JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION AND THE EVOLUTION
OF THE COMMON LAW

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Abstract

This paper explores the role jurisdictional competition played in the development of the common law. For most of English legal history, there were several courts with overlapping jurisdiction. In addition, judges received fees on a per case basis. As a result, judges had an incentive to hear more cases. The central argument of this article is that, since plaintiffs chose the forum, judges and their courts competed by making the law more favorable to plaintiffs. Courts expanded their jurisdictions to give plaintiffs more choices, made their procedures cheaper, swifter and more effective, and developed legal doctrines which made it difficult for defendants to prevail. Of course, jurisdictional competition was not without constraints, most importantly Parliament and Chancery. This paper tries to show how important features of the common law, including the structure of contract law, can be explained as the result of competition among courts and the constraints on that competition.

Starting in 1799, statutes took fees away from the judges. The hypothesis that competition induced a pro-plaintiff bias is tested by quantitative analysis of judicial decisionmaking before and after those statutes.
The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavored to draw to itself as much business as it could. Each court endeavored, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally in a great measure, formed by this emulation, which anciently took place between their respective judges; each judge endeavoring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy, which the law would admit, for every sort of injustice.


Imagine a system in which there are several courts, public or private, with overlapping jurisdictions, and the judges are paid out of litigant fees, and therefore have a direct pecuniary interest in attracting business. It might seem that competition would lead to an optimal set of substantive rules and procedural safeguards. But this is incorrect. The competition would be for plaintiffs, since it is the plaintiff who determines the choice among courts.

Left unexplained ... is the actual pattern of competition in the English courts during the centuries when judges were paid out of litigant fees and plaintiffs frequently had a choice among competing courts. There is evidence of competition among the courts through substantive and procedural innovation, but none (of which we are aware) of the kind of blatant plaintiff favoritism that our economic analysis predicts would emerge in such a competitive setting. Why it did not emerge (assuming it has not simply been overlooked by legal historians) presents an interesting question for further research.


Historians explain the development of the common law in many ways. Some emphasize the internal logic of legal concepts, while others focus on external factors, such as political, social, or economic conditions. A few point to the influence of philosophy or...
other legal systems. For many, the institutional structure of the legal system is of paramount importance, whether it be the role of juries, the changing dynamics of pleading and post-trial motions, or innovation by lawyers in the service of their clients. Among the institutional factors which influenced legal development, many historians point to competition among courts as an agent of legal change. While references to jurisdictional competition are common in the literature, no one has rigorously analyzed the implications of competition for the evolution of the common law. That is the goal of this article.

The main argument of this article is that, since plaintiffs chose the forum, courts competed by making the law more favorable to plaintiffs. Courts expanded their jurisdictions to give plaintiffs more choices, made their procedures cheaper, swifter and more effective, and developed legal doctrines which made it difficult for defendants to prevail. This dynamic, this essay will attempt to show, was an important engine of legal change in England from the twelfth century to the nineteenth.

Of course, jurisdictional competition was not without constraint. If it were, the law might have become outrageously pro-plaintiff. That it did not is testament to the existence of constraints, chief among them Parliament and Chancery.
Jurisdictional competition presumes that courts want to hear more cases. It is less than obvious that modern judges so desire. They might prefer fewer but more interesting cases, or more leisure.10 Until the nineteenth century, however, English judges had strong incentives to hear cases. In addition to the power and prestige which accrues to judges in all ages, English judges derived much of their income from fees paid by litigants. The more litigants patronizing a particular court, the richer its judges.11

Beginning in 1799, statutory reforms took fees away from the judges. By comparing judicial decisionmaking before and after these statutes, it is possible to test empirically whether fee competition affected the development of the law. Statistical analysis of four newly created datasets provides results which are consistent with the hypothesis that competition resulted in a pro-plaintiff bias.

Many lawyers will find the assertion of a pro-plaintiff bias in the common law absurd. Most law students are taught that the common law was pro-defendant. It is a commonplace of the first-year curriculum that doctrines such as privity of contract and the fellow-servant rule made it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to prevail. This view of the common law overlooks one crucial fact. These pro-defendant doctrines were developed in the nineteenth century, after reforms had taken fees away from the judges and thus dampened competition among courts.12

Some readers will find echoes in this argument of contemporary American debates over corporate law.13 Just as state revenue from incorporation fees may encourage states to mold corporate law to attract more corporations, so, this essay suggests, revenue from court

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11 See Section II.B.
12 See Section IV.
fees encouraged English courts to mold the common law to attract more cases. Some scholars argue that competition for corporate chartering leads to efficient corporate law, because managers, who choose the place of incorporation, have incentives to maximize firm value. In contrast, there is no reason to believe that competition among courts should have led to efficient law, because plaintiffs, who chose the forum, had no incentive to prefer efficient law. Rather, plaintiffs preferred law which granted them higher recoveries, more often, more swiftly, and at lesser expense. Although Parliament and Chancery provided checks against excessively pro-plaintiff law, they were unlikely to generate efficient law. Chancery had an incentive to produce excessively pro-defendant law, and, to the extent that legislation (or the threat of it) provided a key constraint on competition between courts, common law is unlikely to have been more efficient than statute law.

Although this article argues that jurisdictional competition is an important and under-appreciated factor in legal development, it certainly does not argue that competition is the sole factor. As the work of numerous historians has demonstrated, doctrinal, institutional, philosophical, economic and other explanations have enormous power.

Section I surveys the literature on the effect of jurisdictional competition on the development of English law. Section II describes in the institutional background and presents some examples of the pro-plaintiff bias. Section III uses game theory and positive political theory to analyze the effects of jurisdictional competition more rigorously and to generate empirically testable predictions. Section IV describes and presents the results of

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14 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 13; Romano, above n 13.
15 The view that the common law is efficient and that statutes are less so is associated with Richard Posner. His view, however, is based largely on nineteenth-century doctrine. Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed, 2003) 252. There is therefore no necessary contradiction between Posner's view and the thesis of this essay, which focuses on English justice before 1800.
16 See: Karsten, above n 1; Horwitz, above n 2; Gordley, above n 3; R H Helmholtz above n 4, Langbein, above n 5; Milsom, above n 6; Baker, above n 7; Manchester, above n 7; Harris, above n 7.
four tests of the predictions generated in the previous section. Section V outlines some of the many issues that remain for future research.

I LITERATURE

Judicial fee income and jurisdictional competition are well known to historians of English Law. Nevertheless, they have never been analyzed in depth. The dominant position is probably that jurisdictional competition produced better law. This was the opinion of Adam Smith, as evidenced by the quote at the beginning of this article.17 It is also implicitly the position of J. H. Baker, probably the most respected living historian of English Law. Consider the following passage:

It can hardly be coincidence that so much of the reform was initiated under Sir John Fyneux, who presided over the court [King’s Bench] from 1495 to 1525 when its fortunes were at their lowest ebb. He appointed his son in law John Rooper as chief clerk in 1498, and the Rooper family made its fortune from the office between then and its retirement in 1616. Cynics might criticise the judges and clerks for making the court a family business; they undoubtedly had more than a professional interest in the success of the procedures under their control. But they had no monopoly, and they thrived only by satisfying litigants and the profession at large.18

First, it should be noted that this passage makes no general claims about jurisdictional competition or its effects, but rather, as is common for historians, analyzes a single court in a single period. Baker characterizes the changes wrought by Judge Fyneux and chief clerk Rooper as satisfying “litigants” generally, rather than plaintiffs specifically. This overlooks the crucial fact that it was the plaintiff who chose the court. It thus misses the insight that frequent invocation of a new legal doctrine or procedure indicates that it satisfied plaintiffs and their lawyers, not “litigants and the profession at large.” Baker seems to suggest that the innovations introduced around 1500 were salutary, because the legal market was

18 Baker, above n 7, 44.
competitive (King’s Bench “had no monopoly”) and because the innovations introduced by Fyneux and Rooper resulted in “satisfied” customers (“litigants and the profession at large”). As through the operation of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” he seems to imply, the private interests of Fyneux and Rooper coincided with the public interest of litigants.19

Other writers, such as Jeremy Bentham, and Australian historian, Bruce Kercher, have suggested that competition had a negative effect, because it encouraged judges to create complicated, time-consuming procedures which multiplied the opportunities for fees.20 Still other historians, most prominently Brian Simpson, have scoffed at the idea that judges were influenced at all by competition or fee income.21

At least three scholars have suggested that competition produced a pro-plaintiff bias. Landes and Posner briefly suggested as much in 1979. The relevant sections are quoted at the beginning of this article. In the mid-1980s, Clinton Francis published two articles on eighteenth and nineteenth century contract law which argued that jurisdictional competition produced a pro-creditor (and hence a pro-plaintiff) bias.22 The work of these three scholars relating to the effects of jurisdictional competition has been largely forgotten.23 Clinton Francis no longer publishes in legal history, and Landes and Posner have never returned to the issue.

II INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE

19 For another discussion in a similar vein, see Ibid 40-41. In other places, Baker is more careful to note that a change favored plaintiffs. Baker, __ 217. On the other hand, even here Baker is not making a general statement about the effect of competition.
23 A Westlaw search revealed only one reference to Landes and Posner’s prediction of “plaintiff favoritism.” Todd Zywicki, “The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis” 97 Northwestern University Law Review 1551, 1607-8 (2003). The reference to plaintiff favoritism is in a discussion which also includes discussion of a prior version of this article.
A. The Court System

For most of the last thousand years, England was home to a multiplicity of courts. The most fundamental distinction lay between royal courts and non-royal courts. Non-royal courts included manorial courts (run by lords for tenants on their manors), honorial courts (run by lords for their vassals), ecclesiastical courts (run by the church), and local courts (run by boroughs, hundreds and counties). Royal courts were divided between common law courts and non-common law courts. The three common law courts were King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. The most important royal, non-common law court was Chancery, sometimes known as the court of equity, but there were others, including Star Chamber, Admiralty, and the Court of Requests.24

By the seventeenth century, non-royal courts were of relatively little importance. King’s Bench could stop proceedings in these courts by issuing writs of “prohibition.” In addition, manorial, seigniorial, and local courts were limited by their inability to try criminal cases, civil cases involving more than 40 shillings, or cases involving freehold land (except pursuant to royal writ). Ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over internal church affairs, matrimonial disputes, and probate, but had lost or given up the right to decide contract cases. Because of their limited powers, this article will pay little attention to non-royal courts.

Although in the medieval period, the three common law courts – King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer-- had distinct jurisdictions, by 1600 their civil jurisdictions were largely coextensive. Nearly any case involving property, contract or tort could be

brought in any of the three courts. Chancery’s most important jurisdiction involved trusts and contracts.25

In nearly all cases, the plaintiff chose the court. There were only a few exceptions. Cases in non-royal courts could sometimes be removed by the defendant into royal courts. In this way, the royal courts could gain cases at the expense of non-royal courts by making the law more favorable to defendants.26 This pro-defendant bias does not seem to have been very prominent, because cases could not be removed from one royal court to another. A defendant in a common law court could, however, petition in Chancery for an injunction ordering the plaintiff not to continue his common law suit. This possibility was a major constraint on the development of excessively pro-plaintiff law. King’s Bench, however, had a countervailing power through the writ of habeas corpus. Chancery enforced its decrees through imprisonment. King’s Bench, however, could use the writ of habeas corpus to free defendants from prison. By doing so, it imposed limits on Chancery’s ability to constrain it.27

Each court was free to develop its own law. The development of judge-made common law amply demonstrates this freedom. Courts defined and expanded their jurisdictions, developed new procedures, and introduced doctrinal innovations without asking permission from Parliament or any other authority. In fact, this is a defining characteristic the common law system. Until the mid-nineteenth century, there was no system of appeals by which one set of courts could comprehensively review the decisions of others. This is important, because a system of appellate review might have constrained inter-court competition by imposing uniformity.28 The only real constraints on common law

25 Baker, above n 7, 37-52, 97-134.
27 See, eg: *Courtney v Glanvil*, Croke Jac (1615) 343, 79 ER 294.
28 There was a limited system of appellate review through “proceedings in error” that involved King’s Bench, *ad hoc* courts, and The House of Lords. This system was severely limited by the fact that appeals...
rule-making were Chancery’s power to issue injunctions (discussed above) and the power of Parliament to pass statutes which were valid notwithstanding common law decisions to the contrary.

B. Judicial Compensation

The idea that jurisdictional competition resulted in law more favorable to plaintiffs presumes that judges had an incentive to hear more cases. Judges’ incentive to hear more cases could have come from many sources. In many times and places, judges are motivated by the power and prestige which comes from the ability to decide. This motivation can be recast in a public-spirited vein. A judge who believes his own decisions to be just will want to ensure that as many cases as possible come before him. In addition, before the nineteenth century, English judges received a large fraction of their income from fees. Although they also received a salary, they were free to augment it by fee income. Fees were a regular part of the judicial process. At every stage of a case, litigants paid a fee. Some of these fees were paid to court staff, who thereby also acquired an incentive to augment the court’s caseload, while other fees were paid directly to the judges.29 Even fees paid to other court officials might benefit the judges, especially the chief judge, because the chief judge usually had the authority to appoint court officials. When staff fee income was large, the chief judge could and did sell the right to be a court official and thus effectively appropriated a portion of the fees paid to judicial staff.30 In addition, a judicial officer might be a relative of the chief judge, in which case fees paid to the officer would indirectly benefit the chief judge.

could be based only on the record (primarily the pleadings) rather than evidence produced at trial. See Section V.G for more details.


30Duman, above n _, 116-21; Manchester, above n 7, 102-4.
judge. One famous instance of such nepotism involved Chief Judge Fyneux of the King’s Bench, who appointed his son-in-law, John Rooper, chief clerk (‘prothonotary’) of his court.\textsuperscript{31} During the period when Fyneux and Rooper ran the King’s Bench, the court introduced many procedural and substantive improvements which increased its caseload.\textsuperscript{32}

A 1798 Parliamentary report provides valuable insight into fees in the late eighteenth century:

Table 1. Judicial Salaries and Fees, 1797

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Total Judicial Income</th>
<th>Fees as a % of Total Judicial Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chancellor</td>
<td>£5000</td>
<td>£5870</td>
<td>£10870</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Justice King’s Bench</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>2399</td>
<td>6399</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puisne Judges King’s Bench (avg.)</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>2954</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Justice Common Pleas</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>2025</td>
<td>5525</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puisne Judges Common Pleas (avg.)</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>2694</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Baron Exchequer</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>3823</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puisne Barons Exchequer (avg.)</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>2756</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2892</td>
<td>1121</td>
<td>4014</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. All amounts rounded to the nearest pound. There were three puisne (non-chief) judges on each common law court. The figures in the table are averages of the puisnes for each court. Each puisne had the same salary, and fees varied by at most 2\% for the puisne judges of King’s Bench and Common Pleas, and at most 17\% for puisne barons of the Exchequer.

Source: Great Britain, \textit{Twenty-Seventh Report from the Select Committee on Finance, &c.: Courts of Justice}(1798), p. 27.

The Table suggests that fee income was substantial. It provided several hundred pounds of income for puisne judges, and several thousand pounds of income for the Chancellor, and chief justices of King’s Bench and Common Pleas. These sums were significant components of total judicial income. For the judges with the fattest fee income, fees composed more than a third of their total official compensation. For most of the other judges, fees provided between ten and twenty percent of their incomes. Fee income was also large in an absolute sense. One pound in 1797 would be worth about $100 today, so average fee income would have been over $100,000 per year.

\textsuperscript{31}Baker, above n 7, 44.  
\textsuperscript{32}Ibid 43-44. Blatcher, above n _, 145-46, 149-50.
There are no comprehensive data on fee income before 1798. There are some hints, however, that fees provided a greater percentage of judicial income in prior centuries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Puisne judges of King's Bench and Common Pleas. 1524-25 (avg.)</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Total Judicial Income</th>
<th>Fees as a % of Total Judicial Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£120</td>
<td>£248</td>
<td>£368</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Whitelock, puisne judge King's Bench. 1627.</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Rockeby, puisne judge King's Bench. 1689-1698 (10yr avg.)</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>1574</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These figures are probably much less reliable than those presented above, but they do suggest that fees were a substantially larger component of income in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

**C. Examples of the Pro-Plaintiff Bias**

That the common law exhibits a pro-plaintiff bias is an empirical proposition. Section IV discusses some strategies for testing the proposition more rigorously and presents some encouraging results. This section provides some examples, which, it is hoped, provide some plausibility to the empirical tests.

Contract disputes were the most common type of cases in early modern England, but the defendant had practically no defenses at common law. Duress was limited to situations where the defendant had been imprisoned or threatened with serious bodily injury at the time the contract was entered into. Fraud was limited to forgery of a written instrument, tampering with a written instrument, or misreading a written instrument to an illiterate

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33Baker, above n 7, 67-68.
The only other defense was incapacity, usually that the contracting party was underage or insane. Beyond these, there were no defenses. Mistake, for example, was no defense, whether unilateral or mutual. Nor was unconscionability. Penalty clauses were fully enforceable. If a debtor repaid a loan but forgot to have the sealed bond canceled or to get a written receipt, prior repayment was no defense, so the creditor could procure double satisfaction. The paucity of contract defenses made the law very favorable to plaintiffs.

The pro-plaintiff bias was partially checked by Parliament. For example, statutes in 1696 and 1705 greatly constrained creditors’ ability to enforce penalty clauses. The second of these statutes also barred recovery when the debtor had paid but failed to procure a written receipt of payment.

