+1}/Y_t$, which leads to the form of the pricing kernel (12).

Incomplete markets introduces a wedge between our stochastic discount factor (12) and the one arising in a standard, Lucas-tree endowment economy. This additional term, given by $e^{\gamma u_{t+1}}$ adjusts for the fact that almost all consumers do not consume the aggregate endowment; a set of measure zero (NR) consumes a non-trivial amount. Importantly, even though households are identical, they cannot share the idiosyncratic risk associated with the future random endowments of firms. Different agents end up with different marginal utilities, and the average marginal utility is higher than that of an agent consuming aggregate consumption. In fact, our specific assumptions — the lucky agents receive infinite wealth with zero probability — equate average marginal utility with that of the agents not receiving valuable endowments, namely $e^{\gamma u_{t+1}} (Y_{t+1}/Y_t)^{-\gamma}$. These agents are hurt more, and the state price higher, when the shock $u$ is large.

Our model is similar to Constantinides and Duffie (1996) in that the cross-sectional dispersion of consumption growth increases the level of the stochastic discount factor. The two models rely on endowment specifications that are quite different. In their model, the cross-sectional distribution of households’ consumption growth is conditionally normal. In our case it is binary: the consumption growth of almost all households is given by $e^{-u_{t+1}}Y_{t+1}/Y_t$, while the consumption growth of the measure-zero set of households that receive profitable firms is infinite. In both cases, the convexity of marginal utility implies that the average marginal utility across households does not equal the marginal utility of average consumption. Furthermore, in Constantinides and Duffie (1996) agents experience permanent shocks to their endowment of consumption, while in our model the increased dispersion in consumption growth derives from new-firm creation.

We note that, even though we illustrate this simple intuition in a stylized model for technical convenience, the economic intuition is robust to modifying the extreme-inequality assumption. In particular, equation (12) would not hold exactly if an agent’s probability of receiving valuable new firms is not zero, but would be a good approximation as long as this probability is small. See also Kogan et al. (2015), which features a similar market incompleteness, but where consumers have a non-zero probability of receiving profitable projects; the results, obtained using numerical solutions, are qualitatively similar.
2.3 Labor and imperfect intergenerational risk sharing

We next extend the model to allow for imperfect inter-generational risk sharing, as in the model of Garleanu et al. (2012). Our goal is to show a close connection of the results obtained so far (where idiosyncratic risks are imperfectly shared within a generation) to a model where risk is imperfectly shared across generations. In addition, the introduction of imperfect inter-generational risk sharing, combined with labor income that also depreciates with the displacement shock, leads to a stochastic discount factor that resembles those of “long-run” risk models.

We start by allowing for labor in the production of consumption goods, that is, $\eta < 1$. Additionally, we drop the assumption that consumers are infinitely lived. Instead, we assume that consumers die with probability $\lambda$ and a new cohort of consumers of mass $\lambda$ arrives every period. Consumers arrive in life endowed with efficiency units of labor, but no endowment of firms. We also make the (standard) assumptions in the overlapping-generations-literature that a) there exists a competitive market for annuities, and b) investors maximize their expected life-time utility, but have no bequest motives.

We introduce aging and displacement effects in labor earnings. In contrast to the previous model, labor is not a homogenous service; instead, the units of labor that enter the production function of firms are measured in terms of a composite service, which is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of the labor efficiency units provided by workers belonging to different cohorts. Specifically, one unit of labor $l_t$ is given by

$$l_t = \prod_{s=0}^{t} h_{t,s}^{q_{t,s}},$$

(14)

where $h_{t,s}$ is the number of hours supplied by workers born at time $s$, and $q_{t,s}$ is a weighting function satisfying $\sum_{s=0}^{t} q_{t,s} = 1$. Due to the Cobb-Douglas assumption, the wage income of cohort $s$ is given by

$$w_{t,s} = (1 - \eta) Y_t q_{t,s}.$$  

(15)

Thus, we can interpret $q_{t,s}$ as the fraction of labor income going to the worker-cohort $s$.

We allow for the displacement of human capital similarly to the displacement of firms. Specifically, we assume that the shock $u_t$ also affects the fraction of income accruing to newly
arriving, versus existing, workers,

\[ q_{t,t} = 1 - (1 - \delta) e^{-\psi u_t}, \]

\[ q_{t,s} = q_{s,s} (1 - \delta)^{t-s} e^{-\psi (\sum_{n=s+1}^{t} u_n)}. \]

Here, the constant \( \psi \) captures the exposure of labor to the shock \( u_t \), while \( \delta \) captures the depreciation of labor income due to aging.

The following proposition shows the impact of the displacement shock \( u \) on the stochastic discount factor.

**Proposition 2** Let

\[ \chi_t \equiv E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (1 - \lambda)^{s-t} \xi_s \xi_t^{(i)}, \]  
\[ \phi_c^t \equiv E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \xi_s e^{-\sum_{v=s+1}^{t} u_v} \left( \frac{Y_s}{Y_t} \right), \]  
\[ \phi_l^t \equiv E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \xi_s (1 - \delta)^{s-t} e^{-\psi \sum_{v=s+1}^{t} u_v} \left( \frac{Y_s}{Y_t} \right). \]

Then,

\[ \left( \frac{\xi_{t+1}}{\xi_t} \right) = \beta \left( \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \frac{1}{1 - \lambda} \right)^{-\gamma} \left[ \eta \frac{\phi_c^{t+1}}{\chi_{t+1}} e^{-u_{t+1}} + (1 - \eta) \frac{\phi_l^{t+1}}{\chi_{t+1}} (1 - \delta) e^{-\psi u_{t+1}} \right]^{-\gamma}. \]

Comparing (19) with (12) shows that the lack of intra-generational risk sharing (inability of existing agents to share the endowment risk associated with new firms) and the lack of inter-generational risk sharing (inability to trade with the newly arriving cohort of workers before their birth) have similar effects on the stochastic discount factor.

A novel implication of Proposition 2 is that shocks to the distribution of future random variables are priced. Thus, not only does the SDF \( \xi_t \) depend on the redistribution of \( u_t \) in addition to aggregate consumption \( Y_t \), it also depends on the distribution of future shocks \( u_{t+s} \).

As a concrete illustration of how future shocks are priced, suppose that \( u_{t+1} \) is drawn from one of two distributions, \( F_0 \) and \( F_1 \), according to a Markov regime-switching process \( s_t \in \{0, 1\} \) with given transition matrix. The Markov property of \( s_t \) implies that the valuation ratios \( \chi_t, \phi_c^t, \) and \( \phi_l^t \) are exclusively functions of \( s_t \). Equation (19) implies that, as long as
the ratios $\phi_c/\chi$ and $\phi_l/\chi$ are not constant,

$$E_t \left( \frac{\xi_{t+1}}{\xi_t} s_{t+1} \right) \neq E_t \left( \frac{\xi_{t+1}}{\xi_t} \right) E_t (s_{t+1}) = \frac{Pr (s_{t+1} = 1 | s_t)}{1 + r_t^f},$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)$$

where $r_t^f$ is the one-period risk-free rate. In words, innovations to $s_{t+1}$ command a risk-premium.

The pricing of variables other than one-step-ahead consumption growth might appear puzzling in a model with expected utility. This effect arises because dividends and labor income have (potentially) different exposures to the displacement shock. The growth rate in the consumption of the marginal agents reflects the proportion of wealth owned next period by current agents who survive until then but do not become new rich — in equation (19), the term in square brackets. This proportion is a weighted average of the displacement of dividend, respectively labor income, and the relative weight is state dependent as long as these two claims depend differently on the displacement shock. By contrast, in the special case in which labor income and dividends are identical in terms of displacement risk ($\delta = 0$ and $\psi = 1$), the last term in (19) collapses to $e^{\gamma u_{t+1}}$, as before.

In sum, this section establishes a close parallel between the lack of inter-generational and intra-generational risk sharing. Furthermore, it illustrates that not only current, but also future redistributive shocks are priced, even in an environment where agents feature time-separable preferences. The stochastic discount factor is thus similar to those of models with long-run risks and recursive preferences (see, e.g. Bansal and Yaron, 2004). Our observation is that recursive preferences are not necessary for the distribution of future shocks to affect current marginal utility — holding consumption fixed — therefore sidestepping the concerns raised by Epstein et al. (2014).

## 3 Empirical Evidence

Here, we present our main empirical findings. Section 3.1 explains how we identify the displacement shock in the data, while Section 3.2 shows that exposures to the identified shocks carry a significant — and negative — risk premium.
3.1 Measuring displacement shocks

We begin our analysis by describing how we can extract a time-series for the displacement shock using movements in the divisor and dividends. Conceptually, our analysis is based on equation (9), which suggests a straightforward way to measure displacement shocks as changes to the index divisor. In doing so, however, we face three major challenges. First, our model implicitly assumes that all firms are traded in the stock market immediately after their introduction; in the data this is not the case. Second, all changes in the divisor in the model are due to the addition of new firms. In the data, however, existing firms also issue and repurchase shares. We next describe how we address these issues.

