Joint NBER/IFRI ‘Brainstorming’ Day
May 15th 2007

Venue: 47th Floor, Deutsche Bank, 60 Wall Street, New York


Time

Topic

Facilitators

08:30

Arrival – Breakfast Available

 

09:00





Introductions of participants
Introductory remarks  from IFRI and NBER


Richard Evans (IFRI)
Rene Stulz, Mark Carey and Marty Feldstein (NBER)

09:20

Topic 1: Objectives of Risk Management within a Financial Firm
2 CROs and 2 NBER to offer thoughts for 6 minutes each
40 minutes of open discussion

David Bushnell (Citicorp)
Raghuram Rajan (University of Chicago, NBER)
Raj Singh (Allianz)
Franklin Allen (University of Pennsylvania)

10:25

Coffee Break

 

10:45

Topic 2: The Pursuit of Risk Management Objectives
2 CROs for 10 min each and 2 NBER for 6 min each offer thoughts
35 minutes of open discussion

Richard Evans (Deutsche Bank)
Till Schuermann (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
Stefan Schoess (Options Clearing Corp)
David Modest (JPMorgan Chase)

11:55

Lunch

 

12.45

Topic 3: Role of Risk Management in Providing Information Useful in (External) Governance
2 CROs and 2 NBER offer thoughts for 8 minutes each
35 minutes of ‘brainstorming’

Robert Le Blanc (Barclays)
Katherine Schipper (Duke University)
Wilson Ervin (Credit Suisse)
Philippe Jorion University of California, Irvine)

1:55

Coffee Break

 

14:15

Topic 4: Value, Valuation and Governance of Risk Management Itself
2 CROs for 10 min each and 2 NBER for 8 min each offer thoughts
40 minutes of ‘brainstorming’

Robert Berry (Goldman Sachs)
Patrick Bolton (Columbia University, NBER)
Raj Singh (Allianz)
Rene Stulz (Ohio State University, NBER)

15:30

Coffee Break

 

15:50

Topic 5: The Corporate Governance required to Manage Reputational Risk
1 CROs and 2 NBER offer thoughts for 6 minutes each
30 minutes of ‘brainstorming’

David Bushnell (Citicorp) 
Eric Rosengren (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston)
Rob Whitfield (Westpac)
Charles Calomiris (Columbia University, NBER)

16:45

Wrap Up and Next Steps

 

17:00

END

 


TOPIC 1:  OBJECTIVES OF RISK MANAGEMENT WITHIN A FINANCIAL FIRM

What are the objectives of risk management?  Should they be different than they are now?  What is missing from the following list of objectives?  What is mis-stated?
Inform others about the firm’s risk posture (senior management, board of directors, managers of units, shareholders, debtholders, rating agencies, regulators, others?)
Set the framework, and the terms of tradeoffs, for making risk decisions (risk posture of the firm as a whole, including leverage; risk allocations to units; other?)
Prevent large losses from occurring?  Prevent exposure to such losses?  What is “large?”
Help maximize firm value?  Over what horizon?  From whose perspective?
Identify kinds of risk faced by the firm and by each unit.
Develop and implement models and other methods of measuring risk.
Develop and implement systems to control, limit, mitigate and manage the risks taken by different individuals and units.
Do any objectives conflict with one another, or do they just compete for resources? 

Who sets the objectives?  What is the role of the board of directors?  What should it be? 
Most board members don’t fully understand the capabilities or methods of risk management.  How much of a problem is this for setting objectives?


What are the important conflicts between the firm’s external stakeholders about the proper objectives for risk management (between equity holders, counterparties, debtholders, regulators, etc.)?   Do any stakeholders apart from regulators try to influence the firm’s risk choices by influencing its risk management objectives or operations?  Do all external stakeholders want risk to be measured well? 

Objectives support both the management of the firm (or “internal governance”) and governance of the firm by external stakeholders.  What is the relative importance or management and governance as motivators of objectives?

To what extent should risk management be purely a control and measurement function versus a designer of compensation and decision processes?  Should it have a role in design of the firm’s strategy?  Would such roles conflict with its control and measurement functions?





TOPIC 2:  CHALLENGES TO THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVES
(or, incentives and conflicts of interest within the firm)

To what extent do challenges in the pursuit of risk management objectives flow from the technical limitations of current art and to what extent are they due to incentive conflicts?

Where are the most important conflicts between the objectives of risk management and the objectives of others within the financial firm?  Do such conflicts come from differences in views or understanding, differences in incentives, or technical limitations of current risk management technology?
At a senior level?
At a junior level?
Objectives of business units, versus interests of individuals?

