Efficiency of Simultaneous Directed Search with Recall

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the properties of a directed search labor market in which workers choose how many applications to send simultaneously after observing the firms’ wage offers. The number of applications can be interpreted as an explicit form of search intensity. Since workers might reject some job offers in favor of better ones, we allow rejected firms to contact (“recall”) other applicants which is modeled as a stable assignment on the endogenous network. The equilibrium is generically unique, all workers choose to send the same number of applications, and firms offer a discrete number of wages. The equilibrium is constrained efficient given the workers’ lack of coordination: entry of firms, number of applications, and number of matches are efficient. Wage dispersion is necessary for the market to achieve constrained efficiency despite homogeneity of workers and firms. For small application costs the equilibrium outcome converges to the unconstrained efficient competitive outcome.

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1 Introduction

While unemployment is generally viewed as an undesirable phenomenon, scholars have pointed out its productive purpose in the allocation of labor in markets with frictions. The productive activity that people pursue during unemployment is usually called “search”. The idea that the market achieves a natural rate of unemployment that efficiently (given the frictions) allocates the productive resources in the economy goes back at least to Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967), and has been debated since.

Initial equilibrium models that investigated this contention are Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982a, 1982b) and Pissarides (1984, 1985). They assumed that only a fraction of workers and firms can meet, that those meetings are random draws, and that wages are set by Nash bargaining. In general they do not support the view that the market achieves the optimal allocation given the frictions.\(^1\) Efficiency fails essentially because cannot compete to increase their matching probability, but instead wages are determined non-competitively after meeting a worker.

The next generation of equilibrium search models allowed firms to directly compete for labor by publicly posting their wage offers.\(^2\) Workers observe the offers and decide where to apply. Frictions arise because firms only have a single vacancy, and workers are assumed to use identical application strategies. Since it cannot be optimal for all workers to apply for the same job, the equilibrium requires a mixed strategy in which workers randomize and sometimes miscoordinate. This means that some jobs happen to attract many applicants, while others attract few or none. Nevertheless, higher wages induce (or “direct”) workers to apply there with higher probability. In this class of directed search models, also known as competitive search models, Moen (1997), Mortensen and Wright (2002), Shi (2002) and Shimer (1996, 2005) show in various degrees of generality that the market interaction is efficient given the frictions in the market, providing theoretical support for the efficiency of the natural rate of unemployment.

These results are obtained under the restrictive assumption that each worker only sends a single application.\(^3\) One application does not necess-

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\(^1\)See also Hosios (1990). A notable exception is Lucas and Prescott (1974), who set up a very different equilibrium search model that does exhibit efficiency.

\(^2\)For an overview of both generations of models see Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (forthcoming).

\(^3\)In some competitive search models like Moen (1997) and Mortensen and Wright (2002)
ily lead to employment, and workers have a natural incentive to apply to multiple firms to improve immediate employment prospects. Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming) and Galenianos and Kircher (2005) introduce multiple applications per worker. Surprisingly, the competitive forces do not lead the market to constrained efficiency even under the specification of homogenous workers and firms. In the former model, entry of firms is too large compared to the level of unemployment. In the latter, wage dispersion precludes an efficient allocation of workers to firms. In both models the number of applications may be too large, i.e. decreasing the number of applications per worker would improve employment. In their main analysis both papers assume that a firm can only propose its job to one applicant, and if the applicant rejects it in favor of a better alternative, the firm remains vacant independent of the number of additional applications it received. Failure of constrained efficiency might be due to this assumption. Or it could result from an inherent externality of multiple applications that cannot be reflected in market wages and therefore distorts various margins of efficiency.