3.1.1. Choice of index

A seemingly important choice in our analysis is the definition of the market portfolio. One possibility is to use the CRSP index as a measure of the market index, and define changes in the divisor as the log-difference of aggregate market capitalization minus the log-difference of the value of the CRSP-index. The two significant expansions of the sample, in 1962 and 1972, when CRSP starts covering AMEX and NASDAQ stocks, respectively, pose a practical challenge. At these dates the CRSP divisor experiences substantial changes (around 6% and 11%, respectively). These jumps introduce outliers, and it is not obvious how to handle them. These jumps in the divisor in 1962 and 1972 clearly do not represent the creation of new firms, but rather a wave of new listings that reflect past firm entry. Further, these changes in the composition of the sample make it likely that some of the econometric estimates we obtain may not be constant in each sub-sample.

To overcome this concern, we use additional information from an alternative definition of the market portfolio that does not suffer from that problem, that is, the S&P 500. The S&P 500 is an index that is available since 1957 and is professionally maintained to provide “broad coverage” of the market. Practically, this means that the index has traditionally covered a relatively stable 80% of the market capitalization of US markets. In the context of our model, it is straightforward to show that any index that reflects a constant fraction of “true” market capitalization at any point in time should exhibit the same divisor changes as an ideal index reflecting the entirety of the stock market capitalization. If that fraction is not literally constant, but stationary, then the index should have the same stochastic trend as the ideal index.

The bottom graph of Figure 2 shows divisor changes for the S&P 500 and the CRSP. In these figures we ignore the years 1962 and 1972 — otherwise the CRSP outliers in these years
Figure 2: Bottom graph: Overall change in the S&P 500 divisor (solid line) and change in the CRSP-divisor (dotted line). Top graph: Change in the S&P 500 divisor (solid line) and change in the CRSP-divisor (dotted line) that is due to new firm entry (first term of equation (21)). To measure new firms in the S&P we use CRSPSift, while to measure new firms in CRSP we use the market valuation of PERMCOs that appear during the respective year.

In our model, changes in the divisor occur only due to new firm entry. In the data, however, divisor adjustments also reflect corporate decisions by existing firms, such as share issuances and share repurchases. To gauge the importance of net issuance by existing firms, we decompose changes in the divisor into a part that results from corporate actions of existing firms and a part that is due to the addition of new firms in the index. Specifically, changes would overwhelm the figure. We see that the divisor changes are highly correlated across the two index definitions. This strong correlation is particularly high at lower frequencies, and also as the coverage of CRSP becomes more complete in the latter half of the sample.

In sum, in our empirical analysis we use both definitions of the market portfolio, and focus on the 1958-2012 period. We report results using both definitions for completeness; however, our results are essentially identical whether we use the S&P 500 throughout or we use the CRSP and simply replace the 1962 and 1972 divisor changes of the CRSP with the respective ones from the S&P 500.

3.1.2. New firm entry versus issuance by existing firms

In our model, changes in the divisor occur only due to new firm entry. In the data, however, divisor adjustments also reflect corporate decisions by existing firms, such as share issuances and share repurchases. To gauge the importance of net issuance by existing firms, we decompose changes in the divisor into a part that results from corporate actions of existing firms and a part that is due to the addition of new firms in the index. Specifically, changes
Figure 3: Change in the S&P 500 divisor (dotted line) and change in the divisor that is due to new companies (solid line).

\[
\frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} - 1 = \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \frac{1}{R_{t+1}^{ex}} + \left( \frac{P_{t+1}^{old}}{P_t^{old}} \frac{1}{R_{t+1}^{ex}} - 1 \right),
\]  

(21)

to the divisor can be decomposed as

where \( P_{t+1}^{new} \) is the market capitalization of firms entering the index in period \( t + 1 \), \( P_t^{old} \) is the time-\( t \) market capitalization of firms that are in the index at both \( t \) and \( t + 1 \), and \( R_{t+1}^{ex} \) is the gross return on the index excluding dividend payments.

A substantial portion in the variation of the divisor is due to new firm entry. In particular, the first term on the right-hand side of (21) captures fluctuations in the divisor due to new firm entry. The term inside brackets captures the change in the divisor due to firms that belong to the index at time \( t \). We plot both series in Figure 3. We see that changes in the divisor due to addition of new firms (the first term in 21) are very close to the total changes in the divisor in most years — with the exception of the late 1980’s and the late 2000’s. We emphasize that these conclusions do not depend on the precise definition of index that we use. Indeed, the first term of (21) is strongly correlated (especially at lower frequencies) across the two index definitions that we consider, as the top graph of Figure 2 shows.

In sum, movements in the divisor reflect predominantly additions of new firms. However, some changes in the divisor are due to the actions of existing firms, which are likely to reflect shocks other than the displacement shock. We next develop an econometric methodology to extract displacement shocks.
3.1.3. Identifying the structural shocks

Our analysis so far has focused on the descriptive properties of the divisor. Guided by our model, we next consider the identification of the displacement shock from movements in the divisor, dividends-per-share, and aggregate dividends. We use two approaches. First, we identify the displacement shocks from a bivariate VAR that includes log dividends-per-share of the index and the log divisor. Taking the model literally, we use a Cholesky decomposition to identify the displacement shock. To address the concern that movements in the divisor reflect shocks other than displacement shocks, we next estimate a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) with three variables: log dividends-per-share of the market index, log aggregate NIPA dividends, and the log divisor of the market index as co-integrated variables (with one co-integrating vector). The VECM allows for cyclical movements in the divisor that are unrelated to the displacement shock. Moreover, we identify the displacement shock using an instrumental-variables-style technique to separate shocks into displacement and “neutral” shocks. Throughout, we deflate all dividend series by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

We start with the VAR analysis. Motivated by the model of Section 2.1, we use a simple Cholesky decomposition to identify the shocks. Specifically, the VAR decomposes the variation of the non-structural residuals as arising from two structural shocks. The first shock (the “neutral” shock, labeled “e”) is defined as affecting dividends, but not the divisor, on impact. The second shock (the “displacement” shock, labeled “u”) is unrestricted in terms of its contemporaneous effects on both variables. We use one lag in the VAR due to the relatively small sample; adding more lags leads to qualitatively similar results.

We plot the impulse responses to the two structural shocks, e and u in Figure 4. We see that both shocks have a significant economic impact on dividends-per-share. Consistent with our model, the neutral shock has a positive impact on the dividends-per-share; by contrast, the divisor shock has a negative impact. In terms of magnitudes, a one-standard deviation neutral shock has a long run (permanent) impact of about 8% on dividends, while the divisor shock has a permanent impact of about -4.4% on dividends-per-share. This quantitatively significant negative impact on dividends-per-share is consistent with the presence of the displacement shock.

An important advantage of our VAR approach — compared to simply regressing dividends-per-share on the divisor change — is that it allows us to isolate innovations in the structural shocks. This advantage is important because new firms, while affected by displacement

---

4 The series on aggregate dividends is Personal Dividend Income, Table 2.1, obtained from the St.Louis FRED.
Figure 4: Results from a Vector-Autoregression of an identified displacement shock (u) and an identified divisor-neutral shock (e) on dividends-per-share (labeled index dividends) and the divisor of the market index. Dotted lines indicate 95% confidence bands. The left panel presents results using the S&P 500 as the index definition; the right panel presents results using the CRSP value-weighted index. Data period is 1962-2012.

Shocks, typically enter the index with a lag. For this reason, divisor changes are likely to be a moving average of past displacement shocks. Assuming that this moving-average specification is invertible — a standard assumption in the VAR literature — the VAR analysis identifies correctly the innovations and their impact on the endogenous variables. By contrast, a simple regression would not.

To see why the VAR can still identify displacement shocks even if firms enter the index with a lag, consider the following modification to the baseline model. Firms that are born at time $t$, enter the index at time $t + \tau$, where $\tau$ is geometrically distributed (with parameter $\hat{\lambda}$) — an assumption that is consistent with the data. In this case, the change in the index divisor $S$ will equal, up to log-linearization,

$$
\Delta \log S_{t+1} \approx \hat{\lambda} \sum_{s=0}^{t+1} \left(1 - \hat{\lambda}\right)^{t+1-s} u_s \\
= \left(1 - \hat{\lambda}\right) \Delta \log S_t + \hat{\lambda} u_{t+1}.
$$
Hence, a VAR with one lag should permit correct identification of $u_{t+1}$ despite the lag in introducing past companies into the market.

A limitation of the VAR analysis is that it identifies movements in the divisor with the displacement shock. Under the null of the model in Section 2.1, this assumption is valid. In the data, however, divisor movements may be affected by business cycle variation that leads existing firms to issue equity or repurchase shares. These cyclical movements in the divisor are unrelated to the displacement shock. To address this concern, we utilize a vector-error-correction model that allows for an explicit modeling of permanent and transient disturbances.