Chancery also provided an important constraint. As a separate court, Chancery had the power to issue injunctions against ongoing proceedings in the common law courts. This power provided an important check on the pro-plaintiff bias in the common law. Through its injunction power, Chancery could, in effect, transform a defendant in a common law court into a plaintiff in Chancery. As a result, in order to attract injunction business, Chancery had an incentive to develop law favorable to defendants in common law actions. For example, if a debtor who had repaid a written loan but failed to procure a written receipt or cancellation of the loan instrument was sued in Common Pleas, that court was likely to

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35 Ibid 20, 72; Baker, above n 7, 324.
36 Ibbetson, above n _, 71, 208.
37 Ibid 72, 226; Baker, above n 7, 353.
38 Ibbetson, above n _, 144, 252.
39 Ibid 29, 150. This may surprise some modern scholars who generally assume that non-enforcement of penalty clauses was part of the common law. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Chancery and English statutory law were the source of the rule against penalty clauses. See below text at notes _, _. Chancery decisions and early statutes, however, are sometimes considered part of the common law, which may explain the confusion.
40 Ibbetson, above n _, 21; Baker, above n 7, 324-25.
41 8 & 9 Will. III c 11 s 8; 4 Anne c 16 s 1; Baker, above n 7, 325-26; Ibbetson, above n _, 150, 214, 255.
rule against him. Nevertheless, the debtor could petition Chancery for an injunction.\textsuperscript{42} Chancery had an incentive to grant the injunction, because those who petitioned for an injunction would, like any claimant, pay a fee to the court. In addition, once the creditor was sued in Chancery, he too would have to pay fees. A Chancery injunction would prohibit the creditor from proceeding in Common Pleas to collect the debt. Over time, Chancery developed a series of legal doctrines governing the issuance of such injunctions. These doctrines form the basis of the contract defenses we know today, including fraud, mistake, and the rule against penalties.\textsuperscript{43}

Another example of the pro-plaintiff bias relates to oral contracts. In the middle ages, Common Pleas had a monopoly on debt cases and decided oral debt cases by a pro-defendant method called “compurgation,” in which the debtor was released from liability if he could find eleven people who would swear that he (the debtor) was in the right. Starting in the fifteenth-century, King’s Bench began to compete for cases involving oral promises by allowing such cases to go to a jury rather than compurgation. Juries, however, were perceived as excessively pro-plaintiff, because they were willing to hold defendants liable on trumped-up evidence. In response, Parliament passed the Statute of Frauds (1677),\textsuperscript{44} which made most important categories of unwritten contracts unenforceable

Other examples could easily be provided, including the medieval expansion of royal jurisdiction over land, tort, and contract, the substitution of jury trial for wager of law in a wide array of actions, early modern pleading, the writ of ejectment, the creation of causes of action for restitution and unjust enrichment, and the Bill of Middlesex.

\textsuperscript{42}Baker, above n 7, 102-3, 106.
\textsuperscript{43}Ibbetson, above n \_\_, 72-73, 150, 208-10, 213-14, 226-27.
III Theory

This section attempts to analyze more rigorously the implications of jurisdictional competition using game theory and positive political theory. It first analyzes competition between courts under the assumption that that competition was unconstrained by Parliament or other institutions. It then models the effects of Parliamentary constraint.

A. The Jurisdictional Competition Game

Consider the following game:

Stage I. Judges on two courts, King’s Bench and Common Pleas, simultaneously and without communication decide between two possible legal rules to govern a particular set of circumstances. One of the rules favors plaintiffs and the other favors defendants. The decisions are made publicly and simultaneously. In deciding on a legal rule, judges vote for the rule which maximizes their utility. Judges care about two things—the rule itself and the number of cases it will generate. That is, they care about aspects intrinsic to the rule—their perception of its fairness, congruence with precedent, and religious, economic, political, distributional, or ideological implications. They also care about caseload, because of its implications for fee income, prestige, and leisure. For simplicity, assume the judges are homogenous, that the intrinsic utility from a pro-plaintiff (abbreviated “pro-π”) rule is zero, that the intrinsic utility from a pro-defendant (“pro-∆”) rule is $\alpha$ (where $\alpha$ is any real number), and that caseload utility is equal to $\gamma$ times the number of cases coming before a particular judge’s court (where $\gamma$ is any real number). If $\alpha > 0$, judges prefer the pro-defendant rule, all other things being equal. If $\gamma > 0$, judges prefer a higher caseload, all other things being equal.

Stage II. Potential litigants choose their actions. Actions include whether to contract, how much precaution to take, and whether to settle disputes out of court. For this analysis, actions are important only because they determine the amount of litigation, and thus the judges’ caseload utility. For simplicity, normalize the amount of litigation under the pro-defendant rule to 2, and denote the amount of litigation under the pro-plaintiff rule as $2\beta$ (where $\beta$ is any non-negative real number). As will be seen below, normalizing to 2 and $2\beta$, rather than 1 and $\beta$, simplifies the analysis by eliminating the need for fractions when litigation is divided evenly between the two courts. $\beta > 1$ implies that the pro-plaintiff rule increases litigation, while $\beta < 1$ implies that the pro-plaintiff rule decreases litigation.

Stage III. If the aggrieved party, the plaintiff, chooses to litigate, he chooses the court which has adopted the most pro-plaintiff rule, i.e. the rule which maximizes his expected recovery. If both courts have adopted the same rule, the plaintiff randomizes between the two courts.
Since the aggrieved party chooses the forum in Stage III, potential litigants in Stage II will choose their actions under the assumption that the more pro-plaintiff rule will govern. Similarly, judges will assume that they will get all the cases (if their court adopts the pro-plaintiff rule and the other court adopts the pro-defendant rule), half the cases (if both courts adopt the same rule), or no cases (if their court adopts the pro-defendant rule while the other court adopts the pro-plaintiff rule). The payoffs can be represented as follows:

Table 3. The Jurisdictional Competition Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Pleas</th>
<th>Pro-Δ</th>
<th>Pro-π</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Δ</td>
<td>(γ+α, γ+α)</td>
<td>(α, 2γβ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King’s Bench</td>
<td>Pro-π</td>
<td>(2γβ, α)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is easiest to proceed by considering first the case where γ = 1, and then to consider other values of γ. γ = 1 means that judges have a substantial preference for a higher caseload. This is a reasonable interpretation of the situation before 1799, when judges received per case fees. I will consider only pure strategy equilibria. Figure 1 represents the equilibria graphically.
The key features are the pro-plaintiff line ($\alpha = \beta$) and the pro-defendant line ($\beta = \frac{1+\alpha}{2}$). To the left of the pro-plaintiff line, it is a Nash equilibrium for both courts to choose the pro-plaintiff rule. To the right of the pro-defendant line, it is a Nash equilibrium for both courts to choose the pro-defendant rule. These two lines define four regions, which are described in greater detail below.

**Region 1. Unique pro-plaintiff equilibrium.** In the region to the left of both the pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant lines ($\beta > \alpha$ and $\beta > \frac{1+\alpha}{2}$), the sole Nash equilibrium is for both courts to adopt the pro-plaintiff rule. The first condition ensures that the pro-plaintiff rule is a Nash equilibrium; the second condition ensures that there are no other equilibria. A simple and intuitive situation satisfying these conditions is $\alpha = 0$ and $\beta > 1$;
that is, where judges have no intrinsic preference for either rule, and the pro-plaintiff rule increases total litigation. One such situation, is represented in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Common Pleas</th>
<th>King’s Bench</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Δ</td>
<td>(1,1)</td>
<td>(1.2, 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-π</td>
<td>(0,4)</td>
<td>(0.6,0.6)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that in this situation, the sole Nash equilibrium is for both courts to choose the pro-plaintiff rule. That is, since judges care only about caseload, and the pro-plaintiff rule increases caseload, both courts choose the pro-plaintiff rule.

Note, however, that, if judges have no intrinsic preferences regarding the rule ($\alpha = 0$), the conditions for this pro-plaintiff equilibrium would also be satisfied even if total litigation decreased, as long as long as $\beta > 0.5$. That is as long as long as the pro-plaintiff rule doesn’t reduce litigation by fifty percent or more, the pro-plaintiff rule is the sole equilibrium. Table 5 illustrates one such situation, where the pro-plaintiff rule reduces litigation by forty percent. This situation might represent the choice between a simple pro-plaintiff rule (which generated relatively little litigation) and a complex pro-defendant rule (which generated more litigation). Note that in this situation the judges would maximize their joint utility by both choosing the pro-defendant rule, because doing so would maximize the total caseload. Nevertheless, they both choose the pro-plaintiff rule, because the strategic situation puts them in a Prisoners’ Dilemma. It is not a Nash equilibrium for both to choose the pro-defendant rule, because either court could increase its caseload by
twenty percent (and thus increase its caseload utility by twenty percent), by defecting to the pro-plaintiff rule.

If judges have an intrinsic preference for the pro-plaintiff rule (i.e. $\alpha < 0$), then the pro-plaintiff equilibrium may obtain even when it reduces the caseload by more than fifty percent ($\beta < 0.5$). If $\alpha \leq -1$ (i.e. judges have a strong pro-plaintiff preference), then the pro-plaintiff rule is adopted even if it reduces the caseload to zero ($\beta = 0$).

If judges have an intrinsic preference for the pro-defendant rule (i.e. $\alpha > 0$), it is important to note that the pro-plaintiff equilibrium is still possible, although only if the pro-plaintiff rule reduces caseloads by less than fifty percent. If $\beta > 1$, then the pro-plaintiff rule is a Nash equilibrium if and only if $\beta > \alpha$, that is, if and only the increase in caseload is larger than the judges’ intrinsic preference for the pro-defendant rule. Table 6 illustrates a situation where judges’ have incentives to rule for the plaintiff, even though they have a significant intrinsic preference for the defendant:

Table 6. Pro-Plaintiff Equilibrium in the Jurisdictional Competition Game Where Judges Have an Intrinsic Preference for the Pro-Defendant Rule, $\alpha = 1$, $\beta = 1.5$ and $\gamma = 1$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pro-(\Delta)</th>
<th>Pro-(\pi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>King’s Bench</td>
<td>Pro-(\Delta)</td>
<td>(2, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-(\pi)</td>
<td>(1, 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3, 1)</td>
<td>(1, 5, 1.5)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that this game again puts the judges in a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Because of their strong intrinsic preference for the pro-defendant rule, they would be better off both choosing the pro-defendant rule and dividing the cases between them. Nevertheless, both choosing the pro-defendant rule is not an equilibrium, because of the large gains either court could make by defecting to the pro-plaintiff rule and garnering all, instead of half, of the cases.
Region 2. Unique pro-defendant equilibrium. In the region to the right of both the pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant lines, \((\beta < \alpha\) and \(\beta < (1+\alpha)/2\)), the sole Nash equilibrium is for both courts to adopt the pro-defendant rule. The first condition ensures that the pro-defendant rule is a Nash equilibrium; the second condition ensures that there are no other equilibria. Note that this equilibrium occurs only when the judges have an intrinsic preference for the pro-defendant rule \((\alpha > 0)\) and only when their intrinsic pro-defendant preference is strong relative to the caseload impact of choosing the pro-plaintiff rule \((\alpha > \beta)\).