This analysis presented here has two purposes. First and most importantly, it explores an alternative assumption on the assignment of workers to firms once wages are announced and applications sent. The aim is to investigate the resulting equilibrium properties, and to analyze whether the failure of efficiency in the above models is due to the assumption about the assignment or whether it poses a deeper challenge for the efficiency in directed search economies. Second, it models the number of applications as a choice for the worker so that the endogenous number of applications can be interpreted as a measure of search intensity, the efficiency of which can then be assessed.\(^4\)

While the second aim requires analytical attention, the first provides a conceptual challenge. Once wages are set and applications are sent, who should work for whom? Here we interpret the applications as links in a network between workers and firms, and we assume a stable matching given the network and the announced wages. This entails that in the final matching agents choose markets rather than firms. The market structure is not clearly spelled out, rather some reduced form arrival rates are assumed. Nevertheless, this implicitly limits the setup to sequential search and rules out any simultaneous choice. Shimer (1996) shows how this can be recast in a model in which agents apply to individual firms with a single application.

\(^4\)Both Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming) and Galenianos and Kircher (2005) suggest to model search costs but provide little analysis on it.
no vacant firm has an applicant that is employed at a lower wage. This specification is based on the idea that employers can call up their applicants sequentially. If an applicant accepts, the employer is momentarily happy and stops making additional proposals. Yet if a better job is proposed to the applicant later on, he can accept the better job and reject the earlier offer. Rejected firms continue to contact (“recall”) remaining applicants and propose their jobs to them. That is, we apply a version of Gale and Shapley’s (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm.  

Apart from these additions, our model uses the standard directed search setup with homogenous workers and firms. Firms decide whether to enter the market, and if they do so they publicly post a wage commitment for their single vacancy. Workers observe these wages and decide how many applications to send and where to send them, where we retain the standard assumption of symmetric strategies that creates the market frictions. Then workers and firms are matched as explained above. In the (generically) unique equilibrium all workers choose to send the same number of applications, and the number of wages offered in equilibrium is equal to the number of applications each worker sends.

The equilibrium is constrained efficient given the workers’ coordination problem. We distinguish three components of efficiency. Search efficiency: for a given number of applications and a given number of firms the number of matches is constrained optimal. Equilibrium wage dispersion is essential for this feature. Entry efficiency: the division of the match surplus is such that the constrained optimal number of firms enter. Application efficiency: the number of applications that workers send is constrained efficient despite the negative externality of an additional application on other workers. All externalities are reflected in the market wages. Finally we show that for vanishing application costs the equilibrium converges to the unconstrained efficient outcome of a frictionless Walrasian economy.

In contrast to the inefficiencies in models without recall, constrained efficiency obtains here. This is due to a commonality between workers and firms. Firms only care about applicants who do not obtain better offers. We call these applicants effective. Workers also only care about rival applicants that are effective, as the others do not compete for the job. As we will see, this commonality implies that raising the wage induces more effective ap-

\footnote{In a finite economy the process converges in finite time and high wage firms clearly hire before lower wage firms do. For the continuum case see the appendix.}
plicants, and firms can “price” their applications optimally. Without recall, firms still only care about effective applicants but workers care about all rival applicants because any applicant who receives a job proposal precludes others from obtaining the job (even if he rejects it and in the end works at another firm). This lack of commonality between workers and firms prevents efficient pricing. A wage raise induces more applications, but potentially only from people that have an easier time getting other jobs, which can even mean less effective applicants. We discuss the different implications with and without recall in section 6.2. Note that this issue has not occurred in the prior literature because a single application allows the worker no alternative, and all applications are effective by assumption.

Our analysis also shows that wage dispersion is not merely a sign of frictions, but rather an optimal response to these frictions (even though agents are homogenous).\textsuperscript{6} The constrained efficient allocation in the market requires different hiring probabilities among firms, as different hiring probabilities can reduce those instances in which one worker does not get a job because it is occupied by another worker while this other worker could take another job elsewhere. The market wages internalize this externality, and preferred jobs are endogenously harder get than back-up (non-preferred) jobs. The paper also adds to the literature on asymptotic efficiency of search markets by showing convergence to the unconstrained efficient outcome in a simultaneous search environment.\textsuperscript{7}

To my knowledge this is the first attempt to integrate the two-sided strategic considerations of a frictional search environment with stability concepts used in matching markets.\textsuperscript{8} The paper draws on three strands of literature. We use insights from the directed search literature (e.g. Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001)) to model the frictions and information flows in the market.