We estimate the VECM model using Johansen’s procedure, allowing for one co-integrating vector (Johansen, 1991). The advantage of the VECM is that it allows us to isolate the impact of cyclical shocks from permanent shocks affecting the divisor. Specifically, the reduced-form residuals are linear combinations of a transitory and two permanent shocks. The temporary shock can thus be identified without any further identification assumptions and is allowed to affect any of the three variables on impact.

Decomposing the two permanent shocks requires further identifying assumptions. Guided by our model, our goal is to decompose these shocks into a shock that is unrelated to new firm creation, a “neutral” permanent shock, and a “displacement” shock. To do so, we use the component of the divisor that corresponds to new firm entry into the index — the first component of (21) — to help us identify displacement shocks. In particular, let $Z_t$ denote the first component in equation (21). We first obtain innovations to $Z_t$ by regressing $Z_t$ on its own lag and the variables included in the VECM. We then identify the permanent neutral shock by the requirement that it be orthogonal to these residuals, $z_t$.

Specifically, we estimate the following VECM

$$\Delta y_t = \alpha_0 + \beta_0' y_{t-1} + \Gamma_1 \Delta y_{t-1} + \nu_t,$$

where $y_t$ is the vector containing real-log dividends-per-share, real-log aggregate NIPA dividends, and the log divisor. Here, $\beta_0' y_{t-1}$ is the co-integrating vector, and $\nu_t$ denotes the residuals. An implication of Granger’s representation theorem is that the process $y_t$ can be written as

$$y_t = \Lambda \sum_{s=0}^{t} v_s + y_0^*,$$

where $\Lambda$ denotes the matrix of cumulative impulse-responses of the shock $v_t$ on the endogenous variables. Denoting by $\eta_t$ the structural shocks, let $B$ be a matrix mapping the reduced-form
residuals \( v_t \) to these shocks, \( v_t = B\eta_t \). Our goal is to determine the matrix \( B \). Co-integration implies that one of the three structural shocks has only transitory impact on the endogenous variables. Placing that shock last in the vector \( \eta_t \) implies

\[
\Lambda B = \begin{bmatrix}
  * & * & 0 \\
  * & 0 & 0 \\
  * & 0 & 0
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

In the right-hand side matrix the asterisks denote unrestricted elements. The three zero restrictions on \( \Lambda B \) constitute only two linearly independent restrictions on \( B \), since co-integration implies that \( \Lambda B \) is of reduced rank. The requirement \( BB' = \Sigma_v \), where \( \Sigma_v \) is the covariance matrix of the non-structural residuals, adds six more restrictions. Hence one last restriction is necessary to identify \( B \). We employ the restriction that the second element of \( \eta_t \) — which we take to correspond to the permanent “neutral” shock — is orthogonal to the innovations in the divisor due to new firm creation, \( z_t \).

In sum, this procedure allows us to identify three shocks that affect dividends-per-share, aggregate dividends, and the divisor: a) a temporary shock with no long run impact on any variable, b) a permanent “neutral” shock that is uncorrelated with innovations to new firm entry, and c) a permanent displacement shock, which is the object of our interest.

We plot the three-by-three impulse response functions in Figure 5. The results of our VECM analysis are qualitatively similar to those of the VAR model. That is, a one standard deviation in the identified displacement shock is followed by a 3% to 8% drop in dividends per share, depending on the horizon. As before, the impulse responses are practically the same no matter how we define the market index (CRSP or S&P). Indeed, when we extract the time series of “displacement” shocks by utilizing either definition of the index, the two series are highly correlated (the first principal component explains 80% of their joint variation). In what follows, we utilize this first principal component, which is likely to contain less measurement error than either series. However, the conclusions are not sensitive to this choice; choosing using either series leads to similar results.

### 3.1.4. Robustness

We perform several robustness tests to examine the sensitivity of our results. First, we replace dividends-per-share with earnings-per-share, and aggregate dividends with aggregate earnings in various permutations. Doing so alleviates the concern that firms’ payout policy has changed over the last few decades, as firms shifted more to repurchases rather than
cash dividends as a form of shareholder payout. Second, rather than imposing that the neutral shock is orthogonal to innovations in the divisor due to new firm entry, we use a simple Cholesky decomposition as in our VAR analysis. The correlations between the identified displacement shocks using these procedures and the procedure we used are fairly high (between 0.73 and 0.99) suggesting that our way of identifying the displacement shock is robust to the identification assumptions made in the VAR, and to whether one uses dividends or earnings.

3.2 Asset pricing implications of displacement shocks

In the previous section, we showed that the displacement shock has a significant impact on dividends-per-share. In this section we perform two exercises. First, we investigate whether the displacement shock carries a significant risk premium. Second, we estimate the contribution of the displacement risk to the equity risk premium. Since the market portfolio is a claim on existing — but not future — firms, its dividends per share are negatively exposed to displacement risk — as we see from equation (7) — and therefore the risk of displacement can contribute to the risk premium of the market portfolio.

3.2.1. The pricing of displacement risk

Here, we focus on whether the displacement shock is priced. Specifically, we examine whether stocks with different betas to the displacement shock exhibit different average returns.\(^5\) Specifically, we form 10 portfolios of stocks based on estimated betas with respect to the displacement shock at the end of each year.\(^6\) We then form equal-weighted portfolios and

\(^5\)In our baseline model all stocks have the same exposure, but this is only for simplicity. Extending the model to allow different stocks to have different exposures is straightforward.

\(^6\)We first repeat the VECM exercise of the previous section and identify the displacement shock using monthly data on (log, real) dividends-per-share, (log, real) aggregate dividends, and the log divisor utilizing 12 lags. We extract the structural displacement shock from the VECM, labeled \(u_t\). We then estimate betas for all stocks in CRSP with share codes 10 or 11, by regressing the excess returns \(R^i_t\) on \(u_{t+1,t+3}\), i.e., on the displacement shock over the next three months (quarter). We adopt this timing convention because dividends are typically paid quarterly and announced in advance of their payment. Excess returns are above the three-month U.S. treasury bill rates as contained in Ken French’s data library. Betas are computed in a rolling five-year fashion. To mitigate the effects of illiquidity we require at least fifty non-zero observations. To mitigate the effect of measurement error in the betas, we use Vasicek (1973) to shrink the time-series beta to the cross-sectional mean. Specifically, the Vasicek (1973) procedure computes beta according as a weighted average of the time-series estimate for each stock \((\beta_{TS})\) and the cross-sectional mean of betas \((\beta_{XS})\):

\[
\beta_i = w_i \beta_{TS}^i + (1 - w_i) \beta_{XS}^i,
\]

where \(w_i = 1 - \sigma_{i,TS}^2 / (\sigma_{i,TS}^2 + \sigma_{XS}^2)\). In our sample the average \(w_i\) is about 0.59 and its standard deviation is 0.21. At the end of December of each year, we sort stocks into ten portfolios based on decile breakpoints for \(\beta\).
compute annual returns over the next year.

We report the results in Table 1 and Figure 6. Portfolio 1 is the portfolio with the lowest value of pre-ranking beta and portfolio 10 is the one with the highest. Panel A of Table 1 shows that the displacement shock carries a negative risk premium. Specifically, there exists a significantly negative relation between average excess returns on these portfolios and displacement betas. Panel B shows that the sorting procedure we adopted is successful in sorting stocks in terms of their exposure to the identified displacement shock. Specifically, post-ranking betas (portfolio betas with the displacement shock) are increasing across portfolio sorts.

The beta-sorted portfolios have a relatively simple factor structure. To see this, we run a regression of the form

$$R_{t}^{ei} = \alpha_i + b_i R_{t}^{em} + s_i S_t + h_i H_t + \gamma_i D_{t+1} + \varepsilon_i^t,$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

where we augment the Fama-French 3 factor model with the long-short portfolio formed by going long the portfolio with the lowest displacement-beta, and short the portfolio with the highest displacement-beta, p1-10.

Examining Panel C of Table 1, we see that the portfolios exhibit relatively similar loadings to the three Fama-French factors, but a clear monotonic loading on the fourth factor. The CAPM alpha of the 1-10 portfolio is 3.5 % with a t-statistic of 2.19, while the 3-Fama French alpha is 3.0 % with a t-statistic of 1.74. The reason for the better performance of the Fama-French model compared to the CAPM is partially due to the fact that the HML factor is negatively correlated with the displacement shock, consistent with (Gărleanu et al., 2012; Kogan and Papanikolaou, 2014; Kogan et al., 2015).

We next show that the displacement shock is priced in the cross section even after including the conventional Fama-French factors.

