College Major Choice and the Gender Gap^{*}

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Abstract

Males and females make different choices with regards to college majors. Two main reasons have been suggested for this gender gap: differences in innate abilities, and differences in preferences. This paper studies the question of how college majors are chosen with a focus on explaining the underlying gender gap. Since observed choices may be consistent with many combinations of expectations and preferences, I collect a unique dataset of Northwestern sophomores which contains the students' subjective expectations about choice-specific outcomes. I estimate a choice model where college major choice is made under uncertainty (about personal tastes, individual abilities, and realizations of outcomes related to the choice of major). Enjoying coursework, enjoying work at potential jobs, and approval of parents are the most important determinants in the choice of college major. Males and females have similar preferences while in college, but differ in their preferences in the workplace: non-pecuniary outcomes at college are most important in the decision for females, while pecuniary outcomes at the workplace explain a substantial part of the choice for males. I decompose the gender gap into differences in beliefs and preferences. Gender differences in beliefs about academic ability and future earnings explain a small and insignificant part of the gap. Conversely, most of the gender gap is due to differences in beliefs about enjoying coursework, and preferences for various outcomes.

JEL Codes: D8, I2, J1, Z1

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1 Introduction

The difference in choice of college majors between males and females is quite dramatic. In 1999-2000, amongst recipients of bachelor's degrees in the US, 13 percent of women majored in education compared to 4 percent of men, and only 2 percent of women majored in engineering compared to 12 percent of men (2001 Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study). Figure 1a highlights the differences in gender composition of undergraduate majors of 1999-2000 bachelor's degree recipients (see also Polacheck, 1978; Turner and Bowen, 1999; Dey and Hill, 2007).

These markedly different choices in college major between males and females have significant economic and social impact. Figure 1b shows that large earnings premiums exist across majors. For example, in 2000-2001, a year after graduation in the US, the average education major employed full-time earned only 60 percent as much as one who majored in engineering (also see Eide and Grogger, 1995; Garman and Loury, 1995; Arcidiacono, 2004, for a discussion of earnings differences across majors). Paglin and Rufolo (1990), and Brown

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and Corcoran (1997) find that differences in major account for a substantial part of the gender gap in the earnings of individuals with several years of college education. Moreover, Xie and Shauman (2003) show that, controlling for major, the gap between men and women in their likelihood of pursuing graduate degrees and careers in science and engineering is smaller. The gender differences in choice of major have recently been at the center of hot debate on the reasons behind women's under-representation in science and engineering (Barres, 2006).

There are at least two plausible explanations for these differences. First, innately disparate abilities between males and females may predispose each group to choose different fields (Kimura, 1999, and 2006). However, studies of mathematically gifted individuals reveal differences in choices across gender, even for very talented individuals. For example, the Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth shows that mathematically talented women preferred careers in law, medicine, and biology over careers in physical sciences and engineering (Lubinski and Benbow, 1992). Moreover, the gender gap in mathematics achievement and aptitude is small and declining (Xie and Shauman, 2003; Goldin et al., 2006), and gender differences in mathematical achievement cannot explain the higher relative likelihood of majoring in sciences and engineering for males (Turner and Bowen, 1999; Xie and Shauman, 2003). These studies suggest gender differences in preferences as a second possible explanation for the gender gap in the choice of major. However, no systematic attempt has been made to study these preferences.

In this paper, I estimate a choice model of college major in order to understand how undergraduates choose college majors, and to explain the underlying gender differences. The choice of major is treated as a decision made under uncertainty– uncertainty about personal tastes, individual abilities, and realizations of outcomes related to choice of major. Such outcomes may include the associated economic returns and lifestyle as well as the successful completion of major. My choice model is closest in spirit to the theoretical model outlined in Altonji (1993), which treats education as a sequential choice made under uncertainty. In his dynamic model, the decision about attending college, field to major in, and dropping out are based on uncertain economic returns, personal tastes, and abilities. I, however, do not model the choice of college. The particular institutional setup in the Weinberg College of Arts & Sciences (WCAS) at Northwestern allows me to estimate a choice model of college major where the decision can be treated as dynamic. However, since individuals are assumed to maximize current expected utility, a static choice model is estimated in this paper.

The standard economic literature on decisions made under uncertainty generally assumes that individuals, after comparing the expected outcomes from various choices, choose the option that maximizes their expected utility. Given the choice data, the goal is to infer the decision rule. However, the expectations of the individual about the choice-specific outcomes are also unknown. The approach prevalent in the literature overlooks the fact that subjective expectations may be different from objective probabilities, assumes that formation of expectations is homogeneous, makes non-verifiable assumptions on expectations, and uses choice data to infer decision rules conditional on maintained assumptions on expectations. However, this can be problematic since observed choices might be consistent with several combinations of expectations and preferences, and the list of underlying assumptions may not be valid (see Manski, 1993a, for a discussion of this inference problem in the context of how youth infer returns to schooling). To illustrate this, let us assume that only two majors exist. Let us assume further that it is easier to get a college degree in the first major, but that it offers lower-paying

jobs than the second major. An individual choosing the first major is consistent with two underlying states of the world: (1) she only cares about getting a college degree, or (2) she only values the job prospects but *believes* that the first major will get her a high-paying job. If one observes only the choice, then clearly one cannot discriminate between the two possibilities. The solution to this identification problem is to use additional data on expectations since it allows the researcher to separate the two possibilities, and that is precisely what I do.

I have designed and conducted a survey to elicit subjective expectations from 161 Northwestern sophomores regarding choice of major. The survey collects data on demographics and background information, data relevant for the estimation of the choice model, and open-ended responses intended to explore how individuals form expectations.

In contrast to most studies on schooling choices which ignore uncertainty, I estimate a random utility model of college major choice allowing for heterogeneity in beliefs.¹ My approach also differs from the existing literature by accounting for the non-pecuniary aspects of the choice. Fiorito and Dauffenbach (1982) and Easterlin (1995) highlight the importance of non-price determinants in the choice of majors. However, no study has jointly modeled the pecuniary and non-pecuniary determinants of the choice. My approach allows me to quantify the contributions of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary outcomes to the choice. Moreover, the model is rich enough to explain gender differences in choices.

Responses to questions eliciting subjective expectations match up with existing statistics for several questions indicating that respondents answer meaningfully and seriously. Respondents exhibit significant heterogeneity in their responses (both between and within genders), which underscores the importance of expectations data to conduct inference in settings with uncertainty. For example, the mean belief of being active in the full-time labor force at the age of 30 is 87.23% for females, and 95.11% for males. The gap widens for beliefs of labor force participation at the age of 40. Differences in beliefs could arise if people's experiences differ and beliefs are formed as a consequence of the individual's experiences and interactions with others in society. Other than that, beliefs could be shaped intentionally either by the subconscious, or by one's parents and peers. I find strong evidence of the latter- parents play a crucial role in shaping one's beliefs. Moreover, the effect differs by gender. For example, females with a stay-at-home mother have beliefs of being active in the full-time labor force at the age of 40 that are, on average, 12 points lower (on a 0-100 scale) than females with a working mother; no corresponding effect is found for males.

I estimate separate models for single major choice and for double major choice. The most important outcomes in the choice of single major are enjoying coursework, enjoying work at potential jobs, and approval of parents. Non-pecuniary outcomes explain about 45% of the choice behavior for males, and more than three-fourths of the choice for females. Males and females have similar preferences at college, but differ in their preferences regarding the workplace: males care more about the pecuniary outcomes in the workplace, females about the non-pecuniary outcomes. The results for the double major choice model are similar to those for single major. Graduating in 4 years, approval of parents, and enjoying coursework are the most important determinants of the choice. Additionally, I find evidence of individuals strategically choosing pairs of majors that allow them to specialize along certain dimensions. Females prefer pairs of majors which entail different chances of completion and getting a job upon graduation. On the other hand, males prefer major pairs that differ in their chances of

 $^{^{1}}$ Literature on college majors has largely ignored the uncertainty associated with the various outcomes of the choice. Two notable empirical exceptions are Bamberger (1986), and Arcidiacono (2004). However, the former only takes into account the uncertainty about completing one's field of study. The latter estimates a dynamic model of college and major choice under highly stylized assumptions on expectations formation.

completion, in the approval of parents, and in how much they would enjoy the coursework.

Besides being related to the literature on college major choice, this paper is related to three strands of literature. On the methodology side, it adds to the recent literature on subjective expectations (see Manski, 2004, for an overview of this literature). In the last decade or so, economists have increasingly undertaken the task of collecting and describing subjective data. Recently expectations data have been employed to estimate decision models. Van der Klaauw (2000) uses expectations data to improve the precision of the parameter estimates of a dynamic model of teacher career decisions. Delavande (2004) collects subjective data to estimate a choice model of birth control choice for women. The choice model used in this paper is motivated by her framework. The most recent step in this literature studies the formation of beliefs (Di Tella et al., 2007; and Lochner, 2007). My paper contributes to all three branches of this literature by providing an extensive description of students' expectations about major-specific outcomes, by using subjective expectations data to estimate a choice model, and by explaining the mechanisms through which beliefs form.

Second, this paper contributes to the recent literature on culture and economic outcomes (see Guiso et al., 2006; Alesina and Giuliano, 2007; Fernandez, 2007a). In order to establish a causal link from culture to economic outcomes, I focus on the dimension of culture that is inherited by an individual from previous generations, rather than being voluntarily selected. I use information on the country of origin of the individual's parents as a cultural proxy. Cultural proxies are found to bias beliefs in systematic ways, and the effect differs by gender. For example, after controlling for other factors, beliefs of females with foreign-born parents about being active in the labor force at age 30 are about 9 points lower than those of females with US-born parents; no such significant difference is found for males. I also find that cultural proxies bias preferences in favor of certain outcomes. Individuals with foreign-born parents value the pecuniary aspects of the choice more. In particular, males with foreign-born parents is the only sub-group in my sample for whom pecuniary outcomes explain more than 50% of the choice.

Finally, this paper is related to the literature that focuses on the underlying reasons for the gender gap in science and engineering. An interesting question is whether gender differences in choices are driven by differences in preferences or in beliefs. In the recent debate on the under-representation of women in science and engineering, some authors have claimed that the gap may be driven by the fact that women are less self-confident about their academic abilities than men. Valian (1998) argues that social prejudice against women causes them to lose self-confidence. Indeed, Solnick (1995) finds that women are more likely to shift to other majors from traditionally female majors if they attend a women's college. To check the validity of these hypotheses, I decompose the gender gap in major choice into differences in beliefs and differences in preferences. First, I find that gender differences in beliefs about ability constitute a small and insignificant part of the gap. This implies that explanations based entirely on the assumption that women have lower self-confidence relative to men (Long, 1986; Niederle et al., 2007) can be rejected in my data. Second, majority of the gender gap in majors that I consider can be explained by gender differences in beliefs about tastes for studying different fields, and preferences. For example, 60% of the gender gap in engineering is due to differences in preferences, while 30% is due to differences in how much females and males believe they will enjoy studying engineering. Gender differences in beliefs about future earnings in engineering are insignificant and explain less than 1% of the gap. I simulate an environment in which the female subjective belief distribution about ability and future earnings is replaced with that of males; in the case of engineering, this reduces the gap by about only 14%. These results suggest that simply raising expectations for women in science, as claimed by Valian (1998), may not be enough, and that wage discrimination and social biases may not be the main reason for why women are less likely to major in science and engineering.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the choice model and the identification strategy. Section 3 describes the institutional setup of Weinberg College of Arts & Sciences, outlines the data collection methodology, describes the subjective data, and discusses the formation of beliefs. Section 4 outlines the econometric framework used for estimation. Section 5 presents the estimation results for the single major choice model. Section 6 presents the results for the double major choice model. Section 7 undertakes a decomposition technique to understand the sources of gender differences in major choice. Finally, Section 8 concludes.

2 Choice Model

At time t, individual i is confronted with the decision to choose a college major from her choice set C_i . Individuals are forward-looking, and their choice depends not only on the current state of the world but also on what they expect will happen in the future. Individual i derives utility $U_{ikt}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}, X_{it})$ from choosing major k. Utility is a function of a vector of outcomes \mathbf{a} which are realized in college, a vector of outcomes \mathbf{c} which are realized after graduating from college, and individual characteristics X_{it} . Examples of outcomes in \mathbf{a} include graduating within 4 years, enjoying the coursework, and approval of parents. Examples of outcomes in \mathbf{c} include future income, number of hours spent at the job, and ability to reconcile family and work. Both vectors, \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{c} , are uncertain at time t; individual i possesses subjective beliefs $P_{ikt}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c})$ about the outcomes associated with choice of major k for all $k \in C_i$.² If an individual chooses major m, then standard revealed preference argument (assuming that indifference between alternatives occurs with zero probability) implies that:

$$m \equiv \arg \max_{k \in C_i} \int U_{ikt}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}, X_{it}) dP_{ikt}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c})$$
(1)

The goal is to infer the preference parameters from observed choices. However, the expectations of the individual about the choice-specific outcomes are also unknown. The most one can do is infer the decision rule conditional on the assumptions imposed on expectations. This would not be an issue if there were reason to think that prevailing expectations assumptions are correct. However, not only has the information processing rule varied considerably among studies of schooling behavior, most assume that individuals form their expectations in the same way.³ First, there is little reason to think that individuals form their expectations in the same way. Second, different combinations of preferences and expectations (about others' behavior) leads to same actions in the ultimatum game. To cope with the problem of joint inference on preferences and expectations, I elicit subjective probabilities directly from individuals. An additional advantage of this approach is that it allows

²Though each major has an objective probability for (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}) , there's no reason to believe that subjective beliefs will be the same as the objective probabilities.

 $^{^{3}}$ Freeman (1971) assumed that income expectation formation of college students is myopic, that is, the youth believe that they will obtain the mean income realized by the members of a specified earlier cohort who made that choice. Arcidiacono (2004), in his dynamic model of college and major choice, makes strong assumptions about various outcomes; for example, he assumes that youth condition their expectations of future earnings on their ability, GPA, average ability of other students enrolled in that college, and some demographic variables. Similarly he assumes that all individuals have same expectations about the probability of working conditional on sex and major. The list of studies that explicitly (or implicitly) make assumptions about expectations formation is long, and there is no evidence that prevailing expectations assumptions are correct.

me to account for the non-pecuniary determinants of the choice (data on which does not exist otherwise).

The exact utility specification is outlined in section 4 which presents the econometric framework. I first describe the data collection methodology in the following section.

3 Data

I collect data on 161 Northwestern sophomores. This section describes the institutional details at Northwestern, the data collection method, and analyzes the elicited subjective data.

3.1 Institutional Details

At time t, the individual uses available information to form subjective beliefs $P_{ikt}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}) \ \forall k \in C_i$. She then uses her subjective beliefs and preferences to choose a major that maximizes her expected subjective utility. Over time she might acquire more information about any of the outcomes. For example, she may learn about her unobserved match quality (ability and taste) in different fields by taking courses. Moreover, she may also receive valuable information about the kinds of jobs and other major-related outcomes over time.




Figure 1c: Timeline

As shown in Figure 1c, the individual starts college at time 0 in her most preferred major. She may take courses in various majors between time 0 and time 1 in order to learn about her tastes and abilities. New information may arrive about match quality, or about the major-specific outcomes which could prompt the individual to change her major. She may switch her major any time between time 0 and time 1. At time 1, which corresponds to the end of the sophomore year, the individual has to declare her major. If she continues college after time 1, she takes further courses in her declared major, and graduates from college at time 2.

This goal is to estimate the individual's preferences between time 0 and time 1. Therefore, the study is restricted to Northwestern sophomores. Moreover, the model allows an individual to experiment with majors until time 1. I therefore restrict the study to schools at Northwestern where students have flexibility in choosing a major. For example, a student in the School of Engineering has to declare her major at time 0, and can only change her major by a special request to the school- she would not be eligible for the study. I further assume the choice set for an individual to be exogenous. This eliminates students in smaller schools at Northwestern since I will have to make strong assumptions about their choice set. Therefore, I restrict the study to the Weinberg College of Arts & Sciences (WCAS) at Northwestern. All sophomores with at least one major in the WCAS were eligible for the study.⁴

⁴A student could have a second major in any other school. She could take part in the study as long as she was pursuing a major in WCAS.

3.1.1 Choice Set

WCAS offers a total of 41 majors. To estimate the choice model, one needs to elicit the subjective probabilities of the outcomes for each major. In order to limit the size of the choice set, I pool similar majors together. Table 1a shows the majors divided into various categories. Categories a through g span the majors offered in WCAS. Categories h through l span undergraduate majors offered by other schools at Northwestern. There is a trade-off between the number of categories and the length of the survey. This categorization is fairly fine, and also seems reasonable.

For a student pursuing a single major in WCAS, it is assumed that her choice set includes all the categories that span WCAS majors (a-g), and category k, the majors offered in the School of Engineering.⁵ Therefore, any student with a single major is assumed to have 8 categories in her choice set.

For an individual with a double major, the choice set is conditional on whether both her majors are in WCAS and the School of Engineering, or not. Conditional on the student's majors being in WCAS and the School of Engineering, the choice set is the same as that of a single major respondent except that the goal is now to select pairs of majors rather than a single one. Conditional on one of the majors being in a school other than WCAS or the School of Engineering, the choice set includes all major categories that span WCAS, category k, and the category which includes the student's non-WCAS major.⁶

3.2 Data Collection

A sample of eligible sophomores and their E-mail addresses was provided by the Northwestern Office of the Registrar. Students were recruited by E-mail, and flyers were posted on campus in schools other than WCAS.⁷ The E-mails and flyers explicitly asked for sophomores with an intended major in WCAS. Prospective participants were told that the survey was about the choice of college majors, and that they would get \$10 for completing the 45-minute electronic survey. It was emphasized that one need not have declared their major to participate in the study. The survey was conducted from November 2006 to February 2007. Respondents were required to come to the Kellogg Experimental Laboratory to take the electronic survey.

A total of 161 WCAS sophomores were surveyed, of whom 92 were females. Table 1b shows the characteristics of the sample and compares them to the sophomore class. The sample looks similar to the population in most aspects. However, two differences stand out: (1) students of Asian ethnicity are over-represented in my sample, and (2) 61% of the respondents had declared their major at the time of the survey, whereas the corresponding number for the sophomore population was only 18%. However, this statistic for the population was obtained at the beginning of the sophomore year. Since students may declare their major at any time during the academic year, it is very likely that this statistic was greater than 18% for the population at the time of the survey.

Table 1c presents the distribution of WCAS majors in the sample. For comparison, the major distribution for the graduating class of 2006 is also presented. There are a few notable features. The proportion of males who (intend to) major in Social Sciences II is twice the corresponding proportion of women in both my sample as well as the graduating class of 2006. This pattern is reversed in the case of Social Sciences I, and Literature and Fine Arts. The proportion of females who (intend to) major in Literature and Fine Arts is more than 3

⁵This was done to elicit subjective beliefs of the outcomes associated with majoring in Engineering.

⁶ For example, the choice set for a student with a major in WCAS and the School of Education would be categories a-g, i, and k.

 $^{^{7}}$ E-mails advertising the survey were also sent out by WCAS undergraduate advisors, economics professors teaching large core classes, and Deans of some schools (other than WCAS).

times the corresponding proportion of males.

The 45-minute survey consisted of three parts. The first part collected demographic and background information (including parents' and siblings' occupations and college majors, source of college funding etc.). The second part collected data relevant for the estimation of the choice model, and is discussed in more detail in the next subsection. The third part collected responses to open-ended questions intended to explore how respondents form expectations about various major-specific outcomes, and the sources of information they used. At the end of the survey, respondents were asked if they were willing to participate in a follow-up survey in a year's time.⁸

3.3 Subjective Data

The subjective beliefs, $P_{ikt}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}) \forall k \in C_i$, are elicited directly from the respondent. The vector \mathbf{a} includes the outcomes:

 a_1 successfully completing (graduating) a field of study in 4 years

 a_2 graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5 in the field of study

 a_3 enjoying the coursework

 a_4 hours/week spent on the coursework

 a_5 parents approve of the major

while the vector \mathbf{c} consists of:

 c_1 get an acceptable job immediately upon graduation

 c_2 enjoy working at the jobs available after graduation

 c_3 able to reconcile work and family at the available jobs

 c_4 hours/week spent working at the available jobs

 c_5 social status of the available jobs

 c_6 income at the available jobs

An individual's choice of major might be motivated by several pecuniary and non-pecuniary concerns. An individual motivated primarily by future earnings prospects may choose a major that is associated with large income streams (c_6) , allows a high probability of getting a job upon graduation (c_1) , and increases the possibility of getting jobs with high social status (c_5) . An individual concerned about her ability may choose a major that presents a greater probability of completion (a_1) , and allows her to graduate with a higher GPA (a_2) . On the other hand, an individual may choose a major with low-salary job prospects which allow a flexible lifestyle (c_3, c_4) , or provide opportunities to do things she enjoys (c_2) . Similarly an individual's choice may be influenced by the kinds of courses she finds interesting (a_3) , or by how demanding the major is (a_4) . Finally, the choice may be influenced by parents and family (a_5) . Another interpreted as taste in college; c_2 and c_3 may be interpreted as tastes in the workplace.

Note that $\{a_r\}_{r=\{1,2,3,5\}}$ and $\{c_q\}_{q=\{1,2,3\}}$ are binary, while outcomes a_4 , and $\{c_q\}_{q=\{4,5,6\}}$ are continuous. For all $k \in C_i$, the following beliefs were elicited: $P_{ikt}(a_r = 1)$ for $r = \{1, 2, 3, 5\}$, $P_{ikt}(c_q = 1)$ for $q = \{1, 2, 3\}$,

 $^{^{8}}$ If the respondent agrees to the follow-up, she is asked for her name and contact information. An astounding 97% (156 out of 161) respondents agreed to the follow-up.

 $E_{ikt}(a_4)$, and $E_{ikt}(c_q)$ for $q = \{4, 6\}$.

Questions eliciting the subjective probabilities of major-specific outcomes are based on the use of percentages. As is standard in studies that collect subjective data, a short introduction was read and handed to the respondents at the start of the survey:

"In some of the survey questions, you will be asked about the PERCENT CHANCE of something happening. The percent chance must be a number between zero and 100. Numbers like 2 or 5% indicate "almost no chance," 19% or so may mean "not much chance," a 47 or 55% chance may be a "pretty even chance," 82% or so indicates a "very good chance," and a 95 or 98% mean "almost certain." The percent chance can also be thought of as the NUMBER OF CHANCES OUT OF 100.

We will start with a couple of practice questions."

This introduction is similar to the one in the Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE) which is described in Dominitz and Manski (1997). However, as in Delavande (2004), I do not round off the percentages. For example, I use 19% instead of 20% to encourage respondents to use the full range from zero to 100. Respondents had to answer two practice questions before starting the survey to make sure they understood how to answer questions based on the use of percentages.

The questions dealing with subjective expectations were worded as follows:

If you were majoring in [X], what do you think is the percent chance that you will graduate with a GPA of at least 3.5 (on a scale of 4)?

and:

Look ahead to when you will be 30 YEARS OLD. If you majored in [X], what do you think is the percent chance that you will be able to reconcile work and your social life/ family at the kinds of jobs that will be available to you?

The question eliciting the expected number of hours/week spent on coursework was:

If you were majoring in [X], how many hours per week do you think you will need to spend on the coursework?

Social status of the available jobs was elicited as follows:

Look ahead to when you will be 30 years old. Rank the following fields of study according to your perception of the social status of the jobs that would be available to you and that you would accept if you graduated from that field of study.⁹

For the expected income, the question was as follows:¹⁰

Look ahead to when you will be 30 years old. Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available to you and that you will accept if you graduate in [X]. What is the average amount of money that you think you will earn per year by the time you are 30 YEARS OLD?