\textsuperscript{6} For homogenous workers and firms such an efficiency role is novel. Models in this area include Acemoğlu and Shimer (2000); Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming); Burdett and Judd (1983); Burdett and Mortensen (1998); Butters (1977); Delacroix and Shi (2005); Galenianos and Kircher (2005); Gautier and Moraga-González (2005).

\textsuperscript{7} Asymptotic efficiency has been established in sequential search e.g. in Gale (1987). For an overview and quite general specifications see Mortensen and Wright (2002) and Lauermann (2005). In simultaneous search, Acemoğlu and Shimer (2000) and Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming) present limit results, yet converge to some constrained efficient outcomes of a still frictional economies.

\textsuperscript{8} Gautier and Moraga-González (2005) present a three player example with a similar concept in an environment where wages are unobservable. Their main analysis of a large market assumes no recall, and also exhibits inefficiencies.
With multiple applications workers face a simultaneous portfolio choice. For this type of problem Chade and Smith (2004) consider an individual agent’s choice and Galenianos and Kircher (2005) derive implications in an equilibrium framework. To model recall we apply insights from the two-sided matching literature (Gale and Shapley, 1962) to the network that formed in the search process in earlier stages. Section 6 provides a further discussion.

In the following, we first present the model. Section 3 then characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes efficiency. Notation and exposition remain much more tractable when we consider at most two applications per worker, therefore sections 2 to 4 are restricted to this case. Section 5 lifts this restriction and, additionally, discusses convergence for vanishing application costs. Section 6 discusses the main modeling assumptions, additional literature, and concludes. Omitted proofs are gathered in the appendix.

2 The Model

2.1 Environment and Strategies

There is a measure 1 of workers and a large measure \( V \) of potential firms. The measure \( v \) of active firms is determined by free entry. Each active firm is capacity-constrained and can only employ a single worker, each worker can only work for a single firm. A vacant firm has a productivity normalized to zero, a firm that employs a worker has a productivity normalized to one but has to pay the wage bill. All agents are risk neutral. Firms maximize expected profits. Workers maximize expected wage payments.

The game has three stages. First, potential entrants can become active by paying a setup cost \( K < 1 \), and active firms publicly post a wage. Next, workers observe all posted wages. Each worker decides on the number \( i \in \{0, 1, 2\} \) of applications he wants to send at cost \( c(i) \), where \( c(0) = 0 \) and the marginal costs \( c_i = c(i) - c(i - 1) \) are assumed to be weakly increasing. The worker also decides on the \( i \) active firms to which he applies. In the final stage workers and firms are matched, the posted wage is paid and matched pairs start production.

We assume a stable assignment on the network based on the idea that firms simultaneously make offers to workers. Workers accept the higher offers, and firms that are not accepted but have additional applicants move to the next stage to make another offer. Acceptances are deferred in the sense that
workers can change their mind and accept better but later offers, in which case the rejected firm can continue to pursue additional applicants in the next round.9 Such a setup has the property that higher wage firms in effect have priority in matching over lower wage firms, and the market clears ”top-down” as if higher wage firms make offers first. This insight will be embedded in the specification of the relevant matching probabilities in the next subsection.10

The notion of a large, anonymous market is captured by the assumption that agents’ equilibrium strategies are symmetric and anonymous. This standard assumption of the directed search literature implies that all firms use the same entry, posting and hiring strategy, and do not condition their strategy on the identity of the worker. All workers use the same application strategies, and do not condition on the firms identity.11 The symmetry of the workers’ application strategies usually requires mixed strategies which create the market frictions: sometimes multiple workers apply for the same job, and sometimes none apply at all.