Specifically, to confirm that exposures to the displacement shock are priced we use a simple Fama-MacBeth procedure. As before, we use the ten displacement-beta-sorted portfolios as test assets. Motivated by existing work that links displacement shocks to the value premium (Gărleanu et al., 2012; Kogan and Papanikolaou, 2014; Kogan et al., 2015), we also include the 25 Fama-French book-to-market and size portfolios. Here, in addition to the identified displacement shock $u$, we also examine the risk premium associated with the other two structural shocks we recover from the VECM, labeled $BC$ (transitory shock) and $PN$ (permanent, neutral shock). First, we estimate time-series betas by projecting the returns of each asset on the various factors we consider. In a second step, we run a series of
Table 1: Decile Portfolios formed on Displacement Beta. Panel A shows annual average returns of ten portfolios formed on beta to the VECM-identified displacement shock. Beta’s are calculated using monthly five year rolling windows to the three month forward displacement shock identified in a VECM using monthly data. Portfolios are then sorted on beta at the end of December every calendar year and rebalanced annually. In Panel C, $R_t^e$, $S_t$ and $H_t$ are the Fama-French three factors, and $(p1 - 10)_t$ is the 1 minus 10 long-short portfolio. Data are annual, 1966 to 2012.

<table>
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<th>Portfolio</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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<td>3.22</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>-2.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel A: Summary Statistics

$R_{t+1}^{e_i} = \alpha_i + \gamma_i d_{shock} + \varepsilon_i$

| u-shock | -0.08 | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.06 | -0.01 |
| t-stat  | -3.19 | -3.26 | -2.65 | -2.73 | -2.82 | -2.79 | -2.60 | -2.99 | -2.77 | -1.22 |        |

$R^2$ | 0.19  | 0.19  | 0.14  | 0.14  | 0.15  | 0.15  | 0.15  | 0.13  | 0.17  | 0.15  | 0.03  |

Panel B: $R_{t+1}^{e_i} = \alpha_i + \gamma_i d_{shock}$

| alpha   | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00  | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.01 |        |
| t-stat  | -1.18 | -0.72 | -1.10 | -1.32 | -1.19 | -0.94 | -0.24 | -1.26 | -0.48 | -1.18 |        |

| mkt     | 1.00  | 0.98  | 1.04  | 0.99  | 1.01  | 1.05  | 0.98  | 0.97  | 1.00  | 1.00  |        |
| t-stat  | 17.10 | 14.64 | 15.07 | 15.64 | 16.58 | 16.01 | 15.48 | 15.14 | 16.21 | 17.10 |        |

| hml     | 0.41  | 0.38  | 0.47  | 0.44  | 0.42  | 0.53  | 0.39  | 0.44  | 0.36  | 0.41  |        |
| t-stat  | 5.70  | 4.54  | 5.52  | 5.59  | 5.55  | 6.63  | 5.04  | 6.37  | 4.77  | 5.70  |        |

| smb     | 0.53  | 0.59  | 0.48  | 0.59  | 0.55  | 0.47  | 0.65  | 0.50  | 0.53  | 0.53  |        |
| t-stat  | 7.38  | 7.14  | 5.63  | 7.64  | 7.35  | 5.81  | 8.42  | 6.42  | 7.09  | 7.38  |        |

| p1-10   | 0.79  | 0.78  | 0.61  | 0.43  | 0.50  | 0.19  | 0.24  | 0.11  | 0.02  | -0.21 |        |
| t-stat  | 8.29  | 7.10  | 5.40  | 4.20  | 4.99  | 1.75  | 2.30  | 1.06  | 0.20  | -2.22 |        |

$R^2$ | 0.93  | 0.91  | 0.90  | 0.91  | 0.92  | 0.90  | 0.91  | 0.90  | 0.91  | 0.91  | 0.92  |
Table 2: Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions. Betas are first estimated from the time-series regression \( R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i f_t + \epsilon_{it} \), for each \( i \), using ten portfolios formed on displacement beta and 25 Fama-French portfolios formed on size and book-to-market. Data are annual, 1966-2012. We use raw returns and estimate the risk-free rate in every cross section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>-1.14</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>-2.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cross-sectional regressions of returns on estimated betas and report the associated average coefficients. The standard errors account for measurement error in betas using the Shanken correction.

Table 2 presents the results. We see that higher exposures to the displacement shock are associated with lower average returns. By contrast, exposures to the other two structural shocks from the VECM carry no statistically significant risk premium. This pattern is robust to controlling for exposures to the other three Fama-French factors. Further, since the displacement shock is normalized to unit standard deviation, the estimated risk premia from the Fama-McBeth regression correspond to the Sharpe Ratio associated with a pure bet on that shock. Depending on the specification, our estimates of the Sharpe Ratio range from -0.76 to -1.45. However, these estimates are fairly imprecise — the \( t \) statistics range from 1.93 to 2.60. We conclude that displacement risk is associated with an economically significant risk premium.

### 3.2.2. Displacement risk and the value premium

A natural prediction of models of displacement risk is that growth firms have higher exposure to displacement shocks than value firms (Gärleanu et al., 2012; Kogan and Papanikolaou,
The mechanism is that firms in a position to grow ("growth firms") are more likely to benefit from improvements in productivity of new capital vintages than value firms, and thus act as a hedge against displacement shocks.\footnote{In the context of our model, a new firm \((i,s)\) can be interpreted as a new project, which may be introduced by an existing firm or a new firm. Under such a modified model, growth firms are those with a higher chance of acquiring new projects.} Here, we examine whether this prediction holds using our new measure of displacement risk.

We find that the correlation between our identified displacement shock and the Fama-French HML factor is equal to -20\% at the annual level. To adjust for the fact that the portfolios are rebalanced at different dates — Fama-French portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June, while our displacement shock is identified with annual data covering January-December — we also compute correlations at the two-year horizon. In this case, the correlation rises in magnitude to -45\%. Figure 7 plots the two-year moving averages of the displacement shock against two-year moving averages of \(\log(1 + hml)\). The magnitude of correlations is similar if we consider 3-, 4- or 5-year moving averages.

3.2.3. Displacement risk and the equity premium

Since the market portfolio is a claim on the \textit{existing set} of firms, displacement risk also affects the equity premium. Here, we quantify the contribution of this risk to the equity premium using a hedging exercise. Specifically, we construct a portfolio that replicates the market portfolio as closely as possible, yet it has no exposure to displacement risk.\footnote{If we had a zero net supply contract (say a futures contract) with returns that are perfectly correlated with the identified displacement shock, then this task would be straightforward. We would simply regress the stock market return on the return of this fictitious security, and measure the average return of the residual (the constant in the regression). In our case, we have a long-short portfolio (the p1-10 portfolio above) that is correlated with the displacement shock; however, it is possible that this portfolio also contains exposures to other risk factors.}

We proceed as follows. First, we regress the excess market portfolio return on the identified displacement shock \(u_t\) from the VECM.

\[
R_t^M - (1 + r^f_t) = \alpha + \beta u_t + e_t
\]

The residuals \(e_t\) from this regression correspond to the payoff of a fictitious security that, by construction, has zero displacement risk. We will refer to these residuals as the "hedged payoff". In a second step we project \(e_t\) on a linear combination of returns from traded

\[\ldots\]
zero-investment portfolios $R_{t}^{e,i}$

$$e_t = \alpha_e + \sum_i \beta_i R_{t}^{e,i}. \quad (23)$$

For the set of excess returns we choose the market excess return, HML, SMB, the p1-10 portfolio and the factor-mimicking portfolio from the second-stage Fama MacBeth regression (the time-series of the slope coefficients on the displacement shock beta\textsuperscript{9}). The resulting coefficients from this projection ($\beta_i$) can be interpreted as portfolio weights that “replicate” the hedged payoff. Since $e_t$ has zero mean –by construction–, it follows that $(-1) \times \alpha_e$ is the average return of this replicating portfolio and therefore gives us a measure of the expected return of the hedged portfolio we are interested in. (We note that this approach to “pricing” the hedged payoff is mathematically equivalent to using the ex-post efficient mean-variance portfolio –formed by the test assets– as a proxy for the stochastic discount factor and then imputing the expected excess return of the hedged portfolio as the covariance between $e_t$ and the ex-post mean-variance efficient portfolio.)

We report the results of this hedging exercise in the left panel of Table 3. Specifically, we report the results from projecting $e_t$ on the five test assets. We see that the $R^2$ from this projection is fairly high, which implies that the correlation coefficient between the payoff we wish to replicate ($e_t$) and the portfolios used to replicate the payoff is quite high. In the last row of the left panel we report the average return of this market portfolio that is hedged for displacement risk. We see that the estimated average return of the hedged portfolio is about 4%. For comparison, the realized equity premium in our sample is equal to 5.7%. Our estimates thus imply that approximately one-third of the equity premium is due to the identified displacement shock.

