Migration, roads and labor market integration: Evidence from a planned capital city

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Abstract

Wages in developing countries differ greatly across sector and across space. In Brazil, the average wage in a municipality at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution is 3.2 times larger than the average wage in a municipality at the 10th percentile of the wage distribution. Adjusting for individual characteristics, industry, and the cost of living, the 90/10 municipality wage gap is 2.1. These large differences in returns to labor present a spatial arbitrage puzzle: why do people not migrate to equalize wages across space? We propose one explanation: it is costly to move. We use the construction of a planned capital city, Brasilia, to generate plausibly exogenous variation in the national road network, and examine the role of roads in facilitating labor market integration. Using a database of gross inter-municipality flows, we construct and estimate a spatial equilibrium model where migration is costly. The results yield that access to roads is a key determinant of migration. Reducing the marginal cost of traveling by 50% would increase migration rates to 12%, from a base of 8.7%. The effect is reduced by 10% once the general equilibrium effects of migration are computed.

Keywords: Internal migration, Brazil, Infrastructure, Roads

JEL Classification: J61, O18, O54

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1 Introduction

Wages in developing countries differ greatly across sector and across space. In Brazil, the average wage in a municipality at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution is 3.2 times larger than the average wage in a municipality in the 10th percentile of the wage distribution. Adjusting for individual characteristics, industry, and the cost of living, the 90/10 municipality wage gap is 2.1. These large differences in the return to labor present a spatial arbitrage puzzle: why do people not migrate to equalize wages across space and increase their welfare?

We propose one explanation: it is costly to move. To study the effect and magnitude of migration costs on labor mobility, we construct and estimate a spatial equilibrium model. Our model extends the standard spatial equilibrium model (Roback (1982); Moretti (2011)) to include bilateral costs of migration. In the model agents optimally choose their location each period, but pay a cost if they migrate. Migration costs therefore introduce a wedge between the utility of being in different locations. We use the construction of a planned capital city, Brasilia, to generate plausibly exogenous variation in the cost of migrating through the location of the national road network. We construct a novel dataset of bilateral inter-municipality migration flows, covering 96% of the universe of internal migrants in Brazil over the period 1980-2000. Using the migration flow database and detailed data on the road network, we estimate the spatial equilibrium model. Roads have a large effect on migration rates. Reducing the marginal cost of traveling on a road between two locales, holding bilateral Euclidean distance constant, would increase migration rates to 12%, off a base of 8.7%. Accounting for general equilibrium effects of migration on the real wage reduces the migration rate slightly, by 10%. These results suggest that road access is a key determinant of migration.

The key contribution of our paper is to quantify the effect of migration costs on migration decisions. We think of migration costs broadly, including fiscal as well as psychic components, such as being away from friends and family (Sjaastad (1962)). We focus the counterfactual analysis on policy-relevant marginal costs of migration, such as the reduction in migration cost due to road access. In addition to marginal costs of migration, we
allow for a fixed component of the cost to measure a general dislike of migration.\textsuperscript{1} In our model, migration is efficient: individuals make rational decisions, internalizing the cost of migrating. The policy-relevant question is therefore whether the migration costs are at an efficient level. If people simply dislike migrating, then, assuming no labor specific location-match effects, low levels of migration may in fact be efficient. However, if part of the cost of migration is due to lack of access to infrastructure such as highways, then migration rates may be lower than if infrastructure was improved. These marginal, policy-relevant, costs are the focus of our analysis.

Of course, it is reasonable to ask whether a one-time migration cost (which may be small relative to the present value of a higher income stream) will have a substantial effect on the decision to migrate. Whether migration costs affect the decision to migration is an empirical question, and is the focus of the paper. We argue that such costs can be significant. For example, if migrants like to return home to visit friends and family once they have migrated, the migration cost will include the flow costs of return visits (both a fiscal component and a time component) as well as the utility cost of not seeing friends and family as often as if they lived closer. It is also easy to see how such costs could depend on the ease of traveling to a specific location. In this paper, we identify and structurally estimate the magnitude of migration costs using observed migration bilateral migration flows.

To separate the effects of migration costs from other determinants of migration, such as income and amenities, we construct a spatial equilibrium model. In the model, agents gain indirect utility from wages and amenities, which vary by location. Migration is costly and depends on the origin and destination. Agents choose the location which maximizes their utility, and will migrate from the current location if the value of moving to another location and paying the cost to do so is higher than the utility from remaining where they are. In our baseline model we assume that labor is homogenous, factor markets are perfectly competitive and capital can move freely. As a result, nominal wage differences

\textsuperscript{1}The cost of migration can be substantial. For example, \textit{Kennan and Walker (2011)} estimate that the fixed cost of migration in the United States for young men is equivalent to 40\% of average wage. \textit{Morten (2013)} estimates that the fixed cost of migration is equivalent to 30\% of mean consumption for rural Indian migrants.
across locations reflect productivity differences. Equilibrium is achieved through the adjustment of the housing market. A location that receives a positive productivity shock will have higher nominal wages. These nominal wages will attract migrants. An inflow of migrants will increase the rental rate of housing, hence reducing the real wage and reducing the returns to migration. Migration costs introduce a wedge between the utility of each location, and can generate differences in real wages across space.

Using micro data from the Brazilian census, we construct a very rich bilateral database on internal migration at the municipality level between 1980 and 2000. We are able to locate the previous municipality for 96% of internal migrants. In addition, we have individual-level data on wages, employment and occupation. We combine this with GIS data on the entire Brazilian road network between 1970 and 2000. We use the construction of Brasilia as an instrument for the location of roads, using the fact that highways were constructed to link the new capital city to state capitals. We first illustrate two facts that link together roads, migration and labor market integration:

1. **Gravity equation for migration:** We show that the proportion of the population who migrate from municipality $a$ to municipality $b$ is a decreasing function of the bilateral distance between the two locations and the travel time, controlling for fixed effects in both the origin and destination. This is consistent with migration costs determining migration destination.

2. **Roads reduce pass-through of productivity shocks:** We show that roads reduce the pass-through of exogenous productivity shocks. A positive productivity shock increases wages, but being closer to a road reduces the impact of the shock on wages. This is consistent with roads affecting labor supply elasticity, for example through making migration less costly, and hence increasing labor market integration between municipalities.

These results suggest a relationship between roads, wages, and migration. However, the decision to migrate is determined by migration costs, income and amenities, and these are in turn determined by migration. Therefore, to understand the relationship between migration costs and migration it is necessary to estimate the entire model, accounting for
the spatial equilibrium adjustment process. We do this using a two-step estimation, following Diamond (2013). First, taking the observed migration choices for each individual, we estimate the indirect utility of each location and the migration cost function. Identification of the migration cost parameters arises from variation in the migration choice for agents in the same location, and variation in the migration choice for agents across location. Once we have extracted the values of the indirect utility for each location, we then identify the labor supply elasticity and housing elasticity by using moment conditions derived from exogenous location-specific labor demand shocks (Bartik (1991)) and initial moment conditions.

The empirical results are as follows. Migration costs are substantial. To aid interpretation of the estimated coefficient, we simulate the implied migration rates if migration costs were to fall. At baseline, the migration rate is 8.7%. We simulate the change in migration rates from reducing the marginal component of the migration cost, for example, the effect of connecting more places by roads. Further, we can compute these effects in both partial equilibrium and accounting for the general equilibrium effects of increase labor flows. Reducing the bilateral highway distance on a road by 50%, holding constant bilateral Euclidean distance, would increase internal migration rates to 12%, an increase of close to 40% off baseline. Accounting for the general equilibrium effects of increased labor, through its affect on housing markets and subsequent reduction in levels of utility, reduces the magnitude by 10%. These results suggest a substantial effect on labor allocation due to costs of migrating across space.

Our paper contributes to several literatures. Our primary contribution is to provide evidence that access to roads are a significant determinant of migration choice and migration destination. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that cleanly identifies the role of infrastructure in the migration decision in a fully specified model of location choice. Our estimates of the magnitude of the costs of migrating complements other studies that have estimated fixed migration costs (Kennan and Walker (2011); Morten (2013)). Here, we

\textsuperscript{2}Mangum (2012) estimates a model where migration costs depend on the bilateral Euclidean distance between two locations, but does not link the costs of migration to policy specific variables. Chein and Assuncao (2009) study the construction of a road in the North of Brazil as an instrument for migration to study the effect of migration on wages, but do not estimate the effect of roads on migration costs directly.
estimate the costs accounting for both fixed components, as well as identifying marginal components that are directly policy relevant.

