Discussion of "The Macroeconomic Effects of Housing Wealth, Housing Finance, and Limited Risk-Sharing in General Equilibrium"

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This paper

- What explains the recent boom/bust episode in house prices?
- Proposed explanation: for a couple of years, fewer frictions in the housing market
- Ambitious exercise with serious quantitative model
- Two sector RBC model with housing (repres. agent: Davis and Heathcote 2003, Kahn 2009)
- heterogeneous agents and collateral constraints (exchange economy: Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh 2005)
- Here: combine the two + transaction costs for housing

Frictions in the housing market

- two frictions: downpayment constraints, transaction costs
- in models with transaction costs,

$$rac{ ext{asset price}}{ ext{dividend}} ~pprox ~ rac{1}{ ext{real interest rate - growth rate of dividends}}$$

discount for expected future transaction costs

(holds exactly e.g., with search as in Piazzesi & Schneider 2009)

This paper: housing boom because of lower discount

Discussion

- What is a house?
- Evidence on main mechanism: how did frictions change during the early 2000s? magnitudes and timing

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Households choose
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\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{bond} = \mathsf{asset} \; \mathsf{that} \; \mathsf{pays} \; 1 \; \mathsf{unit} \; \mathsf{numeraire} \; \mathsf{tomorrow} \\ & \big(\mathsf{shorting} \; \mathsf{bonds} = \mathsf{mortgage}\big) \end{array}
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equity = asset that pays aggregate dividend (numeraire)
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house = share of a real estate investment trust
that holds all structures (not land)
in the United States
pays housing dividends that are not tradable
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
 house = share of a real estate investment trust that holds all structures (not land) in U.S.
 pays housing dividends that are not tradable

	returns on stocks			returns on housing		
-	mean	volatility	Sharpe	mean	volatility	Sharpe
			ratio			ratio
data	8%	19%	0.3	10%	5%	1.5
model	6%	11%	0.3	13%	6%	1.5

- A national real estate trust is a great deal!
- Evidence on idiosyncratic risk in houses
 Flavin & Yamashita 2002, Guerrieri, Hartley & Hurst 2010,
 Landvoigt, Piazzesi & Schneider 2010
- Risk-return tradeoff matters for portfolio choice, pricing Piazzesi & Schneider 2008

- house = share of a real estate investment trust that holds all structures (not land) in U.S.
 pays housing dividends that are not tradable
- house has most attractive Sharpe ratio,
 is the only asset that can be used as collateral
- why do agents not buy as much as they can?
- can't rent out!
- Cobb-Douglas utility over housing and other consumption, only want so much housing

- house = share of a real estate investment trust that holds all structures (no land) in U.S.
 pays housing dividends that are not tradable
- in the data:
 Case-Shiller, Flow of Funds, etc. include land values
- land values are important bigger booms & busts in regions with bigger land components e.g., California, Florida, New York City



Suggestions:


- to make things comparable: either include land in the model or (easy route) exclude land from the data
- study sensitivity to depreciation rate in housing capital

- Downpayment requirements were relaxed during the boom 25% until 2000, 1% after 2000
- Direct evidence?
- How much does this matter for house prices by itself?
- Depends on price impact of agents affected by constraints
- How does price impact depend on details of the model?
- calibration (model overpredicts housing portfolio share of young households, Table 4)
 young households data model
 1998 0.67 1.50
- 2. no rental housing (all households affected by the change)

• Changes in transaction costs:

	fixed cost (% average household	variable cost (% of
	consumption per year)	house value)
before boom	3.5%	5.5%
during boom	2.5%	3.5%
after boom	3.5%	5.5%

• Direct evidence: graph of initial fees and charges



Initial fees and charges

- Timing?
- Approach?
 Paper compares stochastic steady states,
 (changes in frictions are both unexpected & permanent)
 approach typically used for regime changes e.g., social security
- Graph: slow changing process for transaction costs
 Households have seen the same data!
- Why not one stationary equilibrium? (agents discount house prices based on changing expectations about future transaction costs)

Conclusions

- Ambitious exercise with serious quantitative model
- Changes in transaction costs potentially interesting
- Given current modeling choices and reporting of results, quantitative importance is not yet clear