Region 3. Two symmetric equilibria: both courts pro-plaintiff or both pro-defendant. In the region between the pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant lines, where the pro-plaintiff line is lower \((\beta \geq \alpha\) and \(\beta \leq (1+\alpha)/2\)), it is a Nash equilibrium for both courts to adopt the pro-plaintiff rule and for both courts to adopt the pro-defendant rule. The first condition assures that the pro-plaintiff rule is an equilibrium; the second condition assures that the pro-defendant rule is also an equilibrium. This region includes situations where the judges have no strong intrinsic preference, but the pro-plaintiff rule reduces litigation by a large amount. The choice of whether to enforce arbitration agreements might fall in this region. Table 7 illustrates this situation:

Table 7. Arbitration and the Jurisdictional Competition Game, \(\alpha = 0, \beta = 0.2,\) and \(\gamma = 1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Pleas</th>
<th>Pro-(\Delta) (Do not enforce arbitration agreements)</th>
<th>Pro-(\pi) (Enforce arbitration agreements)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>King’s Bench</td>
<td>(1, 1)*</td>
<td>(0, 0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4, 0)</td>
<td>(0.2, 0.2)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The party requesting enforcement would be the plaintiff, so the pro-plaintiff rule would be to enforce arbitration agreements. Routinely enforcing such agreements would reduce caseloads substantially, by diverting cases away from the legal system. The judges’ collective interest would, of course, be to refuse enforcement of such agreements. Nevertheless, even in this situation it is a Nash equilibrium for both courts to enforce them, because, if one court is enforcing arbitration agreements, the other court would be worse off if it refused to enforce them, because it would get no cases. Of course, both courts refusing to enforce arbitration agreements would also be a Nash equilibrium, because if one court refused to enforce arbitration agreements, the other court would be worse off if it enforced them, because it would lose more cases to arbitration than it would gain by opening its doors to enforcement actions. That is, it is better to get half of the non-arbitrated cases than all of the arbitration enforcement cases.

Region 4. Two asymmetric equilibria: one court pro-plaintiff and one court pro-defendant. In the region between the pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant lines, where the pro-defendant line is lower (β ≤ α and β ≥ (1+α)/2 ), it is an equilibrium for one court to choose the pro-plaintiff rule and the other to choose the pro-defendant rule. If β = α and β ≥ (1+α)/2, then, in addition to the asymmetric equilibria, it is also an equilibrium for both courts to choose the pro-plaintiff rule. If β ≤ α and β = (1+α)/2, then in addition to the asymmetric equilibria, it is also an equilibrium for both courts to choose the pro-defendant rule.

45 Note that this analysis of arbitration differs significantly from other accounts. Most writers who have considered fee income have asserted that judges would refuse to enforce arbitration agreements, because doing so would reduce their income. See Landes & Posner, “Adjudication as a Private Good,” 8 J. Legal Stud. 255-56 (1979); Bruce Benson, “An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States,” 11 J. Law, Econ. & Org., 479, 483 (1995). These writers fail to take into consideration the strategic interaction between the courts and the Prisoners’ Dilemma situation that presents. Note that, contrary to conventional wisdom, arbitration agreements were enforced at common law, either through the enforcement of conditional penalty bonds or through rules of court. See Section V.A below.
The above analysis assumed $\gamma = 1$, that is that caseload utility equaled the caseload itself. If $\gamma \neq 1$, the analysis is very similar, but the location of the pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant lines rotates. In this more general case, the pro-plaintiff line is $\beta = \alpha/\gamma$. This means the pro-plaintiff rotates clockwise as $\gamma$ increases, with the fulcrum at the origin. The pro-defendant line is $\beta = (\gamma + \alpha)/2\gamma$. This means the pro-defendant line also rotates clockwise as $\gamma$ increases, although the fulcrum for the pro-defendant line is $(0, \frac{1}{2})$. The $\alpha$ intercept is thus $-\gamma$. The four regions remain largely as before. Figures 2 depicts the four regions under various assumptions about $\gamma$, and Table 8 sets out the conditions.
Figure 2. Equilibria in the Jurisdictional Competition Game under Different Values of $\gamma$

Table 8. General Conditions for Equilibria in the Jurisdictional Competition Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equilibria</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Plaintiff Equilibrium</td>
<td>$\gamma &gt; 0$, $\beta &gt; \alpha/\gamma$, and $\beta &gt; (\gamma + \alpha)/2\gamma$, or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\gamma = 0$ and $\alpha &lt; 0$, or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\gamma &lt; 0$, $\beta &lt; \alpha/\gamma$, and $\beta &lt; (\gamma + \alpha)/2\gamma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Defendant Equilibrium</td>
<td>$\gamma &gt; 0$, $\beta &lt; \alpha/\gamma$, and $\beta &lt; (\gamma + \alpha)/2\gamma$, or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\gamma = 0$ and $\alpha &gt; 0$, or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\gamma &lt; 0$, $\beta &gt; \alpha/\gamma$, and $\beta &gt; (\gamma + \alpha)/2\gamma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Equilibria: Both courts pro-defendant or both courts pro-plaintiff</td>
<td>$\gamma &gt; 0$, $\beta \geq \alpha/\gamma$, and $\beta \leq (\gamma + \alpha)/2\gamma$, or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\gamma &lt; 0$, $\beta \leq \alpha/\gamma$, and $\beta \geq (\gamma + \alpha)/2\gamma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Equilibria: one court pro-plaintiff &amp; one pro-defendant</td>
<td>$\gamma &gt; 0$, $\beta \leq \alpha/\gamma$, and $\beta \geq (\gamma + \alpha)/2\gamma$, or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\gamma &lt; 0$, $\beta \geq \alpha/\gamma$, and $\beta \leq (\gamma + \alpha)/2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is relatively easy to see that as caseload utility gets less important (γ gets smaller), the region for which the pro-plaintiff rule is an equilibrium (either the sole equilibrium or one of several equilibria) gets smaller. One way of seeing this is to think about a semi-circle centered at the origin and residing above the line α = 0 (i.e. above the x-axis). The pro-plaintiff plaintiff line starts at the origin. The region where the pro-plaintiff rule is an equilibrium is to the left of the line. The pro-plaintiff line rotates to the left (counter-clockwise) as γ gets smaller, so the pro-plaintiff region gets smaller as caseload utility gets less important. If γ = 1, then three-quarters of the semi-circle would be to the left of the pro-plaintiff line, so region in which the pro-plaintiff rule is an equilibrium would be three-quarters of the total area. If γ = 0, the area shrinks to a half, and if γ = -1, the area shrinks to a quarter.\(^4\) From this analysis, a relatively simple prediction follows:

**Prediction 1.** All other things being equal, if γ goes down, then the proportion of pro-plaintiff rules announced by the courts should go down.

As will be discussed further in the next section, this prediction is empirically testable, because most fee income was taken away from the judges by statute in 1799. This would reduce γ, so the proportion of cases announcing pro-plaintiff rules should be lower after

\(^4\) It is also true that as caseload utility gets less important (γ gets smaller), the size of the pro-defendant region increases. Consider semi-circles centered at (-γ, 0). This is where the pro-defendant line meets the α (x) axis. The region where the pro-defendant rule is a Nash equilibrium is to the right. As γ decreases, the line rotates to the left (counter-clockwise), so the pro-defendant region increases. The relative size of the pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant regions is given more precisely in Table 9.

### Table 9. Proportion Pro-Plaintiff or Pro-Defendant in the Jurisdictional Competition Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>γ</th>
<th>Proportion Pro-Plaintiff</th>
<th>Proportion Pro-Defendant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
<td>180 - arctan(1/γ)/180</td>
<td>arctan(1/2γ)/180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= 0</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 0</td>
<td>-arctan(1/γ)/180</td>
<td>180 + arctan(1/2γ)/180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1799. Of course, the prediction assumes “all other things being equal,” which is a demanding condition. In particular, if the mix of cases coming to court changes as a result of the statute, then the prediction may not hold. This selection effect poses the most serious challenge to empirical testing and will be addressed in Section IV.

B. Legislative – Judicial Interaction

The previous analysis assumed that judicial competition was unconstrained. This subsection considers the fact that judicial decisions could be overruled by statute. Consider the spatial model below.47

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The line represents possible decisions on a particular legal issue, ranging from pro-plaintiff at the far left to pro-plaintiff at the far right. Point E represents the statute that would be enacted if Parliament took up the issue, and which would receive royal assent. Of course, Parliament didn’t normally legislate on common law issues (property, tort, contract). In part, this is because legislation required time, energy and more generally “political capital.” It was thus only worthwhile for Parliament to legislate if the courts issued decisions which departed greatly from Parliament’s preferences. The range between C and F represents the decisions Parliament would tolerate. Only if courts issued rulings to the left of C (excessively pro-plaintiff) or the right of F (excessively pro-defendant), would
Parliament move itself into action and pass legislation overturning the common-law decision or doctrine. Because judges had pro-plaintiff incentives which Parliament did not, the decision which judges would make, if unconstrained, would be expected to be to the left of E.\footnote{48} If that unconstrained decision were still within the range C to F, there would be no statute. So analysis is only interesting if the judges’ unconstrained decision were so pro-plaintiff that it would be outside the range Parliament would tolerate. The Figure thus places the judges’ unconstrained decision, A, to the left of C. Judges, however, realized that if they made decisions at A, they would be overturned by Parliament. As a result, courts aimed to make decisions at point D. That is, they tried to make decisions which were pro-plaintiff, but within the range that Parliament would not overturn. Unfortunately, the precise location of C was not known to the judges. That is, they could not predict with perfect accuracy which decisions would be so pro-plaintiff as to provoke Parliamentary override. So sometimes they misjudged and made decisions at point B, which Parliament would then overturn with a statute moving the law to E. Such statutes would move the law in a pro-defendant direction, from B to E.