A pure strategy for a firm is its entry decision $e \in \{\text{Enter}, \text{Out}\}$ and a wage offer $w \in [0, 1]$. A mixed strategy for a firm is a probability $\phi$ of playing Enter and a cumulative distribution function $F$ on $[0, 1]$. Throughout the paper we adopt the law of large numbers convention, which for instance implies that $F$ is also the realized distribution of wage offers and $v = \phi V$ is the realized measure of active firms. A worker observes the distribution of posted wages and decides on the number of applications $i \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ that he wants to send. If $i = 1$ he also decides on a wage $w \in [0, 1]$ to which he applies; if $i = 2$ he decides on a wage tuple $(w_1, w_2) \in [0, 1]^2$. This fully characterizes his strategy given the anonymity assumption, which implies that he randomizes equally over the firms that offer the same wage. A mixed strategy for a worker is a tuple $\gamma = (\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2)$, where $\gamma_i$ is the probability of sending $i$ applications, and a tuple $G = (G^1, G^2)$, where $G^i$ is a cumulative distribution function over $[0, 1]^i$ which describes the way the worker sends his $i$ applications.12 If $i = 2$ we will throughout assume that $w_1 \leq w_2$, and

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9In the appendix we explore the convergence of such an algorithm when the number of rounds tends to infinity. This paper is only concerned with the allocation in the limit.

10Hiring precedence of higher wage firms yields a weakly stable allocation given the network and the announced wages. It is also applied in Burlow and Levin (forthcoming). The matching resembles the process used to assign interns to hospitals in the United States. See sections 6.1 and 6.2 for details.

11These assumptions are discussed in section 6. We should note that we could purify the firms’ posting strategy and relax anonymity of the workers’ strategies.

12 It will be convenient to assume that each combination in the support of the random-
will denote by $G_j^2(\tilde{w})$ the marginal distribution over $w_j$ and by $G_j^2(\tilde{w}|w)$ the conditional distribution over $w_j$ when $w_i = w, i \in \{1, 2\}/\{j\}$.

### 2.2 Expected Payoffs and Equilibrium Definition

To describe the expected payoffs under mixed strategies, let $\eta(w)$ denote the probability that a firm that posts wage $w$ hires a worker. Let $p(w)$ be the probability that an application to wage $w$ yields an offer sometime during the matching stage. These are endogenous objects, yet once they are defined, the profit of a firm posting wage $w$ - omitting entry costs - is

$$\pi(w) = \eta(w)(1 - w). \quad (1)$$

The profits comprise the margin $1 - w$ if a worker is hired, multiplied by the probability $\eta(w)$ of hiring.

The utility of a worker who sends no applications is $U_0 = 0$. A worker who applies with one application to wage $w$ obtains utility $U_1(w) = p(w)w - c(1)$, i.e. the expected profit minus the cost of the application. A worker who applies to wages $(w_1, w_2)$ with $w_1 \leq w_2$ obtains utility

$$U_2(w_1, w_2) = p(w_2)w_2 + (1 - p(w_2))p(w_1)w_1 - c(2). \quad (2)$$

The worker’s utility is given by the wage $w_2$ if he is made an offer at that wage, which happens with probability $p(w_2)$. With the complementary probability $1 - p(w_2)$ he does not receive an offer at the high wage and his utility is $w_1$ if he gets an offer for his low wage application, which happens with probability $p(w_1)$. He always incurs the cost for the two applications.

When agents randomize over wages, their payoff is determined by appropriately averaging the payoffs at individual wages.

We will now relate $\eta(\cdot)$ and $p(\cdot)$ to the strategies $(\phi, F)$ and $(\gamma, G)$. We will first determine the payoffs under the assumption that all firms and workers follow this strategy profile. We will then consider individual deviations from this profile. In the following we will talk about the offer set $\mathcal{V}$, which refers to the support of the wage offer distribution $F$, and about the application set $\mathcal{W}$, which refers to the support of $G_1^1(\cdot)$ if $\gamma_1 > 0$ joint with the union of the support of $G_1^2(\cdot)$ and $G_2^2(\cdot)$ if $\gamma_2 > 0$.