Second, we contribute to a large spatial economics literature. This literature is predominantly focused in the US, studying local labor markets and labor response to demand shocks (Diamond (2013); Notowidigdo (2013)), and wage gaps across space (Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012)). Here, we extend these models to allow for location specific costs, as well as apply this framework to consider spatial equilibrium for developing countries.

Third, our paper studies the effect of roads on the functioning of markets. We provide empirical evidence that migration is also affected directly by the presence of roads. Our results use an instrumental variable strategy similar in flavor to that employed by other studies examining the relationship of the transport network and economic development (Michaels, 2008; Banerjee et al., 2009; Faber, 2012; Ghani et al., 2012; Hornung, 2012; Redding and Sturm, 2008). However, a key difference is that we explicitly examine the role of labor mobility and the interaction of the labor market as a result of the change in road networks. This is important because any effects of trade on productivity need to take into account labor market reallocation. This is in fact the subject of our companion paper, Morten and Oliveira (2014), which documents the long-run effects on migration and GDP of introducing roads.

Finally, our paper provides evidence for a possible cause of lower welfare, and potentially productivity, in developing countries. Costly migration can generate inefficiencies in the allocation of labor across space, leading to reductions in welfare and productivity. Given low levels of infrastructure in developing countries, it is plausible that these inefficiencies are larger in magnitude in the developing world than the developed world. For example, a worker may prefer to relocate to an area with a higher real wage, but the cost of moving may be too high to make this decision optimal, reducing welfare. If labor

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3In concurrent but independent work that we became aware of after we had finished this project, Bird and Straub (2014) also use the construction of Brasilia as an instrument for roads. Their study looks at the effects of road on GDP and spatial inequality using aggregate municipal data. They do not study the effect of migration on an individual’s decision to migrate.

4Hornung (2012) uses the expansion of the railway network in Prussia to document an increase in the population of cities with a railway station, as a proxy for economic development. Our results differ from these because we can directly study the effect on GDP and wages, as well as the change in population structure.
is not allocated to the place where it is most efficient then aggregate productivity may
decrease, along similar lines to studies examining the misallocation of capital (Hsieh and
Klenow (2009)). The interaction between migration costs and migrant selection is taken
up in further detail in Bryan and Morten (2014).

The plan of the paper is as follows. We start by giving some background informa-
tion on the construction of Brasilia and how we use this natural experiment to provide
exogenous variation in the road network in Section 2. Section 3 and Section 4 introduces
the regional outcome and road database we construct for Brazil and the reduced form
relationships between roads, migration and labor market integration. We then present
the structural model and outline our estimation strategy in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7
presents our empirical results, and we conclude by discussing the main findings in Sec-
tion 8.

2 Construction of Brasilia

The focus of the paper is on quantifying the effect of migration costs on the decision to mi-
grate. To do so, we need to be able to cleanly identify the components of such a migration
cost. A key concern is that migration costs are endogenous: for example, migration costs
are low between two cities because a road connects the two; however the road was built
precisely because there is high demand for migration. To get around this issue we use
plausibly exogenous variation in the location of highways in Brazil generated by the con-
struction of a planned capital city, Brasilia. This section gives the historical background of
the construction of Brasilia. We discuss how the transfer of the capital triggered the develop-
ment of a new highway system to connect Brasilia to the other state capitals. Then we
present our approach to deal with potential exogenous placement of road network, which
is based on an algorithm that finds the shortest network that connects the new capital to
the other state capitals.
2.1 Selection of the new capital city

Brasilia was constructed in 1960 as a response to a long-standing issue of where to have the capital city. We first briefly review the historical arguments for the construction of a new planned city. We argue that it is the timing, not the location, of Brasilia that was a shock. The location of the new capital was known from the first Constitution, although the area set aside was a relatively large piece of land. However, the timing of when, or even if, the capital would be built was unclear. The start of construction was motivated by political reasons, and once started, the completion of the city was very fast. We test this assumption using a rich database of pre-Brasilia control variables and find no evidence of effects of the future roads prior to the start of the construction of Brasilia.

Brazil had had two capital cities prior to Brasilia. Between 1534 and 1763 (a period covering the sugarcane cycle), the capital of colonial Brazil was located in Salvador. In 1763, the capital was transferred to Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro was conveniently located close to the newly discovered mining areas and its location by the sea allowed the gold to be readily shipped to Portugal.

However, in many ways, Rio de Janeiro was not an ideal capital city. First, Rio de Janeiro was a port city, and was exposed to marine raids. Second, there was a desire to build a national capital immune to foreign influence. Many believed that Rio de Janeiro was too exposed to the ideas coming from the “outside world”. Relocating the administrative center from Rio de Janeiro to the interior would allegedly enable rulers to pay more attention to Brazil and be more conscious of its role in the Americas. Third, there was also a feeling that the federal government in Rio de Janeiro had been excessively concerned with the many problems of this one place and was unable to take care of the rest of the country. The belief was that the decision making of administrators and lawmakers would be more on the national interest if they worked in a smaller capital city (James and Faissol (1956)). Fourth, there was a desire to populate and develop the interior regions of Brazil, in contrast to the concentration of industry on the coasts. A centrally-located cap-

5Brazil is not alone in solving the capital-city location problem by constructing an entirely new city. Other countries that have employed this strategy include Australia (Canberra), Belize (Belmopan), Burma (Naypyidaw), India (New Delhi), Kazakhstan (Astana), Nigeria (Abuja), Pakistan (Islamabad) and the United States (Washington, D.C.).
ital city would facilitate this process and help the country fulfill its “continental destiny” (Epstein (1973)).

Brazil was declared a republic in 1889. The first Constitution in 1891 determined the selection of the site for the new city. In 1922, the National Congress approved the creation of the new capital within a site that was then called *Quadrilátero Cruls*, a 160 x 90 kilometer rectangle located in the Central Upland (*Planalto Central*) close to the border of the state of Goiania with the state of Minas Gerais.\(^6\) This area would eventually become Brasilia.

The transfer of the national capital to the interior was delayed during the Getulio Vargas’ administration (1930-1946), but it resumed in 1947, when Eurico Dutra became president. At that moment, new debates over the site and construction of the new capital arose. Finally in 1955, based on previous reports, the recently created Commission for the New Federal Capital delineated the area in which Brasilia would be placed. The president elected in 1956, Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), carried out the construction of Brasilia and created the Company for Urbanization of the New Capital (NOVACAP). The work on the site began in that same year under the supervision of Israel Pinheiro. After three years and ten months, Brasilia was officially inaugurated in April 21st, 1960.

### 2.2 The roads connecting the new capital to the rest of the country

The construction of Brasilia in the interior of Brazil lead to population and development of the interior regions, known as the “westward march” (*marcha para o oeste*). The development of a new highway system connecting the new capital to the other parts of the country was crucial in this process.

Before 1951, the few existing roads already in place were limited the the coastal areas of the Southeast and Northeast. As a result of transferring the capital to a previously unexplored site, roads had to be built in order to transport workers and construction materials. Between 1951 and 1957, the Brasilia-Belo Horizonte line was laid, connecting the soon-to-be new capital to the capital of the state of Minas Gerais. In the same period, parts of the Brasilia-Anapolis highway had been implanted, a road that would link the

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\(^6\)For comparison, this is a land area approximately equal to the size of the state of Connecticut, and ten times the size of New York City.
new capital to the city of Sao Paulo. There were also plans to built the 2,276 kilometers-
long Belem-Brasilia, or Transbrasiliana, which for the first time would provide an overland
route from the underpopulated Northern states to the demographic and industrial centers
of the country located in the South.

The directions for building the new roads were set by the many transportation projects
designed over the years, the so called Planos Nacionais de Viacao (PNVs). During the
Getulio Vargas’ government, the transportation projects started to contemplate the high-
way system (PNVs 1934 and 1944). But it was during Juscelino’s administration, which
introduced the automobile industry and transferred the national capital to the interior,
that the country experienced a boost in the development of highways (PNV 1956).