⁹This question elicits an ordinal ranking of the social status of the jobs. However, I treat these ordinal responses as cardinal in the choice model analysis. In hindsight, this question should have been asked in terms of subjective expectations of getting a high status job. ¹⁰The wording of this question is very similar to that of Dominitz and Manski (1996) who elicit student expectations of the returns to schooling from high school and college students.

The full questionnaire can be viewed in Appendix 1.

In addition, I elicited the subjective belief of being active in the full-time labor force at the age of 30 and 40, and $E(Y_0)$, the expected income of dropping out from school at the age of 30.

3.4 Data Description

Since the use of subjective data in economics is fairly recent, this section describes the subjective data in some detail. I discuss the precision and accuracy of the responses, and, whenever possible, compare them to objective measures. I also attempt to understand some of the determinants of beliefs; in particular, I study how beliefs for some outcomes are associated with family characteristics (as in Alesina and Giuliano, 2007). Readers interested in the model estimation may skip to section 4.

3.4.1 Subjective Beliefs of non-monetary outcomes

In order to highlight the heterogeneity in beliefs across respondents, I discuss the responses to two representative questions which elicit the subjective beliefs of choice-specific outcomes. Table 2a presents the gender-specific subjective belief distribution of graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5 in Engineering, and Literature and Fine Arts, while Table 2b shows the gender-specific distribution of the subjective probability of being able to reconcile work and family at jobs that would be available if one graduated in Social Sciences I, and Social Sciences II. Both tables show that respondents are willing to use the entire scale from zero to 100. It does seem that respondents tend to round off their responses to the nearest 5, especially for answers not at the extremes. There has been some concern that respondents might answer 50% when they want to respond to the interviewer but are unable to make any reasonable probability assessment of the relevant question.¹¹ However, the 50% response is not the most frequent one in the majority of the cases. There doesn't seem to be any evidence of anchoring since numbers that were presented in the introductory text do not occur more often than others.

Table 2a also indicates that respondents answer seriously and meaningfully. About 60% of males think that the percent chance of graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5 in Engineering is greater than 50%. On the other hand, nearly 95% of them believe that they would be able to graduate with a GPA of at least 3.5 with a probability of more than 0.5 in Literature & Fine Arts. This is consistent with the fact that it's harder to do well in Engineering than in Literature & Fine Arts.¹² Females also exhibit substantive heterogeneity in beliefs, and seem to respond to questions in a consistent manner. Whereas only 30% of females believe that there's a greater than 50% chance of graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5 in Engineering, nearly 90% of females believe that to be the case in Literature & Fine Arts. The different gender-specific belief distributions underscore the heterogeneity in beliefs between the two genders.

Analysis of Table 2b also reveals substantial heterogeneity in responses. However, the gender-specific subjective distributions are similar in this case. Only a quarter of respondents believe the probability of being able to reconcile work and family at the jobs in Social Sciences II to be greater than 75%, while nearly 55% believe that to be the case at the jobs associated with graduating in Social Sciences I. These beliefs are consistent with the general perception of hectic work schedules in the corporate sector in which most Northwestern Social Sciences II undergraduates get jobs.

¹¹See Bruine de Bruin et. al. (2000). This is what they call "epistemic uncertainty", or the "50-50 chance".

 $^{^{12}}$ Average GPA of Northwestern Engineering graduates of 2006 was 3.43, while that of Literature & Fine Arts was 3.56 (Source: Northwestern Graduate Survey). However, responses in Table 2a also includes individuals who have *chosen* not to major in either of these two majors.

3.4.2 Subjective beliefs about Starting Salaries

Survey respondents were asked the average annual starting salary of Northwestern graduates of 2006 for various major categories. There were two reasons for asking this question. First, it allows me to check the plausibility of survey responses since they can be directly compared to actual salary realizations of 2006 graduates. Second, it allows me to gauge the respondents' level of knowledge about income differences across majors. The question asked was: "What do you think was the average annual starting salary of Northwestern graduates (of 2006) with Bachelor's Degrees in Category X?". Though there's substantial heterogeneity in the empirical beliefs, I present average and median beliefs of respondents by gender in Table 2c. The first three columns show the actual outcomes for the 2006 graduating class. Females have lower average starting salaries across all major categories in WCAS (except Ethics and Values), and in most majors outside WCAS. The question posed to survey respondents asked for the average salary, so the point estimate that respondents provide could be a point on their subjective gender-specific earnings distribution, or the general earnings distribution. Since individuals majoring in a field may have better information about their chosen field, and may have beliefs different from those of individuals not majoring in it, I split survey responses by whether the respondent majors in the category about which the question is asked. Columns (4) and (5) present average and median beliefs of respondents who are pursuing a major in that category. In general, responses are consistent with actual trends. Relative magnitudes of responses for different majors match well with the actual statistics which shows that respondents are aware of different returns to majors. Males majoring in area studies overestimate the average earnings in the field. Female respondents overestimate average salaries for the three largest WCAS categories - Natural Sciences, Social Sciences I, and Social Sciences II.¹³ The median and average responses for individuals not majoring in the field are shown in columns (6) and (7), and are remarkably close to the actual outcomes. On the whole, individuals seem to be well-informed about the differences in earnings across majors, and approximate the relative earnings reasonably well.

Using the demographic information collected from the respondents, one might be able to say something about the determinants of the errors in respondents' response to the question about salaries of 2006 graduates. To model the respondents' errors, I use the following metric:¹⁴

$$\ln\left|\frac{\widehat{s_{im}} - s_m^{obs}}{s_m^{obs}}\right|$$

where $\widehat{s_{im}}$ is respondent *i*'s reported average starting salary in major *m*, and s_m^{obs} is the true average salary for Northwestern graduates of 2006 in major *m*. Column (1) of Table 2d presents the results of regressing this metric for starting salaries in all majors on various demographic variables and a random effect to account for repeated observations for an individual. Column 2 (3) restricts the sample to cases where the respondents' point estimates are greater (less) than the observed outcomes. Individuals with higher GPAs make significantly larger errors when estimating starting salaries, and are more likely to overestimate them.¹⁵ Females make larger errors than their male counterparts; moreover, females who overestimate (underestimate) make errors that are significantly larger than those of males who overestimate (underestimate). In most specifications, individuals

¹³This is the case when their responses are compared to either the average salaries for all graduates, or to those for females only.

 $^{^{14}}$ Betts (1996) uses this metric to examine undergraduates' errors in beliefs about salaries by type of education.

 $^{^{15}}$ This could be because such individuals think that GPA is a strong predictor of starting salary, when in fact GPA is not a significant predictor of one's starting salary in either the Northwestern Graduation Survey 2006, or the Baccalaureate & Beyond Longitudinal Study 1993/2003.

who have declared their major at the time of the survey, and whose parents attended college make smaller errors. The former observation is consistent with students who have declared their major being better-informed about the chosen field, while the latter is consistent with students with college-educated parents having access to better information. However, individuals with parents who have studied a given major are not better-informed about starting salaries in that major. Respondents who happen to be foreign students or second-generation immigrants are more likely to make larger errors.¹⁶ Finally, respondents belonging to low-income households make smaller errors.¹⁷

Survey respondents were also asked the average salary they expect to earn at the age of 30 for each major category. There was substantial heterogeneity in responses. Table 2e presents the average and median beliefs of the respondents. Unfortunately, Northwestern does not follow its alumni, and this data does not exist for previous graduate classes. For comparison purposes, I instead use the 2003 average annual salaries for 1993 college graduates from selective colleges in the Baccalaureate & Beyond Longitudinal Study (B&B: 1993/2003).¹⁸ These statistics are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2e. Again, the average and median beliefs of respondents majoring in the field are similar to those who do not major in that field. Both males and females report median and average salaries larger than those for the B&B sample (columns (1) and (2)). It could be that the survey respondents are *self-enhancing* their own salary expectations.¹⁹ However, there are at least three legitimate reasons why respondents' earning expectations may be different from the earnings statistics in the B&B sample. First, even though I have restricted the B&B sample to selective institutions. Northwestern graduates may work at jobs very different from those of graduates from comparable institutions. Second, respondents might think that future earnings distributions will differ from the current ones. Third, respondents may have private information (other than gender) about themselves which justifies having different expectations.

The discrepancy in the average and median responses for female respondents majoring in Natural Sciences, Social Sciences I, and Social Sciences II continues to be much larger than the corresponding discrepancy for other females and males. Given that the same females provided higher average responses for the starting salaries of 2006 graduates in these fields in Table 2d, it seems that they have misperceptions about actual outcomes.

3.4.3 Subjective Beliefs about Labor Force Participation

Beliefs of being active in the full-time labor force at the age of 30 and 40 were elicited from respondents. The median response for being active in the full-time labor force was same at both ages: 90% for females, and 95% for males. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in beliefs both between males and females, and within each gender group. Table 2f shows the subjective belief distributions at the two ages.

The female subjective labor force distribution at the age of 30 is skewed to the left relative to the male distribution. Females have a lower mean belief about their labor force participation at the age of 30 than males (87.23% for females versus 95.11% for males, with the gender difference significant at 0.01%). Moreover, females exhibit greater heterogeneity in their beliefs (a standard deviation of 13.56 for females versus 5.49 for

¹⁶Second-generation immigrants are defined as individuals who are US citizens, and have at least one parent who is foreign-born.

 $^{^{17}}$ This is in contrast to what Betts (1996) finds. This could be because the two studies survey individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds. Recall that the low-income category in my study is household income less than \$150,000.

¹⁸Colleges with high selectivity, and the same Carnegie Code classification as Northwestern were used for comparison.

Assuming students graduate from college at the age of 22, this would be their salary at 32.

¹⁹Smith and Powell (1990) find that male college seniors report higher income expectations for themselves than they do for their college peers at the same school.

males). Whereas nearly 80% of male respondents believe that there is a greater than 90 percent chance of their being active in the labor force at the age of 30, only 45% of females believe so.

The beliefs of being active in the full-time labor force at the age of 40 exhibit even greater heterogeneity between and within gender. The standard deviation of beliefs is 16.97 for females, and 7.57 for males. The mean belief for males is now 92.94%, and for females is 84.13%, with the gender difference being significant again. Now only about 65% of the males believe that the percent chance they will be active in the full-time labor force at the age of 40 is greater than 90%, while the corresponding number is 40% for females.

One can compare the median and mean beliefs of being active in the full-time labor force to a similar question in the expectations module of NLSY97. Though Northwestern undergraduates belong to a specific demographic, the comparison can still be useful. The question: "What is the probability that you will be working for pay more than 20 hours per week when you turn 30?" was posed to youth of ages 16-17 who are yet to start college (for details, see Fischhoff et al., 2000). The median response for both genders is 100%; the mean is 92.76% for males, and 91.84% for females. The difference in the mean belief between the NLSY97 females and those in my survey is significant (p-value = 0.016). Another statistic for comparison is the projected labor force participation for ages 25-34 in 2014. It is 95.3% for males, and 75.4% for females.²⁰ The mean for the male respondents is very similar to the projected mean for the relevant age group, while the mean belief for females is about 10 percent points higher. Though females currently have a higher mean belief of being active in the labor force at 30 than the projected rate, their responses (relative to males) indicate that they start thinking about the uncertainty in their labor force status pretty early in their careers.

It might be of interest to see whether the heterogeneity across and within gender in beliefs about labor force participation can be explained by the demographic characteristics of the respondents. Table 2g presents best linear predictors under square loss of the labor force participation rates. The belief of being active in the labor force for females is, on average, 6.7 (8.7) points lower than that of males at the age of 30 (40). Students with higher GPA have a higher belief of being active in the labor force at both 30 and 40. Individuals from higher income households have higher beliefs of being active in the labor force. Coefficients on parental education are not significant. McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) claim that children of divorced parents are more likely to be unemployed; however, in my sample, I don't find any such effect on the future labor force participation beliefs of individuals with divorced/separated parents. One notable finding is that individuals who are second-generation immigrants have a lower belief of being active in the labor force. A foreign-born parent decreases the belief of full-time labor force participation at the age of 40 by about 11.5 points for females, and 7 points for males. I treat country of birth of parents as a proxy for culture; since these individuals are born and raised in the US, they face the same institutions as individuals with US-born parents, but potentially differ in the cultural values transmitted to them by their parents. Focusing on the dimension of culture which is inherited by an individual (and hence exogenous) allows me to establish a causal link from culture to the economic outcome. Therefore, I conclude that culture is shaping individual's beliefs of labor force participation. This finding is similar to that of Fernandez and Fogli (2005) who find that cultural proxies have significant positive explanatory power for explaining work outcomes for second-generation American women (however, they use the female labor force participation rate in the female's country of ancestry as a cultural proxy).²¹ Another significant finding is the

²⁰Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 2006.

²¹Alesina and Giuliano (2007) also find that ancestry affects labor force participation of second generation immigrants.

effect of having a mother who is a full-time housewife on beliefs. Females with a stay-at-home mother have beliefs about labor force participation at the age of 40 which are, on average, 12.5 points lower than those of females with a working mother; no corresponding effect is found for males. In this context, it seems that beliefs for labor force participation for females are being shaped by the role of their mothers.²²

3.4.4 Parents and Peer Effects

The importance of peer effects in shaping individual choices has been documented in several studies within higher education (see, for example, Betts and Morell, 1999), but there is little research on peer effects in crucial decisions such as choice of college major. Sacerdote (2001) does not find evidence for (roommate) peer effects in major choice for Dartmouth College roommates. De Girogi et al. (2007) find that Bocconi undergraduates are more likely to choose a major when many of their peers make that choice. Several respondents in my survey report to have majors that are the same as that of their roommates and friends. However, there is a self-selection issue: people often select with whom they associate.²³ Since rooming assignments are not totally random at Northwestern and there are endogeneity issues in how friendships are being formed, I cannot analytically study the strength of peer effects in the choice of college major.

Table 2h presents the correlation patterns between the respondent's major and their father's major in Panel A, and the correlation pattern with the mother's majors in Panel B.²⁴ Since the sample is restricted to WCAS students, and several majors have been pooled together for each category, I cannot check for independence in the choice between an individual's choice and that of her parents. However, one feature that stands out is that students pursuing a major in Natural Sciences are more likely to have a parent who majored in that category. Moreover, of the 63 individuals with at least one sibling, 22 major in the same field as their sibling.

A positive correlation between an individual's choice of college major with that of her parents or siblings could be consistent with either (1) her having more information about that particular choice by information acquisition of the various outcomes from her parents and siblings, and hence choosing that major through an *indirect* effect of parents, (2) *direct* parental pressure leading an individual towards a particular major choice, or (3) a utility gain by studying the same major as that of parents. The first two are consistent with the evidence presented earlier. Moreover, when estimating preferences which incorporate individual heterogeneity in section 5.2, demographic characteristics (like country of birth of parents) are found to bias preferences for certain outcomes. However, it is not possible to tell which mechanism is at work, i.e. whether beliefs and preferences are subconsciously being formed as a consequence of the individual's interactions with parents, or whether parents are intentionally shaping the beliefs and preferences of their children (as in Bisin and Verdier, 2001), or both. Survey respondents were asked to explain the reasons for the similarity between their major and that of their parents and siblings. Selected responses are shown in section 9.3.2 of the Appendix. All three reasons come up as possible explanations. The responses also show instances of peer influence, but in most cases individuals seem to form friendships with similar individuals.

 $^{^{22}}$ Fernandez (2007b) explains the s-shaped pattern observed in the female labor force participation in the last century in the US with an intergenerational learning model about payoffs to work for females; females receive private and public signals through which they learn about the payoffs to work. Here, it seems that females give a lot of weight to the signals they receive from their mothers. Also see Fogli and Veldkamp (2007) for a similar model where female labor force participation increases through learning from endogenous information.

 $^{^{23}}$ See Manski (1993); basically if the peers with whom a person associates share his attributes and also affect his attainment, and are not observed by the researcher, then the researcher might falsely attribute a peer effect where one does not exist.

 $^{^{24}}$ Both majors of the individual are included in the table if they happen to pursue more than one major.

To conclude this section, I find that respondents provide meaningful answers to questions eliciting subjective expectations. In cases where responses could be compared to objective realities and statistics, survey responses match up well. Individuals are aware of the earnings differences across majors. However, females tend to make bigger errors about income expectations (overestimate future income), and seem to have misperceptions about future earnings in their own major in some cases. There is substantial heterogeneity in responses both between and within gender. This questions the accuracy of restrictions imposed on expectations in the literature. Since I don't observe the information set of the respondents, it is hard to pin down the exact mechanisms through which beliefs form. However, analysis of labor force participation beliefs and income expectations shows that beliefs for these specific outcomes are associated with culture and parents. Since I focus on aspects of culture (country of birth of parents; traits of parents) which are inherited by an individual, I can conclude that there is a causal link from culture and parents to beliefs about labor force participation.

4 Econometric Model

This section outlines the econometric framework.

Recall that utility, $U_{ikt}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}, X_{it})$, is a function of a 5 × 1 vector of outcomes **a** realized in college, a 6 × 1 vector of outcomes **c** realized after graduating from college, and individual characteristics X_{it} . The individual maximizes her *current* subjective expected utility²⁵; she chooses major *m* at time *t* if:

$$m \equiv \arg \max_{k \in C_i} \int U_{ikt}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}, X_{it}) dP_{ikt}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c})$$
⁽²⁾

Moreover, as explained in section 3.3, the outcomes $\{a_r\}_{r=\{1,2,3,5\}}$ and $\{c_q\}_{q=\{1,2,3\}}$ are binary, while outcomes a_4 , and $\{c_q\}_{q=\{4,5,6\}}$ are continuous. I change the notation slightly, and define **b** to be a 7 × 1 vector of all binary outcomes, i.e. **b** = $\{a_1, a_2, a_3, a_5, c_1, c_2, c_3\}$, and **d** to be a 4 × 1 vector of all continuous outcomes, i.e. **d** = $\{a_4, c_4, c_5, c_6\}$. The utility can now be written as a function of outcomes **b**, **d**, and characteristics X_{it} . I assume that utility is additively separable in the outcomes:

$$U_{it}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}, X_{it}) = \sum_{r=1}^{7} u_r(b_r, X_{it}) + \sum_{q=1}^{4} \gamma_{iqt} d_q + \varepsilon_{ikt}$$
(3)

where $u_r(b_r, X_{it})$ is the utility associated with the binary outcome b_r for an individual with characteristics X_{it} , γ_{iqt} is a constant for the continuous outcome d_q , and ε_{ikt} is a random term. The utility is same for all individuals with identical observable characteristics X_{it} up to the random term. (2) can now be written as:

$$m \equiv \arg \max_{k \in C_i} \left(\sum_{r=1}^7 \int u_r(b_r, X_{it}) dP_{ikt}(b_r) + \sum_{q=1}^4 \gamma_{iqt} \int d_q dP_{ikt}(d_q) + \varepsilon_{ikt} \right)$$
(4)

An individual i with subjective beliefs $\{P_{ikt}(b_r), P_{ikt}(d_q)\}$ for $r \in \{1, ..., 7\}$, $q \in \{1, ..., 4\}$, and $\forall k \in C_i$ chooses

²⁵ Under the assumption that individuals maximize current expected utility, I don't need to take into account that individuals may find it optimal to experiment with different majors. However, experimentation could be important in this context to learn about one's ability and match quality (see Manski, 1989, and Malamud, 2006). It is beyond the scope of this paper and is the focus of follow-up work.

major m at time t with probability:

$$\Pr(m|X_{it}, \{P_{ikt}(b_r), P_{ikt}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1, \dots, 7\}, q \in \{1, \dots, 4\}; k \in C_i\}) =$$

$$\Pr\left(\begin{array}{c}\sum_{r=1}^{7}\int u_{r}(b_{r},X_{it})dP_{imt}(b_{r})+\sum_{q=1}^{4}\gamma_{iqt}\int d_{q}dP_{imt}(d_{q})+\varepsilon_{imt}\\\sum_{r=1}^{7}\int u_{r}(b_{r},X_{it})dP_{ikt}(b_{r})+\sum_{q=1}^{4}\gamma_{iqt}\int d_{q}dP_{ikt}(d_{q})+\varepsilon_{ikt}\end{array}\right)\qquad\forall k\in C_{i},\ m\neq k$$

$$(5)$$

For the binary outcomes in **b**, $P_{imt}(b_r)$ is simply $P_{imt}(b_r = 1)$ for $r \in \{1, ..., 7\}$; $P_{imt}(b_r = 1)$ is elicited directly from the respondents for $\forall r \in \{1, ..., 7\}$ and $\forall k \in C_i$. For the continuous outcomes in **d**, instead of the probability distribution, the expected value of the outcome $E_{ikt}(d_q) = \int d_q dP_{ikt}(d_q)$ is elicited $\forall q \in \{1, ..., 4\}$.²⁶

Next, I explain how I compute the expected income. Since one must successfully complete the major to gain the associated earnings, $E_{ikt}(d_4)$, i's expected earnings associated with choice k at time t are:

$$E_{ikt}(d_4) = \int w dG_{it}(w) [p_{ikt} E_{ikt}(I) + (1 - p_{ikt}) E_{it}(I_0)] \quad \text{for } k, p \in C_i \text{ and } p \neq k$$
(6)

where w is an indicator variable of the individual's labor force status, $G_{it}(w)$ is the subjective belief at time t about one's labor force status at the age of 30, and p_{ikt} is individual *i*'s subjective probability at time t about successfully graduating in major k. The belief distribution of labor force status at the age of 30, $G_{it}(w)$, is simply $G_{it}(w = 1)$; $\int w dG_{it}(w) = G_{it}(w = 1)$, denoted as g_{it} , is elicited directly from the respondents.²⁷ Conditional on being active in the labor force, with probability p_{ikt} , the individual's expected earnings are $E_{ikt}(I)$, the expected income associated with major k at the age of 30; with probability $1 - p_{ikt}$, her expected earnings are $E_{it}(I_0)$, the expected income at the age of 30 if one were to drop out of school at time t.²⁸ Equation (5) can now be written as:

$$\Pr(m|X_{it}, \{P_{ikt}(b_r), E_{ikt}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1,...,7\}, q \in \{1,...,4\}; k \in C_i\}) = \left(\sum_{r=1}^{7} \{P_{imt}(b_r = 1)u_r(b_r = 1, X_{it}) + [1 - P_{imt}(b_r = 1)]u_r(b_r = 0, X_{it})\} + \sum_{q=1}^{4} \gamma_{iqt}E_{imt}(d_q) + \varepsilon_{imt}\right)$$

$$\Pr\left(\sum_{r=1}^{7} \{P_{ikt}(b_r = 1)u_r(b_r = 1, X_{it}) + [1 - P_{ikt}(b_r = 1)]u_r(b_r = 0, X_{it})\} + \sum_{q=1}^{4} \gamma_{iqt}E_{ikt}(d_q) + \varepsilon_{ikt}\right)$$

$$(7)$$

$$\forall k \in C_i, \ m \neq k$$

Moreover, $P_{imt}(b_r = 1)u_r(b_r = 1, X_{it}) + [1 - P_{imt}(b_r = 1)]u_r(b_r = 0, X_{it})$ is equivalent to $P_{imt}(b_r = 1) \Delta u_r(X_{it}) + u_r(b_r = 0, X_{it})$, where $\Delta u_r(X_{it}) = u_r(b_r = 1, X_{it}) - u_r(b_r = 0, X_{it})$, i.e. it is the difference in utility between outcome b_r happening and not happening for an individual with characteristics X_{it} . The expected utility that

²⁶ A consequence of the linear utility specification is that the individual is risk-neutral, i.e. $\int U_{it}(\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}, X_{it}) dP_{ikt}(\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}) = U_{it}(\int \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}, X_{it} dP_{ikt}(\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}))$. Hence, I only need to elicit the expected value for the continuous outcomes. ²⁷ Note that the underlying assumption is that expectation of being active in the labor force, g_{it} , is independent of one's field of study. This

²⁴Note that the underlying assumption is that expectation of being active in the labor force, g_{it} , is independent of one's field of study. This is a rather restrictive assumption since one's decision of participating in the labor force may be influenced by the job opportunities available, which would be related to one's field of study. Relaxing this assumption would have required me to ask this subjective expectation for each field of study in one's choice set, and would not have been feasible.