Examining the portfolio weights of this displacement-neutral market portfolio reveals that, consistent with our discussion above, this portfolio overweighs growth firms relative to value firms. Specifically, all of the portfolios place a negative weight weight on the HML factor and a weight less than one on the market (0.89-0.91). Further, when we include excess returns such as the 1-10 portfolio and the factor-mimicking portfolio implied by the Fama-Macbeth procedure, there is an additional tilt towards these portfolios in an effort to hedge even more of the variation in the identified displacement shock. The tilt on the market to a value less than one is also not surprising. A regression of the market excess return on the identified

\textsuperscript{9}Note that the time-series of the slope coefficients on the displacement shock beta is a linear combination of the returns of the test assets included in the Fama MacBeth procedure – hence corresponds to the return of a zero cost portfolio, since all test assets in the Fama Macbeth procedure are excess returns.
Table 3: Equity Premium and Displacement Risk. The first panel \( (R^m - \beta u) \) reports regressions of the residual payoff of the market portfolio after regressing the identified displacement shock on the excess returns of various portfolios. The second panel \([01]\) regresses the zero vector on the same set of excess returns, imposing the restrictions that the beta of the resulting portfolio is zero with respect to the identified displacement shock (and unity with respect to the part of the market return that is orthogonal to the identified displacement shock).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( R^m - \beta u )</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>( [01] )</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mkt</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.29)</td>
<td>(27.88)</td>
<td>(22.70)</td>
<td>(9.74)</td>
<td>(16.09)</td>
<td>(21.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hml</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.19)</td>
<td>(-1.76)</td>
<td>(-2.14)</td>
<td>(-24.27)</td>
<td>(-.91)</td>
<td>(-6.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smb</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-.46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fnimick</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.63)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p1-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Ret</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>-2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.46)</td>
<td>(6.06)</td>
<td>(5.10)</td>
<td>(-.69)</td>
<td>(.80)</td>
<td>(-.80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Displacement shock gives an estimate of \(-.05\), implying that a positive one-standard deviation shock to the displacement shock moves the stock market down by 5%. This number is also very close to the VAR- (or VECM-) identified permanent impact of a displacement shock on dividends-per-share in Section 3.1.3.

In sum, our results show that approximately one-third of the equity risk premium — approximately 2% — can be attributed to displacement risk. Next, we explore the extent to which these calculations are consistent with a reasonable parametrization of our model.

One concern with the method we utilized above is that even though the payoff \( e_t \) is orthogonal to \( u_t \), the return of the replicating portfolio obtained through the regression (23) may not be. To account for that, we also utilize an alternative approach to “pricing” the payoff \( e_t \). Specifically, we construct a portfolio that has maximal correlation with \( e_t \), while
requiring that the resulting portfolio have zero covariance to the identified displacement shock. (In a regression framework, this can be achieved by running a constrained regression of the excess returns of the test assets on the zero vector, while constraining the coefficients so that the resulting portfolio has a beta of zero to the displacement shock and a beta of one to $e_t$). The results are reported on the right-hand panel of table 3. Compared to the left panel, this alternative approach yields even lower values for the average return of the hedged portfolio. (The intuition has to do with how the two approaches treat the part of the displacement shock that is not spanned by traded assets. The approach on the left panel essentially ignores it, i.e., assigns a zero price of risk to the component of displacement risk that is not spanned by traded assets. The latter approach assigns the same price of risk as for the part that is spanned.) As a result, the approach on the left panel is more conservative, and therefore forms our base-case.

4 Calibration

We next perform a calibration exercise to investigate the plausibility of the numbers we obtained in the previous section — namely that displacement risk can account for approximately one-third of the equity premium. To do so, we consider two versions of the model: a) the simple model of Section 2.2, yielding Proposition 1, and b) the more complex one from Section 2.3. The advantage of the simple model is that the equity premium depends exclusively on two parameters, which makes the quantitative exercise more transparent. The second version of the model is more realistic in that it includes labor income, but does so at the cost of introducing more parameters.

We start with the simple model of Section 2.2. We assume that the displacement shock $u_{t+1}$ is i.i.d. and exponentially distributed with scale parameter $\theta$. To isolate the role of displacement risk, we assume that aggregate consumption is deterministic, that is, $\sigma = 0$. The equity premium (of unlevered equity) is then constant and equals

$$\frac{E_t R_{t+1}}{R^f} - 1 = \frac{\gamma \theta^2}{(1 + \theta)(1 - \gamma \theta)},$$

where $R_{t+1}$ is the gross return on equity, and $R^f$ is the gross return on the risk-free asset. Since returns in the data are levered, we use the Modigliani-Miller formula to convert unleveled to levered returns. Specifically, with the historically observed debt-to-equity ratio the formula suggests that levered equity’s expected return is 1.6 times that of un-levered equity.
We consider two alternatives for calibrating $\theta$. The first determines $\theta$ so that a one-standard deviation shock to $u_t$ results in a drop in dividends-per-share that corresponds to estimated response of dividends-per-share to a one-standard deviation displacement shock (see subplot labeled ”$u_t$ Index Dividends” in figure 4). Second, we also use a more direct approach by estimating $\theta$ from data on the share of new company introductions as a fraction of total market capitalization in annual data.

The first method suggests a value of $\theta$ around 0.02 (to match the short run response of the VAR) or 0.04 to match the long-run response. Since in this baseline model all shocks are permanent, arguably the latter number is more relevant, since it captures the permanent impact of $u_t$ on dividends-per-share. The second approach implies a similar value for $\theta$. Estimating $\theta$ via maximum likelihood yields a point estimate of 0.023 with a 95% confidence band of $[0.018, 0.03]$. In results reported in the appendix –Figure Figure 9 – we present quantile-quantile plots to verify that our assumption of an exponential distribution provides a good fit to the data.$^{10}$

Table 4 reports the levered equity premium implied by our model for various levels of the scale of the displacement shock $\theta$ and consumer risk aversion $\gamma$. In an economy without any aggregate risk and for values of risk aversion around 10 and a value of $\theta$ in the range of 0.025-0.03, the simple version of the model delivers an equity premium of about 1.5-2%. Higher values of $\theta$ that would match the volatility of the permanent component of displacement risk (that is, $\theta$ in the range $[0.03, 0.04]$) can lead to values of the equity premium in the range of 2% to 5.7% for conventional levels of risk aversion.

In sum, these results show that a highly stylized model can reproduce realistic levels of the equity premium with a small number of parameters. We next calibrate the more elaborate version of the model, in which households receive labor income that is also subject to displacement. We do so both to make the calibration more realistic, but also in order to highlight the mechanisms of Section 2.3.

To illustrate these mechanisms, we start by introducing persistence to displacement shocks – an assumption that is consistent with the data. Specifically, we assume that $u$ follows a regime-switching process with two states $s_i$, $i = [0, 1]$; conditional on the state, the shock $u$ is exponentially distributed using different scale parameters, $f(u|s_i) \sim \exp(\theta_i)$.

$^{10}$Figure 9 shows q-q plots for the empirical quantiles of new company introductions as a fraction of total market capitalization against the respective quantiles of an exponential distribution. The exponential distribution seems to provide a good fit to the data, since the empirical quantiles align well on the theoretical line. To ensure that the results are not driven by unreasonable assumptions on extreme values, we also perform a simple Monte-Carlo exercise: We compare the Monte-Carlo distribution of the maximum value drawn from the estimated exponential distribution against the respective value in the data. We show that the maximum value in the data is well within the 95% range of values suggested by the Monte Carlo simulations.
Table 4: Levered equity premium as a function of risk aversion ($\gamma$) and displacement parameter $\theta$. To relate un-levered to levered equity, we use the Modigliani Miller formula which implies that the levered equity premium is 1.6 times the un-levered equity premium, using the historical leverage ratio in aggregate data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\gamma = 6$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 8$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 10$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 12$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta = 0.02$</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta = 0.025$</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta = 0.03$</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta = 0.035$</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta = 0.04$</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We denote state 0 (1) the low (high) displacement state, that is, $\theta_0 < \theta_1$. We denote the transition probabilities as $p_0$ (of remaining in state 0 conditional on being in state 0) and $p_1$ (probability of being in state 1 conditional on being in state 1). These assumptions imply that equations (16)-(18) become a system of 6 equations in 6 unknowns. We determine the parameters $\theta_0, \theta_1, p_0$, and $p_1$ so as to (approximately) match the magnitudes and shapes of model-implied impulse-response functions in the data (in particular the short- and long-run response of a one standard deviation shock to $u$ on index dividends and the divisor) to artificially generated impulse-response functions from the model (the results of this exercise are given in Figure 8 in the appendix). As a robustness check we also estimate $\theta_0, \theta_1, p_0$, and $p_1$ from the time-series on the fraction of market capitalization that is due to new firms, and estimate these 4 parameters by fitting a Markov regime switching model and using the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. The two approaches result in essentially identical estimates for $\theta_0, \theta_1, p_0$, and $p_1$, which are given in table 5.