In particular, these plans determined that the roads were to be built in order to con-
nect the new capital city to the capitals of the other Brazilian states and the North to the
South. This new highway network, known as radial highways, is illustrated in Figure 2. The roads run radially from Brasilia towards the country’s extremes in eight direc-
tions, North, Northeast, East, Southeast, South, Southwest, West, and Northwest. We
exploit the development of the radial highway network to generate exogenous variation
in access to road infrastructure. Municipalities in the path between Brasilia and the state
capitals were more likely to be served by roads after the transfer of the capital city.

Once concern with using the realized roads directly is that the economically important
cities may have been more likely to be connected to the actual radial network. To address
this issue, we predict actual access to roads by constructing the minimum spanning tree
(MST) network that connects Brasilia to the other 26 state capitals, following Faber (2012).
We assume that the planners’ goal was to have a highway network running in eight di-
rections: North, Northeast, East, Southeast, South, Southwest, West, and Northwest. The
resulting network corresponds to the network that planners would choose if their goal
was to connect all the capitals through the shortest distance path.

We use ArcGIS to compute the MST network. First, we use the latitude-longitude

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7 The state capitals, excluding Brasilia, are: Aracaju, Belem, Belo Horizonte, Boa Vista, Cuiaba, Campo
Grande, Curitiba, Florianopolis, Fortaleza, Goiania, Joao Pessoa, Macapa, Maceio, Manaus, Natal, Palmas,
Porto Alegre, Porto Velho, Recife, Rio Branco, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Sao Luis, Sao Paulo, Teresina, e
Vitoria.
coordinates to create point features representing the location of Brasilia and the 26 state capitals. Next, we divide the country into 8 exogenous slices, and consider the optimal network connecting the cities within each slice. We do this to avoid exogenous choice in which capital cities were connected to Brasilia. We proceed by creating an imaginary pie sliced into eight parts and centered around Brasilia. We form eight 45 degree slices starting from North and moving clockwise. Then, we classify the 26 state capitals into eight groups, according to the location of their bearing with respect to Brasilia. We use the Spanning Tree Tool, in Arcmap, to find the minimum spanning tree connecting the states in each of the eight groups.\(^8\) Figure 2 shows the resulting predicted network. Our exogenous measure of access to road network is the straight line distance from the centroid of each county to the nearest road that is is part of the predicted MST network.\(^9\)

The distance to MST network is a strong predictor of actual access to road network. Access to road network is measured using the distance from each municipality to the nearest paved road in place in the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Note that our instrument cannot predict changes over time in access to a road. Therefore, we use the time-varying distance from a paved road as the dependent variable and include year fixed effects to capture the overall level of road access in a given year.

Table 1 displays the results. Column (1) shows that the elasticity of distance to paved roads to distance to MST network is 0.11 (and it is statistically significant at 1% significance level). Looking at Column (2) we can see that the result is robust to adding controls to municipality area (in square km), distance to nearest big city, and distance to Brasilia – elasticity is 0.148. More importantly, the F statistic associated with the first stage is 12.7, which indicates that the instrument is strong. We present further evidence in favor of the instrument in Columns (3) and (4), which display the estimates using an indicator for roads (that is, distance equals zero). Being connected to the MST network is associated with a 11.1 percentage point increase in the probability of being served by a road. After including controls, the coefficient is still large and significant and indicates an increase of 16.3 percentage points in the probability of having a road.

\(^8\)The tool uses Prim’s algorithm to design the euclidean minimum spanning tree.
\(^9\)We use the Near tool, available in ArcGIS, to compute the near distances.
3 Municipality Level Database

We construct a regional database of migration, wages and roads at the municipality level between 1970-2000. Summary statistics for the regional database, by census year, are presented in Table 2. The primary datasource is the individual data files from the Brazilian Census, 1970-2000, collected by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). Our sample of interest is males aged 20-65 who report non-zero earnings in their main occupation. All nominal variables into constant 2010 prices; the exchange rate between the USD and Real is approximately 1 USD = 2.3R.  

3.1 Employment and wages

Wage data are sourced from the census. The census asks both the average earnings per month in the main occupation, as well as the usual hours worked. We use earnings from main occupation and the hours worked to construct an equivalent hourly wage rate. This wage rate is 3.45 Reals in 1970, increasing to 9.0 Reals in 2010. Depending on the census year, between 50-65% of the population report being employees, rather than self-employed. If the agriculture and mining sector is omitted, this number is 75%. The share working in agriculture declines from 46% in 1970 to 22% in 2010.

The high proportion of self-employed people, particularly in agriculture, may generate concerns that the wage we compute does not accurately reflect actual income. We deal with this issue in two ways. First, we use detailed municipality level agriculture input and output data collected in agricultural censuses to show that self-reported income in the population census is highly correlated at the municipality level with agricultural profits (For details, see Appendix A.1). Second, we repeat the reduced form analysis using only the measure of wages of employees, rather than the equivalent wages of all workers. Us-

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10 We constructed a modified consumer price index that accounts for changes in the Brazilian currency that occurred within the period under analysis. All nominal variables were converted to 2010 BRL. See http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/ for the factors of conversion for the Brazilian currency.

11 The exception is 1970, where only total earnings, rather than earnings in the main occupation, is asked.

12 This is equivalent to a wage rate of USD 1.5 in 1970 to USD 3.9. Assuming a standard 2000 hour work year, this would be equivalent to annual incomes of USD 3000 and USD 7800. The per capita GDP figures for Brazil are $2400 in 1970 and $5600 in 2010 (World Development Indicators).
ing only wage workers brings our analysis closer to the concept of a market wage rate, and is consistent with other studies of rural labor markets that only use reported rural wage rates (see, i.e. Jayachandran (2006) and Kaur (2012)).

3.2 Migration

The current location of the individual is coded to the municipality level. In addition, from 1980, location 5 years ago is also coded to the municipality level. We are able to match the previous location at the municipality for 96% of people who report living in a different municipality 5 years ago. \(^{13}\) The inter-municipality migration rate is 17% in 1980. Of these moves, 60% (i.e. a migration rate of 9.9%) were between meso-regions. A focus of our paper is to examine the spatial equilibrium of migration. To show why this is important, we break out the moves by rural and urban destination and origin. \(^{14}\) Internal migration is more complex than simply rural-urban migration: 12% of all migrants are rural-rural migrants in 1980; 26% are urban-urban migrants; 24% are rural-urban and 5% are urban-rural. Our spatial model will capture the heterogeneity in migrant destination by studying the locational choice over \(N\) locations.

3.3 Costs of living

To convert nominal wages into real wages, we need to construct measures of the cost of living across space. Unfortunately, consumer price data is not collected at the municipality level. We instead construct costs of living using the best data sources available: a consumer price index collected at 10 cities in Brazil, and housing prices collected in the population census. The national consumer price index is a data series collected by IBGE for 10 locations across Brazil. For each AMC, we merge to the closest price collection point. Second, we use rental rates from the population census. Approximately 15% of our sample (and 30% of migrants), report paying rent to live in their accommodation. We

\(^{13}\) For the other 4%, the location is given at the state, not municipality, level. Fewer than 0.05% of the population report living abroad 5 years previously, so we ignore international migration.

\(^{14}\) We define a municipality as a rural municipality if at least 50% of the population reports living in a rural area.
construct the mean rental rate per bedroom at the municipality level. The mean rental rate for one bedroom is 128 Reals a month in 1980, equivalent to 37 hours of work at the mean wage. We show in Appendix A.2 that rental rates are positively correlated with the relative price index.\textsuperscript{15}

### 3.4 Road data

Our geographic data come from two sources. We obtained vector-based maps from the highway network for the period 1960 to 2000 from the Brazilian Ministry of Transportation. These maps were constructed based on statistical yearbooks from the Ministry’s Planning Agency, previously known as GEIPOT. We used the ArcGIS software to georeference the maps to match real-world geographic data. The geographic coordinate system applied to the maps is the SIRGAS 2000.

The second source of data is the IBGE, which provides municipality boundaries maps in digital format. We use the municipality boundaries from 2000 and apply the crosswalk that maps the municipalities that existed in 2000 into AMCs.\textsuperscript{16} We also use the meso-region codes defined by the IBGE to group municipalities into 131 meso-regions. Similar to the road data, we applied the coordinate system SIRGAS 2000 to the AMC and meso-region boundaries. Finally, in order to compute geographic distances in kilometers, we projected the maps using the Brazil Mercator projection.