Of course, it is also possible that judges would make decisions to the right of F, and Parliament would respond with a pro-plaintiff decision. This, however, will be rare, as such a decision would require an extremely large miscalculation by the judges about Parliament’s ideal point and the range of tolerable decisions. This analysis suggests the following predictions:

**Prediction 2.** When courts receive fees and thus have an incentive to be more pro-plaintiff than legislators, most statutes will move the law in a pro-defendant direction.

If judicial incentives change and the decision of unconstrained courts moves in the pro-defendant direction (as suggested by Prediction 1), then point A, the judges’

\footnote{48} This assumption is discussed further below.
unconstrained decision, will move to the right. All other things being equal, this should result in fewer pro-defendant statutes. If point A moves in the range C to F, unconstrained decisions will fall within the range of decisions not overturned by statute, so statutes will be uncommon. If point A moves to the right of F, then unconstrained decisions will be more pro-defendant than Parliament would tolerate, and statutes should be predominantly pro-plaintiff. This analysis suggests a third prediction:

**Prediction 3.** When judicial incentives to be more pro-plaintiff are lessened or removed, the proportion of statutes moving the law in a pro-plaintiff direction will increase.

It should be noted that while Prediction 2 assumes that, when judges received fee income, they preferred a significantly more pro-plaintiff rules than legislators (e.g. point A is to the left of point C), Prediction 3 does not rely on that assumption. The third prediction would be true even if fee-taking judges were more pro-defendant than legislators, as long as the removal of fees moved the judges even farther in the pro-defendant direction.

One advantage of Predictions 2 and 3 over Prediction 1 is that they are not affected by selection bias in the cases that are litigated. That is, statutes respond to the legal rules themselves, not to litigation decisions about whether to sue or settle.

**C. Limitations of the Theory**

Although I believe that the two models presented in this section help elucidate common law decisionmaking, they obviously simplify matters and do not represent historical reality in all its complexity. It is thus important to note a few of the many limitations of these models.

1) The Jurisdictional Competition model assumes only two courts. For most of the relevant period, there were three competing courts—King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and
The addition of a third court does not substantially change things. In fact, it strengthens the main results, as the pro-plaintiff equilibrium obtains in a larger set of circumstances. For example, if judges have no intrinsic preferences, and the pro-plaintiff rule reduces caseloads by a half to two-thirds, the pro-plaintiff rule is not an equilibrium in the two court game, but it is in the three court game.

2) The Jurisdictional Competition game assumes simultaneous, one-shot decisionmaking without communication between the courts. This is obviously incorrect, as the nature of the common law process meant that a particular issue was usually decided at different times in different courts. In addition, nothing constrained the judges from talking to each other, and the courts had long-term repeated interactions. With communication and repeated play, judges might be able to avoid the Prisoners’ Dilemma’s problems which competition produced. Nevertheless, the fact that judges often chose bright-line rules, which would reduce caseloads, and the fact that judges enforced arbitration agreements, both of which were contrary to the judges’ collective interest, suggests that the assumption of simultaneous, one-shot decisionmaking captures something important about the interaction between the courts.49 [The next version of the paper will contain sequential decision making. The only real change is that Region 3 (two symmetric equilibria: Both courts pro-plaintiff or both pro-defendant) disappears and merges into Region 2 (Unique pro-defendant equilibrium). That is, there are no longer situations in which it is an equilibrium for both courts to be pro-plaintiff or both pro-defendant, and situations where that would have occurred under simultaneous decisionmaking produce pro-defendant decisions under sequential decisionmaking. The predictions remain the same.]

3) The Jurisdictional Competition game does not take into account litigants’ incentives to settle and to frame issues strategically. This is potentially the biggest problem
with the model. Some strategies for mitigating this problem are discussed in the next section.

4) The Jurisdictional Competition model assumes judges are homogeneous. Of course, they were not. Introducing heterogeneity would complicate the model, without substantially altering the conclusions.

5) The Jurisdictional Competition game assumes a binary choice (pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant rule), while the Legislative – Judicial Interaction model assumes continuous choices. It would be possible to harmonize these models, but doing so would substantially complicate the analysis without adding any real insight. The binary choice aspect of the Jurisdictional Competition game captures the fact that, in most cases, the litigants frame two options and the court chooses between them. The Legislative – Judicial Interaction model captures the fact that a series of related cases may provide judges with a range of doctrinal choices, approximating continuous choice.

6) Prediction 2 (but not 3) assumes that unconstrained courts will make decisions that are more pro-plaintiff than Parliament. It is, of course, possible that judges had such strong intrinsic pro-defendant preferences that, even with the pro-plaintiff incentives competition provided, their unconstrained decisions would still be more pro-defendant than Parliament’s. On the other hand, since judges were chosen by the King and were generally recruited from the same social stratum as members of the House of Commons, it seems more likely that their intrinsic preferences were roughly in accord with Parliament’s and the Kings, and that competition pushed them in a more pro-plaintiff direction. Of course, if the King understood the pro-plaintiff bias that competition induced, he might have deliberately chosen judges with pro-defendant intrinsic preferences, so that, taking into account jurisdictional competition, the judges would make decisions closer to the King’s ideal point.

49 See above __.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the King, or anyone else, perceived the pro-plaintiff bias. In addition, the decision to select a judge would ordinarily have turned on many other aspects of their background and preferences (experience in the king’s service, intelligence, political preferences, etc.) so that, even if kings understood the pro-plaintiff bias and wanted to counteract it, it would have been difficult for them to select judges with pro-defendant intrinsic preferences to counteract the pro-plaintiff incentives of jurisdictional competition.

IV  EMPIRICAL TESTS

The institutional structure described in Section II, which created jurisdictional competition, was radically transformed in the nineteenth century. Perhaps most importantly, statutes in 1799 and 1825 restricted royal judges to fixed salaries. Instead of lining the pockets of judges, fees were now allocated to the Treasury. The 1799 statute took fees away from the puisne (i.e. non-chief) judges of King’s Bench and Common Pleas, and from all of the Exchequer judges. The 1825 statute took fees away from the chief judges of King’s Bench and Common Pleas.

It seems hardly a coincidence that the pro-defendant decisions for which the common law is notorious came soon after these statutes. For example, Priestley v. Fowler, and Hutchison v. York, Newcastle and Berwick Railway Co., which established the fellow-

50 39 Geo. III c. 90 (1799) (taking fees away from puisne judges of King’s Bench and Common Pleas and all judges of Exchequer); 6 Geo. IV c. 82 (1825) (taking fees away from Chief Justice of King’s Bench); 6 Geo. IV c. 83 (1825) (taking fees away from Chief Justice of Common Pleas.

51 The 1799 statute took the fees away in a rather roundabout way. It gave the affected judges salary increase, but also required them to report the amount received in fees to the Treasury every six months. The amount each judge received in fees was subtracted from his salary increase. The judges thus technically kept their fees. Nevertheless, since their fee income, which was smaller than their salary increases, was subtracted from their salaries, the net effect was the same as taking the fees away—judges no longer had any financial incentive to hear more cases.
servant rule in England, were decided in 1837 and 1850. These cases made it nearly impossible for an employee to prevail in tort against his employer when the negligence which caused injury was caused by another employee (a “fellow servant”) rather than directly by the employer. Similarly, Winterbottom v. Wright was decided in 1842. This landmark case established the privity doctrine, which barred consumers from suing the manufacturer of a defective product unless the manufacturer had sold directly to the consumer and the two were, in that way, in “privity of contract.” This doctrine delayed the development of product liability law for almost a century.

Similar pro-defendant developments occurred in contract law. Early modern cases clearly established the right of third-party beneficiaries to enforce contracts for their benefit. Nevertheless, in a series of nineteenth-century cases, King’s Bench rejected the prior cases and held that the beneficiary could not sue, unless he or she had also paid the consideration. Similarly, the famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale, decided in 1854, limited contract damages to those that were foreseeable, in spite of conflicting precedents.

The statutory changes in 1799 and 1825 also permit a more quantitative approach to the hypothesis of a pro-plaintiff bias in the common law. If the desire to increase fee income was an important part of judicial motivation to increase caseloads, removal of those

52 Priestley v Fowler (1837) 3 M & W 1; Hutchison v. York, Newcastle and Berwick Railway Co., 5 Ex 343 (1850). It is not argued here that prior to Priestley, employees had been able to recover and that Priestley changed the law. Rather, in Priestley the court faced a choice about what to do and decided upon a rule which led to fewer suits than a rule which held that employers were liable. In a recent analysis of the case, Kostal argues that “relevant common law was scant, ambiguous, and unevolved” and that distinguished lawyers and judges, including Baron Parke, could and did see the opposite result as justified by precedent. R W Kostal, Law and Railway Capitalism, 1825-1875 (1994) 261, 267-68. Ibbetson also emphasizes that it was “judicial choices,” not precedent, that led to the “invention of the ‘fellow servant’ rule.” D J Ibbetson, “The Tort of Negligence in the Common Law in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” in Eljo J H Schrage (ed), Negligence: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Torts (2001) 254, 256. In contrast, Epstein argues that the absence of relevant precedents “underscore[s] the uncompromising no-liability rule of the common law.” Richard Epstein, “The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’ Compensation Law” (1982) 16 Georgia Law Review 775, 778. Karsten’s view is similar. Peter Karsten, Heart versus Head: Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth-Century America (1997) 114-20.