 $^{^{28}}$ In an earlier version of the model, I allow the individual to change fields of study once before dropping out of school. However, the results don't seem to change much.

individual i derives from choosing major m at time t is:

$$U_{imt}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}, X_{it}, \{P_{imt}(b_r = 1)\}_{r=1}^7, \{E_{imt}(d_q)\}_{q=1}^4)$$

$$= \sum_{r=1}^7 P_{imt}(b_r = 1) \Delta u_r(X_{it}) + \sum_{r=1}^7 u_r(b_r = 0, X_{it}) + \sum_{q=1}^4 \gamma_{iqt} E_{imt}(d_q) + \varepsilon_{imt}$$
(8)

Equation (7) can now be written as:

$$\Pr(m|X_{it}, \{P_{ikt}(b_r), E_{ikt}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1,..,7\}, q \in \{1,..,4\}; \ k \in C_i\}) = \left(\sum_{r=1}^{7} P_{imt}(b_r = 1) \triangle u_r(X_{it}) + \sum_{q=1}^{4} \gamma_{iqt} E_{imt}(d_q) + \varepsilon_{imt} \\ > \sum_{r=1}^{7} P_{ikt}(b_r = 1) \triangle u_r(X_{it}) + \sum_{q=1}^{4} \gamma_{iqt} E_{ikt}(d_q) + \varepsilon_{ikt} \end{array} \right) \qquad \forall k \in C_i, \ m \neq k$$

$$(9)$$

 $\{ \triangle u_r(X_{it}) \}_{r=1}^7$, and $\{ \gamma_{iqt} \}_{q=1}^4$ are the parameters to be estimated. $g_{it}, \{ P_{ikt}(b_r = 1) \}_{r=1}^7$, and $\{ E_{ikt}(d_q) \}_{q=1}^3$, and $E_{ikt}(I) \forall k \in C_i$ are elicited directly from the respondent. In order to ensure strict preferences between choices, $\{ \varepsilon_{ikt} \}$ are assumed to have a continuous distribution. The exact parametric restrictions on the random terms required for identifying the model parameters are discussed in the next section.

5 Single Major Choice Model

This section deals with estimating the preferences for choice of single majors. I drop the time subscript in the analysis that follows.

5.1 Estimation with Homogenous Preferences

The model described in section 4 assumes that the utility function for the binary outcomes $u_r(b_r, X_i)$, and the constants on continuous outcomes $(\{\gamma_{iq}\}_{q=1}^4)$ depend on individual characteristics. I initially assume that the utility function does not depend on individual characteristics. Under this assumption, (9) becomes:

$$\Pr(m|P_{ik}(b_r), E_{ik}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1, \dots, 7\}, q \in \{1, \dots, 4\}; k \in C_i\}}$$

$$= \Pr\left(\begin{array}{c} \sum_{r=1}^7 P_{im}(b_r = 1) \triangle u_c + \sum_{q=1}^4 \gamma_q E_{im}(d_q) + \varepsilon_{imt} \\ \\ > \sum_{r=1}^7 P_{ik}(b_r = 1) \triangle u_c + \sum_{q=1}^4 \gamma_q E_{ik}(d_q) + \varepsilon_{ikt} \end{array} \right) \quad \forall k \in C_i, m \neq k$$

$$(10)$$

If I assume the random terms $\{\varepsilon_{ikt}\}$ are independent for every individual *i* and choice *k*, and that they have a Type I extreme value distribution, then $\{\varepsilon_{ikt} - \varepsilon_{imt}\}$ has a standard logistic distribution. Then the probability that individual *i* chooses major *m* is:

$$\Pr(m|\{P_{ik}(b_r), E_{ik}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1, \dots, 7\}, q \in \{1, \dots, 4\}; \ k \in C_i}) = \frac{\exp(\sum_{r=1}^7 P_{im}(b_r = 1) \Delta u_r + \sum_{q=1}^4 \gamma_q E_{im}(d_q))}{\sum_{k \in C_i} \exp(\sum_{r=1}^7 P_{ik}(b_r = 1) \Delta u_r + \sum_{q=1}^4 \gamma_q E_{ik}(d_q))}$$
(11)

Under these parametric assumptions, the parameters $\{\Delta u_r\}_{r=1}^7$, and $\{\gamma_q\}_{q=1}^4$ are identified. The elicited subjective probabilities described in section 3.2 are used in estimation. Column (1) of Table 3a presents the maximum

likelihood estimates using stated choice data.^{29,30}

The relative magnitudes of $\{ \Delta u_r \}_{r=1}^7$ show the importance of the binary outcomes in the choice. The difference in utility levels is positive and largest for enjoying coursework. The second most important outcome in the choice is graduating within 4 years; it has a positive coefficient that is about half of the coefficient on enjoying coursework. The third most important factor is enjoying work at the available jobs with a positive coefficient of a similar magnitude as the coefficient on graduating within 4 years. The difference in utility levels is positive for parent's approval, and (surprisingly) negative for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5. Both coefficients are significant, and about one-fourth the coefficient on enjoying coursework. The difference in utility levels for reconciling family and work is about one-sixth in magnitude compared to that of enjoying coursework, but is surprisingly negative. The coefficient on the social status of the jobs is positive and significant. A unit increase in the social status of available jobs changes the utility by as much as a 5% increase in the probability of graduating in 4 years. The coefficient on hours/week spent at work is negative, but not significantly different from zero suggesting that it is not important in the choice.

Column (2) of Table 3a shows the maximum-likelihood estimates based on (11) with the addition of female interactions in order to get some measure of relative differences between males and females. For males, the difference in utility levels is largest for enjoying coursework, finding a job upon graduation, and the social status of the jobs in decreasing order of importance. For females, the three outcomes that matter the most are graduating in 4 years, enjoying the coursework, and enjoying work at the available jobs. Though income stays insignificant, the coefficient on income interacted with the female dummy shows that the negative coefficient on income in Column (1) is being driven by the preferences of females; income has a positive coefficient for males now, and negative for females (though neither are significant).

In addition to stating their choice, respondents were also asked to rank the elements in their choice set. The stated preference data provides more information which can be used for estimation of the model parameters. Under the assumptions of standard logit, the probability of any ranking of alternatives can be written as a product of logits. For example, consider the case where an individual's choice set is $\{a, b, c, d\}$. Suppose she ranks the alternatives b, d, c, a from best to worst. Under the assumption that the ε_{ik} 's are iid and Type I distributed, the probability of observing this preference ordering can be written as the product of the probability of choosing alternative b from $\{a, b, c, d\}$, the probability of choosing d from $\{a, c, d\}$, and the probability of choosing c from the remaining $\{a, c\}$. If $U_{ij} = \beta x_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$ denotes the utility i gets from choosing j for $j \in \{a, b, c, d\}$, then the probability of observing $b \succ d \succ c \succ a$ is simply:³¹

$$\Pr(b \succ d \succ c \succ a) = \frac{\exp(\beta x_{ib})}{\sum_{j \in \{a,b,c,d\}} \exp(\beta x_{ij})} \cdot \frac{\exp(\beta x_{id})}{\sum_{j \in \{a,c,d\}} \exp(\beta x_{ij})} \frac{\exp(\beta x_{ic})}{\sum_{j \in \{a,c\}} \exp(\beta x_{ij})}$$
(12)

Column (3) in Table 3a presents the maximum likelihood estimates using stated preference data. The difference in utility levels is still largest and positive for enjoying coursework. Graduating in 4 years, the second most

 $^{^{29}44}$ of the 83 respondents with a single major had declared their major at the time of the survey. For the remaining 39, I use their stated intended choice for estimation.

 $^{^{30}}$ Moreover, a respondent with an adjunct major (see Table 1a) has to have another major. For the purposes of estimation, I don't differentiate between an adjunct major and a normal major. Such respondents are treated as pursuing a single major if both their majors are in the same category, and as pursuing double majors if they are in different categories.

³¹A logit on ranked data is called *exploded* logit in the literature. This is because a ranking of J alternatives explodes into J-1 pseudoobservations for estimation purposes. This expression results from the particular form of the extreme value distribution, first shown by Luce and Suppes (1965).

important outcome using stated choice data, is now negative but not significant. Enjoying work at the jobs is the second most important outcome with a positive coefficient. Approval of parents, now the third most important outcome, has a positive coefficient that is one-half that of enjoying coursework. The difference in utility levels for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5 is now positive and significant. Status of the jobs continues to be important: a unit increase in the social status of the jobs changes the utility by as much as a 4% increase in the probability of enjoying coursework. The difference in utility levels for other binary outcomes is not significantly different from zero. The coefficient on income is now positive, but not significant.

Column (4) allows female interaction dummies to gain further insight into gender differences in preferences. For both genders, the difference in utility levels is largest and positive for enjoying coursework. For males, graduating within 4 years is the second most important outcome, but surprisingly it has a negative sign. The third most important outcome for males is the difference in utility levels for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5; it is positive and about half that of enjoying coursework. Status of the jobs remains important for males: a unit increase in the status of the jobs changes the utility by as much as a 10% increase in the probability of enjoying coursework. For females, two of the important outcomes are approval of parents, and enjoying work at the jobs. Both have a positive coefficient that is about two-thirds the magnitude of the coefficients that are positive and about one-third of the coefficient on enjoying coursework.

One concern with using stated preference data is that an individual may not have complete preferences over all alternatives that are available to her. In the case that a complete ranking does not *exist*, it is possible that the lower end of her preferences is noise. To check the sensitivity of the results, the model was also estimated by using the ranking of the four most preferred choices only. The results (available upon request from the author) are comparable to those obtained from using the complete preference data. Therefore, I continue to use complete stated preference data in the analysis that follows.

In order to get a measure of the magnitude of the estimated parameters, the natural thing would be to do willingness to pay calculations, i.e. translate the differences in utility levels into the amount that an individual would be willing to forgo at the age of 30 in earnings in order to experience that outcome.³² However, since expected income at age 30 is not significant in any of the specifications considered, the standard errors on such calculations are huge, and the results are not very meaningful. I, therefore, don't present the willingness to pay calculations. Instead, I outline a different decomposition method to gain insight into the relative importance of the various outcomes in the choice. For illustration, suppose that $Pr(choice = j) = F(\mathbf{X}_j \boldsymbol{\beta})$, and that \mathbf{X} includes two variables, X_1 and X_2 . Given the parameter estimates, $\widehat{\beta}_1$ and $\widehat{\beta}_2$, the contribution of X_1 to the choice is defined as:

$$M_{X_1} \equiv || \overline{\Pr(choice = j | \{\widehat{\beta_1}, \widehat{\beta_2}\}} - \overline{\Pr(choice = j | \{\widehat{\beta_1} = 0, \widehat{\beta_2}\}} ||$$
(13)

$$= \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{8} \left[\sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\Pr(choice = j \mid \{\widehat{\beta_1}, \widehat{\beta_2}\})}{N} - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\Pr(choice = j \mid \{\widehat{\beta_1} = 0, \widehat{\beta_2}\})}{N}\right]^2}$$

³²For example, the amount that an individual would be willing to forgo in earnings at the age of 30 for a 2% change in the probability of outcome j is $\frac{0.02 \times \Delta u_j}{\gamma_4}$.

where the first term is the average probability of majoring in choice j predicted by the model, and the second term is the average predicted probability of majoring in j if outcome X_1 were not considered. The difference of the two terms is a measure of the importance of X_1 in the choice. Similarly the contribution of X_2 is given as:

$$M_{X_2} \equiv \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{8} \left[\sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\Pr(choice = j \mid \{\widehat{\beta_1}, \widehat{\beta_2}\})}{N} - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{\Pr(choice = j \mid \{\widehat{\beta_1}, \widehat{\beta_2} = 0\})}{N} \right]^2}$$
(13b)

The relative contribution of X_1 to the choice is then $R_{X_1} = \frac{M_{X_1}}{M_{X_1}+M_{X_2}}$. Multiple parameters can be set to zero simultaneously to get a sense of their joint contribution to the choice. However, since the model is not linear, generally $M_{X_1+X_2} \neq M_{X_1} + M_{X_2}$. Table 3b presents the results of this decomposition strategy. Each cell shows the relative contribution (R) of the outcome to the choice. Panel B of Table 3b presents the results of this decomposition technique using the estimates obtained from stated preference data. Column (1) shows the decomposition results of the estimates of the pooled sample: nearly three-fourths of the choice is driven by the non-pecuniary outcomes.³³ If the decomposition is made finer, one can see that parent's approval and enjoying coursework jointly explain about 45% of the choice. Pecuniary outcomes associated with college (hours/week spent on coursework, graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5, and graduating in 4 years), and workplace (finding a job upon graduation, hours/week spent at work, income at the age of 30, and the social status of the jobs) each account for about 20% of the choice.

The estimates of the pooled sample mask the differences between males and females. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3b show the decomposition results using the estimates from the male sub-sample, and the female sub-sample respectively. Non-pecuniary outcomes explain about 45% of the choices for males, but more than 80% of the choice for females. Parent's approval and enjoying coursework are the most important outcomes for females explaining about 45% of their choice, while pecuniary outcomes associated with the workplace are of utmost importance to males explaining 48% of their choice. Reconciling family and enjoying work at the available jobs are second in terms of importance to females, but of least importance to males. On the whole, non-pecuniary determinants are crucial in explaining the choices for both males and females. However, males and females differ in their preferences in the workplace: males value pecuniary aspects of the workplace more, while females value non-pecuniary aspects of the workplace more.

Table 3c presents the results of various thought experiments in an attempt to assess how changes in beliefs affect the choice of majors for males and females. The baseline case is first presented. For example, the model predicts that the average probability of majoring in engineering for males is 11.7%, more than twice that for females. Experiments 1 through 3 show changes in predicted probabilities in response to changes in beliefs of outcomes that are well-defined (for example, graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5). Predicted probabilities are not very responsive to changes in beliefs in these cases. Experiments 4 through 6 shows results of *thought* experiments for outcomes that are not well-defined. For example, experiment 5 shows that the average probability of majoring in engineering increases by 20% for females, and by about 10% for males in response to a 10% increase in beliefs of enjoying coursework in engineering. The results in Table 3c indicate that outcomes like enjoying coursework and approval of parents are crucial in one's choice of major.

Before I conclude the discussion of the homogenous choice model, I discuss some robustness checks that I

³³Outcomes classified as being non-pecuniary are: parent's approval, enjoying coursework, reconciling work and family, and enjoying work at the jobs. The remaining outcomes are termed as being pecuniary.

did in order to figure out whether income is actually insignificant in the choice of major, or if the result is driven by large standard errors. The descriptive analysis of respondents' expectations of income in different majors in Table 2e indicates that students are aware of the income differences across majors, but the variation in their responses is much larger than in actual data (for males in particular). This indicates that the insignificance of income might be driven by the noise in the reported expectations. I undertake the decomposition in equation (13) for 1000 bootstrap samples for each of the sub-samples. The bootstrap confidence interval of R_{γ_4} for both males and females does not include zero: the higher end of the 90% bootstrap interval for expected income is 16% and 7.5% for males and females respectively. This seems to suggest that γ_4 is insignificant because of a large standard error, and not because it is a precise zero.³⁴

5.2 Estimation with Heterogeneous Preferences

The analysis undertaken in section 3.4 shows that beliefs for various outcomes are associated with demographic characteristics and cultural proxies. However, it could be the case that preferences for the different outcomes also depend on individual characteristics. For example, if individuals have declining marginal utility of consumption, and preferences are separable in consumption and non-pecuniary outcomes, then the value of pecuniary outcomes will be higher for individuals from low-income households. Such heterogeneity, if not accounted for, may bias the estimates presented in section 5.1. Several empirical studies have documented the influence of family and society in the endogenous formation of preferences. For example, Fernandez et al. (2004) find that whether a male's mother worked while he is growing up is correlated with whether his wife works, and interpret this as preference transmission. Moreover, Guiso et al. (2006) present evidence of culture affecting individuals' preferences.³⁵ I now relax the assumption of section 5.1 that the utility for each binary outcome $u_r(b_r)$, and the constants γ_q for the continuous outcomes do not depend on individual characteristics other than gender. Though I have relatively rich demographic information on the respondents, it is not possible to account for heterogeneity in all outcomes because of the small sample size. I, therefore, consider heterogeneity along the following dimensions:

- 1. An individual might care about her parent's approval for several reasons. She might be more inclined to ensure that her parents approve of her choice if she relies on them for college support. Moreover, concern for parent's approval might depend on the individual's cultural and ethnic background. I allow for heterogeneity in the utility for approval of parents by incorporating the financial support an individual receives from her parents when in college, and whether her parents are foreign-born or not.
- Children growing up in divorced/separated households make different choices than other individuals (Gruber, 2004). Here I consider the effect of growing up in such a household on the individual's preference for being able to reconcile work and family.
- 3. An individual's preference for the social status of jobs may vary by her cultural background. In certain

³⁴An additional robustness check that I did was to estimate the model using the ordinal ranking of income (instead of expected income). This allows me to control for the noise in the reported income expectations. The coefficient on (ranked) income is now significant for the males, but continues to be insignificant for females. Moreover, the confidence interval of R_{γ_4} is [3.8%, 29.2%] for males, and [3.6%, 18.7%] for females. The overall contribution of income and social status, however, does not change since ranked income picks up a substantial part of the contribution of status towards the choice (ranked income and status are highly correlated). Therefore, none of the results change. However, this seems to suggest that income is at least significant for males.

³⁵Also see Doepke and Zilibotti (2007); their theoretical framework of occupational choice models culture as a feature of preferences.

cultures, immense importance is given to the status of the jobs. This heterogeneity is accounted for by taking into account whether the individual's parents are foreign-born.

4. If non-pecuniary outcomes are a normal good, an individual from a low-income family will value the income profiles associated with the majors more relative to other individuals. I account for this heterogeneity by including information on parent's annual income. I also allow for heterogeneity by taking into account whether an individual's parents are foreign-born or not.

The enriched utility function for individual i is:

$$U(X_i, \{P_{im}(b_r), E_{im}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1,..,7\}, q \in \{1,..,4\}}) = \sum_{r = \{1,2,3,5,6,7\}} P_{im}(b_r = 1) \triangle u_r + \triangle u_4[parents'_support_i \times (1-Foreign_i) \times P_{im}(b_4 = 1)]$$

 $+\widetilde{\Delta u_4} \left[parents'_support_i \times Foreign_i \times P_{im}(b_4 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \sum_{q=1}^2 \gamma_q E_{im}(d_q) + \gamma_3 \left[(1-Foreign_i) \times E_{im}(d_3) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_4} \left[parents'_support_i \times Foreign_i \times P_{im}(b_4 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \sum_{q=1}^2 \gamma_q E_{im}(d_q) + \gamma_3 \left[(1-Foreign_i) \times E_{im}(d_3) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \sum_{q=1}^2 \gamma_q E_{im}(d_q) + \gamma_3 \left[(1-Foreign_i) \times E_{im}(d_3) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \sum_{q=1}^2 \gamma_q E_{im}(d_q) + \gamma_3 \left[(1-Foreign_i) \times E_{im}(d_3) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1) \right] + \widetilde{\Delta u_7} \left[divorced_i \times P_{ijt}(b_7 = 1)$

$$+ \widetilde{\gamma_{3}} \left[Foreign_{i} \times E_{im}(d_{3}) \right] + \gamma_{4}E_{im}(d_{4}) + \gamma_{4}^{HI}[E_{im}(d_{4}) \times (1-low_{inc_{i}}) \times (1-Foreign_{i})] + \widetilde{\gamma_{4}^{HI}}[E_{im}(d_{4}) \times (1-low_{inc_{i}}) \times Foreign_{i}] \right]$$

$$+ \gamma_4^{LI}[E_{im}(d_4) \times low_inc_i \times (1\text{-}Foreign_i)] + \widetilde{\gamma_4^{LI}}[E_{im}(d_4) \times low_inc_i \times Foreign_i] + \varepsilon_{im} \qquad \forall \ m = 1,.,8$$

$$\tag{14}$$

where low_inc is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual's parents earn less than \$150,000 annually; parents'_support captures the financial support an individual receives from her parents,³⁶ Foreign is a dummy that equals one if either of the individual's parents is foreign-born, and *divorced* is a dummy that equals one if the individual's parents are either separated or divorced.

I continue to assume that the random terms $\{\varepsilon_{ik}\}$ are independent for every individual i and choice k. Table 3d presents the maximum likelihood estimates of this model using stated preference data. Estimates from the pooled sample in Column (1) show that difference in utility levels is still largest and positive for enjoying coursework, and that the coefficient is almost unchanged from the specification with homogenous preferences. The coefficients of the outcomes for which heterogeneity is not considered stay almost the same as that in the earlier specification. With this enriched specification, the difference in utility levels for parent's approval is 0.34 for individuals with US-born parents who do not receive college support from their parents, and 2.04 for individuals who annually receive more than \$25,000 in college support from their parents. This is consistent with the hypothesis that approval of parents matters more to individuals who depend on their parents for college funding. However, I don't find support for this hypothesis for individuals with foreign-born parents. The difference in utility levels for reconciling work and family continues to be insignificant. Individuals with separated or divorced parents have a negative coefficient for reconciling work and family, but it is not significantly different from zero. Introducing heterogeneity for the status outcome gives an interesting result. Status of the available jobs, an important determinant in the choice in the earlier specifications, is not important to individuals with US-born parents. However, for individuals with foreign-born parents, a unit increase in the social status of the jobs changes the utility by as much as a 8% increase in the probability of the most important outcome, enjoying coursework. This implies that the large positive coefficient on the social status of jobs in earlier specifications is being driven by the preferences of individuals with foreign-born parents in the sample.

 $^{^{36}}$ It is increasing in the financial support an individual receives from her parents. Parents' support = 1 if no education expenses are paid by one's parents; equals 2 if they pay less than \$5,000; equals 3 if they pay between \$5,000- \$10,000; equals 4 if they pay between \$10,000-\$15,000; equals 5 if they pay between \$15,000- \$25,000; equals 6 if they pay \$25,000+.

The coefficient on income at age 30 is still not significantly different from zero. However, there is weak support for the hypothesis that individuals from low-income households value the future earnings profile more in their choice.

Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3d present the results of the heterogeneous choice model for the male and female sub-sample respectively. Coefficients of outcomes which are not interacted with any demographic variables are almost unchanged with respect to the corresponding specification (column 4 in Table 3a). For males with US-born parents, difference in utility levels for approval of parents varies from 0.578 when receiving no support from parents to 3.47 when annually receiving more than \$25,000 in support from them. The corresponding coefficient for females with US-born parents is only half in magnitude to that for males. The coefficient on parents' approval for females with foreign-born parents is similar in magnitude to that of males with US-born parents. Surprisingly, the utility change in approval of parents for males with foreign-born parents is not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, social status of jobs only matters to males with foreignborn parents: a unit increase in the social status of the jobs changes the utility by about a 13% increase in the probability of enjoying coursework for these males. Earnings at the age of 30 are a significant determinant for males belonging to low-income families with foreign-born parents.

To gain insight into the magnitude of these parameters, Table 3e shows the results of the decomposition methodology outlined in equation (13). Except for males with foreign-born parents, non-pecuniary attributes explain more than half of the choice. For individuals with US-born parents, more than two-thirds of the choice is driven by non-pecuniary motivations; the non-pecuniary outcomes at college are of utmost importance to this group. For individuals with foreign-born parents, pecuniary outcomes at the workplace are of greatest value in the choice for males, while non-pecuniary outcomes at college continue to be of utmost importance to such females.