In our migration cost function, we use two variables to measure the cost of moving between two locations. The first variable is the Euclidean distance, which is computed using the latitude and longitude coordinates of each origin-destination pair. The second variable measures the distance between origin-destination pairs taking into account the actual road coverage. To compute the latter, we use the fast marching algorithm, following the approach used in Allen and Arkolakis (2014).\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15}We also have producer level agricultural prices at the municipality level, sourced from the agricultural census. This has not been incorporated in the analysis yet; for some preliminary analysis of how these prices correlated with the consumer price index see Appendix A.2.

\textsuperscript{16}The crosswalk file can be obtained from http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/

\textsuperscript{17}The fast marching algorithm finds the solution to the Eikonal equation used to characterize the propagation of wave fronts. The algorithm uses a search pattern for grid points in computing the arrival times (distances) that is similar to the Dijkstra shortest path algorithm (Hassouna and Farag (2007)). However,
the road network and the location of the 131 meso-regions. This picture is converted into pixels and a travel speed is assigned to each pixel. Pixels corresponding to a paved road are assigned a travel speed of 100, whereas pixels outside the road network are assigned a travel speed of 0.00001. Essentially, this algorithm finds the shortest route, traveling on roads, between two locations, with the minimum off-road traveled to connect a region without a road to the road network. The outcome is a 131x131 matrix where each entry corresponds to the fastest arrival time between a origin-destination pair. We undertake the same exercise for our predicted highway system (the MST network) to find an instrument for the actual bilateral cost using the travel time on the exogenous road network.\(^{18}\) For each year, the bilateral distances were normalized using the travel distance between the nothernmost and the southernmost meso-regions as a nummeraire. The value used when estimating the model is the predicted values from a regression of the actual bilateral distances on the MST bilateral distances, including year fixed effects.

### 3.5 Geographic Units

Municipality boundaries change over time. In order to analyze the same geographical area, we use data aggregated to two geographical regions. The first are the minimum comparable areas (areas minimas comparaveis) constructed by the Institute of Applied Economic Research in Brazil. We refer to these units as AMCs, or municipalities for short hand. There are 3659 AMCs in Brazil in the period 1970 to 2000. The second unit of analysis are meso-regions. Meso-regions are statistical regions constructed by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). There 3659 were grouped into 131 meso-regions.\(^ {19}\) We present statistics where possible at the finer level of geography; however, it is not possible to estimate a dynamic choice model over 3659 dimensions, and so for the estimation of the spatial model we instead use the coarser geography.

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\(^{18}\)See Section 2 for details on the MST network.

\(^{19}\)There are 137 meso-regions defined by IBGE. However, there is not a perfect match between 6 meso-regions and the consistent municipalities and so we drop these 6 from the analysis.
4 Reduced Form Evidence

The distribution of wages at the municipality level is shown in Figure 1. Each observation is one municipality-year. We plot the distribution of log wages. In addition, we show the cut-offs for the 90th and 10th percentile of the distribution; a measured commonly used when analyzing productivity gaps within and across countries (see, for example, Caselli (2005)).

The first plot in Figure 1 shows the wage distribution adjusting only for year fixed effects. The 90/10 wage gap is 3.2: on average, municipalities at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution have wages 3 times wages at the 10th percentile. However, there could be many explanations for this difference: people have different education levels or working in different industries which have different wages. The overlaid distribution controls for a host of individual level characteristics (schooling, age and industry worked) as well as our best measures of the cost of living. Adjusting for these characteristics, the 90/10 wage gap is 2.1. Municipalities at the 90th percentile of the distribution have real wages more than twice those at the 10th percentile.

Figure 3 plots the wage gaps for 2000 to show the spatial dispersion of wages. The data are plotted at the mesoregion, instead of the municipality, to show the data more clearly. The figure shows that wages are heterogenous across space: it is not simply the large coastal cities that have the highest wages, or vice versa.

These large differences in the return to labor, as well as the heterogeneity in wages across space, present a spatial arbitrage puzzle: why do people not migrate to equalize wages across space and increase their welfare? This spatial heterogeneity will be the focus of our analysis when we estimate the full migration model. Before turning to the full spatial model, we first demonstrate two facts that link together roads, migration and labor market integration.

4.1 Gravity equation for migration

We show that the proportion of the population who migrate from municipality $a$ to municipality $b$ is a decreasing function of the bilateral distance between the two locations
and the travel time. We run the following specification:

$$\log \text{ proportion migrating}_{i,j,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_j + \beta \text{cost}_{i,j,t} + \alpha_t \epsilon_{i,j,t}$$

where migration cost is parameterized by the bilateral distance between $i$ and $j$ and the bilateral travel time on the road network between $i$ and $j$, instrumented with the bilateral travel time on the MST road network. $\alpha_i$ and $\alpha_j$ are origin and destination fixed effects. Results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients on both the bilateral distance and bilateral travel time are negative and statistically significant: a smaller proportion of people choose to migrate to locations that are further away.

### 4.2 Roads reduce pass-through of productivity shocks

Next, we turn to a measure of labor market integration. We show that roads reduce the pass-through of exogenous productivity shocks. To do this, we estimate the specification from Jayachandran (2006):

$$\log w_{i,t} = \alpha_1 \log \text{TFP}_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \text{roads}_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \log \text{TFP X roads}_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

We construct productivity shocks in two ways. First, following Jayachandran (2006), we construct a value-weighted yield measure using output of the four main crops produced in Brazil. We instrument crop yields with monthly rainfall. The second productivity shock we use is a local labor demand shock, known as a Bartik shift-share shock Bartik (1991).\(^{20}\) Results are reported in Table 4. A positive productivity shock increases wages; and the interaction between the productivity shock and access to roads is negative. This holds for both agricultural and non-agricultural wages, using either rainfall or Bartik share-shifter shocks to instrument for productivity shocks. This is consistent with roads affecting labor supply elasticity, for example through making migration less costly, and hence increasing labor market integration between municipalities.

These results suggest a relationship between roads, wages, and migration. However, to separately identify the effects of amenities, income and migration costs it is necessary

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\(^{20}\)The Bartik shock is described in Section 5.
to estimate the fully specified spatial equilibrium model. This is what we turn to next.

5 Model

This section presents the spatial equilibrium model. The framework is based on Moretti (2011). We augment the model by adding in pairwise location-specific migration costs. In the model, agents gain indirect utility from wages and amenities, which vary by location. Migration is costly and depends on the origin and destination. Agents choose the location which maximizes their utility, and will migrate from the current location if the value of moving to another location and paying the cost to do so is higher than the utility from remaining where they are. In our baseline model we assume that labor is homogenous, factor markets are perfectly competitive and capital can move freely. As a result, nominal wage differences across locations reflect productivity differences. However, the real wage agents receive depends on the cost of living. Each location has a rental market, with a housing supply elasticity that determines the response of rental rates to increased demand for housing. A location that receives a positive productivity shock will have higher nominal wages. These nominal wages will attract migrants. An inflow of migrants will increase the rental rate of housing, hence reducing the real wage and reducing the returns to migration.

Differences in real wages across space can arise from both migration costs as well as differences in amenity values. In the original Roback model of migration (Roback, 1982), all agents are indifferent across locations, and differences in real wages are equal to the difference in amenity value of locations across space. With an idiosyncratic taste component for location, such as in Moretti (2011), the marginal, rather than the average, migrant is indifferent across location. Introducing migration costs into the model generates a wedge in utility for the marginal migrant. This can lead to larger gaps in real wages than if labor were perfectly mobile: without migration costs the agent may migrate, driving up rental rates in the destination and reducing them in the origin, hence reducing the real wage gap between origin and destination. With migration costs, the agent no longer migrates and so the wage differential is larger. The magnitude of these effects is the aim
of our empirical estimation.

We now set up the key ingredients of the model: equations specifying labor demand, labor supply and housing supply, and show how these equations form the spatial equilibrium system.

