Understanding the Great Recession

Lawrence Christiano Martin Eichenbaum Mathias Trabandt

Boston, October 18, 2013

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Board or any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System.

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- Why was the drop in inflation so moderate?
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 - Fall and slow recovery in TFP.

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- Use estimated model to analyze post-2008 data.


Novel Feature of Model: Labor Market


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
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- Derive wage inertia as an equilibrium outcome.







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- If bargaining costs don't depend sensitively on state of economy, neither will wages.
- After expansionary shock, rise in wages is relatively small.

- See CET (2013), for intuition in a DSGE model with capital.

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- Opening offer is accepted.

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- Our labor market structure.

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- Elasticity of substitution between home and market goods: 3.
 set a priori, see Aguiar-Hurst-Karabarbounis (2012).

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
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- Standard DMP model requires replacement ratio > 95% to reproduce volatility of labor market data (Hagedorn-Manovskii).

Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock


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
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
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2008Q2 - - Linear Trend from 2001Q1 to 2008Q2
 Forecast 2008Q3 and beyond



Data

1.4


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
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
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
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











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


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
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The U.S. Great Recession: Data Targets



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
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
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- We investigate the effect of a shock by shutting it off.
 - Resulting decomposition is not additive because of nonlinearity.

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
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
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 - Recession leads to lower marginal costs -> inflation falls.



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Baseline model = = Constant financial wedge



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
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 - Both raise countervailing pressure on inflation.

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
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
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- Alternative: standard Phillips curve misses working capital term including financial wedge.
 - Usually that term is not very important, but it *was* in post-2008 period.

Gilchrist-Zakrajsek Corporate Spread





Responses to an Invest. Techology Shock



Notes: x-axis in guarters.

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- Solve nonlinear model, imposing certainty equivalence.