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[5] The notation $\gamma_1 > 0$ and $\gamma_2 > 0$ indicates that the union of the support of $G_1^1(\cdot)$ and $G_2^2(\cdot)$ is used. When $\gamma_1 > 0$, the support of $G_1^1(\cdot)$ is included in the union. When $\gamma_2 > 0$, the support of $G_2^2(\cdot)$ is included in the union. This notation is used to simplify the description of the strategy profiles and the payoffs under mixed strategies.
We first consider wages that are in the offer and in the application set. Let $\lambda(w)$ denote the ratio of applications per firms at wage $w$. It is characterized by the following mass balance:\footnote{We define $\lambda(\cdot)$ on $\mathbb{R}_+ \cup \{\infty\}$ to account for the case that a negligible fraction of firms might (non-optimally) receive a mass of applications.}

$$\gamma_1 G^1(w) + \gamma_2 G^2_1(w) + \gamma_2 G^2_2(w) = v \int_0^w \lambda(\tilde{w}) \, dF(\tilde{w}) \quad \forall w \in [0, 1]. \quad (3)$$

The left hand side denotes the expected mass of applications that are sent to wages up to $w$. It is given by the probability that workers who send one application send it below $w$, and the probability that workers who send two applications send either their low or their high application below $w$. It is the inflow of applications to wages up to $w$. These are dispersed over the firms that offer wages up to wage $w$. This outflow is specified on the right hand side. It is given by the ratio of applications per firm multiplied with the number of firms, aggregated over all relevant wages. We refer to $\lambda$ as the gross queue length.

The crucial observation is that not all applications are ”effective” in the sense that the firm can hire the applicant. The applicant cannot be hired if he receives a strictly better offer, or has already received a weakly better offer. Denote the fraction of applications that are unavailable for hiring by $\psi(w)$. Then the ratio of effective applications per firm is given by

$$\mu(w) = (1 - \psi(w))\lambda(w). \quad (4)$$

We call $\mu(w)$ the effective queue length at $w$.

The probability that a firm with wage $w$ has at least one effective application is given by $1 - e^{-\mu(w)}$. This is due to the anonymity of the workers strategy, which leads to random assignment of applications to firms at a given wage. In a finite economy this implies that the number of effective applications is binomially distributed; for a large economy this is approximated by the Poisson distribution under which the probability that a firm receives no effective application is $e^{-\mu(w)}$. If the firm receives at least one effective application it will be able to fill its vacancy, because when it successively makes offers it will eventually make an offer to this application and become matched. Therefore the hiring probability for a firm is

$$\eta(w) = 1 - e^{-\mu(w)}. \quad (5)$$
Now consider the probability of a worker to receive an offer at wage $w$. His competitors for a job are only those applications that are effective, since for all others the workers decline even if they are made an offer. Each individual worker calculates his acceptance probability by considering his own application effective (because he considers the case where he is unsuccessful at better wages) but realizes that only a fraction of the other applications will be effective. Given that there are $1 - e^{-\mu(w)}$ matches per firm and $\mu(w)$ effective applications per firm, the probability of an effective application to yield a match is given by\(^{14}\)

$$p(w) = \frac{1 - e^{-\mu(w)}}{\mu(w)},$$

(6)

with the convention that $p(w) = 1$ if $\mu(w) = 0$.

Finally, consider the probability $\psi(w)$ that an offer does not lead to a match because the sender receives and accepts a different offer. $\psi(\cdot)$ is trivially zero if workers send only one application, i.e. if $\gamma_2 = 0$. Otherwise, consider some application sent to wage $w$, and let $\hat{G}(\tilde{w}|w)$ denote the probability that the sender had a second application and sent it to a wage weakly lower then $\tilde{w}$.\(^{15}\) Similarly, let $\hat{g}(w|w)$ denote the probability that the sender sent a second application to $w$, i.e. $\hat{g}(w|w) = G(w|w) - \lim_{\tilde{w} \to w} \hat{G}(\tilde{w}|w)$. Then $\psi(w)$ is given by

$$\psi(w) = \int_{\tilde{w} > w}^1 p(\tilde{w})d\hat{G}(\tilde{w}|w) + \frac{p(w)}{2}\hat{g}(w|w).$$

(7)

That is, $\psi(w)$ is the average probability that the applicant sent two applications and the other application was strictly higher and successful. If the other application was sent to the same wage, the probability that it was successful is $p(w)$, and in this case the unconditional probability for each firm to make the offer first is $1/2$.\(^{16}\) The system defined by (4), (6) and (7) is

\(^{14}\)For a careful but intuitive derivation of (5) and (6) as the limit for a finite but large economy see Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).