5.1 Labor demand

Assume that there is a homogenous good produced in each location $j$ at time $t$. Production is determined by a constant returns to scale technology. Productivity is location-specific, and denoted by $A_{jt}$.

$$Y_{jt} = A_{jt}L_{jt}^\alpha K_{jt}^{1-\alpha}$$

Firms have access to capital at price $i_t$. The market for capital and labor is competitive, and factors are paid their marginal products.

$$\log w_{jt} = \log A_{jt} + \log \alpha + (1-\alpha) \log \frac{K_{jt}}{L_{jt}}$$

(1)

$$\log i_t = \log A_{jt} + \log(1-\alpha) - \alpha \log \frac{K_{jt}}{L_{jt}}$$

(2)

Together, Equation 1 and Equation 2 form the labor demand curve for location $j$:

$$\log w_{jt} = \frac{1}{\alpha} \log A_{jt} + \beta_t$$

(3)

where $\beta_t = (\log \alpha + \frac{(1-\alpha)}{\alpha} \log(1-\alpha) - \frac{(1-\alpha)}{\alpha} \log i_t)$, and is common across all locations.

Given the assumption about competitive markets and the free movement of capital, labor demand is only a function of location-specific productivity. That is, any nominal wage differences between two locations reflect productivity differences: the location with the higher nominal wage has higher productivity.\footnote{The implication that capital is perfectly mobile and therefore nominal wage differences purely reflect productivity differences is a strong assumption. For a study that relaxes the perfect capital mobility assumption, see Ottaviano and Peri (2012).}
5.2 Housing supply

All housing is owned by absentee landlords. The elasticity of rental rates to labor is given by:

\[ \log r_{jt} = \log z_t + \eta_{\text{house}} \log L_{jt} \] (4)

where \( \eta_{\text{house}} \) is the elasticity of house prices to population. If it is easy to expand the housing supply (for example, there is a lot of available land), then \( \eta_{\text{house}} \) will be small. If it is not easy to expand the housing supply (for example, very strict zoning regulations), then \( \eta_{\text{house}} \) will be large: the price of housing will increase a lot when there is a larger workforce. Each worker demands one unit of housing, so the equilibrium in the housing market will equate housing supply with labor supply.

5.3 Labor supply

Individuals choose where to live and work. They start the period in one region, and can make an instantaneous decision about which region to live and work in that period. In addition to wages, agents receive utility from amenities and an individual specific match value, and disutility from paying rental costs and any migration costs.

An agent begins the period living in location \( j \). Indirect utility for an individual \( i \) living in region \( j \) depends on the wage \( (w) \), their rental expenses \( (r) \), the amenity value of the city \( (X) \), as well as an individual-specific match value \( (\epsilon) \). The indirect utility is composed of a term that is common to all people who live in region \( j \) \( (V_j) \) and the idiosyncratic match component:

\[ V_{ijt} = \log w_{jt} - \log r_{jt} + X_{jt} + \epsilon_{ijt} \]

\[ = V_{jt} + \epsilon_{ijt} \]

An agent who starts the period in location \( j \) can chose to remain in \( j \) or relocate to another location. In total, there are \( M \) possible locations, including their current location.
If they relocate from $j$ to location $k$ they must pay a migration cost of $c_{jkt}$, where $c_{jkt} > 0$ if $j \neq k$. Agents observe their match-specific shock for each of the $M$ locations, including where they currently reside, and then make a decision about where to migrate. The location decision for agent $i$ living in location $j$ is therefore to choose the location with the highest utility:

$$\max_k \{ V_{kt} + \epsilon_{ikt} - c_{jkt} \}$$

Assume that the individual match specific terms are distributed as random type 1 extreme value: $\epsilon_{ik} \sim EV1$. Then, the probability that agent moves to location $k$, given that they start the period in location $j$, is given by the conditional logit expression:

$$\pi_{jkt} = \frac{\exp(\log w_{kt} - \log r_{kt} + X_{kt} - c_{jkt})}{\sum_{m=1}^{M} \exp(\log w_{mt} - \log r_{mt} + X_{mt} - c_{jmt})}$$

(6)

Note that $\sum_k \pi_{jkt} = 1$. The probability that the agent does not migrate is given by the probability they stay in their current location:

$$\pi_{jjt} = \frac{\exp(\log w_{jt} - \log r_{jt} + X_{jt})}{\sum_{m=1}^{M} \exp(\log w_{mt} - \log r_{mt} + X_{mt} - c_{jmt})}$$

Labor supply for region $k$ is determined by the net in-migration into each region. Because it is costly to move between locations, equilibrium labor supply will also depend on the initial distribution of population. This is because the utility of living in region $k$ (conditional on the realization of the match value epsilon) is not the same for all potential migrants: if there are more people living close to region $k$ and it is cheap to migrate to $k$ the in-migration response will be larger than if people are living further away from region $k$ and it is expensive to migrate there. In a world without bilateral migration costs, labor supply does not depend on the distribution of population because the cost does not differ based on current origin - people migrate to region $k$ if it provides the highest level of utility, independent of their current location.

Given the initial distribution of the population, $N_{j,t-1}, \forall j = 1, 2, ..., M$, the labor supply in locality $k$ is the net inflow of labor into region $k$ from every region (including those
who start in $k$ and chose not to migrate out):

$$L_{kt} = \sum_{j=1}^{M} \pi_{jkt} N_{j,t-1}$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^{M} \frac{\exp(\log w_{kt} - \log r_{kt} + X_{kt} - c_{jkt})}{\sum_{m=1}^{M} \exp(\log w_{mt} - \log r_{mt} + X_{mt} - c_{jmt})} N_{j,t-1}$$

(7)

5.4 Spatial equilibrium

The spatial equilibrium is given by solving a system of simultaneous equations for gross migration from $j$ to $k$ ($\pi_{jkt}^*$), equilibrium labor ($L_{kt}^*$), wage ($w_{kt}^*$) and housing quantities ($r_{kt}^*$) for each region $k$, such that:

1. Labor demand is given by equation 3:

$$\log w_{kt}^* = \frac{1}{\alpha} \log A_{kt} + \beta$$

2. Migration rates are given by 6:

$$\pi_{jkt}^* = \frac{\exp(\log w_{kt}^* - \log r_{kt}^* + X_{kt} - c_{jkt})}{\sum_{m=1}^{M} \exp(\log w_{mt}^* - \log r_{mt}^* + X_{mt} - c_{jmt})}$$

3. Labor supply is given by equation 7:

$$L_{kt}^* = \sum_{j=1}^{M} \pi_{jkt}^* N_{j,t-1}$$

4. Housing supply is given by equation 4:

$$\log r_{kt}^* = \log z_t + \eta_{\text{house}} \log L_{kt}^*$$

The spatial equilibrium yields that the marginal migrant is indifferent between staying in their current location and migrating. In a world where migration was costless, the marginal migrant would receive the same utility at each location. However, with costly
migration, the marginal migrant internalizes the cost of migrating and will only migrate if the utility at the new destination is large enough to compensate for the cost of migrating. Migration costs therefore introduce a wedge in utility across locations.

6 Estimation

This section describes the procedure to estimate the spatial equilibrium model. Consider an initial spatial equilibrium where the number of people in region $j$ at time $t$ is given by $N_{jt}$. The economy experiences productivity shocks in period $t+1$, which generate new wage shocks for each location. The productivity shocks propagate through the economy. Initially, the productivity shock in $k$ increases nominal wages in region $k$. This will increase the returns to migrating, and so people from every other region will migrate into $k$. As labor migrates in, the demand for housing increases, pushing up the rental rate for housing. The rate of increase of rental rates will depend on the elasticity of housing to population. As the rental rate for housing increases, the real return to migration to region $k$ decreases. Agents will continue to migrate into $k$ until the marginal migrant is indifferent between staying in their initial region $j$ and migrating to $k$. The new spatial equilibrium is the allocation of individuals across space, $N_{j,t+1}$. The goal of the estimation is to predict the new spatial allocation as closely as possible.

To estimate the model we implement a two-step estimator, following Diamond (2013), based on a two-step BLP estimator. The first step of the estimation process is to estimate the common utility for each region separately from the transportation cost. We then use the change in the common utility over the 10-year census periods to identify the parameters determining the spatial equilibrium process: elasticities of utility to changes in rents and wages, and elasticity of house prices to changes in population. We use three sets of instruments to identify the model. To identify the effect of roads on migration costs in the first stage estimation, we use the instrument generated by the construction of highways linking Brasilia with state capitals. To identify the spatial adjustment parameters in the second stage we use a combination of moment conditions derived from initial conditions (the population distribution across space) and exogenous productivity shocks.
6.1 First stage: estimation of transportation costs

The first stage of the estimation process is to use the observed gross migration flows to separately estimate the common utility ($V_j$) from the transport cost ($c_{jk}$). A key part of our analysis is to identify the bilateral migration costs of moving between $j$ and $k$. In order to estimate these costs, it is necessary to have data on gross migration flows, not just the net population allocation. This is because due to preference shocks, in the data we will see observationally equivalent people migrating between $j$ and $k$ in both periods in response to the same wage shock. Our analysis is similar to the approach used for identifying costs of switching industries in Artuç et al. (2010).

