

# Inflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis

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
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- In spite of massive contraction in economic activity during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the general level of prices has remained surprisingly stable.
- Can financial factors account for the absence of deflationary pressures in light of the enormous resource slack in the economy?
- Intuition: In a customer-markets model with financial frictions, firms have the incentive to raise prices to increase cash flow at the cost of future market share (Gottfries [1991]; Chevalier and Scharfstein [1996]).

- Monthly **good-level** price data underlying the PPI.  
(Nakamura & Steinsson [2008]; Goldberg & Hellerstein [2009]; Bhattarai & Schoenle [2010])
- Match 584 PPI respondents to their income and balance sheet data from Compustat.
- Sample period: Jan2005–Dec2012

# RELATIVE INFLATION


Financially unconstrained vs constrained firms



NOTE: Weighted average monthly inflation relative to industry (2-digit NAICS) inflation.

# RELATIVE INFLATION

Effect of Financial Frictions, Cumulated Response



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# PRICE ADJUSTMENT AND FIRM CHARACTERISTICS

- Multinomial logit specification:

$$\Pr(p_{i,j,t+3} - p_{i,j,t}) = \begin{cases} + \\ 0 \text{ (base)} \\ - \end{cases} = \Lambda(\mathbf{X}_{jt}; \boldsymbol{\beta}_t)$$

- Price change regression:


$$\log(p_{i,j,t+3}) - \log(p_{i,j,t}) = \beta X_{j,t} + \epsilon_{i,j,t+3}$$

- $\mathbf{X}_{jt}$  = liquidity ratio and other controls.
  - Includes fixed time effects and 3-digit inflation.
  - Estimated using four-quarter rolling window.


# PROBABILITY OF PRICE CHANGE

Marginal effect with respect to liquidity ratio

Negative price changes




Positive price changes



- Quantitative implication: a two std. dev. reduction in liquidity implies a 33% higher probability of a price increase.

# INFLATION

## Marginal effect with respect to liquidity ratio



- Quantitative implication: A two std. dev. reduction in liquidity implies a 5% increase in annualized inflation.

# New Keynesian Model with “Deep Habits”

Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2006]

- Demand for monopolistically competitive good:

$$c_{it} = \left( \frac{p_{it}}{\tilde{p}_t} \right)^{-\eta} s_{i,t-1}^{\theta(1-\eta)} c_t$$

where

$$s_{it} = \rho s_{i,t-1} + (1 - \rho) c_{it}$$

- Firms are forward looking – set low price today to build future stock of customer base.

- Firms make production decision prior to realization of cost:

$$y_{it} = \left( \frac{h_{it}}{a_{it}} \right)^{\alpha} - \phi_k$$

- If realized operating income is negative, firms must raise costly equity finance:
  - $\varphi \in (0, 1)$  = constant per-unit dilution costs of new equity
- Setting a low price exposes the firm to the risk of operating losses, which must be covered by external financing.

# LOG-LINEARIZED PHILLIPS CURVE

## New Keynesian model with cost channel

$$\hat{\pi}_t = -\frac{\omega(\eta-1)}{\gamma_p} \left[ \hat{\mu}_t + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \chi \tilde{\delta}^{s-t+1} \hat{\mu}_{s+1} \right] + \beta \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{\pi}_{t+1}] \\ + \frac{1}{\gamma_p} [\eta - \omega(\eta-1)] \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \chi \tilde{\delta}^{s-t+1} \left[ (\hat{\xi}_t - \hat{\xi}_{s+1}) - \hat{\beta}_{t,s+1} \right]$$

- $\hat{\mu}_t =$  (financially-adjusted) mark-up
- $\hat{\beta}_{t,s+1} =$  capitalized growth of customer base
- $\hat{\xi}_t =$  shadow value of internal funds

# LOG-LINEARIZED PHILLIPS CURVE

## The role of “deep habits”

$$\hat{\pi}_t = -\frac{\omega(\eta - 1)}{\gamma_p} \left[ \hat{\mu}_t + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \chi \tilde{\delta}^{s-t+1} \hat{\mu}_{s+1} \right] + \beta \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{\pi}_{t+1}]$$
$$+ \frac{1}{\gamma_p} [\eta - \omega(\eta - 1)] \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \chi \tilde{\delta}^{s-t+1} \left[ (\hat{\xi}_t - \hat{\xi}_{s+1}) - \hat{\beta}_{t,s+1} \right]$$

- $\hat{\mu}_t$  = (financially-adjusted) mark-up
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# LOG-LINEARIZED PHILLIPS CURVE


## The role of financial frictions

$$\hat{\pi}_t = -\frac{\omega(\eta - 1)}{\gamma_p} \left[ \hat{\mu}_t + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \chi \tilde{\delta}^{s-t+1} \hat{\mu}_{s+1} \right] + \beta \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{\pi}_{t+1}]$$
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
# DEMAND SHOCK: FINANCIAL CRISIS ( $\varphi = 0.5$ )

Economy with sticky prices



# DEMAND SHOCK

With temporary increase in financial frictions




- Fixed dilution cost:  $\varphi = 0.5$
- Temporary increase:  $\varphi = 0.3 \rightarrow 0.37$


# “PRICE WAR” IN RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL SHOCKS

Heterogeneous firms

(a) Relative prices



(b) Output




- Case I:  $\phi_1 = 0.8\bar{\phi}$ ,  $\phi_2 = \bar{\phi}$  and  $\omega_1 = \omega_2 = 0.5$
- Case II:  $\phi_1 = 0$ ,  $\phi_2 = \bar{\phi}$  and  $\omega_1 = \omega_2 = 0.5$


# PARADOX OF FINANCIAL STRENGTH

Heterogeneous firms

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(b) Output




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
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# CONCLUSION

- Empirical results imply that financially healthy firms **decreased** prices, while financially weak firms **increased** prices during the financial crisis.
- DSGE model implies attenuation of inflation dynamics in response to demand shocks and severe contraction in response to **temporary** financial shocks.
- Implications for monetary policy: inflation-output tradeoff in response to demand or financial shocks.