\(^{15}\)There are $\gamma_1 dG_1(w)$ single applications, $\gamma_2 dG_2^1(w)$ low applications and $\gamma_2 dG_2^2(w)$ high applications at $w$, adding to a total measure $T(w) = \gamma_1 dG_1(w) + \gamma_2 dG_2^1(w) + \gamma_2 dG_2^2(w)$. Then $\hat{G}(\tilde{w}|w) = \sum_{j=1}^2 [\gamma_2 dG_2^j(w)/T(w)]G_2^j(\tilde{w}|w)$, where $-j \in \{1,2\}/\{j\}$.

\(^{16}\)Alternatively, one can think about workers that apply twice to the same wage as randomizing in advance about which offer they would prefer to accept in case they get both offers. Then an applicant is not available to a firm if the other firm is preferred and makes this applicant an offer.
recursive: At the highest offered wage the probabilities $p(w), \eta(w)$ and $\psi(w)$ can be determined, and are then used to evaluate the corresponding terms at lower wages.

To round off the specification, briefly consider the case of a wage in the offer set that is not in the application set. In this case nobody applies, and we specify $\lambda(w) = \mu(w) = 0$. We interpret the polar case of wages in the application but not in the offer set as free disposal of applications without the chance of receiving an offer. This covers all possibilities in the support of the workers and/or firms randomization, and their average ex-ante payoffs can be calculated.

Now consider deviations. For a firm, any wage in the offer set can be evaluated as described above as it arises as a possible realization of $F$. Yet for a deviation to wages $w \not\in V$ the firm has to form a belief about the workers reaction. This problem is common in the directed search literature, and the most common approach is to assume that the queue length at the deviant is exactly such that workers are indifferent between applying and not applying. If it were higher workers should adjust by applying less; if it were lower they should apply more. We will call the highest utility a worker can obtain at wages in the offer set as the Market Utility. Let $U^*_i = \sup_{w \in V_i} U_i(w)$ denote the highest utility a worker can get by sending $i$ applications. Then we can define the Market Utility as $U^* = \max\{U_0, U^*_1, U^*_2\}$.

Now consider some wage $w \not\in V$ and assume the queue length were $\mu(w) \in [0, \infty]$, which defines $p(w)$ as in (6). A worker who applies there with one application can at best get $U_1(w)$. A worker who sends two applications and applies there with his low application can at best get $U_{1,1}(w) = \sup_{\tilde{w} \in V} U(w, \tilde{w})$. Applying with the high application he can get $U_{2,h}(w) = \sup_{\tilde{w} \in V} U(\tilde{w}, w)$. Let $\hat{U}(w) = \max\{U_1(w), U_{1,1}(w), U_{2,h}(w)\}$. We will assume

**Definition 2.1 (Market Utility Assumption)**

*For any $w \not\in V$, $\mu(w) > 0$ if and only if $U^* = \hat{U}(w)$. It states that workers are indifferent between obtaining the Market Utility and applying to the not-offered wage (possibly combined with the most attractive offered wage). Only if the wage is too low it is not possible to*
adjust the effective queue length to obtain indifference, in which case the effective queue length is set to zero because nobody would apply there. While the arguments presented here have only intuitively appealed to “reasonable” responses of workers to deviating wage offers, papers by Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) and Peters (1997, 2000) rigorously establish equivalence of the Market Utility Assumption and the subgame perfect response in (a limit of) finite economies in which workers send one application.

Firms also have to evaluate the profit of entering if \( \phi = 0 \), i.e. no other firm enters. Assume some firm enters and offers a wage. In the same spirit of subgame perfection, workers either do not apply at all because the wage is too low, or they drive the queue length down to a level where they are indifferent between applying or not applying. Anticipating this response, the firm will enter if it can find a profitable wage offer. Formally, we assume

\[
\phi > 0 \text{ if there exist } w \in [0, 1] \text{ and } \mu(w) \in \mathbb{R}_+ \text{ such that } U_1(w) = c_1 \text{ and } \pi(w) > K.
\]

Finally, consider the deviation of an individual worker. All other workers still use their mixed strategy. The competition for each job is therefore unchanged, and he still obtains payoff \( U_i(w) \) when he applies to wages in the application set. Wages \( w \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{W} \) yield an offer for sure. Other wages cannot provide profitable deviation even if they are offered by some (possibly deviating) firm when the worker’s belief about the other workers’ behavior corresponds to the belief summarized in the Market Utility Assumption.