53 Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109; Baker, above n 7, 417; Ibbetson, above n __, 173-74, 295. Ibbetson also notes the “judicial choice” involved in this case. Ibbetson, above n __, 254.

54 See Baker, supra n. 7, pp. 354-55.
incentives should have led to measurable changes in the law. This section attempts to test that hypothesis in four ways: (1) by comparing all reported cases one year before and one year after the 1799 and 1825 statutes, that is comparing 1798 cases to 1800 cases, and 1824 cases to 1826 cases, (2) by comparing leading cases, as identified by modern historians, in the periods 1600-1798, 1800-1824, and 1826-1872, (3) by comparing leading cases, as identified by citation in pre-1865 English cases, in the periods 1600-1798, 1800-1824, and 1826-1865, and (4) by comparing statutes changing the common law in the periods 1600-1798 and 1800-1872.

A. Reported Cases 1798, 1800, 1824 and, 1826

The simplest way to measure the impact, if any, of the 1799 and 1825 statutes taking fees away from the judges, is to compare all reported cases in the year before the statutory change to cases decided the year after. If fees induced the judges to decide cases in a more pro-plaintiff way, then the removal of fees might be reflected in more pro-defendant decisionmaking after the statutes.\footnote{See Ibbetson, p. .}

On the other hand, if reported cases were a complete or random sample of all litigated cases and if litigants adjusted their settlement behavior to the change in judicial decisionmaking, one might expect that the percentage pro-plaintiff would have been unaffected by the statutes. This, of course, is an application famous Priest-Klein selection hypothesis.\footnote{See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, “The Selection of Cases for Trial,” 13 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1984); Keith Hylton, ‘Information, Litigation and Common Law Evolution,’ (working paper 2005).} Because of the possibility of selection bias, this test of the pro-plaintiff hypothesis is not very strong. On the other hand, if parties failed to appreciate the change in judicial decisionmaking caused by the removal of fees, an effect might still appear. In addition, if only cases which made significant changes in the law were reported, analyzing
all reported cases might indicate the direction in which the law was changing rather than simply ordinary litigation probing the ambiguities of established legal doctrine.

Table 10 reports the percentage of reported cases which were decided for the plaintiff in the relevant years. I categorized cases as pro-plaintiff if the plaintiff received all or most of what she had claimed, and pro-defendant if the defendant prevailed.

Table 10. Reported Cases, 1798, 1800, 1824, 1826

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>King’s Bench</th>
<th>Common Pleas</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% for plaintiff</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>% for plaintiff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1798</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Difference between 1798 and 1800 | -16%** | 6% | -5% |
| Difference between 1824 and 1826 | -8%   | 14% | -2% |

Source: *English Reports on CD-ROM.*

Cases are categorized as “pro-plaintiff” or “pro-defendant” solely based on who won the particular case, not based on a more complex analysis of the case’s precedential value. Cases where the plaintiff received some, but not all, of his or her claim, were categorized as 50% for the plaintiff. Cases “in error” were excluded, as the incentives for judges in these quasi-appellate cases were different.

** means that the one-tailed p-value was less than 0.025, and thus that the two-tailed p-value was less than 0.05.

Data collection is still in progress. The 1798 and 1800 rows are complete, while the 1824 and 1826 rows represent about a quarter of reported cases.

The data do not lend themselves to any straightforward analysis. The only statistically significant change (two-tailed p-value 0.04) is the change in King’s Bench from 1798 to 1800, where there was a sixteen point drop in the percentage of pro-plaintiff decisions. This drop accords with Prediction 1, that removal of fees would reduce the percentage of pro-
plaintiff decisions. On the other hand, results for the other three changes – King’s Bench 1824 to 1826, Common Pleas 1798 to 1800, and Common Pleas 1824 to 1826 – are not statistically significant and are of different directions. Pooling King's Bench and Common Pleas cases together yields changes of the predicted sign, although lacking in statistical significance. Most probably, the inconclusive results reflect the selection-bias problem discussed above.

B. Leading Cases Identified by Modern Historians

Another way of measuring legal change is to look at important cases. The advantage of such cases is that they might avoid the selection bias problem. Important cases are those which decide new and important issues, and thus set important precedents for the future. Although parties will still settle and litigate such cases strategically, eventually cases posing significant new issues will be litigated, and the outcomes of such cases will reveal underlying biases and incentives in judicial decisionmaking, rather than simply strategic selection of cases for settlement or litigation.

Of course, identifying important cases is difficult and potentially subject to bias. In the next subsection, I use citation frequency in pre-1865 English cases to select cases which were important to contemporary litigants and judges. In this section, I use citation in modern legal histories to select cases which, with the benefit of hindsight, had the greatest impact on the development of the law.

As sources for this section, I used John Baker’s *Introduction to English Legal History* (2004), David Ibbetson’s *A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations* (1999), and Richard Epstein’s *Cases and Materials on Torts* (2004). The first two choices need little explanation. John Baker is probably the most distinguished living English legal historian, and his *Introduction* is a comprehensive and scholarly synthesis. David Ibbetson’s book is the most recent history of tort and contract and has been widely acclaimed. Use of Richard
Epstein’s torts casebook requires a little more justification. Richard Epstein is best known as a modern lawyer and law professor. Nevertheless, he is also an accomplished historian, and his casebook pays close attention pre-1900 English case law.

The Epstein casebook deals only with torts, and the Ibbetson text covers both tort and contract, as well as related topics such as unjust enrichment. Baker’s *Introduction* covers the entirety English law, but for this subsection, I have examined only the tort and contract chapters. I chose to focus on tort and contract for two reasons. First, these two subjects composed more than eighty percent of cases brought in the common law courts. Second, the third major common law area, property, presents special problems, because the impact of doctrine on future plaintiffs is especially unclear. For example, it is impossible to say whether the rule in *Shelley’s Case*—that a grant to A of a life estate with the remainder in fee simple to A’s heirs gives A a fee simple interest--will benefit plaintiffs or defendants. Its primary effect is probably on the drafting of deeds, and only secondarily on who will take possession under the deed and who will challenge it in court. In contrast, in tort cases, the effect of doctrine on plaintiffs and defendants is usually clear. Contract cases present some of the same difficulties as property cases, but it is usually easy to tell which party will benefit from a case -- for example *Slade’s Case* expanding the enforceability of oral contracts will usually benefit plaintiffs, while *Hadley v. Baxendale*, restricting damages, will usually benefit defendants.

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59 Chapters 18-26. Like Ibbetson’s book, these chapters also include quasi-contract and unjust enrichment, which are therefore included in the statistics.
62 Of course, *ex ante*, it is not clear that one side will benefit, as prices and other terms may adjust to reflect anticipated litigation outcomes. Nevertheless, when judged at the time litigation is initiated, it is clear which side benefits. For the purposes of this article, the time of suit is the relevant time frame. Benefit is measured in comparison to the previous state of the law (e.g. limited enforcement of oral contracts before *Slade’s Case*) or the alternative rule argued to the court e.g. (full damages in *Hadley*).
The cases analyzed came from the period 1600 to 1872. 1600 was chosen as the starting point, because it was clear by that time that the courts had jurisdictions that were almost completely overlapping, and thus the hypothesis of competition is most plausible from this point onward. 1872 is a logical end point, because the 1873 and 1875 Judicature Acts consolidated the courts and thus eliminated any possibility of competition between them.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Judicature Act 1873} (UK) 36 & 37 Vict, c 66; \textit{Judicature Act 1875} (UK) 38 & 39 Vict, c 77; Baker, above n 7, 50-51.
Table 11. Leading Cases Identified by Modern Historians, 1600-1872

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baker</th>
<th>Ibbetson</th>
<th>Epstein</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% for plaintiff</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>% for plaintiff</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1798</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-1824</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826-1872</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-1872</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Difference between 1600-1798 and 1800-1824

-6% -16%* -28% -14%**

Difference between 1800-1824 and 1826-1872

-13% 13% 1% 2%

Difference between 1600-1798 and 1800-1872

-14%** -6% -25%* -12%**

** means that the one-tailed p-value was less than 0.025, and thus that the two-tailed p-value was less than 0.05.
* means that the one-tailed p-value between 0.025 and 0.05, and thus that the two-tailed p-value was between 0.05 and 0.10.

Cases cited by Baker and Epstein were coded primarily based on Baker’s and Epstein’s descriptions of their holdings. Where these descriptions were ambiguous, I read the cases themselves and coded them in accordance with their outcomes. The plaintiff or defendant orientation of a case in Ibbetson’s descriptions was so frequently ambiguous that I always coded cases by reading them and coding their outcomes.

Cases decided by courts “in error” or by the House of Lords were excluded, as the incentives of appellate (or quasi-appellate) courts were different.

The last row includes cases from 1825, which are not included elsewhere in the table. As a result, the last row does not merely combine information in the prior two rows.

Where two sources (e.g. Baker and Ibbetson) both identified the same case, it was counted only once in the “All” column.