From equation 6, the gross migration flows between $j$ and $k$ are given by the following equation, which takes the form of a conditional logit:

$$
\pi_{jkt} = \frac{\exp(\log w_{kt} - \log r_{kt} + X_{kt} - c_{jkt})}{\sum_{m=1}^{M} \exp(\log w_{mt} - \log r_{mt} + X_{mt} - c_{jmt})}
$$

$$
\pi_{jkt} = \frac{\exp(V_{kt} - c_{jkt})}{\sum_{m=1}^{M} \exp(V_{mt} - c_{jmt})}
$$

We assume a parametric form for $c_{jkt}$, consisting of a common component across all migrants, and a variable component depending on the pairwise migration move:

$$
c_{jkt} = \alpha_t + \beta X_{jkt}
$$

The vector $X_{jkt}$ will include variables such as the Euclidean distance between $j$ and $k$ as well as a measure of the road coverage between the two locations. The specification for transportation costs is discussed further in the empirical section.

The likelihood function is constructed from the observed location choices. Consider individual $i_j$ who was living in location $j$ at the end of period $t - 1$. In total, $N_j$ people were in location $j$ at the end of period $t - 1$. In period $t$, each individual $i_j$ has moved to location $k$ with probability $P_{jkt}$. The likelihood function is therefore:
\[ LLL((V_{k,t})_{k=1}^M, \alpha, \beta) = \sum_j \sum_k \sum_{i_j} \mathbb{I}(d_{ij} = k) P_{jkt} \]

\[ LLL((V_{k,t})_{k=1}^M, \alpha, \beta) = \sum_j \sum_k \sum_{i_j} \mathbb{I}(d_{ij} = k) \frac{\exp(V_{k,t} - \mathbb{I}(k \neq j)(\alpha_t + \beta X_{jkt}))}{\sum_{m=1}^M \exp(V_{m,t} - \mathbb{I}(m \neq j)(\alpha_t + \beta X_{jmt}))} \] (9)

The likelihood function is globally concave and can be estimated by maximum likelihood. The first stage of the estimation therefore uses observed migration flows and extracts the migration cost coefficients and the location-specific utilities.

### 6.2 Second stage: estimation of spatial equilibrium

Once we have recovered the mean level of utility for each region \(V_{jt}\), we then relate this to observable changes in wages and rents that occurred over this period. We estimate four structural parameters: the elasticity of utility to wages, \(\gamma^w\), the elasticity of utility to rents, \(\gamma^r\), the elasticity of wages to productivity shocks, \(\alpha^A\), and the elasticity of rental rates to population \(\eta_{house}\). To estimate these parameters, we use a GMM estimation procedure. We construct exogenous productivity shocks to use as instruments for productivity differences across space. In addition, we use initial conditions to generate moments to generate an over-identification test of the model.

The specific productivity shock we construct will be a Bartik shock (Bartik (1991)).\(^{22}\) The Bartik shock takes the national-level growth rate in wages for each industry, and constructs a region specific wage shock based on the initial industry specialization of each region. Precisely, we compute the nation-wide increase in wages for each industry between period \(t\) and period \(t+1\) and then assign a predicted wage shock to region \(k\), based on the baseline composition of industry in region \(k\). Let the Bartik shock for region \(k\) be given by \(\Delta B_{k,t+1} = B_{k,t+1} - B_{kt}\):

\(^{22}\)Bartik shocks are extensively used in urban economics to generate spatial productivity differences. For recent examples, see for example Diamond (2013); Notowidigdo (2013). They have been less extensively used in developing countries, one exception is Theoharides (2013) who studies the effect of migrant demand shocks in the Philippines.
\[ \Delta B_{k,t+1} = \sum_{\text{ind}} (\Delta \log w_{\text{ind},-k,t+1}) \frac{L_{\text{ind},k,t}}{L_{k,t}} \]

where \( \log w_{\text{ind},-k,t} \) is the average log wages in industry \( \text{ind} \) in year \( t \), excluding workers in region \( k \). The Bartik shocks utilizes variation across space in the location of industry.

The second set of instruments we will use to construct moment inequalities in the estimation procedure is the initial allocation of people across space, \( N_{jt} \).

The change in indirect utility for region \( k \) between period \( t+1 \) and \( t \) is given by:

\[ \Delta V_{k,t+1} = \alpha^w \Delta \log w_{k,t+1} - \alpha^r \Delta \log r_{k,t+1} + \Delta X_{k,t+1} \]

That is, utility is composed of differences in real returns across space. We assume that location amenities change exogenously, so \( \Delta X_{j,t+1} = \alpha_t \).

\[ \Delta V_{k,t+1} = \alpha^w \Delta \log w_{k,t+1} - \alpha^r \Delta \log r_{k,t+1} + \alpha_t \]

We have recovered \( \Delta V_{k,t+1} \) from the first stage estimation equation. We now use the equations that explain the spatial equilibrium model to estimate the underlying parameters of the spatial equilibrium model.

### 6.2.1 Labor demand

The Bartik instrument provides variation in the productivity shock for region \( k \):

\[ \Delta \log w_{k,t+1} = \alpha^A \Delta B_{k,t+1} + \epsilon^w_{k,t+1} \]

The identifying assumption is that the error term in the labor demand equation is not correlated with the Bartik shock. In addition, the initial allocation of population is predetermined, so we require that the error term is not correlated with the initial population \( N_{kt} \):

\[ E(\Delta B_{k,t+1}\epsilon^w_{k,t+1}) = 0 \]
\[ E(N_{k,t}\epsilon^w_{k,t+1}) = 0 \]
6.2.2 Housing supply

Housing supply depends on the elasticity of house prices to population increases. The Bartik shock identifies the house price elasticity through the predicted in-migration of labor in response to the realized productivity shock, and allowing a trend constant across all regions ($\alpha_t$).

$$\Delta \log r_{k,t+1} = \eta_{\text{house}} \Delta \log L_{k,t+1} + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{k,t+1}$$

Identifying restrictions:

$$E(\Delta B_{k,t+1} e_{j,t+1}) = 0$$
$$E(N_k e_{j,t+1}) = 0$$

Together, these set of instruments identify the structural parameters determining the effect of wages on indirect utility, $\gamma^w$, the effect on rents on indirect utility, $\gamma^r$, the elasticity of wages to productivity shocks, $\alpha^A$, and the elasticity of rental rates to population $\eta_{\text{house}}$. In the estimation, we normalize $\gamma^r$ to be 1, and so we estimate the relative weight of wages to utility in the utility function.

7 Structural results

We present the estimates for the spatial equilibrium model. The estimation occurs in two stages. The first stage of the estimation procedure is to estimate the indirect utility for each location and the migration cost function. We specify the migration cost function as

$$c_{jkt} = \alpha_t + \beta_1 \text{Euclidean distance}_{jk} + \beta_2 \text{highway distance}_{jkt}, \forall j \neq k$$

The intercept of the cost equation, $\alpha_t$, measures the fixed cost of migration. The other two coefficients measure variable costs of migration, depending on origin and destination. For each bilateral pair, we include both the euclidean distance between the two locations, as well as the travel distance based on the existing road networks. Because the
road network is likely endogenous, we instrument it by the travel time on the predicted MST network.

The migration cost function is identified by looking at the gross flows of migrants. Agents who can travel to a region more cheaply will respond more to a given wage shock in that region. This variation in migration responses at origin, given the same wages in destination, identifies the migration cost separately from the utility gained once the destination is reached. The actual migration cost occurred will also depend on the destination chosen: for example, destinations that are further away may incur a large migration cost that destinations that are closer and easier to migrate to. We capture this by including the Euclidean distance between the centroids of each region. The gross migration flows follow a gravity model, and so if it is more costly to travel longer distances we would expect to see a positive coefficient for $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$. If people dislike migration, as has been found in many other studies, then we would expect $\alpha_t$ to also be positive.