To recap the findings in this section, enjoying coursework and enjoying work at the available jobs are outcomes most important in the decision. Demographic characteristics bias preferences in favor of certain outcomes. Males with foreign-born parents are primarily driven by the pecuniary attributes when making their choice of college major, while the converse is true for all other groups. Parent's approval matters to all individuals except for males with foreign-born parents. One of the mechanisms through which parent's approval matters is the extent of an individual's reliance on them for college support. Finally, social status of jobs only matters to males whose parents are foreign-born.

5.3 Parent's Approval

The estimation results in sections 5.1 and 5.2 show that approval of parents is an important determinant in the choice for males with US-born parents and for all females. The social psychology literature documents a similar finding for females: Vincent et al. (1998) find that females' perceptions of their parent's preferences for them predict their career orientation. Though section 5.2 shows that one channel through which parent's approval matters is the individual's reliance on them for college support, it is not clear what majors parents are more likely to approve, and what criteria they use for approving a major. Since only the beliefs of students are observed, I can only study the relationship between students' beliefs of parent's approval of a major and their own beliefs of other outcomes associated with the choice.³⁷ Controlling for the individual's major, I regress respondent *i*'s beliefs about her parent's approval for major *j* on her beliefs about the other outcomes associated with *j*. More specifically, I consider the following regression model:

$$P_{ij}(b_4 = 1) = \delta_i + \lambda_j + \alpha' X_{ij} + \beta' \left[\sum_{\substack{c=1\\c\neq4}}^7 P_{ij}(b_c = 1) + \sum_{q=1}^4 E_{ij}(d_q) \right] + \varepsilon_{ij}$$
(15)

where δ_i is an individual fixed-effect, λ_j is a field-fixed effect, X_{ij} is a vector of individual-specific controls, and β is the vector of interest. The results are presented in Table 3f. Students' beliefs of parent's approval for a given major increase in their beliefs of finding a job upon graduation, enjoying work at potential jobs, and social status of jobs. Expectation of parent's approval for a major increases by nearly 3 points (on a scale of 0 -100) if the probability of finding a job upon graduation in that major increases by 10 points. This effect is even stronger for students with foreign-born parents: students believe that switching to a major with a 10 points higher probability of getting a job upon graduation is likely to increase parent's approval by nearly 5 points. A positive and significant effect, half in magnitude to that of finding a job, is found for the social status of the jobs. Again the effect is stronger for students with foreign-born parents. The only other outcome that affects beliefs about parent's approval is the expectation of enjoying work at the jobs for females.

Males with foreign-born parents expect approval of parents for a major to increase by about 12.5 points for a unit increase in the social status of the jobs. This result reconciles the earlier finding in section 5.2 of parent's approval not mattering to males with foreign-born parents. Expectation of parent's approval has a positive relationship with the perceived social status of jobs, and status of jobs is an important outcome only in the choice for males with foreign-born parents (column (2) in Table 3d); hence, because of colinearity, approval of parents does not *directly* affect the choice of these individuals.

5.4 Robustness Checks

The model estimated in section 5.1 assumes that all individuals have homogeneous preferences for various outcomes. Individuals with different characteristics are very likely to have different preferences. Moreover, the assumption that the random terms $\{\varepsilon_{ik}\}$ are independent for every individual *i* and choice *k* might be very strong. Though a model with limited heterogeneity in preferences is estimated in section 5.2, any unaccounted or unobserved heterogeneity may bias the model estimates. In this section, I specify a random parameters logit model to account for these issues (see Revelt and Train, 1997, for a discussion of mixed logit models). One could allow heterogeneity in preferences for all outcomes, but I focus on the most important outcomes: I consider a model in which the differences in utility levels for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5, enjoying the coursework, approval of parents, enjoying work at the available jobs, and the parameter for social status of the available jobs are allowed to vary in the population with a specified distribution. The utility that individual *i*

 $^{^{37}}$ It could be that parents have subjective beliefs about the outcomes that are very different from those of the student. However, I can only analyze the relationship the student *believes* exists between her expectation of parent's approval and her subjective expectations of the various choice-specific outcomes.

receives from choosing major m is:

$$U(X_i, \{P_{im}(b_r), E_{im}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1, \dots, 7\}, q \in \{1, \dots, 4\}})$$

$$= \sum_{r=\{1,5,7\}} P_{im}(b_r=1) \triangle u_r + \sum_{s=\{2,3,4,6\}} P_{im}(b_s=1) \triangle u_{si} + \sum_{q=\{1,2,4\}} \gamma_q E_{im}(d_q) + \gamma_{3i} E_{im}(d_3) + \varepsilon_{im}$$
(16)

where Δu_{si} for $s = \{2, 3, 4, 6\}$, and γ_{3i} are allowed to vary in the population according to a specified parametric distribution, and ε_{im} is an iid random term that is extreme value distributed. I denote the vector of parameters $\{\Delta u_{2i}, \Delta u_{3i}, \Delta u_{4i}, \Delta u_{6i}, \gamma_{3i}\}$ by β_i , and the density of these parameters $f(\beta_i | \theta)$ where θ are the parameters of the distribution. The probability of *i* choosing the major *m* conditional on β_i is:

$$\Pr(m|\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}) = \Pr(m|\{P_{ik}(b_{r}), E_{ik}(d_{q})\}_{r \in \{1,..,7\}, q \in \{1,..,4\}; k \in C_{i}}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_{i}) =$$

$$= \frac{\exp(\sum_{r=\{1,5,7\}} P_{im}(b_{r}=1) \bigtriangleup u_{r} + \sum_{s=\{2,3,4,6\}} P_{im}(b_{s}=1) \bigtriangleup u_{si} + \sum_{q=\{1,2,4\}} \gamma_{q} E_{im}(d_{q}) + \gamma_{3i} E_{im}(d_{3}))}{\sum_{k \in C_{i}} \exp(\sum_{r=\{1,5,7\}} P_{ik}(b_{r}=1) \bigtriangleup u_{r} + \sum_{s=\{2,3,4,6\}} P_{ik}(b_{s}=1) \bigtriangleup u_{si} + \sum_{q=\{1,2,4\}} \gamma_{q} E_{ik}(d_{q}) + \gamma_{3i} E_{ik}(d_{3}))}$$

$$(17)$$

The unconditional probability of choosing m is the integral of this conditional probability over all possible values of β_i , and depends on the parameters θ of the distribution of β_i . The unconditional probability for i choosing m is:

$$P_{im}(\theta) = \int \Pr(m|\{P_{ik}(b_r), E_{ik}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1,..,7\}, q \in \{1,..,4\}; k \in C_i, \beta_i\} f(\beta_i|\theta) d\beta_i$$
(18)

This integral is approximated through simulation since it cannot be calculated analytically. For a given value of the parameter vector $\boldsymbol{\theta}$, a value of $\boldsymbol{\beta}_i$ is drawn from its distribution. Using this draw, the conditional probability is calculated. This process is repeated for D draws, and the average is taken as the approximate choice probability:

$$\widehat{P_{im}(\theta)} = \frac{1}{D} \sum_{d=1}^{D} \Pr(m | \{P_{ik}(b_r), E_{ik}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1,..,7\}, q \in \{1,..,3\}; k \in C_i, \beta_i^d\})$$

The log likelihood function $\sum_{i} \ln(\Pr_{i})$ is approximated by the simulated log-likelihood function $\sum_{i} \ln(\widehat{P}_{i}(\widehat{\theta}))$, and the estimated parameters are those that maximize the simulated log-likelihood function. I assume that the coefficients for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5, enjoying the coursework, approval of parents, enjoying work at the available jobs, and social status of the available jobs are independently log-normally distributed.³⁸ The difference in utility levels for an outcome k which is assumed to vary in the population is expressed as Δu_k $= \exp(\overline{\Delta u_k} + \sigma_k \mu_k)$ where μ_k is a standard normal deviate. The parameters $\overline{\Delta u_k}$ and σ_k , which represent the mean and standard deviation of $\log(\Delta u_k)$ are estimated. The mean and standard deviation of Δu_k are $\exp(\overline{\Delta u_k} + \frac{\sigma_k^2}{2})$ and $\exp(\overline{\Delta u_k} + \frac{\sigma_k^2}{2}) * \sqrt{(\exp(\sigma_k^2) - 1)}$ respectively.

Columns (1a)-(1c) in Table 3g present the estimates of the mixed logit specification for the model with D = 100,000. Estimates of various outcomes are similar to those obtained in the corresponding model with no heterogeneity (column (3) of Table 3a). The mean coefficient of enjoying coursework is still largest in absolute value and significant. The estimated standard deviations of the (random) coefficients are highly significant indicating that these parameters do indeed vary in the sample. Standard deviations for coefficients

 $^{^{38}}$ I use a log-normal distribution instead of a normal distribution for these parameters since these are all outcomes which one would expect to be desirable to an individual. The normal distribution allows coefficients of both signs, and implies that some share of the sample has negative coefficients for those outcomes, whether or not it is true. The log-normal assumption ensures that each respondent in the sample has a positive coefficient for these outcomes.

of graduating in 4 years and social status of available jobs are especially very large, indicating that there is substantial heterogeneity in how these outcomes are valued in the sample (consistent with what was also found in the previous section). Another point of note is that the mean coefficients in the mixed logit model are larger than the corresponding fixed coefficients in Table 3a. This is because in the mixed logit, some of the stochastic portion of the utility is captured in β_i rather than in ε_i . Since the utility is scaled so that ε_i has the variance of an extreme value, the parameters are scaled down in the standard model relative to the mixed logit model (the same result is obtained by Revelt and Train, 1998, and Brownstone and Train, 1999). The fact that the mean coefficients are bigger than the fixed coefficients implies that the random parameters constitute a large share of the variance in unobserved utility.

One might wonder as to what extent can the variation in the parameters in the mixed logit model be explained by including demographic characteristics. Columns (2a) through (2c) in Table 3g present estimates of the mixed logit model with demographic variables that were used in the heterogeneous model described in section 5.2. The estimates are similar to those in column (1) of Table 3d, though they are larger in magnitude, which is expected. The standard deviations are still large and significant which indicates that the demographic variables considered in section 5.2 only capture some of the heterogeneity that is exhibited by the individuals. Nonetheless, the fact that the relative magnitude of the estimates is similar to previous results is reassuring.

6 Double Major Choice Model

For reasons that will become clear shortly, a separate choice model is estimated for double majors. Nearly half of the sample respondents state that they are pursuing two majors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that about half of them will end up dropping one of their majors some time before graduation.³⁹ Since I have stated preference data from these respondents, I first estimate the same model as in section 5.1 in order to get a sense of the motivations of the choice for these individuals. The parameter estimates (available upon request) are similar to those for respondents pursuing a single major. Table 4a presents the decomposition results of equation (13) using these estimates. As before, non-pecuniary attributes explain most of the choice. It does seem that these individuals are similar to those pursuing single majors in their preferences for various outcomes.

This section outlines a model that incorporates the choice of double majors, and then deals with its estimation.

6.1 Estimation of Double Major Choice Model

Depending on the exact composition of the individual's major pair, the choice set of the individual now consists of either 8 or 9 categories.⁴⁰ For estimation, I assume that the individual may choose a single major or a pair of majors. The set of alternatives available to the individual includes all subsets of two majors in WCAS (${}^{8}C_{2} = 28$), all possible single majors in WCAS (7), and all possible pairings of WCAS majors with non-WCAS majors for a total of 70 alternatives. The distribution of majors for individuals pursuing double majors in the sample is shown in Table 4b. There's no obvious pattern in which individuals are choosing pairs.

 $^{^{39}}$ According to the Registrar's Office and Northwestern Graduation Survey 2006, less than 30% of WCAS undergraduates graduate with more than one major.

 $^{^{40}}$ It would be the former if both majors are in WCAS and/or School of Engineering. In the event that one of the majors is in neither of the two schools, the choice set will be the latter, with the extra category including the majors offered in that school.

The major-specific outcomes that appear in the utility function remain the same as before, but the form of the utility function is now different. Before specifying the structural form of the utility function, it may be useful to think about why an individual may decide to choose two majors. Respondents pursuing more than one major were asked to explain reasons for pursuing more than one major; selected responses are shown in Appendix 1 (section 9.3.1). Two main reasons emerge: first, two majors appropriately differentiated can provide a broader mix of options than a single major; second, it might be the case that no single major meets the needs of the individual. For example, an individual might be interested in both maximizing her income prospects as well as enjoying the coursework. It could very well be the case that no single major meets her needs, but a combination of two majors does. To capture the enhanced options and specialization of function that two majors provide, I assume that the utility of a major pair depends on the attributes of each major separately, and on the attributes of a composite major combining the best of both majors. However, I only apply the idea of a composite major to outcomes associated with college. Outcomes associated with the workplace are not considered since they come as a package; for example, one does not have the option to choose the income associated with the jobs available in one major, and the lifestyle associated with the jobs in the second major. I also do not consider the composite major representation for graduating with a GPA of more than 3.5 because GPA is a composite of all coursework an individual does, and it is not possible to hedge along this dimension. The outcomes for which the composite major specification is used are: graduating in 4 years, hours/week spent on coursework, enjoying the coursework, approval of parents, and finding a job upon graduation. The utility function of a major pair p consisting of majors p_1 and p_2 takes the form:

$$U_{ipt} = U_{ip_1t}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}, X_{it}, \{P_{ip_1t}(b_r = 1)\}_{r=1}^7, \{E_{ip_1t}(d_q)\}_{q=1}^4) + U_{ip_2t}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}, X_{it}, \{P_{ip_2t}(b_r = 1)\}_{r=1}^7, \{E_{ip_2t}(d_q)\}_{q=1}^4) + U_{i\tilde{p}t}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}, X_{it}, \sum_{r=\{1,3,4,5\}} \max[P_{ip_1t}(b_r = 1), P_{ip_2t}(b_r = 1)], \max[E_{ip_1t}(d_1), E_{ip_2t}(d_1)])$$

(19)

where $U_{ip_1t}(.)$ is as defined in equation (8), and \tilde{p} refers to the composite major. Since there is no way of specifying a "primary" and a "secondary" major, I use the same functional form for the utility of each major in one's major pair, i.e. $U_{ip_1t} = U_{ip_2t}$. Since $U_{ip_1t}(.)$ is linear-in-parameters, the average characteristics of the two majors appear in the utility function. Assuming that the utility function does not depend on the individual characteristics, X_{it} , and dropping the time subscript, the utility function can be written as:

$$U_{ip}(\{P_{ip_{1}}(b_{r}), E_{ip_{1}}(d_{q}), P_{ip_{2}}(b_{r}), E_{ip_{2}}(d_{q})\}_{r \in \{1,..,7\}, q \in \{1,..,4\}})$$

$$= \sum_{r=1}^{7} \{\frac{P_{ip_{1}}(b_{r}=1) + P_{ip_{2}}(b_{r}=1)}{2}\} \Delta u_{r1} + \sum_{q=1}^{4} \gamma_{q1}\{\frac{E_{ip_{1}}(d_{q}) + E_{ip_{2}}(d_{q})}{2}\}$$
(20)

$$+\sum_{r=\{1,3,4,5\}} \max[P_{ip_1}(b_r=1), P_{ip_2}(b_r=1)] \triangle u_{r2} + \gamma_{12} \min[E_{ip_1}(d_1), E_{ip_2}(d_1)] + \varepsilon_{ip} = U_{ip} + \varepsilon_{ip}$$

The composite major representation captures the notion of functional specialization as follows: say an individual with a major pair chooses one major with a low completion probability because of some of its other attributes, and a second major where the completion probability is the most important consideration. Given the specification above, one would expect $\Delta u_{11} \approx 0$ and $\Delta u_{12} > 0$ in this case of extreme specialization. On the other hand, for an individual who equally values the completion probabilities associated with both her majors, one would expect $\Delta u_{12} \approx 0$ and $\Delta u_{11} > 0$. Thus the ratio $\Delta u_{12}/\Delta u_{11}$ ($\{\Delta u_{r2}/\Delta u_{r1}\}_{r=\{1,3,4,5\}}$, γ_{12}/γ_{11}) is a measure of the extent to which an individual desires to functionally specialize her majors along the given outcome.

I continue to assume that the random terms $\{\varepsilon_{ip}\}$ are independent for every *i* and every *p*, and have a extreme value distribution. The maximum likelihood estimates are shown in Table 4c. Panel B shows $\{\bigtriangleup u_{r1} + \bigtriangleup u_{r2}\}_{r=1}^7$; the relative magnitudes of $\{\bigtriangleup u_{r1} + \bigtriangleup u_{r2}\}_{r=1}^7$ are a measure of the importance of each outcome in choosing a major pair. For the pooled sample results presented in column (1), the difference in utility levels for graduating in 4 years is positive and largest in magnitude. The next most important outcome is enjoying the coursework with a positive coefficient. Approval of parents is the third most important outcome. Enjoying work at potential jobs, graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5, finding a job, and reconciling work and family are next in order of importance. All four are significant with positive coefficients. The coefficient on hours/week at the jobs is positive, which is rather surprising. However, an increase of 5 hours/week at work only increases the utility by as much as a 1% increase in the probability of graduating in 4 years. The coefficients on status of the jobs, hours/week spent on coursework, and earnings at 30 are not significantly different from zero.

Next I check for evidence of specialization. Estimates presented in Table 4c suggest that there is strong evidence of extreme specialization for graduating in 4 years ($\Delta u_{12} > 0$, $\Delta u_{11} \approx 0$), and for finding a job ($\Delta u_{52}/\Delta u_{51} \gg 1$). This implies that individuals concentrate their chances of graduating in 4 years, and getting a job upon graduation in one of the majors in their major pair.⁴¹ On the other hand, approval of parents and enjoying coursework are outcomes that are important in the choice of both majors (i.e. $\Delta u_{41} > 0$, $\Delta u_{42} \approx 0$ and $\Delta u_{31} > 0$, $\Delta u_{32} \approx 0$ respectively). The coefficient on hours/week spent on coursework, γ_{12} , is negative; this supports the specialization hypothesis, i.e. individuals prefer pairs of majors that entail different hours/week in college.

Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4c shows the estimates for the males and females sub-samples respectively. The three most important outcomes for both are the same: enjoying the coursework, graduating in 4 years, and approval of parents (though not in the same order). For males, an analysis of the ratios of $\{ \Delta u_{r2} / \Delta u_{r1} \}_{r=\{1,3,4,5\}}$, and $\gamma_{12} / \gamma_{11}$ reveals that they prefer to choose majors that differ in their chances of graduating in 4 years ($\Delta u_{12} > 0$, $\Delta u_{11} \approx 0$), in enjoying the coursework ($\Delta u_{32} / \Delta u_{31} \gg 1$), and approval of parents ($\Delta u_{52} / \Delta u_{51} \gg 1$). The coefficient on hours/week spent on coursework, γ_{12} , is negative implying that males prefer pairs of majors with different coursework levels. Females, like their male counterparts, prefer majors that entail different chances of graduating in 4 years ($\Delta u_{12} > 0$, $\Delta u_{11} \approx 0$). In addition, they prefer majors that differ in their chances of getting a job upon graduation ($\Delta u_{52} > 0$, $\Delta u_{51} \approx 0$). There is also some evidence of females preferring majors with different amounts of workload in terms of coursework ($\gamma_{12} < 0$). On the other hand, approval of parents and enjoying coursework matter significantly in the choice of both majors ($\Delta u_{41} > 0$, $\Delta u_{42} \approx 0$ and $\Delta u_{31} > 0$, $\Delta u_{32} \approx 0$).

This model exhibits the restrictive IIA property, which is not a very realistic assumption in this particular situation. For example, one could imagine that an individual majoring in Area Studies and Literature & Fine Arts is more likely to choose Area Studies and Ethics & Values, rather than Natural Sciences and Ethics & Values. To allow flexible substitution patterns, I allow for a stochastic part for each major that is perhaps correlated over majors and heteroskedastic over individuals and majors (these appear as 12 random effects, one

⁴¹There is ample evidence of the latter in the comments submitted by the respondents (see Appendix 1).

for each of the 7 alternatives in WCAS, and the 5 categories outside WCAS), and another stochastic part that is iid over individuals and alternatives. The utility function of a major pair p is now:

$$U_{ip}(\{P_{im}(b_r), E_{im}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1, \dots, 7\}, q \in \{1, \dots, 3\}}) = U_{ip} + \varepsilon_{ip} + c_{p1}\eta_{i,1} + c_{p2}\eta_{i,2} + \dots + c_{p12}\eta_{i,12}$$

where, as before, ε_{ip} is a random term with zero mean that is iid over alternatives of major pairs, and is normalized to set the scale of utility. The $\eta_{i,m}$ for $m = \{1, ..., 12\}$ are normally distributed effects with zero mean, and $c_{px} = 1$ if major x appears in the major pair p.⁴² This structure allows flexible substitution patterns across alternatives. For example, the correlation between a major pair κ consisting of $m = \{1, 2\}$, and a second major pair ω consisting of majors $m = \{2, 3\}$ is $E([U_{i\kappa} + \varepsilon_{i\kappa} + \eta_{i,1} + \eta_{i,2}][U_{i\omega} + \varepsilon_{i\omega} + \eta_{i,2} + \eta_{i,3}]) = Var(\eta_{i,2})$. So utility is now correlated over alternatives. Given the vector η_i , the conditional choice probability is simply logit, since the remaining error term is iid extreme value. The probability of individual i choosing the major pair p is:

$$\Pr(p|\boldsymbol{\eta}_{i}) = \Pr(p| \{P_{im}(b_{r}), E_{im}(d_{q})\}_{r \in \{1,..,7\}, q \in \{1,..,4\}}, \boldsymbol{\eta}_{i})$$
$$= \frac{\exp(U_{ip} + c_{p1}\eta_{i,1} + c_{p2}\eta_{i,2} + ... + c_{p12}\eta_{i,12})}{\sum_{k \in C_{i}} \exp(U_{ik} + c_{k1}\eta_{i,1} + c_{k2}\eta_{i,2} + ... + c_{k12}\eta_{i,12})}$$

The unconditional choice probability is the expected value of the conditional probability over all the possible values of η_i , and depends on $\mathbf{g}(\eta_i | \Omega)$, the density of η_i . It is:

$$P_i(\Omega) = \int \Pr(p|\boldsymbol{\eta}_i) \mathbf{g}(\boldsymbol{\eta}_i|\Omega) d\boldsymbol{\eta}_i$$

Since the integral does not have a closed form in general, it is approximated through simulation. 100,000 draws of η_i for a given value of the parameters Ω are drawn; for each draw, the $\Pr(p|\eta_i)$ is calculated, and the average of these probabilities is taken as the approximate choice probability:

$$\widehat{P_i(\Omega)} = \frac{1}{100,000} \sum_{d=1}^{100,000} \Pr(p|\boldsymbol{\eta}_i^d)$$

The estimated parameters from maximizing the simulated log-likelihood, $\sum_{i} \ln(\widehat{P_i(\Omega)})$, are shown in Table 4d. The coefficients are similar in relative magnitude, but larger in absolute terms than the corresponding fixed coefficients in column (1) of Table 4c. This is because, in the standard model, all stochastic terms are absorbed into one error term, ϵ . The variance of this error term is larger in the standard logit model than in a mixed logit since some of the variance is now captured by the η 's rather than the ϵ in the mixed logit model. Since utility is scaled so that ϵ has the variance of an extreme value, the variance before scaling is larger in the standard logit than the mixed logit, and hence parameters are scaled down in a standard logit relative to the mixed logit. Graduating in 4 years, enjoying the coursework, and approval of parents continue to be the three most important outcomes. Individuals choose majors in their choice pair such that they enjoy coursework and have approval of parents in both majors ($\Delta u_{31} > 0$, $\Delta u_{32} \approx 0$ and $\Delta u_{41} > 0$, $\Delta u_{42} \approx 0$). Graduating in 4 years is an important consideration for both majors, but there is some evidence that individuals prefer majors that differ in their chances of graduating in 4 years ($\Delta u_{12}/\Delta u_{11} > 1$). Individuals also prefer pairs of majors

⁴²For example, the utility function of a major pair p that includes Natural Sciences (m = 1), and Social Sciences II (m = 4) would be: $U_{ip}(\{E_i(Y_m), P_{im}(b_r), E_{im}(d_q)\}_{r \in \{1,...,7\}, q \in \{1,...,4\}}) = U_{ip} + \varepsilon_{ip} + \eta_{i,1} + \eta_{i,4}$

that allow them different chances of getting a job upon graduation ($\Delta u_{52} > 0$, $\Delta u_{51} \approx 0$). Graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5 has a positive coefficient but is not significant. The somewhat puzzling results are the positive coefficients on hours/week spent on coursework, and at the jobs (the latter is not significant). γ_{12} , the coefficient on min $[E_{ip_1}(d_1), E_{ip_2}(d_1)]$, is negative suggesting that individuals prefer pairs of majors with different time commitments at college. However, it is not significantly different from zero.