Next, we calibrate the two parameters $\delta_0$ and $\delta_1$ which control the rate of depreciation of human capital in the low- and high-displacement state, respectively. These two parameters, along with the household discount factor $\beta$, affect the mean and the volatility of the interest rate. We thus determine $\delta_0, \delta_1$, and $\beta$ to roughly match the mean and the volatility of the interest rate in the data. In addition, we calibrate the mean of $\delta_i$ to equal 0.035, effectively treating labor income as a risky bond with a stochastic maturity, which on average equals 33 years.

An alternative interpretation of $\delta_0 > \delta_1$ is that the displacement shocks to labor are drawn from a distribution with a lower mean (compared to the one for firm value) in the high-displacement regime. In that sense, the value of human capital is affected less than the value of firm upon transition to a high-displacement regime. Given the large importance
of human capital for the total wealth of the representative investor, such a transition has a muted impact on the expected growth rate of her marginal utility, even though it impacts the volatility and the skewness of her marginal utility. (As already noted, in our model forward-looking valuation ratios affect the moments of the marginal utility of the representative investor). As a result the interest rate remains unaffected by regime transitions, even though the market price of risk is impacted, similar to what would happen in long run risk models with high inter temporal elasticity of substitution.

This ability to control the variation of the interest rate is important both quantitatively, but also conceptually, to illustrate some connections with representative-agent models with recursive preferences. The easiest way to see the issue, is to revisit the simpler model without labor income. If we introduced autocorrelated displacement shocks in such a model, rather than the i.i.d shocks we used, then the presence of CRRA utilities and a risk aversion (inter-temporal elasticity of substitution) larger than one (small than one) would have the counterfactual implication of large positive returns in the stock market as the economy shifts to the high displacement regime. This issue is reminiscent of the reason why long run risks models need to assume an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution larger than one.

The remaining parameters are chosen to match standard moments. We choose $\mu = 2.5\%$ and $\lambda = 2\%$, to approximately match the aggregate growth rate of consumption and the population birth rate, respectively. These choices affect predominantly the equilibrium interest rate, and are not important for the pricing of risk. The parameter $\eta = 0.25$ determines the capital share.\footnote{The correspondence between the “capital share” in the data and the “capital share” in the model is not straightforward. Many factors (share of income that is proprietor’s income, the presence of real estate, the treatment of depreciation etc.) are present in the data, but not in the model. Moreover, the fact that a substantial fraction of workers are not participating in markets (they are essentially hand-to-mouth consumers) implies that the capital share in the data is underestimating the fraction of capital income that is directed to active market participants. Fortunately, even though the magnitude of the capital share is sensitive to these assumptions, our results are not. Magnitudes of the capital share between 0.2 and 0.5 lead to similar results – especially if we simultaneously adjust $\delta_1$ and $\delta_2$ to keep the interest rate low and non-volatile.} Last, regarding the parameter governing the volatility of aggregate productivity $A$, we present two versions of the calibration. First, as before, we set $\sigma = 0$, so that all the risk premia are due to re-distributional risks, not aggregate risks. Second, we also calibrate a version of the model with a more realistic assumption of $\sigma = 3\%$. Table 5 reports the parameter values used in our calibration.

The last remaining parameter is risk aversion. We chose a risk aversion of 10 to determine the maximum possible equity premium that can be derived by displacement risk. As we see in Table 6, when $\gamma = 10$, the model can produce an equity premium of around 2% even in a world without any aggregate uncertainty, and an equity premium around 4% if we set $\sigma = 3\%$. 

The last remaining parameter is risk aversion. We chose a risk aversion of 10 to determine the maximum possible equity premium that can be derived by displacement risk. As we see in Table 6, when $\gamma = 10$, the model can produce an equity premium of around 2% even in a world without any aggregate uncertainty, and an equity premium around 4% if we set $\sigma = 3\%$. 

\footnote{The correspondence between the “capital share” in the data and the “capital share” in the model is not straightforward. Many factors (share of income that is proprietor’s income, the presence of real estate, the treatment of depreciation etc.) are present in the data, but not in the model. Moreover, the fact that a substantial fraction of workers are not participating in markets (they are essentially hand-to-mouth consumers) implies that the capital share in the data is underestimating the fraction of capital income that is directed to active market participants. Fortunately, even though the magnitude of the capital share is sensitive to these assumptions, our results are not. Magnitudes of the capital share between 0.2 and 0.5 lead to similar results – especially if we simultaneously adjust $\delta_1$ and $\delta_2$ to keep the interest rate low and non-volatile.}
Table 5: Parameters used in calibration of extended model. We report the parameters for the extended model described in Section 2.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_0$</td>
<td>0.850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_0$</td>
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<td>$\theta_1$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_0$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_1$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</table>

Table 6: Comparison between the model and the data. The last column gives results when we set $\sigma = 0.03$. Since $\sigma = 0.03$ introduces a motive for precautionary savings, to keep the models comparable we adjust the subjective discount factor to keep the average interest rate roughly unchanged compared to the baseline model. For the results on the equity premium we multiply the un-levered equity premium by 1.6, consistent with historical leverage ratios. The data column is taken from Gârleanu and Panageas (2015). We refer to that paper for details on the data sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Baseline model</th>
<th>Model ($\sigma = 0.03$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Interest rate</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Price-dividend ratio</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22.06</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Equity premium</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Sharpe Ratio</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility of Interest rate</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, we see that our model can generate not only a plausible equity premium but also a stable and low risk-free rate.

Fluctuations in the volatility of displacement shocks also imply time-variation in risk premia. To gauge the magnitude of this predictability, we estimate predictive regressions of log excess market returns on the log price dividend ratio in simulated data. As we see in Table 7, the model generates a substantial amount of time-series predictability, even though the point estimates are smaller than the data. Nevertheless, there is significant variation in point estimates across simulations, and the empirical values typically lie inside the 95% confidence intervals implied by the model.

In sum, we find that the empirical estimates obtained in Section 3.2 are consistent with a plausible calibration of the model. The model can generate a realistic equity premium with a coefficient of relative risk aversion that is around 10. We conclude that the addition of displacement risk in a simple endowment economy with time-separable preferences helps in terms of explaining not only the equity premium, but also the risk free-rate puzzle, while also being consistent with the stylized facts of non-volatile real rates and return.
Table 7: Long-horizon regressions of excess returns on the log P/D ratio. The simulated data are based on 1000 independent simulations of 100-year long samples, where the initial state is drawn from the stationary distribution of high- and low-displacement states. For each of these 100-year long simulated samples, we run predictive regressions of the form \( \log R_{t+h} = \alpha + \beta \log \frac{P_t}{D_t} \), where \( R_{t+h} \) denotes the time-t gross excess return over the next \( h \) years. We report the mean values of the coefficient \( \beta \) and the \( R^2 \) in these simulations along with [0.025, 0.975] percentiles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horizon (Years)</th>
<th>Data (( \beta ))</th>
<th>Model (( \beta ))</th>
<th>Data (( R^2 ))</th>
<th>Model (( R^2 ))</th>
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<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
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<td>[-0.469 0.255]</td>
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<td>[0.000 0.070]</td>
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</tr>
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<td>[0.000 0.128]</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.036</td>
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predictability. Since displacement risk is fairly persistent, extending the model to allow for recursive preferences would only close the gap with the data.

5 Conclusion

We build a simple model that captures the distinction, largely overlooked in the asset-pricing literature, between the cash-flow properties of the market portfolio and aggregate dividends. Not only does the model accommodate the significantly higher growth in aggregate dividends than in dividends-per-share, but it also allows for the wedge between the two — predominantly due to displacement risk — to be priced, due to market incompleteness. Motivated by the model, we propose a new measure of displacement risk. We show that this measure carries a significant risk premium: firms with high exposures to displacement risk earn higher returns than firms with low exposures. Based on the estimated risk premium we conclude that displacement risk can account for approximately one-third of the equity premium.
References


Appendix: Additional Results

A.1 Extensions

Here, we extend the baseline model to address three issues: a) the source of rents accruing to the firm owners in the baseline model, b) the introduction of capital, and c) endogenous entry into the innovation sector. Our goal is to show that all of these realistic extensions do not impact the key qualitative features of our results.

A.1.1 Monopolistic rents

First, we illustrate how monopolistic competition can lead to rents accruing to the firm owners in the baseline model—that is, the decreasing returns to labor \( l_{it} \) in equation (1). This section is based on arguments from Romer (1986, 1990) and Gârleanu et al. (2012). Hence, it is intentionally brief and the reader is referred to the aforementioned papers for details.