Note that the identification assumptions for the first stage results are relatively minimal. Because we do not explicitly model wages and rental rates in this stage, instead, capturing them in a destination fixed effect, identification comes from the fact that we have bilateral migration moves for each destination. In particular, any concerns about the determinants of wages do not affect the identification of the migration cost as long as all individuals face the same rental, wage and amenity markets once they have reached the destination.

We estimate the migration cost function by estimating a conditional logit, using the likelihood function specified in Equation 9. The point estimates are reported in Table 5. All components of the migration cost are positive, as expected, and strongly statistically significant: migration costs are a significant component in the decision of whether, and where, to migrate. The fixed cost of migration is substantial. This coefficient reflects any dislike of moving. The bilateral distance is positive and significant: traveling a longer distance is more costly. However, the actual distance on a road is also strongly negative and significant. This means that even controlling for the difference between two locations,

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23Part of this cost may also be that people who live closer to major highways have better information about the wage rates in other locations. We include this reduction in the costs of acquiring information as part of the cost reduction of roads.
the actual travel time will affect the migration decision. This is important because neither a dislike of moving nor Euclidean distance are variables that are under the control of policy makers. However, distance on a road is a policy-relevant variable. We explore the responsiveness of migration rates to changes in road travel time below.

Figure 4 shows the fit of the model from the first stage. The figure plots predicted migration rates against the realized migration rates, where each point in the plot is a bilateral pair. If no-one from the origin migrated, this would correspond to a migration rate of 1 in the diagram for one bilateral point, and a migration rate of 0 for the \( N - 1 \) other bilateral pairs. The graph shows that there is clustering around 0 and 1: for every location, the most common migration destination is to not migrate, and on average, migration rates are small to other regions. This is clear: the overall migration rate is 8.7%, so more than 90% of people are non-migrants. The fit of the data is good: the R-squared from a regression of actual migration rate of predicted migration rate is above 0.995 for each year.

The second step of the estimation recovers the underlying structural parameters that determine the migration response to income shocks; the housing price response to labor migration; and the wage response to TFP shocks. To estimate the model, it is necessary to make an assumption about the production function, as such, the identification depends on the production function specified. We estimate the second stage using two step GMM. The point estimates are reported in Table 6. The elasticity of wages to TFP is close to 1, which is as expected given that the Bartik shock is derived from mean wage rates. The housing elasticity is 4.25, reflecting inelastic housing supply. This will be the key variable that determines the general equilibrium effects of migration. The elasticity of indirect utility to wages is 0.11 and statistically significant. The elasticity of utility to rental prices has been normalized to -1 and is not reported in the table.

We now turn to the effect of migration costs on migration and welfare equalization across space. Our model allows us to estimate partial equilibrium effects, and importantly, to also compute the general equilibrium effects of migration, taking into account endogenous responses of the housing market as agents migrate more in response to reductions in migration costs. We highlight the magnitudes by undertaking two counter-
factual policy exercises. We first compute the effect of the change in road access in partial equilibrium (holding all other endogenous variables constant). Next, we compute the general equilibrium effect, allowing the endogenous response of the housing market to the inflow of new migrants. Without considering the general equilibrium effects the migration response will be overstated.

The results are reported in Table 7. The results suggest a substantial effect on labor allocation due to costs of migrating across space. In the data, 8.7% of adults aged over 20 migrated internally in 1980. If the average travel distance on a road was reduced by 50% internal migration rates would increase to 12%, an increase of 40%. However, as people migrate, there is an endogenous response of the housing market to an inflow of new migrants. Column (2) shows the implied migration rate, taking into account the general equilibrium response. Once the housing response is accounted for, the endogenous migration rate would increase to 11%, or 10% less than in partial equilibrium. A similar pattern is seen for each of the years: it is important to account for the general equilibrium adjustment effects of the reduction in road prices.

The second counterfactual experiment examines the migration response to a reduction in the fixed cost of migration. Reducing the fixed cost of migration would increase internal migration rates to 44%. Again, the general equilibrium effects are approximately 10% smaller than the partial equilibrium effects, reflecting the endogenous reduction in indirect utility as housing prices rise. However, fixed costs of migration may not be a policy relevant variable: this could easily capture the fact that people prefer to remain with friends and family, and so reflects efficient non-migration. This is in contrast to the large increase in migration rates from changing the marginal cost of migration, which does provide evidence that access to transportation network impedes the efficient allocation of labor across space.

We show the welfare effects of the policy that reduces the marginal cost of migrating in Figure 5. The figure plots the distribution of indirect utility at baseline (estimated from the data), and then after the reduction in migration costs, for each year. The dotted line shows the partial equilibrium effects; the shaded line reflects the general equilibrium effect. The reduction in transportation cost increases the welfare of individuals dramatically: the
average increase in utility is 8.0% (7.9% in GE). There is also a reduction in the variance of utility: that standard deviation decreases by 7.1% (7.8% in GE).

8 Conclusion

Wages in developing countries differ greatly across sector and across space. In Brazil, the average wage in a municipality at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution is 3.2 times larger than the average wage in a municipality in the 10th percentile of the wage distribution. Adjusting for individual characteristics, industry, and the cost of living, the 90/10 municipality wage gap is 2.1. These large differences in the return to labor present a spatial arbitrage puzzle: why do people not migrate to equalize wages across space and increase their welfare?

We propose one explanation: it is costly to move. To study the effect and magnitude of migration costs on labor mobility, we construct a spatial equilibrium model. Our model extends the standard spatial equilibrium model (Roback (1982); Moretti (2011)) to include bilateral costs of migration. We use the construction of a planned capital city, Brasilia, to generate plausibly exogenous variation in the national road network, and then examine whether having access to the road network affects labor movement. We construct a novel dataset of bilateral inter-municipality migration flows, covering 96% of the universe of internal migrants in Brazil over the period 1980-2000. We first show that roads affect migration decisions and local wages: i) a lower proportion of the origin population migrate to locations that are further away, and ii) regions with road access have a lower pass-through of productivity shocks into wages. Using the migration flow database and detailed data on the road network, we then estimate the structural model to separate out the income, amenity and migration effects of roads. The key result is that access to roads is an important determinant of migration. Controlling for the euclidean distance between two location, reducing the road distance by 50% would increase migration rates by 40%, and increase welfare by over 8%. The effect is reduced by 10% once the general equilibrium effects of migration are computed.

Our paper shows an important role for infrastructure in developing countries: facil-
itating the movement of labor to where their returns are highest. Costly migration can generate inefficiencies in the allocation of labor across space. For example, a worker may prefer to relocate to an area with a higher real wage, but the cost of moving may be too high to make this decision optimal, reducing welfare. At an aggregate level, if certain production locations require certain skills, the inability of labor to move easily may increases the mismatch between labor and location, reducing productivity. The aggregate effects of this misallocation, particularly for developing countries where infrastructure is poor, is an important topic and will be pursued in future research.
References


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Figure 1: Distribution of municipality wages

Notes: Figure shows distribution of wages. Each observation is one municipality. We plot residuals, averaged over municipality, from an individual level regression of log wage on a) year fixed effects, and b) year fixed effects, age, years schooling, mean municipality rental rates and industry fixed effects.
Figure 2: Map of straight line instrument and radial highways

Notes: Figure shows Brasilia and the 26 state capitals. The map shows radial highways out of Brasilia and the straight line instrument for roads. The straight line shows the minimum spanning tree instrument between Brasilia and grouped state capitals. Source: Authors’ calculations based on maps obtained from the Brazilian Ministry of Transportation.
Figure 3: Wage gaps across space: removing individual and industry characteristics

Notes: Figure shows wage gaps, measured in log differences, across mesoregions in Brazil. Source: Authors’ calculations based on census data.
Figure 4: Predicted vs actual migration rates

Notes: Figure shows predicted migration rates again actual migration rates. Each dot is a bilateral meso region pair. Source: Authors’ calculations based on census data.
Figure 5: Welfare effects of reducing transport costs by 50%