To recap, double major individuals have preferences similar to those with single majors. Graduating in 4 years, enjoying coursework and approval of parents are the most important outcomes in the choice of a major pair. There is evidence that individuals prefer to choose pairs of majors that differ in their chances of graduating in 4 years. Females and males differ in the outcomes they specialize in. Females choose major pairs that offer different chances of finding a job, while males choose major pairs that are different in the approval of parents and enjoying coursework. On the whole, students with double majors pursue their interests at college while taking into account parents' approval, and also act strategically in their choices by choosing majors that differ in their chances of completion and finding a job upon graduation.

7 Understanding Gender Differences

The descriptive analysis in section 3.4 documents the heterogeneity in beliefs for various outcomes between the two genders. In sections 5 and 6, it is shown that males and females also differ in their preferences for the various outcomes. Though the results of the decomposition metric of equation (13) presented in Tables 3b, 3e, and 4a highlight the gender differences in preferences, it is not clear how much of the gender gap in the choice of college majors is driven by differences in preferences, and how much is due to differences in distributions of subjective beliefs. This distinction is important since males and females identical in their preferences will make different career choices if there are past gender differences in beliefs about success in different occupations (see Breen and Garcia-Penalosa, 2002). Moreover, any policy recommendations will depend on whether the gender gap exists because of innate differences in preferences, then no direct policy intervention could change the gap. Alternatively, if the gender gap existed because of, say, gender differences in beliefs about ability and self-confidence, then policy interventions like single-sex classes could possibly reduce the gap.⁴³ In this section, I dig deeper into the underlying causes for the gender gap.

7.1 Decomposition Analysis

As a first step, I decompose the gender gap into gender differences in beliefs and preferences. A common way to explore differences between groups in a linear framework is to express the difference in the average value of the dependent variable Y as:

$$\overline{Y}_M - \overline{Y}_F = [(\overline{X}_M - \overline{X}_F)\widehat{\beta}_M] + [\overline{X}_F(\widehat{\beta}_M - \widehat{\beta}_F)]$$

where \overline{X}_j is a vector of average values of the independent variables and $\widehat{\beta}_j$ is a vector of the estimated coefficients for gender $j \in \{(M)ale, (F)emale\}$. The first term on the right hand side is the inter-group difference in mean

 $^{^{43}}$ However, there is mixed evidence in terms of academic achievement gap with regards to same-sex classes. See Haag's literature review in the 1998 report of the AAUW Educational Foundation.

levels of the outcome due to different observable characteristics, while the second term is the difference due to different effects of the characteristics. This technique is attributed to Oaxaca (1973). However, in the current context, the probability of choosing a given major, Y, is non-linear. In the case Y is nonlinear, such as $Y = F(X\beta), \overline{Y}$ does not necessarily equal $F(\overline{X}\beta)$. The gender difference in this non-linear case can be written as:

$$\overline{Y}_M - \overline{Y}_F = \left[\sum_{i=1}^{N_M} \frac{F(X_{Mi}\beta_M)}{N_M} - \sum_{i=1}^{N_F} \frac{F(X_{Fi}\beta_M)}{N_F}\right] + \left[\sum_{i=1}^{N_F} \frac{F(X_{Fi}\beta_M)}{N_F} - \sum_{i=1}^{N_F} \frac{F(X_{Fi}\beta_F)}{N_F}\right]$$
$$= \left[\overline{F(X_M\hat{\beta}_M)} - \overline{F(X_F\hat{\beta}_M)}\right] + \left[\overline{F(X_F\hat{\beta}_M)} - \overline{F(X_F\hat{\beta}_F)}\right]$$

where N_j is the sample size of gender j.⁴⁴ The first expression in the square brackets represents part of the gender gap that is due to gender differences in distributions of X, and the second expression represents the part due to differences in the group processes determining levels of Y. It is relatively simple to estimate the total contribution. However, identifying the contribution of group differences in specific variables/ coefficients to the gender gap is not straightforward. For this purpose, I use a decomposition method proposed by Fairlie (1999, and 2005). Contributions of a single variable/ coefficient are calculated by replacing the relevant variable of one group with that of the other group sequentially one by one. For illustration, suppose $Y_j = F(X_j\beta_j)$ for $j=\{F, M\}$, and that X includes two variables, X_1 and X_2 . Moreover, let $N_M = N_F = N$, and assume there exists a natural one-to-one matching of female and male observations. The independent contribution of X_1 to the gender gap is given as:

$$\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}F(X_{1Mi}\widehat{\beta}_{1M}+X_{2Mi}\widehat{\beta}_{2M})-F(X_{1Fi}\widehat{\beta}_{1M}+X_{2Mi}\widehat{\beta}_{2M})$$

and that of X_2 is given as:

$$\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}F(X_{1Fi}\hat{\beta}_{1M} + X_{2Mi}\hat{\beta}_{2M}) - F(X_{1Fi}\hat{\beta}_{1M} + X_{2Fi}\hat{\beta}_{2M})$$

Therefore the contribution of a variable to the gap is equal to the change in the average predicted probability from replacing the female distribution with the male distribution of that variable while holding the distributions of the other variable constant. One important thing to note is that, unlike in the linear case, the independent contributions of X_1 and X_2 depend on the value of the other variable. Therefore, the order of switching the distributions can be important in calculating the contribution to the gender gap.⁴⁵ Similarly the independent contribution of β_1 to the gap is given by:

$$\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}F(X_{1Fi}\hat{\beta}_{1M} + X_{2Fi}\hat{\beta}_{2M}) - F(X_{1Fi}\hat{\beta}_{1F} + X_{2Fi}\hat{\beta}_{2M})$$

and that of β_2 is given as:

$$\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}F(X_{1Fi}\widehat{\beta}_{1F} + X_{2Fi}\widehat{\beta}_{2M}) - F(X_{1Fi}\widehat{\beta}_{1F} + X_{2Fi}\widehat{\beta}_{2F})$$

⁴⁴An equally valid expression is: $\overline{Y}_M - \overline{Y}_F = [\overline{F(X_M \hat{\beta}_F)} - \overline{F(X_F \hat{\beta}_F)}] + [\overline{F(X_M \hat{\beta}_M)} - \overline{F(X_M \hat{\beta}_F)}]$. This alternative method provides different estimates, which is the familiar index problem with the Oaxaca decomposition technique.

 $^{^{45}}$ Yun (2004) outlines an alternate decomposition strategy which is free from path-dependency. The method is easier to implement but I don't use it since it involves a first order Taylor approximation. Moreover, I believe that the decomposition employed in this paper is closer to what is standard in the literature.

In this illustration, I have assumed equal number of observations for females and males. However, my sample has more females than males. Since the decomposition requires one-to-one matching of female and male observations, I use the following simulation process: from the female sub-sample, I randomly draw 60 samples with the same number of observations as in the male sub-sample, and sort the female and male data by the predicted probabilities, and calculate separate decomposition estimates. The mean value of estimates from the separate decompositions is calculated and used to approximate the results from the entire female sample. As in Fairlie (2005), I approximate the standard errors using the delta method.

For the purposes of this decomposition, I treat double-major respondents as if they were pursuing a single major; I use the parameter estimates obtained from the single major choice model estimation using stated preferences of the respondents. Results of this decomposition are presented in Table 5a for four different majors.⁴⁶ The last row of the table shows that both expectations and preferences contribute to the gender gap for all major categories. The contributions of preferences and beliefs to the gap differ by fields: majority of the gender gap in Literature & Fine Arts and Social Sciences II is due to gender differences in beliefs, while gender differences in preferences explain most of the gap in Engineering and Social Sciences I.

A closer look at columns (1)-(4) shows that gender differences in beliefs about ability (more precisely beliefs about graduating in 4 years, and graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5) are insignificant and explain a small part of the gender gap. If women are less overconfident than men (Niederle et al., 2007; and references therein), and low in self-confidence (Long, 1986; Valian, 1998), one would expect females to have lower beliefs (relative to males) about graduating in 4 years and graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5, but that is not the case. Therefore, explanations entirely based on the assumption that women have lower self-confidence can be rejected in my data. Another striking observation is that gender differences in beliefs about enjoying coursework in the various fields are significant and explain a large part of the gap.

Here I discuss the decomposition results for Engineering in some detail. These results are presented in columns (1) and (5) of Table 5a. The model predicts that, on average, males are nearly twice as likely as females to major in engineering (an average male probability of 0.104 versus 0.045 for females); 60% of this gap is due to gender differences in preferences for various outcomes. Moreover, nearly 27% of the gap is due to gender differences in beliefs about enjoying coursework. Interestingly, gender differences in beliefs about future earnings are insignificant and constitute less that 0.5% of the gap. Females have beliefs similar to those of males about academic ability in engineering.⁴⁷ These findings suggest that females are less likely to major in engineering not because they are underconfident about their academic ability, low in self-confidence, or because of beliefs about wage discrimination in the labor market. Instead this is because they believe that they won't enjoy studying it. The results seem to suggest that a policy that changes social attitudes might be more useful in narrowing the gap. In the next section, I study how the gender gap changes by simulating different environments.

⁴⁶I do not conduct this analysis for the category of Natural Sciences. This is because the category pools both life sciences and physical sciences. Traditionally, females are more likely to major in the former, and less likely to major in the latter. Since I pool them together, the decomposition analysis for the pooled category would not be very useful.

 $^{^{47}}$ I only observe the beliefs about academic ability, and not *actual* academic ability. However, Chemers et. al. (2001) show that confidence in one's ability is strongly related to academic performance.

7.2 Simulations

I carry out some simulations to see how the gender gap would change in a world with a different environment. Column (1) of Table 5b shows the gender gap predicted by the model for the various major categories. The simulation in column (2) considers an environment where the female subjective ability distribution (beliefs about graduating within 4 years, and about graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5) is replaced with that of males.⁴⁸ The purpose of this simulation is to answer how much of the gap is due to females having less self-confidence in their ability. The second simulation in column (3) replaces the female subjective earnings distribution with that of males; it is meant to answer the question of how much of the gap is due to beliefs of wage discrimination in the labor market. Columns (4) and (5) simulate an environment in which females have the same beliefs as males about enjoying coursework and enjoying work at potential jobs respectively.

I continue to focus the discussion on Engineering. The results confirm the findings obtained in Table 5a. If female expectations about ability were raised to the same level as that of males through some policy intervention, the gender gap in engineering would decrease by less than 14%. The gender gap virtually stays the same if female expectations of future earnings were forced to be the same as those of males. Finally, the gender gap reduces by nearly 50% if the female beliefs about enjoying coursework in engineering were replaced with those of males. These results are in line with the findings of the previous section. It is not clear what kind of policy would be able to bring about a change in the female beliefs about enjoying coursework. This is because gender differences in beliefs of enjoying coursework are hard to explain: they could be a consequence of innate gender differences in attitudes (Baron-Cohen, 2003), or due to social biases including discrimination (Etzkowitz et al., 1992; Valian, 1998).⁴⁹ However, the insignificant and small gender differences in ability and future earnings in engineering allows me to rule out low self-confidence in women and perceived wage discrimination in the labor market as possible explanations for why women are less likely to major in fields like engineering.

A major question that has been left unanswered is the source of gender differences in preferences. Gender differences in preferences could arise from differences in tastes, as well as gender discrimination. For example, parents who know that females would be discriminated in male-dominated majors/ occupations could try to shape the preferences of their female children so that they are more comfortable in female-dominated majors/ occupations (Altonji and Blank, 1999). The question of understanding the sources of gender differences in preferences is beyond the scope of this paper.

8 Conclusion

Choosing a college major is a decision that has significant social and economic consequences. Little is known about how youth choose college majors and why the observed gender gap exists. In this paper, I estimate a model of college major choice with a focus on explaining the gender gap. Gender differences in major choice are extremely complex, and no simple explanation can be provided for them. The analysis presented in this

⁴⁸I sort the female and male sub-samples according to the predicted probability of majoring in that field, and then replace the female subjective belief about ability with that of the corresponding male. Since there are more females than males, I use a simulation method similar to the one used for the Fairlie decomposition.

 $^{^{49}}$ An example of the latter is that women might believe that these fields are not gender-neutral but constructed in accordance with the traditional male role, and that they would be treated *poorly* in the workplace. For example, Traweek (1988) argues that an aggressive behavior is a necessary ingredient for achieving success in science, and Niederle et al. (2007) show that women tend to shy away from competitive environments. In that case, even if women perceive no gender difference in ability and compensation, their beliefs about how much they will enjoy studying engineering and science will be affected.

paper attempts to enhance our understanding of these issues.

On the methodology side, this paper shows that elicited expectations can be used to relax strong and often nonverifiable assumptions on expectations to infer decision rules under uncertainty. Descriptive analysis of the subjective data shows substantial heterogeneity in beliefs both within and between genders. Comparison of subjective beliefs with objective realities and statistics show that respondents provide meaningful answers. My approach also differs from the literature on major choice by accounting for both the pecuniary and nonpecuniary determinants of the choice. I have shown that elicited subjective data can be used to infer decision rules in environments where expectations are crucial. This is particularly relevant in cases where the goal is to explain group differences in choices under uncertainty, and where expectations may differ across groups (in unknown ways).

I estimate models for single major and double major choice. Outcomes most important in choice of major are enjoying coursework, approval of parents, and enjoying work at jobs. Non-pecuniary determinants explain about half of the choice for males, and more than three-fourths of the choice for females. Males and females have similar preferences regarding choices at college, but differ in their tastes regarding the workplace; females mostly care about non-pecuniary outcomes (reconciling work and family, and enjoying work at jobs), while males value pecuniary outcomes (social status of the jobs, likelihood of finding a job, and earnings profiles at jobs) more. In addition, I find that students choosing double majors hedge their chances of getting a job upon graduation and completing their studies by choosing pairs of majors which differ in these two outcomes. Cultural proxies and demographic variables bias beliefs and preferences in systematic ways. Individuals with foreign-born parents value the pecuniary determinants of the choice more than individuals with US-born parents. Males with foreign-born parents are the only sub-group in my sample who value pecuniary determinants more than the non-pecuniary outcomes.

The analysis in this paper has some limitations. First, the study is based on data from Northwestern only. The heterogeneity in subjective expectations underscores the need to elicit similar data at different undergraduate institutions, and at a larger scale in order to make policy recommendations. Second, heterogeneity in subjective responses could be driven by differential access to information, or by different information processing. Demographic data collected from respondents allows me to explain some of the heterogeneity in beliefs; I find that cultural proxies and parents shape beliefs for certain outcomes. However, progress in understanding how people form and update expectations requires richer longitudinal data. Moreover, as Manski (2004) argues, understanding expectations formation will also require intensive probing of individuals to learn how they perceive environments and how they process new information. Third, individuals may find it optimal to experiment with different majors to learn about one's ability and match quality (Manski, 1989; Altonji, 1993; and Malamud, 2006). This study does not focus on this aspect by assuming that individuals maximize current expected utility. Since experimentation may be important, I plan to focus on it in follow-up work.

My results shed some light on the reasons for the gender gap in college major choice. Gender differences in beliefs about ability and future earnings are insignificant in explaining the gender gap. A policy intervention which were to raise the expectations of females about ability and future earnings in engineering to the same level as that of males would only decrease the gender gap by about 15%. This has two implications: (1) just raising expectations of women may not be enough to eradicate the gap, and (2) hypotheses which claim that the gap could be explained by women having low self-esteem and being less overconfident than men can be rejected by my data. Most of the gender gap is due to gender differences in beliefs about enjoying coursework, and preferences for various outcomes. The evidence suggests that social prejudices and wage discrimination may not be the main explanation for why women are less likely to major in engineering. However, one should be careful in jumping to a definite conclusion since gender differences in beliefs about enjoying coursework as well as preferences may exist because of differences in tastes, or due to gender discrimination. Richer data is needed to answer this question. I believe the next natural step is to re-interview respondents in my sample to explore these issues.

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9 Appendix 1

9.1 Practice Questions

In some of the survey questions, you will be asked about the PERCENT CHANCE of something happening. The percent chance must be a number between zero and 100. Numbers like 2 or 5% indicate "almost no chance," 19% or so may mean "not much chance," a 47 or 55% chance may be a "pretty even chance," 82% or so indicates a "very good chance," and a 95 or 98% mean "almost certain." The percent chance can also be thought of as the NUMBER OF CHANCES OUT OF 100.

We will start with a couple of practice questions.

- 1. PRACTICE QUESTION 1: What do you think is the PERCENT CHANCE (or CHANCES OUT OF 100) that you will eat pizza for lunch next week? _____%
- 2. PRACTICE QUESTION 2: What do you think is the PERCENT CHANCE (or CHANCES OUT OF 100) that you will eat pizza for lunch on Tuesday next week? _____%

Once students had answered the questions, they were given the following instructions

Note that "pizza for lunch next week" INCLUDES the possibility of "pizza for lunch on Tuesday next week". Recall that:

PRACTICE QUESTION 1: What do you think is the PERCENT CHANCE (or CHANCES OUT OF 100) that you will eat pizza for lunch next week?

PRACTICE QUESTION 2: What do you think is the PERCENT CHANCE (or CHANCES OUT OF 100) that you will eat pizza for lunch on Tuesday next week?

Since "pizza for lunch next week" INCLUDES the possibility of "pizza for lunch on Tuesday next week", your answer to PRACTICE QUESTION 2 should be SMALLER or EQUAL than your answer to PRACTICE QUESTION 1.

9.2 Questionnaire

The following set of questions was asked for each of the relevant categories. The questions below were asked for Natural Sciences.

- Q1 If you were majoring in Natural Sciences, what would be your most likely major?
- Q2 If you were majoring in Natural Sciences, what do you think is the percent chance that you will successfully complete this major in 4 years (from the time that you started college)? (Successfully complete means to complete a bachelors)

NOTE: In answering these questions fully place yourself in the (possibly) hypothetical situation. For example, for this question, your answer should be the percent chance that you think you will successfully complete your major in Natural Sciences in 4 years IF you were (FORCED) to major in it.

- Q3 If you were majoring in Natural Sciences, what do you think is the percent chance that you will graduate with a GPA of at least 3.5 (on a scale of 4)?
- Q4 If you were majoring in Natural Sciences, what do you think is the percent chance that you will enjoy the coursework?
- Q5 If you were majoring in Natural Sciences, how many hours per week on average do you think you will need to spend on the coursework?
- Q6 If you were majoring in Natural Sciences, what do you think is the percent chance that your parents and other family members would approve of it?
- Q7 If you were majoring in Natural Sciences, what do you think is the percent chance that you could find a job (that you would accept) immediately upon graduation?
- Q8 If you obtained a bachelors in Natural Sciences, what do you think is the percent chance that you will go to graduate school in Natural Sciences some time in the future?
- Q9 What do you think was the average annual starting salary of Northwestern graduates (of 2006) with Bachelor's Degrees in Natural Sciences?

Now look ahead to when you will be 30 YEARS OLD. Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available for you and that you will accept if you successfully graduate in Natural Sciences.

NOTE that there are some jobs that you can get irrespective of what your Field of Study is. For example, one could be a janitor irrespective of their Field of Study. However, one could not get into Medical School (and hence become a doctor) if they were to major in Journalism.

Your answers SHOULD take into account whether you think you would get some kind of advanced degree after your bachelors if you majored in Natural Sciences.

- Q10 What kind of jobs are you thinking of?
- Q11 Look ahead to when you will be 30 YEARS OLD. If you majored in Natural Sciences, what do you think is the percent chance that you will enjoy working at the kinds of jobs that will be available to you?
- Q12 Look ahead to when you will be 30 YEARS OLD. If you majored in Natural Sciences, what do you think is the percent chance that you will be able to reconcile work and your social life/ family at the kinds of jobs that will be available to you?
- Q13 Look ahead to when you will be 30 YEARS OLD. If you majored in Natural Sciences, how many hours per week on average do you think you will need to spend working at the kinds of jobs that will be available to you?

When answering the next two questions, please ignore the effects of price inflation on earnings. That is, assume that one dollar today is worth the same as one dollar when you are 30 years old and when you are 40 years old.

- Q14 Look ahead to when you will be 30 years old. Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available to you and that you will accept if you graduate in [X]. What is the average amount of money that you think you will earn per year by the time you are 30 YEARS OLD?
- Q15 Now look ahead to when you will be 40 years old. Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available to you and that you will accept if you graduate in Natural Sciences. What is the average amount of money that you think you will earn per year by the time you are 40 YEARS OLD?

9.3 Debriefing

9.3.1 Why Choose Two Majors

I present some of the responses to the question posed to survey respondents pursuing more than one major: "Why are you pursuing more than one major?"

- I am unsure as to what I want to do later in life and would like to open up my options.
- To have more options, since I am not certain as to what career I want to follow
- There are plenty of econ majors in the country, doubling with Math will help me stand out. Also, the complement each other well and I enjoy them both.

- My first major, MMSS, is an adjunct major. Getting a second major allows me to broaden my horizons and also specialize in a practical field. Also, I feel it looks more impressive if you have completed more than one major
- I want to have a science major (chemistry) as well as another route (economics) for careers in life.
- One practical (MMSS) One personal interest (Linguistics). Real goal is to go to law school soon after grad. perhaps working a couple years in the consulting/finance industry
- Because Spanish is for a career and art is for a lifetime hobby.
- Multiple personal interests, having additional options later in life, stand apart from others
- I have a conflict between what is practical for the job prospect and what I truly would enjoy learning about, so I am pursuing one major which falls into each of the two categories.
- There is no single major at Northwestern which encompasses my interests;
- I want to have more fields open to me.
- To make it more easy to get a job and have a solid career
- Keep career opportunities open.
- I feel that having both majors will open up a wider range of job opportunities when I graduate. I also feel that I am interested in both subjects and am taking the opportunity to further my knowledge in them.
- Interest in subject, a more applicable major for attaining business jobs
- The Quarter system at Northwestern makes obtaining a double major very feasible. I have multiple interests so it makes sense for me to pursue multiple majors.
- I want to be a well rounded person after I graduate, and also just in case one of them does not work out.
- Because I enjoy the material, have the time, and feel like it will improve my chances of acquiring a job after I graduate

9.3.2 Peer Effects

The question was:

Check all that apply

- 1) My (intended) major is the same as that of one of my parents
- 2) My (intended) major is the same as that of one of my siblings
- 3) My (intended) major is the same as that of my freshman-year roommate
- 4) My (intended) major is the same as that of my current roommate
- 5) My (intended) major is the same as that of the majority of my best high school friends who went to college
- 6) My (intended) major is the same as that of the majority of my friends in Northwestern
- 7) None of the above

Next the respondent was asked: "For each of the options (1 through 6) in Question 5 that you have marked, please explain the underlying reason for it"

Some of the selected responses are:

- I am influenced by my father but not much by friends.
- My Integrated science major is the same as the majority of my friends, because most of the classes that I take is with Integrated science majors. Since we are in class together all the time, we have become good friends.
- My brother is majoring in Journalism but also Political Science. This played a minor influence on my decision but is mostly coincidence that we like the same sort of classes. My freshman year roommate was possibly an influence on me, but we generally had the same interests in terms of school subjects from the start.
- My dad majored in English, is passionate about the subject and is now a college professor who teaches it. He loved it, but it was never forced on me, resulting in that i grew to love it as well. And I'm good at it. When you're constantly being grammatically corrected and pushed to think loftier ideas then it kind of becomes second nature, a permanent habit. As far as my freshman year roommate, i lived in the Communications Residential College. It's 80% journalism and 19% theater. It was bound to happen.
- My brothers and I have very similar interests and strengths.