We define an equilibrium as follows.

\textbf{Definition 2.3 (Equilibrium)} An equilibrium is a tuple \( \{\phi, F, \gamma, G\} \) of strategies for the agents such that there exists \( \pi^*, U^* \) and \( \mu(\cdot) \) and

1. (a) \( \pi(w) = \pi^* \geq \pi(w') \) for all \( w \in \mathcal{V} \) and \( w' \in [0, 1] \) if \( \phi > 0 \).
   (b) \( \pi^* = K \) if \( \phi > 0 \).
2. (a) \( U_i(w) \geq U_i(w') \) for all \( w \in \text{supp} G^i \) and \( w' \in [0, 1]^i \), if \( \gamma_i > 0 \).
   (b) \( U^*_i = U^* \) if \( \gamma_i > 0 \).
3. \( \mu(\cdot) \) conforms to (3) - (7) and the Market Utility and Entry Assumptions hold.
Condition 1 \(a\) and \(b\) specify profit maximization and free entry.\(^{18}\) Condition 2 \(a\) implies that workers who send \(i\) applications send them optimally given the wage offer distribution and the behavior of other workers. Condition 2 \(b\) ensures that workers send out the optimal number of applications. Condition 3 reiterates the determination of the effective queue length. The distinction between \(a\) and \(b\) allows the discussion of an exogenous number of applications and/or exogenous number of firms using the appropriate subset of conditions. While the exposition uses the terminology of a game, the definition resembles a competitive equilibrium with a somewhat non-standard feasibility constraint that embeds the frictions.

### 3 Equilibrium Characterization

In this section we characterize the equilibrium properties of the model and show

**Summary 3.1** An equilibrium exists. Generically the following holds: The equilibrium is unique; all workers send the same number of applications; the number of offered wages equals the number of applications; each worker applies with one application to each wage.

We will proceed in three subsections: First we analyze the workers’ search behavior given a distribution of wages and given the number of applications. Then we analyze the distribution of wages that firms will optimally set. Finally, we characterize equilibrium play.

#### 3.1 Workers’ Search Decision

To analyze the workers’ search decisions, first consider a single worker who observes all wages and - given the strategy of the other workers - knows the probability of success at each wage. That is, he knows all pairs \((w, p(w))\). Equilibrium condition 2\(a\) implies that each wage to which workers apply has to be optimal. For a worker with \(i = 1\) the application choice is trivial. An application to \(w'\) is optimal if and only if \(p(w')w' = u_1 \equiv \max_{w \in [0, 1]} p(w)w\), i.e. he chooses a wage with the highest expected return \(u_1\). For a worker with \(i = 2\) the analysis is slightly more involved. Let \(\bar{w}\) be the highest wage out of all wages that deliver \(u_1\), i.e. \(\bar{w} = \sup\{w \in [0, 1] | p(w)w = u_1\}\).

\(^{18}\)To ensure that entry implies zero profits it is sufficient to assume that \(V > 1/K\).
Lemma 3.1 Assume that an optimal choice for a worker with \( i = 2 \) exists. The optimal choice involves sending one application to a wage weakly below \( \bar{w} \) and one application to a wage weakly above \( \bar{w} \).

Proof: The worker maximizes

\[
\max_{(w_1, w_2) \in [0,1]^2} p(w_2)w_2 + (1 - p(w_2))p(w_1)w_1. \tag{8}
\]

Note that we have set up problem (8) without the restriction that \( w_1 \leq w_2 \). Nevertheless it is immediate that a worker who has the choice between two wages will always accept the higher over the lower. Therefore any solution to (8) has \( w_1 \leq w_2 \).