Notes: Figure shows predicted the distribution of welfare at baseline and when transport costs are reduced by 50%. PE is the partial equilibrium effect; GE is the general equilibrium effect. Source: Authors’ calculations based on census data.
Table 1: First stage for straight line instrument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. variable: Dist. from paved road</th>
<th>Log distance</th>
<th>Indicator for road</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) b/se</td>
<td>(2) b/se</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted road (log km)</td>
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<td>0.148***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On straight-line path</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closer nearest big city</td>
<td>-0.105**</td>
<td>-0.038**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closer to Brasilia</td>
<td>0.558*</td>
<td>0.206*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>0.515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-stat</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of municipalities</td>
<td>3659</td>
<td>3659</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table shows OLS regressions. Cols (1) and (2) show distance to nearest road as a function of the distance to the straight line distance between Brasilia and state capitals. Distances measured in log km. Col (3) regresses an indicator variable for having a paved road on an indicator variable for being on the straight line path. Stars indicate statistical significance. *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at municipality level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean/sd</th>
<th>(1) 1970</th>
<th>(2) 1980</th>
<th>(3) 1991</th>
<th>(4) 2000</th>
<th>(5) 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equiv. wage (all)</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>9.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.03)</td>
<td>(15.5)</td>
<td>(16.1)</td>
<td>(22.6)</td>
<td>(35.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equiv. wage (employee only)</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>8.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.26)</td>
<td>(10.7)</td>
<td>(10.7)</td>
<td>(13.2)</td>
<td>(24.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share pop. who are employees</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in agriculture</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in manufacturing</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean rent</td>
<td>129.0</td>
<td>254.1</td>
<td>188.5</td>
<td>195.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(154.0)</td>
<td>(403.9)</td>
<td>(208.4)</td>
<td>(180.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share paying rent</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality migration rate</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meso-region migration rate</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing previous location</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-Rural migrant</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-Urban migrant</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-Rural migrant</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-Urban migrant</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Number observations** | 476814 | 591047 | 354989 | 397045 | 446171 |
**Number municipalities** | 3659 | 3658 | 3659 | 3657 | 3659 |

**Notes:** Summary statistics calculated from Census microdata. Sample is 20-65 year old males with non-zero earnings in main occupation. Financial values in year 2000 Brazilian reals (R). 1USD =2.3R. Rural is defined at the municipality level and is equal to 1 if ≥ 0.5 of people are rural.
Table 3: Gravity equation for migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep var: Prop. migrating</th>
<th>(1) All pairs</th>
<th>(2) Only migrant pairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log traveltime</td>
<td>-6.97***</td>
<td>-34.0***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(7.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log distance</td>
<td>-0.89***</td>
<td>-0.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>16075</td>
<td>15551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data from 1980, 1991, 2000 and 2010 censuses. Each observation is a bilateral meso-region pair (n=131). Total possible sample size = 4 years*(131^2) = 68,644. Pairs dropped from regression if zero pairwise migration. Robust standard errors reported.

Table 4: Roads reduce pass-through of productivity shocks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep var: Log wage</th>
<th>Rainfall Shocks</th>
<th>Bartik Shocks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) All Employees</td>
<td>(2) Baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP shock</td>
<td>0.093* (0.038)</td>
<td>1.10*** (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP X Road</td>
<td>-0.17** (0.063)</td>
<td>-0.72*** (0.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to road</td>
<td>0.079 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muni FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>10449</td>
<td>16864</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Close to road is a dummy variable if the municipality is within the 20th percentile distance to road, instrumented with the same definition for the instrument. Robust standard errors clustered at municipality. Agricultural shocks don’t include 2010 census as crop yields not available.
Table 5: Fixed and marginal costs of migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed cost of migrating</td>
<td>4.58***</td>
<td>5.13***</td>
<td>5.22***</td>
<td>5.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral distance (km)</td>
<td>0.0020***</td>
<td>0.0017***</td>
<td>0.0017***</td>
<td>0.0018***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000013)</td>
<td>(0.000016)</td>
<td>(0.000016)</td>
<td>(0.000018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral travel time</td>
<td>5.73***</td>
<td>4.91***</td>
<td>4.91***</td>
<td>4.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. individuals</td>
<td>538,244</td>
<td>323,232</td>
<td>357,986</td>
<td>398,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean migration rate</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean bilateral distance migrated</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean bilateral distance</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Source: Brazilian Census data, 1980-2010. Table reports estimates from a conditional logit model of migration. Location fixed effects estimated but not reported. Mean bilateral distance relative to N-S Brazil. Note: standard errors should be bootstrapped as distance to road is instrumented. This is in progress.

Table 6: Structural coefficient estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b/</th>
<th>se</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity wages to TFP</td>
<td>1.01***</td>
<td>(0.0063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity rental rates to population</td>
<td>4.25***</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity utility to wages</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J statistic</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Estimated using 1980-2000 data. Coefficients calculated using two-step GMM. Elasticity of utility to rent normalized to -1. Robust standard errors provided. Overidentification J statistic and p-value provided.
Table 7: Counterfactual migration rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) PE</td>
<td>(2) GE</td>
<td>(3) PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce marginal cost by 50%</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce fixed cost by 50%</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Source: Brazilian Census data, 1980-2000. 1.5% sample. PE = partial equilibrium. GE = general equilibrium. Sample only individuals aged 20 and over. Table reports estimates derived from structural estimation.
A Appendix

A.1 Self-reported agricultural income

In the Brazilian census, between 50-70% of the sample who report working in agriculture are self-employed rather than employees.\(^{24}\) Self-reported income in censuses may not accurately reflect agricultural wage income for at least three reasons: i) self-reported income may be revenues, rather than income, ii) it may contain payments to both labor as well as other factors of production such as capital, or iii) it may be more accurately provided at the household, rather than the individual, level (Lagakos et al. (2012)). In this section we use data from Brazilian agricultural censuses and present evidence that, despite the potential problems, agriculture self-employment income as measured in population censuses highly correlates with agriculture profits computed from agricultural censuses. In addition, we run the reduced form analysis in the paper both including and excluding non-employees, and results are robust.

Starting in 1970, the Agriculture Censuses were collected every five years. The agriculture census allows us to measure agricultural income accurately as it covers the universe of agricultural production unities, regardless of their size, output level, or location.\(^{25}\) It is worth mentioning that home gardens were not considered as agricultural unities for the purpose of data collection. Nonetheless, we believe that we only miss some of the production for own consumption of those who work mainly outside the agricultural sector.

We obtain the series of agriculture revenues and expenses at the AMC level from IPEADATA. Agriculture revenue comprises proceeds from the sale of agricultural products, including final goods produced inside the agricultural unities, as well as revenues from the rental of land and livestock and services rendered to third parts. Agriculture expenses include expenses with wages, rents, other inputs, and operational expenses. Our benchmark measure of AMC-level agricultural income is agricultural profits, as measured by the difference between revenues and expenses. We used the years 1975, 1980, and 1996, which are the closest to the population census years (1970, 1980 and 1991).

\(^{24}\) The share of the population working in labor force declines from 46% in 1970 to 22% in 2010.

\(^{25}\) The agricultural censuses include unities located in urban areas.
Appendix Figure 1 displays the scatterplot of the agriculture (log) profits obtained from the agriculture census against the agriculture self-employment (log) income computed from the population census. The two income measures are positively correlated. The R-squared from regressing the level of agriculture self-employment income on the level of agriculture profits indicates is 0.80.

Appendix Figure 1: Comparison: population and agricultural censuses
Appendix Table 1: Correlation of CPI with other measures of cost of living

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep var: Relative price index</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean agricultural prices (producer)</td>
<td>0.026**</td>
<td>(0.0097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean rental rate</td>
<td>0.0037</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Each observation is a municipality-year. The CPI is collected at 10 locations in Brazil. For each year, we normalize the mean of the index to 1, so the index measures spatial variation in the cost of living. Agriculture prices are available for 1980, 1991 and 2000. Rents are available for 1970, 1980, 1991 and 2010. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.

A.2 Cost of living

Consumer prices are only collected at 10 cities in Brazil. In this section, we show how the prices correlate with two measures of the cost of living: mean rental rates from the population census, and producer prices at the municipality level computed from the agricultural census. The dependent variable is the price index, normalized each year to have value 1. The agricultural price index is a weighted average of the prices of the 4 main agricultural crops (soy, sugarcane, coffee and corn), sourced from the agricultural census. The rental rate is the mean rental rate per bedroom, sourced from the population census. Table 1 shows that both are positively correlated with the relative price index, although the small sample size means that the rental rate is not statistically significant.26

---

26Additionally, the CPI is only collected in cities, as a result, there is less variation in rental rates that in the entire sample. The variable of (log) rental rates in the municipalities included in the CPI sample is 0.49, compared with a variance of 0.84 across all municipalities.