- My parents have always encouraged me to do well in school, and placed an emphasis on math and the sciences. Also, I live in a town of only 20,000 people, but there are two major research facilities in the town. Many of my peers were also children of scientists. I have a twin brother who also goes to Northwestern and studies Chemistry and German. We probably influenced each other because we're very close. We both took the German AP, which is why both of us have German as a second major (the German major is relatively light, especially if you come in already taking third year classes).
- I am interested in Psychology, and although my parents are not too keen on me studying psychology, that's what I want to to. My mom was also interested in Psych, but she never perused it
- My major is the same as my parents purely by coincidence. Somehow our interests coincide. My major is the same as the majority of my high school friends (but most of my best friends are doing medicine) because most of my high school friends who study abroad chose economics. It is also the major which most students from Hong Kong would choose when they study abroad since most jobs you can find back home is econ-related. My major is the same as the majority of my friends in Northwestern because 1) Economics is a popular major, the probability that you can find an econ major student is quite high 2) I met most of my friends and formed the friendship through classes and extracurricular activities.
- My mom is a psychologist, and even though I have no desire to pursue that career I think she might have influenced my interest in psychology
- I grew up in a household where my parents are both scientists so I became interested in medicine and science simultaneously. They never told me what to do, it was just a matter of spending more time around a certain field. Also, I live on North Campus where a majority of Northwestern science majors and engineers live so it just so happens that many people are in the same field that I intend to be in, primarily by location because the dorms up North are closer to Tech, which is where most of our classes are held.
- 1) Parental Influence 5 and 6) Social Integration with Friends of Similar Background
- For the first, my parents raised me and my siblings, and for the second, I tend to make friends with people I share classes with.
- I think they paired me with a roommate with whom I had stuff in common. My friends at Northwestern and I have the same interests and personalities and that is reflected in our majors.
- My roommate took a Psychology class last year and really enjoyed it. I had never had any exposure to Psychology classes in high school, so decided that it would be interesting to take. I took the class this fall, and really enjoyed it.
- My parents and I have similar tastes and I like the things they like. My roommate and I were best friends from high school and had very similar interests.
- I think I want to major in economics because I see how successful my dad is today and since he majored in business, I thought economics would be close enough.
- economics is something that flows for me when i learn it, maybe it's in my genes since my dad majored in it during graduate school, it's also very practical and covers many bases, so i see why my friends picked it, it's respected, it's not seen as a slacker major like psychology, and i find it very interesting as i would hope many people do since it's such a popular major
- I really think it's a coincidence. My roommate is interested in politics, too. Maybe it's because we're from similar places. We're both from coastal cities, where politics is big.
- My father has influenced me indirectly because he is an economics professor. My brother is young and wants to follow me into business. i am friends with a lot of people in my classes, which happen to be econ./MMSS classes
- My mother is terrible at math so she majored in an all-words major, Sociology, but I am OK at math so my Social Policy major incorporates a bit more economic reasoning and logic than hers




Figure 1a: Gender Composition of Undergrad Majors of 1999-2000 Bachelor's Degree Recipients Employed Full-Time in 2001. Source: 2001Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study (B&B:2000/01)




Figure 1b: Average income of 1999-2000 Bachelor's Degree Recipients Employed Full-Time in 2001 by Undergraduate Major.

Table 1a: List of Majors

The following is the classification of majors into categories: a Natural Sciences **Biological Sciences** Chemistry **Environmental Sciences** Geography* Geological Sciences Integrated Science Materials Science Physics **b** Mathematical and Computer Sciences Cognitive Science Computing and Information Systems Mathematics Statistics c Social Sciences I Anthropology Gender Studies^{*} History Linguistics Political Science Psychology Sociology d Social Sciences II Economics Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences^{*} e Ethics and Values Legal Studies^{*} Philosophy Religion Science in Human Culture^{*} f Area Studies African American Studies American Studies Asian And Middle East Languages and Civilization European Studies International Studies^{*} Slavic Languages and Literatures g Literature and Fine Arts Art History Art Theory and Practice Classics **Comparative Literary Studies** Drama English French German Italian Spanish

h Music Studies¹ Jazz Studies Music Cognition Music Composition Music Education Music Technology Music Theory Musicology Piano Performance String Performance Voice and Opera Performance Wind and Percussion Performance i Education and Social Policy² Human Development and Psychological Services Learning and Organizational Change Secondary Teaching Social Policy j Communication Studies³ **Communication Studies** Dance Human Communication Science Interdepartmental Studies Performance Studies Radio/Television/Film Theatre k Engineering⁴ **Applied Mathematics Biomedical Engineering** Chemical Engineering **Civil Engineering** Computer Engineering Computer Science **Electrical Engineering Environmental Engineering** Industrial Engineering Manufacturing and Design Engineering Materials Science Engineering Mechanical Engineering L Journalism⁵ Journalism

* Adjunct majors. These do not stand alone

- 1 Majors in the School of Music
- 2 Majors in the School of Education and Social Policy
- 3 Majors in the School of Communication
- 4 Majors in the McCormick School of Engineering
- 5 Majors in the Medill School of Journalism

Table 1b: Sample Characteristics

			Sa	mple			Popul	\mathbf{lation}^a
		A 11	Single	• Majors	Double	e Majors		
Characteristics	Freq.(I	Percent)	Freq.($\mathbf{Percent})$	Freq.(1	$\mathbf{Percent})$	Freq.(H	$\mathbf{Percent}$
Gender								
Male	69	(43)	33	(40)	36	(46)	465	(46)
Female	92	(57)	50	(60)	42	(54)	546	(54)
Total	161		83		78		1011	
Ethnicity								
Caucasian	79	(49)	40	(48)	39	(50)	546	(54)
African American	11	(7)	7	(8.5)	4	(5)	71	(7)
Asian	56	(35)	27	(33)	29	(37)	232	(23)
Hispanic	5	$(3)^{'}$	2	(2)	3	(4)	61	$(6)^{'}$
Other	10	(6)	7	(8.5)	3	(4)	101	(10)
Declared Major? ^{b}								
Yes	90	(56)	44	(53)	46	(59)	182	(18)
No	71	(44)	39	(47)	32	(41)	829	(82)
International Student? ^c								
Yes	8	(5)	5	(6)	3	(4)	40	(4)
No	153	(95)	78	(94)	75	(96)	971	(96)
Second-Generation Immigrant? ^{d}								
Yes	66	(41)	33	(40)	33	(42)		_
No	95	(59)	50	(60)	45	(58)		_
Average GPA								
Male	3	.48	e e	3.43	3	.52	3.	.26
Female		.40		3.39		.45		.31

 \overline{a} Population Statistics for the sophomore class. (Source: Northwestern Office of the Registrar)

b Whether the respondent has declared their major at the time of the survey

c Whether the respondent is an international student

d Whether at least one of the respondent's parents is foreign-born, and the respondent was born in the US

Table 1c: Distribution of WCAS Majors

			Sar	\mathbf{nple}^b				(Class o	of 2006 ^c		
		All	\mathbf{N}	I ales	Fe	males	l I	A 11	\mathbf{M}	[ales	Fei	nales
$\mathbf{WCAS} \ \mathbf{Majors}^a$	Fre	q (%)	Fre	eq (%)	Fre	eq (%)	Free	q (%)	\mathbf{Fre}	q (%)	\mathbf{Fre}	q (%)
Natural Sciences	31	(19)	15	(22)	16	(17)	156	(14)	62	(12.5)	94	(15.5)
Math & Computer Sci.	4	(2.5)	2	(3)	2	(2)	37	(3.5)	29	(6)	8	(1)
Social Sciences I	41	(25.5)	12	(17)	29	(31.5)	512	(46.5)	211	(42.5)	301	(49)
Social Sciences II	48	(30)	29	(42)	19	(21)	217	(20)	140	(28.5)	77	(13)
Ethics and Values	4	(2.5)	4	(6)	0	(0)	25	(2)	14	(3)	11	(2)
Area Studies	13	(8)	5	(7)	8	(9)	24	(2)	4	(1)	20	(3)
Literature & Fine Arts	20	(12.5)	2	(3)	18	(19.5)	132	(12)	32	(6.5)	100	(16.5)
Total	161	(100)	69	(100)	92	(100)	1103	(100)	492	(100)	611	(100)

a Majors that appear in each category are listed in Table 1a

b In cases where the survey respondent has more than one major in WCAS, only the first one is included in the table

c Only includes students with a primary WCAS major (Source: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System)

			Engin	eering			Lit. & I	Fine Arts	
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		N			males	Ν			
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Sub. Beliefs	Freq.	Cum. %	Freq.	Cum. %	Freq.	Cum. %	Freq.	Cum. %
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0	_	0	2	2.38	1	1.45	1	1.09
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1	1	1.49	1	3.57	_	1.45	_	1.09
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	3	_	1.49	2	5.95	_	1.45	_	1.09
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	5	1	2.99	2	8.33	_	1.45	_	1.09
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	10	3	7.46	_	8.33	1	2.90	_	1.09
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	12	_	7.46	1	9.52	_	2.90	_	1.09
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	15	1	8.96	3	13.10	_	2.90	_	1.09
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	18	_	8.96	1	14.29	_	2.90	_	1.09
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	20	3	13.43	12	28.57	_	2.90	_	1.09
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	25	2	16.42	8	38.10	_	2.90	_	1.09
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	26	1	17.91	_	38.10	_	2.90	_	1.09
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	30	1	19.40	4	42.86	_	2.90	2	3.26
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	33	_	19.40	1	44.05	_	2.90	_	3.26
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	35	2	22.39	3	47.62	_	2.90	1	4.35
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	40	3	26.87	7	55.95	_	2.90	_	4.35
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		3		3		1		_	
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$				_	59.52	_		_	
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		6		8	69.05	1		7	
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Total 67 84 69 92			-		-		-		

Table 2a: Percent Chance of graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5 if majoring in:

		Social So	iences II	-		Social S	ciences I	
	N	Aales		males	Ν	Iales		males
Sub. Beliefs	Freq.	Cum. %	Freq.	Cum. %	Freq.	Cum. %	Freq.	Cum. %
0	1	1.45	-	0	1	1.45	-	0
10	-	1.45	2	2.17	-	1.45	1	1.09
12	-	1.45	1	3.26	-	1.45	-	1.09
20	-	1.45	2	5.43	_	1.45	-	1.09
25	1	2.90	1	6.52	1	2.90	-	1.09
30	2	5.80	3	9.78	_	2.90	1	2.17
35	1	7.25	$\overset{\circ}{2}$	11.96	_	2.90	-	2.17
40	3	10.14	8	20.65	1	4.35	3	5.43
43	-	10.14	1	20.00 21.74	-	4.35	-	5.43
44	1	11.59	-	21.74	_	4.35	_	5.43
45	3	11.99 15.94	3	22.83	_	4.35	1	6.52
46	-	15.94 15.94	-	23.91	_	4.35	-	6.52
40	1	17.39	_	23.91 23.91	_	4.35	-	6.52
50	8	28.99	10	34.78	6	13.04	- 4	10.32
50 55				40.22			4	10.87
	-	28.99	5		1	14.49		
56 60		30.43	1	41.30	-	14.49	-	11.96
60 65	9	43.38	9	51.09	5	21.74	9	21.74
65	3	47.83	3	54.35	2	24.64	2	23.91
68 70		49.28	-	54.35	-	24.64	-	23.91
70	3	53.62	8	63.04	7	34.78	14	39.13
71	-	53.62	-	63.04	-	34.78	1	40.22
72	-	53.62	1	64.13	1	36.23	-	40.22
74	-	53.62	1	65.22	-	36.23	-	40.22
75	13	72.46	9	75.00	7	46.38	6	46.74
76	1	73.91	-	75.00	1	47.83	. 2	48.91
77	-	73.91		75.00	1	49.28	-	48.91
78	-	73.91	-	75.00	1	50.72	-	48.91
79	-	73.91	-	75.00	-	50.72	-	48.91
80	10	88.41	7	82.61	11	66.67	18	68.48
82	-	88.41	1	83.70	-	66.67	2	70.65
83	-	88.41	1	84.78	-	66.67	-	70.65
85	3	92.75	5	90.22	4	72.46	7	79.26
86	1	94.20	-	90.22	-	72.46	-	79.26
87	-	94.20	-	90.22	-	72.46	1	79.35
88	-	94.20	_	90.22	-	72.46	1	80.43
89	_	94.20	1	91.30	-	72.46	1	81.52
90	2	97.10	$\overline{5}$	96.74	12	89.86	10	92.39
93	_	97.10	-	96.74	1	91.30	1	93.48
95	1	98.55	2	98.91	1	92.75	3	96.74
96 96	-	98.55	-	98.91	-	92.75	1	97.83
90 97	1	100	_	98.91	_	92.75	-	97.83 97.83
98	_	100	- 1	100	2	92.15 95.65	- 1	98.91
98 99	_	100	T	100		95.65	1	100
99 100	_	100	-	100	- 3	95.05 100	-	100
	- 60	100	-	100		100		100
Total	69		84		69		92	

Table 2b: Percent Chance of reconciling work and family at the jobs if majoring in:

Variable: Average Annual Starting Salary of 2006 Northwestern Graduates in each Category as reported by:	I Starting	Salary of 20	006 Northwe	stern Graduates in	each Category as rep	orted by:	
)	Member G	Member Graduating Class of 06a	lass of 06^a	Respondent with M	Respondent with Major in the category ^{b}	Respondent with Maje	Respondent with Major not in the $Category^c$
Category	All	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
	(1)	(2)	(3)	4a $4b$	5a $5b$	6a $6b$	7a $7b$
	Avg.	Avg.	Avg.	Avg. Median	Avg. Median	Avg. Median	Avg. Median
Natural Sciences	$38,562^*$ $[16]^d$	55,000 [4]	33,083 $[12]$	$43,667 40,000 \\ [15]$	56,294 35,000 [17]	46,528 $44,000[53]$	$\begin{array}{ccc} 49,933 & 50,000 \\ & (75) \end{array}$
Math & Computer Sciences	59,950 $[10]$	65,285 [7]	47,500 [3]	51,40052,000 [5]	32,50032,500	50, 12550, 000	47,366 $45,000$ [90]
Social Sciences I	39,665 $[81]$	42,422 [32]	37,865 $[49]$	40,727 $40,000$ $[20]$	46,277 $[40,000$ [36]	41,132 $40,000$ $[49]$	$34,148 \begin{array}{c} 32,500 \\ 56 \end{array}$
Social Sciences II	$52,850^{*}$ $[96]$	55,072 [59]	49,308 [37]	58,078 $55,000$ [38]	62,772 57,500 [22]	60,064 50,000 [31]	50,928 $50,000$ [70]
Ethics and Values	37,875 $[4]$	35,500 [3]	45,000[1]	32,600 $35,000$ $[5]$	34,500 $34,500$ $[2]$	39,109 $35,000$ $[64]$	$36, 144 \overline{31}, 000 [90]$
Area Studies	38,250 (4)	40,500 (3)	35,000(1)	59,000 $[46,000$ $[8]$	$35,136 \begin{bmatrix} 36,000 \\ [22] \end{bmatrix}$	36,721 $35,000$ $[61]$	34,157 31,000 $[70]$
Literature and Fine Arts	37,667[18]	48,333[3]	35,533 $[15]$	$27,600$ $\begin{bmatrix} 25,000 \\ 5 \end{bmatrix}$	36,475 $37,500$ $[20]$	36, 234 31, 000 [64]	30,472 $30,000$ $[72]$
Music Studies	37,889[9]	35,800[5]	$\begin{array}{c} 40,500\\ [4]\end{array}$	25,000 $25,000$ $[1]$	25,000 $25,000$ $[2]$	I	1
Education & Social Policy	$43,500^{*}$ $[16]$	67,000 [4]	35,667 $[12]$]	35,000 $35,000$ $[2]$	I	Ι
Communication Studies	42,528 [46]	50,833 $[15]$	38,510 [31]	Ι	43,333 $40,000$ [3]	Ι	Ι
Engineering	53,491 $[109]$	54, 525 [71]	52, 549 $[38]$	50,000 $52,500$ $[4]$	50,000 $50,000$ $[1]$	53,190 $50,000$ $[63]$	55, 548 50, 000 [83]
Journalism	$42,937^*$ [38]	80, 117 [7]	36,094 $[31]$	32,500 $32,500$ $[2]$	40,000 $40,000$ $1]$, , ,	
\uparrow Response to this question in the survey: What do you think was the average annual starting salary of Northwestern graduates (of 2006) with Bachelor's Degrees in Category X?	he survey: Wh	tat do you thi . two tailed t	ink was the ave	rage annual starting sala	ry of Northwestern gradua	tes (of 2006) with Bachelor'	s Degrees in Category X?
a v		, worwartou	-rusu), -rusus,				0000
^a Average reported starting salary of a graduating member of the 2006	ry ot a gradua	ating member	t of the ZUUD CI	ass majoring in that cate	gory. (source: Northwester	Class majoring in that category. (source: Northwestern University Graduation Survey 2006)	rvey 2006)

^b Survey respondent's answer to the question in * when (one of) his/her intended major is in category X. Column (a) gives the mean, and Column (b) gives the median

^c Survey respondent's answer to the question in * when his/her intended majors are in a category other than X.

 d $[N]\colon$ N is the number of observations for the given statistic

Table 2c: Statistics on Average Annual Starting Salaries of 2006 Graduates †

Table 2d: Explaining the errors in students' salary expectations

	Entire	e Sample	Overe	$estimate^{\dagger}$	Under	$estimate^{\ddagger}$
	Estimates	(Std. Error)	Estimates	(Std. Error)	Estimates	(Std. Error)
	(1a)	(1b)	(2a)	(2b)	(3a)	(3c)
Major Declared ^{b}	-0.002	(0.106)	0.287	(0.193)	-0.144	(0.094)
Cumulative GPA	0.302^{**}	(0.138)	0.486^{**}	(0.243)	0.205^{*}	(0.118)
SAT $Math^c$	-0.0313	(0.0472)	0692	(0.0924)	-0.0065	(0.0389)
SAT Verbal ^{d}	-0.0186	(0.0404)	-0.088	(0.083)	-0.0207	(0.0349)
Female	0.199^{*}	(0.113)	0.143	(0.225)	0.221**	(0.099)
NU Credits ^{e}	-0.0212	(0.0177)	0.0902***	(0.029)	0.0044	(0.0138)
Asian	0.0380	(0.168)	0.0301	(0.346)	0.0567	(0.127)
$\mathrm{Foreign}^{f}$	0.0525	(0.287)	-0.201	(0.696)	0.268^{*}	(0.146)
Second-Generation Immigrant^g	0.142	(0.157)	0.285	(0.325)	0.0646	(0.103)
Studying Given Major ^h	-0.0034	(0.118)	0.0701	(0.246)	0.0145	(0.084)
Studying Given Major	0.190	(0, 1, 0, 1)	0.159	(0, 001)	0,0000	(0, 110)
\times Major Declared	-0.186	(0.161)	-0.158	(0.291)	-0.0992	(0.119)
Private High School	0.0199	(0.104)	0.112	(0.179)	0.0017	(0.103)
Low Parents' $Income^i$	-0.152	(0.115)	-0.274	(0.189)	0.0112	(0.102)
Father went to College	-0.124	(0.252)	-0.219	(0.548)	-0.142	(0.169)
Mother went to College	-0.247	(0.254)	-0.697	(0.438)	0.0259	(0.126)
Father studied major ^{j}	-0.114	(0.105)	-0.241	(0.173)	0.0106	(0.089)
Mother studied major ^{k}	0.057	(0.110)	0.064	(0.185)	0.0467	(0.0965)
Respondent Random Effect		Yes		Yes		Yes
No. of Observations	1	288		557	,	731
No. of Clusters		161		128		141

Dependent Variable: Log Absolute Error in Beliefs about Starting Salaries^{$\oplus a$}

NOTES:

Parameter estimates correspond to the estimation of OLS model. Cluster errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

 \oplus The dependent variable is the log of the absolute value of the salary error: $\ln \left| \frac{(\widehat{s_{ix}} - s^{obs})}{s^{obs}} \right|$ where $\widehat{s_{ix}}$ is the respondent's answer to the question: "What do you think was the average annual starting salary of Northwestern graduates (of 2006) with Bachelor's Degrees in Category X?" s^{obs} is the actual average salary earned by 2006 graduates in category

X (source: Northwestern Career Center Survey of 2006 Graduates)

[†] Sample restricted to observations where reported estimate is greater than observed salary, i.e. $\widehat{s_{im}} > s^{obs}$

 \ddagger Sample restricted to cases where reported estimate is less than observed salary, i.e. $\widehat{s_{im}} < s^{obs}$

a All regressions include major-specific dummies, and respondent fixed effects. (Constants not shown)

b a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has already declared his/ her major

c(d) - SAT Math (Verbal) score; = 1 if SAT Math (Verbal) score is less than 400; =2 if score = 400-499; =3 if score = 500-549

=4 if score = 550-599; =5 if score = 600-649; =6 if score = 650-699; =7 if score = 700-749; =8 if score = 750-800

e The number of credits the respondent gets when starting Northwestern because of AP/ IB exams taken in high school f a dummy that equals one if the respondent is an International student

q a dummy that equals one if either of the respondent's parents are foreign-born, and the respondent was born in the US

h a dummy that equals one if the respondent's intended major category is same as category X in the salary question

i a dummy that equals one if parents' annual income is less that \$150,000

j a dummy that equals one if father's field of study is the same as the salary question

k a dummy that equals one if mother's field of study is the same as the salary question

Table 2e: Expected Annual Salary at the Age of 30

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	Expect	Expected Salary ^{a}		Maio Maio	<u>espond</u>	$\frac{\text{Respondent with}}{\text{Maior in the category}^b}$	2			Maior	Respondent Maior not in the	<u>Respondent with</u> r not in the Category ^c	orv ^c	
Category:	Males	Males Females		Males		H	$\overline{\mathbf{F}}$ emales			Males			Females	
	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)	(4a)	(4b)	(4c)	(5a)	(5b)	(5c)	(6a)	(q9)	(6c)
	Avg.	Avg.	Avg.	Median	N^{q}	Avg.	Median	N	Avg.	Median	N	Avg.	Median	N
Natural Sciences	82, 333	61, 768	101,000	100,000	[15]	97, 352	70,000	[17]	96, 205	80,000	[54]	87, 720	65,000	[75]
Math & Computer Sciences			66,000	60,000	2	41,000	41,000	[2]	79,501	75,000	[64]	71,011	60,000	[00]
Social Sciences I	72,150	58,804	78, 750	75,000	[20]	72, 222	62,500	[36]	74, 755	70,000	[49]	53, 303	50,000	[56]
Social Sciences II	83, 434	63,005	149, 552	100,000	38	117,500	85,000	$\begin{bmatrix} 22 \end{bmatrix}$	98, 870	95,000	[31]	118, 542	75,000	[20]
Ethics and Values	Ι	I	63,000	65,000	2	61,500	61,500	2	80, 578	60,000	[64]	62, 188	55,000	[00]
Area Studies	76, 785	53, 765	87,500	77,500	∞	55,863	55,000	$\begin{bmatrix} 22 \end{bmatrix}$	62, 262	60,000	[61]	54, 571	50,000	[20]
Literature and Fine Arts	76, 785	53, 765	58,400	50,000	5	55, 150	50,000	[20]	60,062	50,000	[64]	47, 138	45,000	[72]
Music Studies	Ι	Ι	60,000	60,000	Ξ	36,500	36,500	[2]						
Education & Social Policy	65, 717	45,914	Ι	ı	ı	47,500	47,500	[2]						
Communication Studies	Ι	Ι	Ι	I	ı	61, 166	65,000	<u></u>						
Engineering	87, 356	78, 258	106, 250	80,000	[4]	80,000	80,000	Ξ	80,000	88, 629	[63]	94,759	75,000	[83]
${ m Journalism}$	Ι	I	67,500	67,500	$\begin{bmatrix} 2 \end{bmatrix}$	55,000	55,000	Ξ						
* Response to the question: "Look ahead to when you will be 30 y in [X]. What is the average amount of money that you think you	ok ahead to unt of mon	o when you when you they that you t	ill be 30 yea hink you wi	rears old. Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available to you and that you will accept if you graduate will earn per year by the time you are 30 YEARS OLD?	nk abou year by	it the kinds the time y	t of jobs that ou are 30 Y	t will b EARS	e available OLD?	e to you an	d that ;	you will acc	ept if you {	graduate

^a Average salary (in 2007 dollars) in 2003 of college graduates of 1993. Restricted to selective colleges with Carnegie Code 4. Source: U.S. Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics 1993/03 Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study (B&B:93/03).