In all three texts, there was a drop in the percentage of cases which were pro-plaintiff after 1799. In Baker’s Introduction, the drop between 1600-1798 and 1800-1824 was six percentage points; in Ibbetson, the drop was sixteen points, and in Epstein the drop was fourteen points. Although, taken alone, only the drop in Ibbetson is statistically significant, if one pools the cases from all three sources, the drop is fourteen points and statistically significant. Comparing the period 1600-1798 to the longer period, 1800-1872 confirms the idea that the drop seen immediately after 1799 was durable. In all three sources, the
percentage of pro-plaintiff decisions fell, and the drops are statistically significant for Baker, Epstein, and the three sources combined, although not for Ibbetson alone.

On the other hand, there is no evidence that the 1825 statute which took fees away from the Chief Judges of King’s Bench and Common Pleas had any effect. The cases in Baker show a large, thirteen percentage point drop in the percent pro-plaintiff, but Ibbetson and Epstein show increases. Overall, there is a slight (two percentage point) increase in the percent pro-plaintiff. None of these changes is statistically significant. Most probably, the 1825 statute had little impact, because all cases in the examined reports were decided *en banc* by all four judges in the court. Since the chief was only one of the four, the change in his incentives had little effect. In addition, the 1825 statute had no effect on the Court of Exchequer, because fees from all its judges were taken away in 1799.

Taken together, the analysis of important cases as identified by modern historians, is consistent with Prediction 1. When fees were taken away from most judges, the proportion of doctrinally important cases in which the court ruled for the plaintiff fell seventeen percent, from sixty-nine percent to fifty-seven percent.

C. Leading Cases Identified by Citation Frequency

Another method of identifying important cases is to use citation frequency in pre-1900 English cases. Unfortunately, this is much more difficult than one might expect. There is no citation service equivalent to the modern American Shepherds which has already compiled lists of cited and citing cases. Fortunately, the standard edition of pre-1865 reports has recently been put on a CD-ROM. Nevertheless, extracting accurate citation frequency data from this database is difficult for several reasons. First, there were no standard citation formats, so it is not possible to search by citation. Instead one must search by case name, which leads to the second difficulty. There is often more than one case with
the same name. To avoid this problem, all cases identified as having been cited frequently must be checked manually to identify which, if any, of the several cases with the same name has been cited frequently. Third, the CD-ROM was created by scanning pre-existing printed reports. Unfortunately, this scan is of extremely poor quality. As a result, some citations have no doubt been missed. Finally the printed edition upon which the CD-ROM based is neither complete nor entirely reliable. Nevertheless, because there is no reason to think that the errors introduced by these problems is in any way correlated with variables of interest, it is reasonable to believe that this method of identifying important cases will yield useful results.

Because of these difficulties, I have only just begun identification and analysis of highly cited cases. So far I have identified common law cases in the period 1600 to 1865 cited more than thirty times in the database. As in the previous subsection, 1600 was chosen as the starting point, because it is from this time that it is clear that there was competition between the courts. 1865 was chosen as the end point, because the database ends at this date. Citing cases are also from the same period.

One surprising fact is that citation frequencies for common-law cases are generally quite low. The most highly cited common law case that I have found was cited only sixty-one times, and I have found only twenty-one cases which were cited more than thirty times. Table 12 below provides analysis of those cases:

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64 I thank my colleague, Gillian Hadfield, for suggesting this way of measuring legal change.
Table 12. Leading Cases Identified by Citation Frequency, 1600-1865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% for plaintiff</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1600-1798</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-1865</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, because of the very small number of cases, it is not possible to draw any reliable inferences from these data. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the change around 1799 is in the direction predicted by theory, and is of comparable magnitude to the change found above in the leading cases identified by modern historians.

D. Statutes, 1600-1872

As discussed above, Prediction 2 suggests that pre-1799 statutes should tend to change the law in pro-defendant ways, because the courts were biased in favor of the plaintiff. After 1799, Prediction 3 suggests that statutes should be less pro-defendant, and perhaps even pro-plaintiff. One problem is identifying the relevant universe of statutes. Most statutes deal with revenue or military concerns, and have no effect on the volume of litigation or judicial fees. One promising way of identifying the relevant statutes is to see which statutes are cited in modern works of English legal history. I have done this for three sources—tort and contract statutes cited in Baker’s Introduction to English Legal History, statutes cited in Ibbetson’s Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations, and statutes cited in A.W.B. Simpson’s A History of the Common Law of Contract (1975). The first two sources were discussed above and need no further explanation. Epstein’s casebook cites relatively few English statutes and thus could not be used again. Simpson is a leading legal
historian and his history of contract law is widely cited, so analysis of statutes cited in his book is illuminating.

As before, the period 1600-1872 was chosen for analysis. Unfortunately, the sources analyzed here cite only two statutes from the period 1800-1824, so that subperiod cannot be analyzed separately. Table 13 below presents the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baker</th>
<th>Baker w/o Copyright</th>
<th>Ibbetson</th>
<th>Simpson</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>All w/o Copyright</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% for plaintiff</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>% for plaintiff</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>% for plaintiff</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1798</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10%**</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-1872</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>40%**</td>
<td>69%*</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>39%**</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** means that the one-tailed p-value was less than 0.025, and thus that the two-tailed p-value was less than 0.05.

* means that the one-tailed p-value was between 0.025 and 0.05, and thus that the two-tailed p-value was between 0.05 and 0.10.

For the first row, the null hypothesis was that the proportion was equal to fifty percent (a two-tailed test) or greater than fifty-percent (a one-tailed test). For the last row, the null hypothesis was that there was no difference between 1600-1798 and 1800-1872 (two-tailed) or that the proportion pro-plaintiff was lower in 1800-1872 than in 1600-1798 (one-tailed).

Statutory citations were identified using the Table of Statutes at the beginning of each book. Ibbetson’s book does not have Table of Statutes, so statutes were located by skimming the footnotes and by GooglePrint searches. The pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant character of the statute was identified using Baker, Ibbetson, or Simpson’s description of the statute. Statutes which did not relate to contracts or torts, or which had no clear pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias, were excluded.

Where two sources (e.g. Baker and Ibbetson) both identified the same statute, it was counted only once in the “All” and “All w/o Copyright” columns.

The results in the table are broadly consistent with the predictions. Look first at the statutes in the Ibbetson and Simpson treatises. The pro-defendant character of legislation before 1799 is manifest. Only ten or twenty percent of statutes were pro-plaintiff. For both, the percentage pro-plaintiff is significantly different from fifty percent, with p-values less than 0.05. The statutes cited in Baker’s text are more ambiguous. If one looks at all the
1600-1798 statutes, a majority (60%) were pro-plaintiff, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. When one looks more deeply, one notices that more than two-thirds of the pro-plaintiff statutes deal with copyright and are the legislative reaction to a single decision, *Donaldson v. Beckett*, which held that there was no common law copyright. If copyright statutes are excluded, the percentage pro-plaintiff drops to 31%, which is consistent with the prediction of pro-defendant legislation before 1799, although 31% is not statistically different from 50%.

While the exclusion of copyright statutes may seem *ad hoc*, it actually provides further support for the hypothesis that common law decisions were ordinarily pro-plaintiff. The decision holding that there was no common law copyright was not made by one of the regular common law courts. In fact, King’s Bench had held that there was common law copyright in 1769. The issue came before Parliament only because the House of Lords held to the contrary in 1774. While proceedings before the House of Lords were a part of the common law process, they were rare and were not subject to the same pro-plaintiff pressures as cases in King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. Unlike the ordinary courts, where the plaintiff chose the forum, cases got to the House of Lords in proceedings “in error,” which were like appeals in that the party which lost below initiated the proceedings. Since the party which lost below might be the defendant, even if the House of Lords wanted to increase its caseload (which is unlikely), there is no reason to think it would do so by systematically favoring the plaintiff.

The figures for statutes since 1800 are also largely consistent with the prediction that when fees were taken away, courts shifted pro-defendant, so statutes would become more

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65 4 Burrow 2408 (1774).
pro-plaintiff. The statutes cited by Baker are exclusively pro-plaintiff, and the difference between the pre-1799 and post-1799 statutes is statistically significant, whether copyright statutes are excluded or not. On the other hand, the number of post-1799 statutes cited by Baker is small, so the results should be interpreted with caution. Nineteenth-century statutes cited by Ibbetson and Simpson were pro-defendant, which is inconsistent with the prediction. On the other hand, they cite only a single statute each. Pooling together all the statutes cited by Baker, Ibbetson and Simpson, and excluding duplicate citations, there are sizable shifts in the pro-defendant direction (twenty-five or thirty-nine percentage points), although, because of the small numbers, only the shift which includes the copyright statutes is statistically significant.

Taken together, the statutory analysis is largely consistent with Predictions 2 and 3. Statutes were overwhelmingly pro-defendant before 1799, and the proportion pro-plaintiff doubled after 1799.

V ADDITIONAL ISSUES

Research on this project is still in progress. In addition to the research plans discussed in Part V, this section discusses a number of related issues requiring further investigation.

A. Arbitration and choice of forum clauses

Most of the examples in this essay came from contract law. If there really was an inefficient pro-plaintiff bias, however, one might have expected parties to have contracted around it. There are two ways they might have done so: arbitration and choice-of-forum clauses. That is, parties might have agreed, before a dispute arose, to submit any future dispute to arbitration. Or they might have agreed that any litigation would take place in a particular court, perhaps Common Pleas.