How, and to what extent, can the incentives of others within the firm be designed to support behavior consistent with risk management objectives (or can risk management only impose controls)?  How much of a problem is it for incentive design when the employees don’t understand the objectives and practices of risk management?

How seriously does senior management take the proposition that risk management is integral to maximizing firm value?  What about others outside of risk management?  

What happens when the CRO disagrees with the CEO (about risk posture, process, or other matters)?  What should happen?  Do CROs have direct reporting lines to the board, and to what extent are such reporting lines effective when board members don’t fully understand risk management?

Do CROs bear personal reputational risk from the risk outcomes of the firm to a greater extent than other senior executives?

Do objectives, their pursuit, or conflicts of interest differ at the trough of a risk cycle versus at a peak?  Is it appropriate that such differences exist?  Should an objective of risk management be to smooth out cyclical variations in the firm’s behavior or strategy?
Does behavior differ in crisis and non-crisis situations?  Do firms batten down too much after a crisis, or minimize the implications and not react enough, or both?

On the whole, have regulators aided the pursuit or risk management objectives or gotten in the way? 

 TOPIC 3:        ROLE OF RISK MANAGEMENT IN PROVIDING INFORMATION
TO EXTERNAL PARTIES INVOLVED IN GOVERNANCE

To value the firm properly, and to exercise influence over its decisions and strategy, external parties need information about the firm’s risk posture and strategies.  Risk management functions produce a lot of value-relevant information.  How can it be disclosed, efficiently and effectively?

To what extent do stakeholders currently use information from the risk management function?
In valuing claims on the firm?
In setting the terms of contracts (e.g., derivatives, loans, credit lines)?
Do gatekeepers (underwriters, analysts, auditors) use information from risk management? Do they understand risk management?

What kind of information do stakeholders say they want?  What should they want?
What are the technical constraints on what can be provided? 
What are the competitive constraints? 
How much variation across stakeholders in the nature of desired information?
How much of a problem is legal risk associated with disclosure?

Many stakeholders say they want information that is “comparable” across institutions.  What are the barriers to collective action by firms in moving together to disclose comparables?

Do CROs routinely use information produced by risk management functions at competing firms in helping their firm make strategic or tactical business decisions?

What is the proper extent of information sharing across CROs, or across risk management personnel at different firms?




TOPIC 4:         VALUE, VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE
OF RISK MANAGEMENT ITSELF

An important function of risk management is the design and operation of systems used to measure the performance of other units and staff members.  How can the performance of risk management be measured?
How do senior managers of the firm, and the board of directors, think about the value added by risk management?
Do they understand all the objectives?
Do they understand why risk management resources are allocated as they are?
How should a board of directors evaluate risk management performance?

What are the key differences, if any, between the risk management function and Treasury or CFO functions, and what are the implications of such differences for the organization of risk management?

To what extent do external parties consider the quality of a firm’s risk management in valuing the firm (or in making value-relevant decisions, like rating actions)? 
Do different parties place different values on risk management?  Are the values consistent with their differing objectives and interests?
Do capital market prices reflect the value added by risk management?  If so, what’s the relative importance to such recognition of value of disclosure of risk metrics about the firm versus information about the risk management function?
If external parties cannot value the characteristics of a firm’s risk management, how much of a problem is created for internal valuation of the function? 

What kind of information do external parties need in order to properly value risk management?
What are the barriers to providing the information they need?  Are such barriers surmountable?
To what extent can different parties be given different information (e.g., rating agencies versus equity analysts)?

What is the right design for incentive compensation for risk managers?  To what extent should risk managers be incentivized to make non-risk-management contributions?
At a junior level?
At a senior level?


TOPIC 5:  REPUTATION RISK

How do we think properly about reputation risk? Can it be measured? Is it a fad? Is it a distraction?

Does a reputation-reducing event have a near-term impact on profitability, apart from any losses associated with the event itself? Does the value of the firm decrease by more than the direct losses from the event?

Are the losses primarily due to perceived or real constraints on the firm’s strategy in the wake of the event?  Due to distraction of senior management?  Due to perceptions of the risk of similar losses in the future?

To what extent are  reputation events costly because they draw attention of regulators? Of gatekeepers? Are litigation costs an important consideration?

What is the role of risk management in identifying and limiting reputational risks?  Is it through a reputation risk audit? Is it through an approval process? Is it through capital allocation ? To what extent can risk management hope to be effective in such a role?