^b Survey respondent's answer to the question in * when (one of) his/her intended major is in category X. Column (a) gives the mean, and Column (b) gives the median

^c Survey respondent's answer to the question in * when his/her intended majors are in a category other than X. d Number of respondents

Table 2f: Percentage Chance of being active in the full-time labor force:

	Hatire	Entire Sampa	Ц	Famalas		Malas	H.ntin	Entire Semule	Ц Ц	Famalas		Malae
Subjective Beliefs	Frea	Cum %	Fred	Cum %	Freq	Cum %	Fred.	Cum. %	Freq.	Cum. %	Freq.	Cum. %
30	•	0	•	0	'	0	3	1.24	2	2.17		
35	·	0	ı	0	·	0	1	1.86		3.26	'	0
40	1	0.62	μ	1.09	ı	0	2	3.11	2	5.43	ı	0
45	1	1.24	1	2.17	ı	0	ı	3.11	ı	5.43	ı	0
50	33	3.11	3	5.43	ı	0	n	4.97	3 S	8.70	ı	0
55	1	3.73	1	6.52	ı	0						
60	1	4.35	1	7.61	ı	0	4	7.45	°	11.96	1	1.45
65	2	5.59	2	9.78	ı	0	1	8.07	'	11.96	1	2.90
02	2	6.83		10.87	1	1.45	9	11.80	9	18.48	ı	2.90
75	က	8.70	က	14.13	ı	1.45	5	14.91	ъ	23.91	ı	2.90
80	11	15.53	6	23.91	2	4.35	10	21.12	7	31.52	က	7.25
82	4	18.01	4	28.26	ı	4.35	2	22.36	Η	32.61	1	8.70
84	Η	18.63	ı	28.26	1	5.80	1	22.98	μ	33.70		8.70
85	5	21.74	5	33.70	ı	5.80	10	29.19	×	42.39	2	11.59
86	ı	21.74	ı	33.70	ı	5.80	2	30.43	·	42.39	2	14.49
87	ı	21.74	ı	33.70	ı	5.80	1	31.06		43.48	·	14.49
88	ı	21.74	ı	33.70	ı	5.80	1	31.68		44.57	·	14.49
89	2	22.98	1	34.78	1	7.25	1	32.30	ı	44.57	Ч	15.94
90	29	40.99	20	56.52	9	20.29	28	49.69	14	59.78	14	36.23
92	1	41.61	ı	56.52	1	21.74	2	50.93	'	59.78	2	39.13
93	2	42.86	2	58.70	ı	21.74	1	51.55	·	59.78		40.58
95	37	65.84	13	72.83	24	56.52	31	70.81	15	76.09	16	63.77
96	ı	65.84	ı	72.83	ı	56.52	1	71.43	'	76.09	1	65.22
97	2	67.08		73.91	1	57.97	4	73.91	က	79.35	1	66.67
98	17	77.64	11	85.87	11	66.67	14	82.61	×	88.04	9	75.36
66	x	82.61	2	88.04	2	75.36	4	85.09		89.13	c C	79.71
100	28	100.00	11	100.00	11	100.00	24	100.00	10	100.00	14	100.00
T_{c+c}]	161		00		00		101		00		00	

This is the response to the survey question: "What do you think is the percent chance that you will be active in the FULL-TIME labor force when you are 30 YEARS OLD? (i.e. you will be working full-time at the age of 30) ASSUME that you will be done with graduate studies or further studies by that time." Mean response: 90.75% (all); 95.11% (males); 87.23% (females) (gender diff. significant at 0.00%) This is the response to the survey question: "What do you think is the percent chance that you will be active in the FULL-TIME labor force when you are 40 YEARS OLD? (i.e. you will be working full-time at the age of 40)

_		At age of			At age of -	
	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female
Major Declared ^{b}	-3.46^{*}	-2.67^{*}	-5.70^{*}	-4.11*	-4.61^{*}	-5.16
Major Declared	(1.81)	(1.49)	(3.03)	(2.27)	(2.36)	(3.62)
Cumulative GPA	4.23	1.75	9.36**	8.65***	(2.30) 5.39	16.41^{***}
	(2.64)	(2.11)	(4.67)	(3.32)	(3.33)	(5.58)
$\operatorname{SAT} \operatorname{Math}^c$	1.19	2.24^{**}	1.18	0.647	0.69	1.49
	(0.88)	(0.92)	(1.37)	(1.11)	(1.45)	(1.64)
SAT Verbal ^{d}	0.199	-0.66	0.472	-0.657	-0.98	-1.39
	(0.80)	(0.68)	(1.35)	(1.00)	(1.08)	(1.61)
Female	-6.70^{***}	omitted	· · · ·	-8.72^{***}	omitted	omitted
	(1.80)	omitted	omittod	(2.25)	omitted	omitted
Black	2.53	2.76	5.06	2.84	5.58	5.07
	(3.90)	(4.41)	(5.74)	(4.90)	(6.98)	(6.85)
Hispanic	13.74^{**}	3.37	18.62**	14.98**	7.40	20.17**
	(5.53)	(6.19)	(8.40)	(6.93)	(9.78)	(10.03)
Asian	6.65**	3.41	6.92	10.34***	6.79*	10.68^*
	3.01	(2.31)	(5.35)	(3.77)	(3.65)	(6.39)
$\operatorname{Foreign}^{e}$	-2.95	-0.043	· · · ·	-9.81	-4.89	-14.56
	(4.95)	(3.69)	(9.34)	(6.21)	(5.84)	(11.16)
Second-Generation Immigrant^f	-5.29^{*}	-2.19	-8.85^{*}	-8.34^{**}	-7.16^{*}	-11.54^{*}
	(2.88)	(2.32)	(5.04)	(3.61)	(3.68)	(6.02)
Parents' Earnings: ^g		(-)		()	()	()
\$75,000-\$150,000	1.067	1.76	-0.633	2.32	0.36	3.01
,	(2.34)	(1.75)	(4.07)	(2.93)	(2.77)	(4.86)
\$150,000 - \$350,000	4.66^{*}	6.64***	6.12	1.83	1.70	4.61
,	(2.43)	(1.88)	(4.12)	(3.05)	(2.97)	(4.92)
\$350,000-\$500,000	-4.08	3.77	-9.31		-1.37	-14.56^{*}
, , ,	(4.06)	(3.37)	(6.40)	(5.10)	(5.33)	(7.65)
> than $$500,000$	7.15^{**}	7.18**	5.97^{-1}	8.43**	6.36	10.97^{*}
,	(3.21)	(2.73)	(5.20)	(4.02)	(4.31)	(6.21)
Father went to College	-2.43	-3.65	1.21	-5.22	-2.65	-4.88
C	(3.67)	(3.35)	(5.90)	(4.61)	(5.30)	(7.04)
Mother went to College	2.04	1.13	0.74	-0.095	-2.09	-1.36
C	(2.95)	(2.79)	(4.63)	(3.70)	(4.42)	(5.53)
Mother full-time housewife	-2.00	0.333	-5.97^{*}	-5.02^{*}		-12.51^{***}
	(2.10)	(1.57)	(3.60)	(2.63)	(2.48)	(4.38)
Parents divorced/ separated	2.69	-2.50	5.75^{-}	2.13	-3.76	6.76
, -	(2.34)	(1.90)	(3.84)	(2.93)	(3.00)	(4.59)
R-squared	0.2793	0.2060	0.2697	0.1840	0.2175	0.1818
No. of Observations	161	69	92	161	69	92

Dependent Variable: Belief of being active in the Full-Time Labor Force

Notes

Parameter estimates correspond to the estimation of a OLS model. Standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

a Dependent variable is a response 0-100 to: "What do you think is the percent chance that you will be active in the FULL-TIME labor force when you are 30 YEARS OLD?"

b a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has already declared his/ her major

c(d) - SAT Math (Verbal) score; = 1 if SAT Math (Verbal) score is less than 400; =2 if score = 400-499; =3 if score = 500-549 =4 if score = 550-599; =5 if score = 600-649; =6 if score = 650-699; =7 if score = 700-749; =8 if score=750-800

e a dummy that equals one if the respondent is an International student

f a dummy that equals one if either of the respondent's parents are foreign-born, and the respondent was born in the US g The left out income category is Parents' annual earnings is less than \$75,000

Table 2h: Correlation Patterns between respondent's and parents' majors (Frequency in cell)

Panel A

						$\operatorname{Fath}\epsilon$	Father's Major	IC						
<u>Respondent's</u> <u>Major:</u>	Natural Science	Math & Comp Sci	Social Sci. I	Social Sci. II	Ethics $\&$ Values	Area Studies	Lit & Arts	Music	Educ	Comm. Studies	Eng.	Journ.	N/A^{a}	Total
Natural Sc.	12		-	3			-		1	1	6	I	9	33
Math & Comp.	2	Ι	H	Ι	1	I	Ι	Ξ	I	Ι	Η	Ч	Ι	7
Soc. Sci I	10	Ι	7	9	4	Ι	1	1	1	I	13	က	12	61
Soc. Sci II	×	5	10	15	4	Ι	1	Ι	Ι	Ι	19	Ι	7	69
Eth. & Values	2	I	Ι	Ι	1	Ι	1	Ι	I	I	က	Ι	Ι	7
Area Studies	ŋ	I	4	2	2	Ι	2	Ι	I	Ι	x	Ι	x	31
Lit. & Fine Arts	4	Ι	2	က	4	Ι	က	Ι	Ι	Ι	2	Ι	6	27
Music Studies	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	1	Ι	°.	4
Education	Ι	Ι	Ι	1	1	I	I	Ι	I	I	Ι	Ι	Ι	2
Comm. Std.	2	I	I	1	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	1	4
Engineering	Ι	1	I	1	I	Ι	I	I	I	I	က	I	I	S
Journalism	1	Ι	Ι	1	Ι	Ι	1	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	°°
Observations	46	7	16	36	17	I	10	2		1	59	4	46	253
Panel B														
						Mothe	Mother's Major	L.						
Respondent's	Natural	$\operatorname*{Math}_{\widetilde{\mathcal{X}}} \&$	Social		Ethics $\&$	${ m Area}$	Lit $\&$	Music	Educ	Comm.	Eng	Journ	N/A	Total
Major	Science	Comp. Sci	Sci. I	Sci. II	Values	Studies	Arts			Studies		ſ		
Natural Sc.	13	1	2	5	1	I	က	Ι	1	I	1	I	9	33
Math & Comp.	က	Ι		Ι	I	I			1	Ι	1	Ι	Ι	7
Soc. Sci I	12	Ι	10	9	I	Ι	4	2	7	2	4		11	59
Soc. Sci II	11	2	5	12	2	Ι	x	2	9	1	x	Ι	14	71
Eth. & Values	2	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	က	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	1	9
Area Studies	6	1	4	33	I	1	4	1	Η	1	2	Ι	5	32
Lit. & Fine Arts	9	Ι	Ι	e C	Ι	Ι	9	Ι	9	Ι	Ι	Ι	9	27
Music Studies	I	Ι	Ι	Ι	I	Ι	ц,	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	3	4
Education	Ι	Ι	2	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Η	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	e S
Comm. Std.	1	Ι	Ι	Ι	1	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	H	e S
Engineering	Ι	Ι	Ι	1	Ι	Ι	Ι	Ι	Η	Η	Η	Ι	Η	5
Journalism	1	I	Ι	Ι		I	Ι	Ι	I	1	I	Ι	1	റ
Observations	58	4	23	30	4	1	30	9	24	9	17		49	253
a Includes the case where the parent's major is not known, or does not exist	iere the pare	nt's major is r	ot knowr	1, or does	not exist.									

	Using Stat	ted Choice [‡]	$\underline{\text{Using stated Preference}}^{\dagger}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Δu_1 for graduating within 4 years	6.84^{***} (1.78)	1.65 (2.93)	-0.447 (0.868)	-1.54^{*} (0.80)	
Δu_1 for graduating within 4 years \times female	_	54.27^{***} (6.63)	_	3.15^{**} (1.37)	
Δu_2 for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5	-3.83^{***} (1.11)	-1.95 (1.94)	0.903^{*} (0.520)	1.13^{*} (0.67)	
Δu_2 for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5 × female	_	-8.44^{**} (4.03)	_	0.048 (1.12)	
Δu_3 for enjoying the coursework	13.11^{***} (2.47)	9.93^{**} (4.36)	2.69^{***} (0.45)	2.06*** (0.70)	
Δu_3 for enjoying the coursework \times female	_	11.36 (8.39)	_	1.43 (0.946)	
γ_1 for hours/week spent on ${\rm coursework}^a$	-0.058^{***} (0.017)	-0.057^{**} (0.028)	0.012 (0.011)	0.0064 (0.0135)	
γ_1 for hours/week spent on course work \times female	_	-0.045 (0.071)	_	0.0189 (0.021)	
Δu_4 for approval of parents and family	3.71^{***} (1.16)	1.74 (3.14)	1.37^{**} (0.56)	0.98 (0.75)	
Δu_4 for approval of parents and family \times female	_	1.71 (3.98)	_	1.03 (1.13)	
Δu_5 for finding a job upon graduation	2.27^{*} (1.20)	4.01^{*} (2.17)	-0.076 (0.512)	0.279 (0.829)	
Δu_5 for finding a job upon graduation \times female	_	0.74 (4.15)	_	-0.863 (1.04)	
Δu_6 for enjoying work at the available jobs	6.65^{***} (2.05)	1.80 (3.21)	1.59^{***} (0.384)	0.468 (0.526)	
Δu_6 for enjoying work at the available jobs × female	_	18.86^{***} (7.01)	_	1.80^{**} (0.817)	
Δu_7 for reconciling family and work at the available jobs	-1.93^{*} (1.11)	-1.31 (2.77)	0.241 (0.539)	0.258 (0.671)	
Δu_7 for reconciling family and work \times female	_	-2.36 (4.66)	_	0.181 (0.946)	
γ_2 for hours/week spent at work b	-0.0066 (0.0166)	0.0282 (0.038)	-0.0080 (0.0099)	-0.015 (0.015)	
γ_2 for hours/week spent at work \times female	_	-0.073 (0.082)	_	0.024 (0.018)	
γ_3 for the social status of the available jobs^c	3.27^{***} (1.12)	4.01^{*} (2.28)	1.09^{***} (0.32)	2.14^{***} (0.53)	
γ_3 for the social status of the available jobs \times female	_	-0.59 (4.08)	_	-1.696^{**} (0.662)	
γ_4 for expected Income at the age of 30	-5.25e - 7 (4.25e - 6)	9.43e - 6 (7.91e - 6)	6.43e - 7 (1.02e - 6)	1.13e - 6 (2.43e - 6)	
γ_4 for expected Income at the age of 30 \times female	_	-19.1e - 6 (21.8e - 6)	_	-4.40e - 7 (2.53e - 6)	
Log-Likelihood No. of Observations [‡] Estimates correspond to the estimation of a locit model using	-56.58 83	-40.77 83	-733.52 83	-703.255 83	

[‡] Estimates correspond to the estimation of a logit model using stated choice data

[†] Estimates correspond to the estimation of a logit model on stated preference data

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; robust standard errors in parentheses

a (b) - number of hours spent per week on coursework (job) varies between 0 and 100;

c - social status is on a scale of 1-8 (8 being the highest social status); normalized to be between 0.1-0.8

all other variables (except income) are probabilities between 0 and 1

Table 3b:	Decomposition	Analysis
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	Entire Sample	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Estimates Using Stated Choice Data			
Attributed to:			
Pecuniary Attributes	24.30%	49.00%	33.90%
Non-Pecuniary Attributes	75.70%	51.00%	66.10%
Attributed to:			
Parents' Approval + Enjoying Coursework	44.95%	40.35%	39.95%
Coursework hrs/week + GPA + Graduating in 4 yrs	22.20%	7.10%	22.50%
Finding a job + Job hrs/week + Income at 30 + Status of Job	22.05%	47.00%	13.35%
Reconcile work & family + Enjoying Work	10.80%	5.55%	24.20%
Panel B: Estimates using Stated Preference			
Attributed to:	07 0007	FR 0.007	10.000
Pecuniary Attributes ^a	27.90%	53.80%	18.20%
Non-Pecuniary Attributes ^{b}	72.10%	46.20%	81.80%
Attributed to:			
Parents' Approval + Enjoying Coursework	43.50%	34.00%	44.00%
Coursework hrs/week + GPA + Graduating in 4 yrs	20.40%	10.30%	11.85%
Finding a job + Job hrs/week + Income at 30 + Status of Job	20.10%	48.30%	16.05%
Reconcile work & family + Enjoying Work	16.00%	7.40%	28.10%

a Pecuniary attributes are the following outcomes pooled together: Graduating in 4 years; Graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5; hrs/week spent on coursework; Finding a job upon graduation; Job hrs/week; Income at 30; Status of the available jobs. b The non-pecuniary attributes include all outcomes not included in a

Table 3c: Thought Experiments

	Natural	${\rm Math}\ \&$	Social	Social	Ethics	Area	Lit. &	Engineering	
	Sciences	$\operatorname{Comp}\operatorname{Sci}$	Sciences I	Sciences II	& Values	Studies	Fine Arts		
Baseline Model									
Avg. Male Prob. for:	0.189	0.090	0.171	0.189	0.094	0.082	0.068	0.117	
Avg. Female Prob. for:	0.151	0.062	0.226	0.112	0.106	0.140	0.156	0.047	
% Change in the probability of majoring if:									
Expt 1: 10% INCREASE	n probabili	ty of gradua	ting with a	GPA of at le	east 3.5 in I	Engineerin	g		
Avg. Male Prob. for: ^{a}	-0.93%	-1.07%	-0.75%	-0.97%	-0.70%	-0.68%	-0.71%	6.46%	
Avg. Female Prob. for:	-0.49%	-0.49%	-0.18%	-0.44%	-0.24%	-0.21%	-0.16%	5.86%	
Expt 2: 10% DECREASE	in probabil	ity of gradu	ating with a	n GPA of at l	least 3.5 in	Literature	and Fine A	.rts	
Avg. Male Prob. for:	0.54%	0.50%	0.66%	0.50%	0.77%	0.70%	-6.56%	0.49%	
Avg. Female Prob. for:	0.76%	0.88%	1.35%	1.07%	1.53%	1.61%	-7.89%	0.79%	
Expt 3:10% INCREASE in	n probabilit	y of finding	a job after g	graduating in	n Social Sci	ences I			
Avg. Male Prob. for:	-0.27%	-0.23%	1.41%	-0.29%	-0.32%	-0.36%	-0.33%	-0.25%	
Avg. Female Prob. for:	0.56%	0.60%	-2.35%	0.57%	0.81%	0.81%	0.79%	0.47%	

Expt 4: 10% INCREASE i	n probabilit	y of approv	al of parents	s for Social S	Sciences I			
Avg. Male Prob. for:	-1.12%	-0.99%	6.00%	-1.22%	-1.47%	-1.56%	-1.51%	-1.05%
Avg. Female Prob. for:	-2.52%	-2.72%	10.50%	-2.49%	-3.69%	-3.53%	-3.60%	-2.06%
Expt 5: 10% INCREASE i	n probabilit	y of enjoyir	ng coursewor	k in Engine	ering			
Avg. Male Prob. for:	-1.57%	-1.61%	-1.29%	-1.67%	-1.21%	-1.13%	-1.21%	11.04%
Avg. Female Prob. for:	-1.53%	-1.83%	-0.57%	-1.72%	-0.70%	-0.72%	-0.49%	19.23%
Expt 6: 10% DECREASE	in the social	l status of j	obs availabl	e after gradu	ating in Sc	cial Scienc	es II	
Avg. Male Prob. for:	2.50%	3.09%	2.86%	-11.50%	2.31%	2.29%	2.47%	3.14%
Avg. Female Prob. for:	0.23%	0.41%	0.24%	-2.14%	0.26%	0.27%	0.23%	0.48%

a each cell corresponds to the percent change in the probability of majoring in that category after the intervention relative to the baseline case.