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68 Whether the members of the House of Lords received fee income from cases is unclear, but even if they did, the fees would presumably be split among the many members of the body, most of whom were
Choice of forum clauses, if widely used, would have encouraged the courts to develop efficient contract law, rather than pro-plaintiff doctrine, because rational parties would choose the court which had developed rules which maximized their joint surplus. I am unaware of any use of such clauses, or any litigation about them.

One reason such clauses might not have been used is that there was seldom any real disagreement between the courts. This is the prediction of the game theoretic analysis in Section III; only in one relatively small region—Region 4, Asymmetric Equilibria—is it an equilibrium for the courts to adopt different rules. The absence of disagreement between the courts also accords with the historical record, where each court usually adopted the innovations of the other. As a result, it would not usually have been worthwhile for contracting parties to include such clauses. Since they were used infrequently, if at all, courts had no incentive to develop efficient law. Of course, a court might have thought it could develop a competitive advantage by creating efficient law and then hoping parties would use forum-selection clauses to increase the caseload of that court. Even if a court could really have counted on widespread use of forum-selection clauses, this strategy, might not have been beneficial if, as is likely, efficient rules would have generated less litigation.

Enforcement of forum selection clauses might have been another potential problem, although probably not a fatal one. If the contract specified the Court of Common Pleas, but the plaintiff chose King’s Bench, King’s Bench would obviously have an incentive not to enforce the choice of forum clause. On the other hand, at least before 1695, contracting parties could have backed up their choice of forum clauses with a penalty bond stipulating large penalties for violation of the choice of forum clause. In that situation, if the plaintiff violated the choice of forum clause and brought the case in King’s Bench, the defendant could sue on the penalty bond in Common Pleas. In that situation, Common Pleas would

phenomenally wealthy and thus unlikely to be influenced by prospective fee income.
obviously have an incentive to enforce the penalty bond. If the amount of the penalty bond was sufficiently high (e.g. greater than the difference between expected damages in King’s Bench and Common Pleas), the threat of penalty bond enforcement would give the plaintiff an incentive to obey the choice of forum clause and sue in Common Pleas in the first place.

The existence of arbitration, like the possibility of statutory override, could have constrained the pro-plaintiff bias. On the other hand, because of the transactions costs of drafting arbitration clauses and the costs of arbitration itself, there might have been a wide range of pro-plaintiff decisions that would not have provoked parties to resort to arbitration. The situation might, therefore, have been similar to the Legislative-Judicial Interaction model, where, because of legislative transaction costs, Parliament might have tolerated a wide range of decisions that deviated from legislation it would have favored.

It is often said that the common law was hostile to arbitration, and this attitude is sometimes attributed to the judges’ pecuniary interests. Some have argued that judges made arbitration agreement unenforceable, because arbitration would have reduced their incomes by diverting cases from the courts.69 As noted above, however, this analysis, is too simplistic. It overlooks competition between the courts. While the judges collectively would have had an interest in discouraging arbitration, each court might have seen it as in its own interest to enforce arbitration agreements. By enforcing arbitration agreements, such a court might reduce its own docket of cases on the merits, but it would gain arbitration enforcement cases that might otherwise have gone to one of the other courts. Courts thus may have faced a collective action problem. It might have been in their collective interest to void arbitration agreements, but in their individual interests to enforce

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them. Decisions on arbitration thus provide an interesting window on the extent to which courts acted individually (e.g. competitively) or collectively (e.g. collusively).

In the medieval and early modern periods, arbitration agreements were usually enforced by penal bonds. That is, the parties entered into an agreement in which they agreed to arbitrate, each promising to pay some large sum as a penalty if it did not arbitrate or abide by an arbitration award. Such bonds, like most penal bonds, were enforceable. Even *Vynior’s Case*, which is often cited as evidence of common-law hostility to arbitration because it held that either party could revoke the arbitrator’s authority, held that the party which revoked the arbitrator’s authority forfeited the bond amount. Thus, as long as the parties stipulated a large enough penalty, arbitration agreements would be effective.

Nevertheless, the power of penal bonds to back up arbitration agreements was eviscerated by the 1696 and 1705 statutes mentioned above, which made penalty clauses unenforceable. Nevertheless, as James Oldham has shown, even after these statutes, courts continued to enforce arbitration agreements using rules of court. Their ability to do so was bolstered by a 1698 statute, but judges were already using rules of court to enforce arbitration agreements even before these statutes were passed. Although eighteenth and nineteenth-century decisions such as *Kill v. Hollister* (1746) are often cited as evincing hostility to arbitration, James Oldham has shown that the printed versions of these cases are inaccurate and that the actual decisions supported arbitration.

B. Collective Action Problems within Courts

This essay has so far assumed that each court acted as a single unit, rationally maximizing its income. This is a grave simplification, as the courts were composed of

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70 8 Coke Report 81b (1607).
71 See , __
72 9 Will.III c. 15.
numerous individuals whose interests might conflict. Depending on the ability of certain actors to veto changes, reforms which might benefit the court as a whole, might be blocked by those whose incomes would be adversely affected.

Blatcher presents a tantalizing hint of the possible importance of the internal structure of courts. Why was the Bill of Middlesex (a procedural fiction which increased jurisdiction and reduced cost) developed in King's Bench rather than Common Pleas? Blatcher suggests part of the answer lies in the allocation of responsibility among court staff. In King’s Bench, a single prothonotary (chief clerk) had the power and financial incentive to innovate. In Common Pleas, the prothonotary’s responsibilities were split among three men, and change would also have required the assent of an independent keeper of the seal. Thus, collective action problems may have impeded innovation in Common Pleas.

Similarly, practice in Common Pleas was restricted to serjeants, an elite subset of the bar. While this monopoly enriched the serjeants, it raised costs and thus gave King’s Bench an advantage. In parallel fashion, the four sworn attorneys and sixteen side clerks had a monopoly of the common law business in Exchequer. Although these practice restrictions impeded their courts’ ability to compete, those who benefited fought to retain them.

C. Analysis by Court and Case Type

The possibility of arbitration suggests that judicial decisionmaking might have been more constrained in contract than in tort, and thus that the pro-plaintiff bias might have been less pronounced in contract. This hypothesis could be tested by classifying cases analyzed in Section IV according case type.

74 Blatcher, above n __, 109-10.
75 First Report.... by the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Practice and Proceedings of the Superior Courts of Common Law (1829), 211.
The analysis of all reported cases in Section IV and the possibility of collective action problems in Common Pleas, discussed in the previous subsection, suggest that there might have been significant differences between the courts in their competitive posture. This hypothesis could be tested by classifying cases analyzed in Section IV according to the deciding court.

D. How did the fee system work?

While it is relatively clear that judges received fees, the details of the system are uncharted. How were fees distributed between chief and puisne (non-chief) judges? between judges and staff? between staff members? When did the fee system begin and how did it evolve? Did changes in the fee system affect legal evolution? Did competition produce pressure to lower fees?

E. Procedure

This article has focused on legal doctrine. Competition could also affect procedure. Does the evolution of common law procedure accord with the hypothesis of a pro-plaintiff bias?

F. Testing Alternative Hypotheses about Jurisdictional Competition

As noted in Section II, some historians think that jurisdictional competition led to more complex law or more efficient law, rather than pro-plaintiff law. I would like to develop methods for testing those hypotheses.

G. Quasi-Appellate Cases

Although there was no true system of appeals before the mid-nineteenth century, proceedings “in error” provided a limited form of judicial review. By this method, King’s Bench had the power to review cases from Common Pleas. Cases from King’s Bench and Exchequer were reviewed by ad hoc courts composed mostly of judges from other courts, and ultimately by the House of Lords. Proceedings in error, however, were very
circumscribed, because the reviewing court could examine only the official legal record. Since the legal record did not include evidence presented at trial and was often obscured by unreviewable legal fictions, proceedings in error did not provide an effective constraint on the separate development of law and procedure in each court. Nevertheless, they probably did encourage one of the distinctive features of English law – the proliferation of legal fictions – because fictions enabled courts to expand their jurisdictions without correction by proceedings in error.76

Courts in error had different incentives. If they collected fees, which I suspect they did, they would have an incentive to favor appellants, who were the ones who chose whether to appeal. On the other hand, it would have been difficult to systematically favor appellants through doctrinal choice, because any doctrine would just change the nature of future appellate cases. Courts of error might favor uncertain rules, as they might provoke more litigation and more appeals. In addition, since these quasi-appellate courts were often composed of judges from competing courts, appellate courts could facilitate collusion or allow one court to undercut the competitive position of a rival. In any case, there is little reason to predict a pro-plaintiff bias in proceedings in error. The decisions of such courts could thus provide a useful control for the trial courts analyzed in the bulk of this article.

H. Alternative Explanations

While this article argues for the importance of fees and competition, there are other potential explanations for the patterns discussed here. Perhaps class or ideological biases can explain the results. Perhaps judges were pro-plaintiff in contract cases, because of a class-bias in favor of creditors. Perhaps they were pro-defendant in Priestly and Winterbottom, because of class-bias against employees and consumers. Alternatively, it is possible that the common law rigidly enforced contracts while Chancery developed

76 See: text at notes _, _.
defenses, because of differences in institutional competence. Perhaps defenses were too complex for the common law courts, which relied on lay juries, and required the sort of nuanced fact-finding which only Chancery's professional judging could provide.

VII CONCLUSION

This essay has presented a relatively simple hypothesis: that competition among courts led to a pro-plaintiff bias in the common law. This idea is supported by quantitative analysis of decisionmaking before and after the 1799 statute which took fees away from the judges and thus dampened competition. Much research, however, remains.