Here, we assume that the production of the final consumption good requires intermediate goods, which are supplied by monopolistic competitors. Specifically, the final good is produced by competitive firms according to the following production technology

\[
Y_t = \sum_{i \in I_t} x_{i,t}^\delta \omega_{i,t}^{1-\delta},
\]

where \( I_t \) is the set of all firms in existence at time \( t \), \( x_{i,t} \) is the intermediate good produced by firm \( i \), and \( \omega_{i,t} \) is a measure capturing the relative importance of each firm in the index. Firms produce intermediate goods using a constant-returns-to-scale technology, \( x_{i,t} = l_{i,t} \).

These assumptions imply a profit function for intermediate good firms exactly as in (1), with \( a_t^{(i)} = \omega_{i,t} \). To see this, note that maximizing the profits of the final-goods-producing firm leads to the familiar demand function for the intermediate good

\[
x_{i,t} = \left( \frac{p_{i,t}}{\delta \omega_{i,t}} \right)^{1/(1-\delta)},
\]

where \( p_{i,t} \) is the price of intermediate good \( i \). Using the fact that final good firms make zero profits in equilibrium and that the labor market clears, we obtain that the share of profits accruing to firm \( i \) equals

\[
\frac{p_{i,t}(x_{i,t})x_{i,t}}{\sum_{i \in I_t} p_{i,t}(x_{i,t})x_{i,t}} = \omega_{i,t}.
\]

In sum, this section shows the familiar equivalence of a) assuming that firms produce subject to a decreasing-returns-to-scale technology—as in the baseline model and b) assuming that firms produce according to a constant returns to scale production, but have market power.
A.1.2. Capital

We reconsider here the baseline model, where we add a factor of production, namely capital, which can be accumulated. Our goal is twofold. First, we show that allowing for capital accumulation leads to qualitatively similar results as the baseline model. Second, we show a close relation between our displacement shock and investment-specific shocks that are commonly considered in the literature.

The production function is given by

\[ x_{t,s} = \left( a_{t,s} \right)^{\eta} \left( k_{t,s}^{(i)} \right)^{1-\eta}, \]  

(A.3)

where \( k_{t,s}^{(i)} \) is the amount of capital used by firm \( i \). Assuming that production also requires labor is a straightforward extension.

Capital can be accumulated. Each household can forego one unit of consumption to create one unit of capital. Importantly, capital is specific to each vintage: capital that was created for the cohort of firms born at time \( s \) cannot be used for firms in cohort \( s \neq s' \). As a result, all capital created at time \( t \) is invested in new firms. As before, \( a_{t,s} \) evolves according to (4)-(5). Thus, the shock \( u_t \) can be interpreted as a productivity shock that is specific to capital of vintage \( t \). To obtain a simple closed-form solution, we assume that \( u_t = \bar{u} \) is constant, that is, the extent of displacement each period is deterministic. Last, purely for convenience and ease of exposition, we assume that investors have logarithmic preferences, \( U(c) = \log(c) \).

The following proposition characterizes the steady state of this economy.

**Proposition 3** The consumption growth of the newly rich is given by

\[
\frac{c_{t+1}^{NR}}{c_t^{NR}} = 1 - \frac{(1 - \beta) \eta (a_{t,t})^{\eta} (\bar{k})^{1-\eta} \left( 1 - e^{-\eta \bar{u}} \right)^{-1}}{A (\bar{k})^{1-\eta} - \bar{k}},
\]  

(A.4)

where \( A \equiv \sum_{s \leq t} (a_{t,s})^{\eta} \) and \( \bar{k} \) is a constant given in the appendix that is equal to the amount of consumption goods investors forego each period to produce new capital goods.

Proposition 3 illustrates that the fact that the consumption growth of the newly rich in (A.4) is increasing in \( \bar{u} \). As in the baseline model, an increase in \( \bar{u} \) implies that a lucky few are endowed with firms that are more productive than existing firms. The fact that the production function in (A.3) features decreasing returns to capital, while investment and consumption are perfect substitutes implies that the benefits of higher \( u \) accrue to firm owners rather than all households.

Further, the price of installed capital falls with \( u \), illustrating the close link with investment-specific technology shocks. Specifically, the price of installed capital of vintage \( s \) at time \( t \) \((q_{t,s})\) satisfies the following recursion,

\[ q_{t+1,s} = q_{t,s} e^{-\eta \bar{u}}. \]  

(A.5)
That is, the shock $\pi$ leads to the economic depreciation of existing capital, illustrating the close relation between the displacement shock and investment-specific shocks.

A.1.3. **Endogenous entry**

Next, we allow for endogenous entry of firms. Specifically, we now assume that the creation of a new firm requires human capital. That is, a representative “venture capitalist” hires inventors to produce ideas that will lead to new firms. The output share of new firms created at time $t$ is given by

$$a_{t,t} = l_t \left(1 - e^{-u_t}\right)$$  \hfill (A.6)

where $l_t$ is the amount of inventors hired by the venture capitalist. Since (A.6) is linear in $l$, the venture capitalist makes zero profits. Importantly, innovators are assigned to one project, and only a set of measure zero of these projects are economically viable, as in the baseline model. However, the ones that prove to be viable result in the same (large) profits as in the text.

A key assumption is that once the idea for a new firm proves to be viable, the innovator who came up with the idea needs to be given a fraction $\xi$ of the market value of the associated firm, so that he has incentives to develop the project to completion. The innovator can appropriate a fraction $\xi$ either because he is essential to the success of the project, or because he can steal the idea and start her own firm. Here, we should emphasize that the term innovator includes not just the entrepreneur who had the idea for the new firm, but also partners in the VC firm who had the talent to discover the entrepreneur as well as early stage employees. In sum, the fraction $\xi$ captures the share of the project value that does not accrue to outside investors that buy shares in an IPO.

The following proposition characterizes the stochastic discount factor

**Proposition 4** The stochastic discount factor is given by

$$\left(\frac{\xi_{t+1}}{\xi_t}\right) = \beta \left(\frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t}\right)^{-\gamma} \times \left\{1 - \frac{\xi}{\lambda} M_{t+1,t+1}\right\}^{-\gamma},$$ \hfill (A.7)

where $M_{t,t} = \phi a_{t,t}$ is the aggregate market value of projects created at time $t$, $\phi$ is a constant, and $\lambda$ is the consumption-to-wealth ratio, which is constant.

Proposition 4 shows that even if there is endogenous entry, the stochastic discount factor has the same form as in the baseline model. Intuitively, as long as a fraction of innovation is inalienable from the innovators, and the proceeds from innovation are not equally shared in the population, then innovation will make some parts of the population disproportionately rich and the key insights of the paper continue to hold.

**A.2 Proofs**

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Equation (12), giving the SDF dynamics, is proved in the text. Equation (11) follows from simple accounting. Specifically, let $\bar{W}_t^i$ denote the total financial
wealth owned by agents $j \leq i$ at time $t$. Since all agents invest in the same portfolio — the market portfolio — and choose the same consumption-to-wealth ratio, we have

$$W_{t+1}^j = W_t^j \frac{Y_{t+1}^j}{Y_t} e^{-u_{t+1}} + Z_{t+1}^j \left(1 - e^{-u_{t+1}}\right) W_{t+1}^1,$$

which gives

$$\frac{W_{t+1}^j}{W_{t+1}^1} = \frac{W_t^j}{W_t^1} \left(\frac{W_t^1}{W_{t+1}^1} Y_{t+1}^j \frac{Y_{t+1}^1}{Y_t}\right) e^{-u_{t+1}} + Z_{t+1}^j \left(1 - e^{-u_{t+1}}\right).$$

This is the desired relation for wealth, given that the term in the large parentheses equals one, and it readily translates to consumption.}

Proof of Proposition 2. Let $O_{t+1}$ be the set of all indices of agents alive at both $t$ and $t + 1$ and who do not receive strictly positive-valued firm endowments at $t + 1$. For all these agents, the marginal-utility growth is aligned with pricing kernel, as in (13), resulting in

$$\frac{\xi_{t+1}}{\xi_t} = \beta \left(\frac{\int_{i \in O_{t+1}} dC_{t+1}^{(i)}}{\int_{i \in O_{t+1}} dC_t^{(i)}}\right)^{-\gamma}. \quad (A.8)$$

We further note that

$$\int_{i \in O_{t+1}} dC_t^{(i)} = (1 - \lambda)Y_t \quad (A.9)$$

$$\int_{i \in O_{t+1}} dC_{t+1}^{(i)} = Y_{t+1} - C_{t+1,t+1} - C_{NR}^{t+1} \quad (A.10)$$

which leads to equation (??) in the text.