	Entire Sample	Males	Females
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	-0.545	-0.958	1.20
Δu_1 for graduating within 4 years	(0.791)	(0.911)	(1.21)
	(0.151)	(0.511)	(1.21)
	0.752	0.751	1.01
Δu_2 for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5	(0.575)	(0.721)	(1.01)
	(0.010)	(0=1)	(1101)
	2.92^{***}	2.49^{***}	3.57^{***}
Δu_3 for enjoying the coursework	(0.466)	(0.754)	(0.658)
	(× /	· · · ·
	0.0152	0.0098	0.0232
γ_1 for hours/week spent on coursework ^{<i>a</i>}	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.016)
	× ,		. ,
$\Lambda = \begin{pmatrix} c_1 & c_2 & c_3 \\ c_4 & c_4 & c_4 \\ c_6 & c_4 & c_4 \\ c_6 & c_4 & c_4 \\ c_6 & c_6 & c_6 \\ c_6 $	0.340^{**}	0.578^{***}	0.262
Δu_4 for approval of parents × parents'_support ^d × (1-Foreign ^e)	(0.150)	(0.217)	(0.194)
$\widetilde{\Delta u_4}$ for approval of parents × parents' support × Foreign	0.0439	-0.147	0.601^{**}
Δu_4 for approval of parents \times parents support \times roreign	(0.159)	(0.205)	(0.246)
Δu_5 for finding a job upon graduation	0.205	0.680	-0.536
Δa_5 for finding a job upon graduation	(0.494)	(0.759)	(0.637)
Δu_6 for enjoying work at the available jobs	1.51^{***}	0.319	2.24^{***}
and for enjoying work at the available jobb	(0.414)	(0.611)	(0.678)
Δu_7 for reconciling family and work at the available jobs	0.246	0.700	0.547
	(0.579)	(0.747)	(0.847)
		0.404	0.610
$\widetilde{\Delta u_7}$ for reconciling family & work \times divorced ^f	-0.357	0.494	-0.613
	(0.864)	(1.26)	(1.32)
	-0.0097	-0.0044	0.0045
γ_2 for hours/week spent at work ^c			
	(0.0100)	(0.016)	(0.012)
	0.310	1.30^{*}	0.297
γ_3 for the social status of the available jobs ^b × (1-Foreign)			
	(0.432)	(0.76)	(0.546)
	2.28^{***}	3.27^{***}	0.817
$\widetilde{\gamma_3}$ for social status of jobs $ imes $ Foreign	(0.550)	(0.93)	(0.580)
	(0.000)	(0.33)	(0.000)
	$2.66\mathrm{e}-06$	$3.08\mathrm{e}-06$	17.5e - 06
γ_4^{HI} for exp. Income at 30 × (1- low_income ^g) × (1-Foreign)	(2.75e - 06)	(2.80e - 06)	(12.5e - 06)
	(=	(=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::	(12.000 00)
	-8.16e - 07	-11.1e - 06	$7.13\mathrm{e}-07$
$\gamma_4^{\bar{H}I}$ for expected Income at 30 × (1-low_income) × Foreign	(2.33e - 06)	(8.07e - 06)	(7.28e - 06)
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	()	(
	1.06e - 07	-3.89e - 06	1.02e - 06
γ_4^{LI} for exp. Income at 30 × low_income × (1-Foreign)	(3.39e - 06)	(3.54e - 06)	(2.58e - 06)
	· · · /	()	(
	6.64 e - 06	$11.3e - 06^{**}$	1.40e - 06
$\gamma_4^{\bar{L}I}$ for expected Income at 30 \times low_income \times Foreign	(4.55e - 06)	(5.42e - 06)	(5.78e - 06)
	()	(00)	(
Log-Likelihood	-726.19	-287.61	-401.68
No. of groups	83	33	50

† Estimates correspond to the estimation of a logit model on stated preference data

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; robust standard errors in parentheses

a(b) - number of hours spent per week on coursework (job) varies between 0 and 100;

c - social status is on a scale of 1-8 (8 being the highest social status); normalized to be between 0.1-0.8

all other variables (except income) are probabilities between 0 and 1 $\,$

e - Foreign is a dummy that equals 1 if either of the respondent's parents is foreign-born.

f - divorced = 1 if respondent's parents are divorced or separated; zero otherwise

g - low_income = 1 if parents' annual income is less than \$150,000; zero otherwise

d - parents' support = 1 if no education expenses are paid by parents; = 2 if they pay less than \$5,000; = 3 if they pay between \$5,000-\$10,000; = 4 if they pay between \$10,000-\$15,000; = 5 if they pay between \$15,000-\$25,000;= 6 if they pay \$25,000+

Table 3e: Decomposition Analysis

	Foreig	gn-Born	No Fore	eign-Born
	Pa	rents	Pa	rents
	Males	Females	Males	Females
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Attributed to:				
Pecuniary Attributes	71.40%	35.40%	27.60%	12.20%
Non-Pecuniary Attributes	28.60%	64.60%	72.40%	87.80%
Attributed to:				
Parents' Approval + Enjoying Coursework	25.25%	46.90%	56.55%	51.80%
Coursework hrs/week + GPA + Graduating in 4 yrs	2.85%	15.30%	5.20%	8.20%
Finding a job + Job hrs/week + Income at 30 + Status of Job	65.90%	26.70%	28.95%	11.80%
Reconcile work & family + Enjoying Work	6.00%	21.10%	9.30%	28.20%

a Pecuniary attributes are the following outcomes pooled together: Graduating in 4 years; Graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5; hrs/week spent on coursework; Finding a job upon graduation; Job hrs/week; Income at 30; Status of the available jobs. b The non-pecuniary attributes include all outcomes not included in a

Table 3f: Best Linear Predictor of Expectation of Parent's Approval

Dependent Variable:Expectation of Parent's Approval [†]								
	Entire	Sample	Ma	Males		nales		
	Estimates	Std. Error	Estimates	Std. Error	Estimates	Std. Error		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(3)		
Expectation of: ^{a}								
Social Status of jobs \times (1- Parents_foreign ^b)	0.084^{**}	(0.035)	0.0611	(0.0622)	0.090**	(0.043)		
the status of the jobs \times Parents_foreign	0.188^{***}	(0.047)	0.125^{*}	(0.091)	0.228***	(0.064)		
graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5	-0.0466	(0.0467)	-0.003	(0.078)	-0.073	(0.056)		
graduating in 4 years	0.0798	(0.067)	0.068	(0.096)	0.069	(0.092)		
enjoying coursework	0.0013	(0.0013)	0.00046	(0.0019)	0.0016	(0.0018)		
enjoying work at the jobs	0.114^{***}	(0.041)	0.063	(0.0660)	0.145^{***}	(0.053)		
finding a job upon graduation	0.289^{***}	(0.067)	0.279^{**}	(0.122)	0.303***	(0.071)		
finding a job \times Parents_foreign	0.207^{**}	(0.082)	0.219^{*}	(0.124)	0.202^{*}	(0.110)		
Income at 30 (in $10,000$ s)	0.000023	(0.00112)	0.0023	(0.0035)	-0.0006	(0.0009)		
Income at 30 (in 10,000s) × Low_Income ^{c}	0.0018	(0.0022)	-0.00082	(0.0048)	0.0028*	(0.0015)		
Mother studied given $major^d$	0.024	(0.018)	0.051	(0.031)	0.0055	(0.02)		
Father studied given major ^{e}	0.032^{**}	(0.015)	0.0364^{*}	(0.022)	0.024	(0.022)		
Studying Given Major^{f}	0.0357^{***}	(0.013)	0.021	(0.021)	0.048***	(0.016)		
Respondent Fixed-Effects	Y	es	Y	es	Y	<i>T</i> es		
Major-Specific Dummies	Y	es	Y	es	Y	Tes		
No. of Observations	12	287	5	51	7	36		
No. of Clusters	1	61	6	59	(92		

[†] Dependent variable is a response 0-1 to: "If you were majoring in [X], what do you think is the percent chance that your parents and other family members would approve of it?"

All regressions include major-specific dummies, and respondent fixed effects. (Constants not shown)

Parameter estimates correspond to the estimation of OLS model. Cluster errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

a Expectations of outcomes except income are between 0 and 1; status is discrete on a scale of 0-0.9

 \boldsymbol{b} a dummy that equals one if either of the respondent's parents is for eign-born

c a dummy that equal one if respondent's parents' annual earnings are less than 150,000

d a dummy that equals one if mother's field of study is the same as the relevant question

e a dummy that equals one if father's field of study is the same as the relevant question

f a dummy that equals one if the respondent's intended major category is same as category X in the question

		Without Demographic Variables	graphic Vai	riables	With Demographic Variables	phic Variab	les
			Mean a of Log-N	Mean and Std. Dev of Log-Normal Coeff. ^a		Mean and of Log-No	Mean and Std. Dev of Log-Normal Coeff
		Estimates (Std. Error) (1_{α})	Mean (1b)	Std. Dev. (1_{n})	Estimates (Std. Error) (2α)	Mean	Std. Dev. $(2n)$
Fixed Coefficients		(77)	(01)	(71)	(n7)	(07)	(27)
$\overline{\Delta u_2}$ for graduating within 4 years	Coefficient	-0.124 (0.687)			$0.0415 \ (0.7277)$		
γ_1 for hours/week spent on coursework	Coefficient	$0.0214^{*} (0.0128)$					
Δu_4 parents approve × parents'_support × Foreign	Coefficient	I			-0.508^{**} (0.2092)		
Δu_5 for finding a job upon graduation Δu_5 for momenting family and mode at the jobs	Coefficient	-0.1343 (0.4642)			0.0677 (0.4681)		
Δu_7 101 reconcuting tantify and work at the jobs	Coefficient				0.01014 (0.042) 0.201 (1.01)		
Δa_7 reconclude taning ∞ work as jobs \times Divorced γ_c for hours/week spent at work	Coefficient				-0.653 (0.767)		
γ_2 - Expected Income at the age of 30	Coefficient	5.0e-7 $(1.15e-6)$			-6.7e-7 (1.45e-6)		
Random Coefficients					1		
Δu_2 for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5	$\overline{\Delta u}$	-0.553 (1.16)	2.31	8.14	-1.01 (1.24)	2.88	16.88
	σ	1.69^{*} (0.87)			2.07*** (0.67)		
Δu_3 for enjoying the coursework	$\overline{\Delta u}$	1.09***	4.01	3.62	1.18***	4.23	3.52
	Ь	0.794^{***}			(0.744^{***})		
		0.128)			(011.0)		
Δu_4 for approval of parents	$\overline{\Delta u}$	(0.485)	2.11	3.11			
	Ь	1.075^{***} (0.37)			I	I	I
- - - - - -	.				-0.662^{*}		
Δu_4 for approval of parents $\times P$ arents'_support	Δu	I	I	I	(0.383)	0.725	0.730
	υ				(0.287)		
Δu_6 for enjoying work at the available jobs	$\overline{\Delta u}$	0.404 (0.388)	2.28	2.64	0.441 (0.387)	2.25	2.38
	Ь	0.912^{***}			0.857** (0.408)		
\sim for the corial status of the available inde	$\overline{\Lambda_{n}}$	-0.493	9.10	0.18	-1.66	9.95	31.35
	3 1	(0.67) 1 50***	i		(2.17) $^{0.10**}$	i	0010
	σ	(0.545)			(1.04)		
$\widetilde{\gamma_3}$ for social status of available jobs \times Foreign	Mean Coeff.				2.53^{***} (0.84)		
		I	Ι	I	1.98^{**}		
	л. реу ој Соеп.				(0.88)		
$\widetilde{\gamma_4}$ for Expected Income at the 30 \times Low_Income	Mean Coeff.				1.3 e = 00 (2.86e - 06)		
	St. Dev of Coeff.	I	I	I	2.84e - 06		
Log-Likelihood		-698.00			-690.84		
No. of Groups		83			83		
No. of Observations		2957			2957		

a Mean and Standard Deviation of the Log-Normally distributed coefficients are calculated at the estimated Δu and σ . * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; standard errors in parentheses

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Table 4a:	Decomposition	Analysis for	double major	respondents	using stated	preference data

	Entire Sample	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Attributed to:			
Pecuniary Attributes	24.55%	43.90%	15.90%
Non-Pecuniary Attributes	75.55%	56.10%	84.10%
Attributed to:			
Parents' Approval + Enjoying Coursework	52.25%	49.80%	54.50%
Coursework $hrs/week + GPA + Graduating in 4 yrs$	14.55%	11.60%	22.00%
Finding a job + Job hrs/week + Income at 30 + Status of Job	24.70%	32.00%	14.50%
Reconcile work & family + Enjoying Work	8.50%	6.60%	9.00%

Table 4b: Distribution of Double Majors

	Second Major						
	Natural	Math &	Social	Social	Ethics	Area	Lit. &
First Major	Sci.	Comp. Sci.	Sci. I	Sci. II	& Values	Stud.	Fine Arts
Natural Sciences	1	_	_	_	_	_	_
Math & Computer Sci.	2	0	_	_	_	_	_
Social Sciences I	2	0	2	_	_	_	_
Social Sciences II	3	1	11	0	_	_	_
Ethics and Values	2	1	0	1	0	_	_
Area Studies	1	0	9	10	1	0	_
Literature and Fine Arts	1	1	3	2	0	5	2
Music Studies	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
Education	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Communication Studies	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
Engineering	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
Journalism	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total	14	3	29	21	1	6	4

Table 4c: Double Major Choice Model - Estimation Using Choice Data

	A	11	Males		Females	
	Estimates	Std. Error	Estimates	Std. Error	Estimates	Std. Error
Variables	(1a)	(1b)	(2a)	(2b)	(3a)	(3b)
Δu_{11} for graduating within 4 years	-1.81	(2.73)	-5.92	(3.89)	-1.59	(5.00)
Δu_{12} for maximum of graduating within 4 years	23.70^{***}	(3.37)	19.77^{***}	(6.53)	24.17^{***}	(5.66)
Δu_2 for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5	3.53^{***}	(1.19)	2.27	(1.98)	5.54^{***}	(1.71)
Δu_{31} for enjoying the coursework	11.54^{***}	(2.74)	10.54^{**}	(4.75)	12.15^{**}	(4.60)
Δu_{32} for maximum of enjoying the coursework	3.41	(3.02)	24.85^{***}	(6.42)	-1.38	(4.24)
γ_{11} for hours/week spent on coursework	0.155^{***}	(0.043)	0.190	(0.134)	0.157^{***}	(0.061)
γ_{12} for min. of hours/week spent on coursework	-0.176^{***}	(0.047)	-0.101	(0.151)	-0.217^{***}	(0.059)
Δu_{41} for approval of parents and family	9.17^{***}	(2.03)	6.70	(4.44)	10.00^{***}	(3.26)
Δu_{42} for maximum of approval of parents	1.58	(2.43)	10.02^{*}	(6.14)	0.52	(3.64)
Δu_{51} for finding a job upon graduation	-3.31^{*}	(1.78)	-1.84	(3.12)	-4.36	(1.40)
Δu_{52} for maximum of finding a job upon graduation	5.67^{***}	(2.01)	5.46	(3.70)	6.48^{**}	(2.72)
Δu_{61} for enjoying work at the available jobs	4.51^{***}	(1.13)	6.01^{**}	(2.81)	4.33^{***}	(1.40)
Δu_{71} for reconciling family and work at the jobs	1.85^{**}	(0.91)	0.151	(2.22)	2.23^{**}	(1.11)
γ_{21} for hours/week spent at work	0.047^{***}	(0.015)	0.021	(0.034)	0.033	(0.021)
γ_{31} for the social status of the available jobs	-0.644	(0.82)	0.935	(2.00)	-1.08	(1.11)
γ_{41} for expected income at the age of 30	$1.09\mathrm{e}{-6}$	(2.78e-6)	1.33e-6	(7.05e-6)	$5.72\mathrm{e}{-7}$	(3.73e-6)
Log Likelihood	-15	54.87	-5	9.66	-86	543
Number of Respondents	7	78	ŝ	36	4	2

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 4C (Panel B): Contributions of various outcomes

	All	Males	Females
	Estimates	Estimates	Estimates
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\overline{\Delta u_{11} + \Delta u_{12}}$ (graduating within 4 years)	21.88^{***}	13.84^{**}	22.58^{***}
Δu_2 (graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5)	3.53^{***}	2.27	5.54^{***}
$\Delta u_{31} + \Delta u_{32}$ (enjoying the coursework)	14.95^{***}	35.39^{***}	10.77^{***}
$\gamma_{11} + \gamma_{12}$ (hours/week spent on coursework)	-0.0200	0.089^{**}	-0.0597^{*}
$\Delta u_{41} + \Delta u_{42}$ (approval of parents and family)	10.75^{***}	16.73^{***}	10.52^{***}
$\Delta u_{51} + \Delta u_{52}$ (finding a job upon graduation)	2.36^{**}	3.62^{*}	2.12^{*}
$\Delta u_{61} + \Delta u_{62}$ (enjoying work at the available jobs)	4.51^{***}	6.01**	4.34^{***}
$\Delta u_{71} + \Delta u_{72}$ (reconciling family and work at the jobs)	1.85^{**}	0.151	2.23^{**}
$\gamma_{21} + \gamma_{22}$ (hours/week spent at work)	0.047^{***}	0.021	0.0326
$\gamma_{31} + \gamma_{32}$ (social status of the available jobs)	-0.644	0.93	-1.08
$\gamma_{41} + \gamma_{42}$ (expected income at the age of 30)	$1.09e{-}06$	1.33e - 06	5.72 e - 07

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 4d: Double Maj	or Choice Model with	${\bf Error} \ {\bf Components}^{\dagger}$

	All		
	Estimates	Std. Error	
Variables	(1)	(2)	
$\overline{\Delta u_{11}}$ for graduating within 4 years	20.54^{*}	(11.94)	
Δu_{12} for maximum of graduating within 4 years	28.69^{*}	(16.92)	
Δu_2 for graduating with a GPA of at least 3.5	1.64	(3.33)	
Δu_{31} for enjoying the coursework	17.73^{***}	(6.30)	
Δu_{32} for maximum of enjoying the coursework	8.54	(5.52)	
γ_{11} for hours/week spent on coursework	0.215^{**}	(0.100)	
γ_{12} for minimum of hours/week spent on coursework	-0.033	(0.024)	
Δu_{41} for approval of parents and family	20.24^{***}	(6.57)	
Δu_{42} for maximum of approval of parents	-3.59	(4.43)	
Δu_{51} for finding a job upon graduation	-2.16	(3.99)	
Δu_{52} for maximum of finding a job upon graduation	4.91^{*}	(2.96)	
Δu_{61} for enjoying work at the available jobs	6.48^{*}	(3.36)	
Δu_{71} for reconciling family and work at the jobs	6.23	(4.31)	
γ_{21} for hours/week spent at work	0.075	(0.073)	
γ_{31} for the social status of the available jobs	1.63	(2.07)	
γ_{41} for expected income at the age of 30	-1.62e-06	(7.86e-06)	
Log Likelihood	-114.46		
Number of Respondents	76		

† Includes Error Components for each major category (estimates not shown)

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table ba: Decomposition Analysis to explain genuer unterences Engineering Lit. & Arts	Engineering	Lit. & Arts	Social Sci. II	Social Sci. I	Engineering	Lit. & Arts	Social Sci. II	Social Sci. I
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)
Avg. Prob of majoring for Males	0.1047	0.0681	0.2065	0.1740	0.1047	0.0681	0.2065	0.1740
Avg. Prob of majoring for Females Conder Difference in Probability	0.0446 0.0601	0.1524 0843	0.1158 0.0007	0.2151	0.0446 0 0601	0.1524 0843	0.1158 0.0007	0.2151
Actual Dutelence III I 1000001	T000.0	07-00-0-	10000		1000.0	0+00.0L	000.0	
	Contributio	ons from gend	Contributions from gender differences in beliefs of:	n beliefs of:	Contribution	s from gender	Contributions from gender differences in coefficients of:	coefficients of:
Graduating in 4 years	-0.00053	0.0015	-0.0042^{***}	0.0022	0.0090^{***}	-0.004^{***}	0.0025^{**}	-0.011^{***}
	(0.0011)	(0.0023)	(0.001)	(0.0043)	(0.0026)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.0015)
	$-0.89\%^{a}$	-1.76%	-4.63%	-5.34%	15.07%	4.89%	2.74%	27.12% 0.0000***
Graduating with a GFA of at least 3.5	0.0028 (0.0033)	-0.0028 (0.0034)	-0.00084 (0.0010)	-00.002 (0.0061)	(0 014)	-0.0002 (0.0006)	U.UU4 (0.0006)	(0 0000)
	4.63%	3.36%	-0.93%	12.51%	14.48%	7.38%	4.47%	19.95%
Enjoying the coursework	0.0161^{***}	-0.043^{***}	0.0282^{***}	-0.036^{***}	0.0081^{***}	-0.007^{***}	0.0028^{***}	-0.010^{***}
	(0.0037)	(0.0087)	(0.0073)	(0.008)	(0.0015)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.001)
-	26.71%	51.25%	31.12%	86.69%	13.52%	8.24%	3.11%	24.26%
Avg. Hours/week spent on coursework	(0.0015) (0.0015)	0.0022	(0,000,0)	0.0007	0.0000) ***2100.0	-0.00032^{**}	0.0015 ^{***}	-0.003*** /0.0000)
31	(010010) 2 1.4%	-9610%	(0.0008)	(0.000)	0.0002) 0.00%	(0.00012)	(0.00022) 1 6902	(0.0002) 6 70%
Approval of parents	0.0015^{**}	-0.0050^{**}	0.0059^{**}	0.0027	0.0014^{***}	-0.0034^{***}	0.0240	-0.0007
······································	(0.0006)	(0.0020)	(0.0023)	(0.0018)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)	(0.0004)
	2.51%	5.96%	6.47%	-6.44%	2.35%	3.99%	2.68%	1.79%
Finding a job upon graduation	0.00016	-0.00049	0.00027	0.0004	-0.00012^{***}	0.00018^{***}	-0.00023^{***}	0.00012^{***}
	(0.0013)	(0.0039)	(0.0022)	(0.003)	(0.00002)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.0002)
	0.27%	0.58%	0.30%	-0.96%	-0.20%	-0.21%	-0.25%	-0.28%
Enjoying work at the available jobs	0.0035	-0.0065	0.010	-0.00003	0.0030^{***}	-0.0032^{***}	0.004^{**}	-0.0106^{***}
	(0.0024)	(0.0046)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.0006)	(0.0017)	(0.0013)
	5.87%	7.70%	10.91%	0.63%	4.92%	3.77%	4.37%	25.85%
Reconciling family and work at the jobs	0.0027	-0.0024	0.0037		-0.0013^{**}	0.0070***	-0.0050^{***}	0.0046^{***}
	(0.0023)	(0.0022)	(0.0032)	(0.0005)	(0.005)	(0.0004)	(0.0009)	(0.0006)
Conial status of the amilable ichs	4.33% 0.0004	2.80% 0.00 <i>96</i>	4.04% 0.097***	-0.25% 0.010***	-2.21%	-8.31% 0.0944***		-11.20%
and anothe and a chief watched	(0 0014)	(0.0013)	(0 006)	(0 004)	(0.001)	(0.0019)	(0.0013)	(0.0023)
	-1.74%	-3.11%	29.98%	-46.44%	13.81%	28.92%	13.05%	-5.63%
Avg. hrs/week spent at work at the jobs	0.0014	-0.0007	-0.004	-0.0012	-0.0020^{***}	0.0083^{***}	-0.0084^{***}	0.0066^{***}
	(0.0023)	(0.0012)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0014)	(0.000)
	2.29%	0.89%	-4.47%	2.86%	-3.32%	-9.89%	-9.27%	-16.01%
Expected Income at the age of 30	-0.0002	0.0026^{***}	0.006^{***}	0.009^{**}	0.00017	-0.0015^{***}	0.0043	-0.0013^{*}
	(0.0008)	(0.0014)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.00028)	(0.0003)	(0.0023)	(0.0006)
	-0.27%	-3.11%	6.76%	-20.87%	0.29%	1.81%	4.82%	3.20%
All included variables	0.0251	-0.0523	0.0711	-0.0082	0.0350	-0.0320	0.0196	-0.0328
	41.75%	6201%	78.36%	20.00%	58.25%	37.99%	21.64 %	80.00%
Standard errors (computed by delta method) in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; a: The contribution in % of the relevant variable to the gap	n parentheses. *	** significant at]	l%; ** significant a	tt 5%; * significant at	10%; a: The contrib	oution in % of the	e relevant variable t	o the gap

Fields of Study	$Base^{c}$	Ability	Income	Enjoying	Enjoying
U		v		Coursework	Work
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Engineering	0.0602^{a}	0.0517	0.0608	0.0308	0.0534
		$13.92\%^{b}$	-1.06%	48.74%	11.18%
Natural Sciences	0.0550	0.0445	0.0529	0.0229	0.0406
		18.98%	3.88%	58.29%	26.48%
Math & Computer Sci.	0.0191	0.0135	0.0184	0.0074	0.0083
		29.07%	3.45%	61.41%	56.38%
Social Sciences I	-0.0412	-0.0524	-0.0474	-0.0643	-0.0613
		-27.28%	-15.32%	-56.25%	-48.84%
Social Sciences II	0.0907	0.0737	0.0881	0.0272	0.0608
		18.68%	2.88%	69.92%	32.92%
Ethics & Values	-0.0189	-0.0266	-0.0219	-0.0419	-0.0381
	-	-40.77%	-15.87%	-122.03%	-101.9%
Area Studies	-0.0624	-0.0634	-0.0655	-0.0563	-0.0721
		-1.69%	-4.96%	9.87%	-15.48%
Lit. & Fine Arts	-0.0843	-0.0863	-0.0888	-0.0545	-0.0777
	0.0010	-2.35%	-5.35%	35.34%	7.84%

Table 5b: Simulations of the Gender Gap under different Environments

a The model predicted gender gap (male prob. - female prob.) under the relevant environment

b The % decrease in the gender gap (relative to the baseline case) after the change

c The predicted gap under the baseline case, i.e. no intervention