As we have already argued, agents consumption and portfolio decisions are made as if they know they will never be new rich. Consider therefore an agent born at $t$, who will never become new rich, and who is therefore facing complete markets. The value of this agent’s future consumption is

$$E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (1 - \lambda)^{s-t} \frac{\xi_s}{\xi_t} c_{s,t} \quad (A.11)$$

while his wealth, given by the value of his labor earnings, is

$$E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} (1 - \lambda)^{s-t} \frac{\xi_s}{\xi_t} \lambda^{-1}(1 - \eta)Y_s \frac{q_{s,t}}{(1 - \lambda)^{s-t}} \quad (A.12)$$

where the term $(1 - \lambda)^{t-s} q_{s,t}$ captures the per-capita fraction of aggregate wages accruing at time $t$ to agents born at time $s$. 42
Equating these two quantities, we obtain

$$\frac{C_{t,t}}{Y_t} = \lambda \frac{c_{t,t}}{Y_t} = (1 - \eta) \frac{\phi_l}{\chi_t} q_{t,t}. \quad (A.13)$$

Similarly, treating the new-rich as one representative agent for simplicity, their wealth equals

$$E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \frac{\xi_s}{\xi_t} \eta Y_s \left(1 - e^{-ut}\right) e^{-\sum_{v=t+1}^{s} u_v}, \quad (A.14)$$

which leads to

$$\frac{C_{t}^{NR}}{Y_t} = \eta \frac{\phi_c}{\chi_t} (1 - e^{-ut}). \quad (A.15)$$

Equations (??), (A.13), and (A.15) give (19). ■

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We derive a steady state of such an economy. In the steady state investors forego \(k\) units of consumption each period to produce new capital goods and hence aggregate output is given by

$$Y_t = Y(k) = A(k)^{1-\eta},$$

where

$$\overline{A} \equiv \sum_{s \leq t} (a_{t,s})^\eta.$$

To determine \(k\) we use two optimality conditions. The first is the familiar Euler equation,

$$\frac{1}{1 + r} = \beta E \frac{U'(c_{t+1,s}^{(i)})}{U'(c_{t,s}^{(i)})} = \beta \frac{c_{t+1,s}^{NR}}{c_{t,s}^{NR}}, \quad (A.16)$$

where we have used the assumption of logarithmic preferences and the notation \(c_{t,s}^{NR}\) to denote the consumption growth of “non-recipients”.

The second optimality condition is that Tobin’s q for newly created capital equal one. To formalize this optimality condition, we define the price of capital \(q_{t,s}\) as

$$q_{t,s} = r_{t,s}^{K} + \frac{1}{1 + r} q_{t+1,s}, \quad (A.17)$$

where \(r_{t,s}^{K}\) is the time\(-t\) rental rate of capital that was produced at time \(s\). In turn, the rental
rate of capital is given by its marginal product
\[ r^K_{t,s} = (1 - \eta) (a_{t,s})^\eta \left( \overline{k} \right)^{-\eta}. \]  

Combining (A.17) with (A.18) and \( \frac{(a_{t+1,s})^\eta}{a_{t,s}} = e^{-\eta \pi} \), implies a solution whereby \( \frac{q_{t+1,s}}{q_{t,s}} = e^{-\eta \pi} \). In that sense \( \pi \) is equivalent to economic depreciation of existing capital (reminiscent of the literature on investment-specific shocks). Evaluating (A.17) with \( q_{t,t} = 1 \) and recognizing that \( q_{t+1,t} = e^{-\eta \pi} \) leads to
\[ 1 = \overline{A} (1 - \eta) \left( \overline{k} \right)^{-\eta} + e^{-\eta \pi} \frac{1}{1 + r}. \]

Finally, market clearing implies that
\[ \frac{c^N_{t+1,t}}{c^N_t} = 1 - \frac{(1 - \beta) \eta (a_{t,t})^\eta Y \left( 1 - e^{-\eta \pi} \right)^{-1}}{Y - \kappa}, \]  

where we have used the fact that \( 1 - \beta \) is the wealth-to-consumption ratio for a logarithmic investor, along with the fact that the present value of the aggregate monopolistic rents to new firms as a fraction of aggregate consumption is \( \eta (a_{t,t})^\eta Y (1-e^{-\eta \pi})^{-1} \). We note here one difference with the representative investor setup. Since the rents from new firm creation accrue to a set of measure zero in the population the gross consumption growth rate in (A.19) is not one, but less than one, similar to the baseline model.

Combining (A.19) with (A.16) leads to the following non-linear equation for the determination of \( \kappa \)
\[ \frac{e^{-\eta \pi \beta}}{1 - \overline{A} (1 - \eta) \left( \overline{k} \right)^{-\eta}} = 1 - (1 - \beta) \frac{(a_{t,t})^\eta}{A} \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \frac{1}{\overline{A} \left( \overline{k} \right)^{-\eta} - 1} \]

Letting \( x = \overline{A} \left( \overline{k} \right)^{-\eta}, \chi = (1 - \beta) \frac{(a_{t,t})^\eta}{A} \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta}, \) implies that the above equation is a quadratic equation for \( x \) with solution
\[ x = \frac{[(1 + \chi) (1 - \eta) + 1 - e^{-\eta \pi \beta}] \pm \sqrt{[(1 + \chi) (1 - \eta) + 1 - e^{-\eta \pi \beta}]^2 - 4 (1 - \eta) (1 - e^{-\eta \pi \beta} + \chi)}}{2 (1 - \eta)} \]

Assuming parameters such that at least one of the roots \( x > 1 \), the resulting root gives an equilibrium, whereby \( \kappa = \left( \frac{x}{A} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\eta}} \).

**Proof of Proposition 4.** Our assumptions imply that the condition for entry into the
innovation market is given by

$$(1 - \xi) M_{t,t} = w_t l_t,$$

where $M_{t,t}$ is the aggregate market value of projects created at time $t$. Combining the aggregate demand of labor by intermediate firms $l_t^{(I)}$, which can be shown to equal $(\frac{w_t}{\delta})^{\frac{1}{\delta-1}}$ with the market clearing condition $l_t + l_t^{(I)} = 1$, and conjecturing that $M_{t,t}$ has the form $M_{t,t} = f(u_t) l_t$, allows one to obtain $w_t = (1 - \xi) f(u_t)$ and $l_t^{(I)} = \left(\frac{(1-\xi)f(u_t)}{\delta^2}\right)^{\frac{1}{\delta-1}}$. Under this conjecture, and repeating the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2, the stochastic discount factor is given by

$$\left(\frac{\xi_{t+1}}{\xi_t}\right) = \beta \left(\frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t}\right)^{-\gamma} \times \left(1 - \frac{\xi}{\chi}, M_{t+1,t+1}\right)^{-\gamma},$$

(A.20)

where $\chi$ is the consumption-to-wealth ratio, which is conjectured to be constant. Given the conjectures that $\chi$ is constant and that $M_{t,t} = f(u_t)l_t$, the stochastic discount factor is i.i.d., which confirms that the consumption-to-wealth ratio is constant, and also that $M_{t,t}$ is equal to $\phi a_{t,t}$ for a constant $\phi$, which in turn implies that $\frac{M_{t,t}}{l_t} = \phi (1 - e^{-u_t})$, consistent with our conjecture. ■
A.3 Additional Tables and Figures

Figure 9: The top left (right) plot is a q-q plot of quantiles of the fraction of new company market value as a fraction of aggregate market valuation for the S&P 500 (left) and the entire CRSP universe (right) dropping the years when AMEX and NASDAQ enter the sample. The bottom figures report results of a Monte Carlo exercise. We draw 56 values (the length of our data) from an exponential distribution, with scale parameter estimated via maximum likelihood (S&P data on the left, CRSP on the right). We record the maximal value, repeat the exercise 10,000 times, and then compare the distribution of the maximal values to the respective maximal value in the data (vertical line labeled “data”). The line “data” is well above the 10-th percentile of the Monte Carlo simulations.
Figure 5: Results of the Vector Error Correction model: Impulse responses of the temporary shock, the permanent “neutral” shock and the displacement shock on real, log-dividends-per-share (labeled index dividends), the log-divisor and log-real, aggregate dividends. Panel A presents results using the S&P 500 as the index definition; Panel B presents results using the CRSP value-weighted index. Data period is 1962-2012.

A. S&P 500

B. CRSP
Figure 6: Plot of average excess returns versus (minus) ex-post displacement betas. The plot exhibits ten portfolios sorted on their rolling, past five-year beta to the VECM-identified displacement shock.

Figure 6: Average returns versus displacement betas

Figure 7: Displacement Shock vs HML. Figure plots the two-year moving average of identified displacement shock and two-year moving average of \((-1) \times \log(1 + hml)\).
Figure 8: Impulse Responses: Data vs Model. We simulate 10,000 repetitions of the process for dividends and the divisor in equations (7) and (9), where the shock $u$ is exponential with two different scale parameters $\theta_1$, $\theta_2$ that change in a regime-switching fashion. Using the parameters of table 5 and setting the volatility of the neutral component $\sigma$ to 0.07 (so as to produce realistic implications for the impulse response functions of the neutral shock on the two endogenous quantities) we draw 10,000 artificial paths of length equal to the data. The dashed lines report the 95% bands and the mean of the impulse responses in these simulations. The solid line corresponds to the data (see Figure 4).