Next, note that \( w_1 \) is only exercised if \( w_2 \) failed. (8) immediately implies that for \( w_1 \) only the expected return \( p(w)w \) is important, and his optimal decision resembles that of workers with a single application. I.e. he chooses \( w_1 \) such that

\[
p(w_1)w_1 = u_1. \tag{9}
\]

Taking this into account, any high wage \( w_2 \) is optimal if it fulfills

\[
p(w_2)w_2 + (1 - p(w_2))u_1 = u_2, \tag{10}
\]

where \( u_2 \equiv \sup_{w \in [0,1]} p(w)w + (1 - p(w))u_1 \). Clearly any combination of \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \) that satisfies (9) and (10) solves the maximization problem (8). Since we know that any solution to the latter problem has \( w_2 \geq w_1 \), it has to hold that the highest low wage associated with (9) has to be weakly lower than the lowest high wage associated with (10). The highest low wage is given by \( \bar{w} \). Q.E.D.

At high wages the worker takes into account the possibility of obtaining a low wage offer. He is willing to accept a lower expected pay \( (p(w_2)w_2 < u_1) \) in return for a high upside potential if he gets a job (high \( w_2 \)), because if he does not get the good job the low wage application acts as a form of insurance.\(^{20}\)

Since all workers face the same maximization problem we obtain

\(^{19}\)Assume a worker would choose \((w_1, w_2)\). By (8) he gets \( U(w_1, w_2) = p(w_2)w_2 + (1 - p(w_2))p(w_1)w_1 \). Now assume he reversed the order to get \( U(w_2, w_1) = p(w_1)w_1 + (1 - p(w_1))p(w_2)w_2 \). \( U(w_1, w_2) \geq U(w_2, w_1) \) if and only if \( w_2 \geq w_1 \).

Proposition 3.1 Any equilibrium with $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 > 0$ fulfills the following conditions for the effective queue length:

\begin{align*}
p(w) &= 1 \quad \forall w \in [0, u_1] \\
p(w)w &= u_1 \quad \forall w \in [u_1, \bar{w}] \\
p(w)w + (1 - p(w))u_1 &= u_2 \quad \forall w \in [\bar{w}, 1],
\end{align*}

for some tuple $(u_1, u_2, \bar{w})$. It holds that $u_1 = \max_{w \in V} p(w)w$ and

i) for $\gamma_2 > 0$, $u_2 = \max_{w \in V} p(w)w + (1 - p(w))u_1$ and $\bar{w} = u_1/(2u_1 - u_2)$.

ii) for $\gamma_2 = 0$, if $u_2^2/(u_1 + c_2) \in (0, 1)$ then $\bar{w} = u_1^2/(u_1 + c_2)$ and $u_2 = u_1 + c_2$, otherwise $\bar{w} = 1$.

Low wages do not receive applications, wages in the intermediate range receive the low applications that workers are only willing to send if (9) is fulfilled, and high wages receive high applications under condition (10). We should note that even if workers do not send high wage applications, i.e. $\gamma_2 = 0$, the queue lengths at high wages might be determined by (10). If a deviant posts a high wage, the Market Utility Assumption specifies that workers are indifferent. If the second application is quite costly, indifference implies that the workers are indifferent between sending their single application to the deviant or to the offered wage. Yet if the second application is not very costly, it might be optimal to continue to send the single application to some offered wage but to send an additional application to the deviant. Indifference then implies that the marginal benefit of the additional application is zero, i.e. $u_2 - u_1 - c_2 = 0$, which then determines $u_2$ and governs the queue length at high wages.

3.2 Firms’ Wage Setting

This subsection focuses on the nature of equilibrium wage dispersion. We first show that wage dispersion is a necessary feature of any equilibrium with $\gamma_2 > 0$. We then show that this leads to exactly two wages being offered in equilibrium.

Consider the case where $\gamma_2 > 0$, which implies that $v > 0$ as otherwise there is no reason to apply. Before we proceed, we will briefly rewrite firms’ profits in a convenient way. Consider some (candidate) equilibrium characterized by $u_1$, $u_2$ and $\bar{w}$, which by proposition 3.1 characterizes the workers
application behavior. We will call firms that end up offering wages below \( \bar{w} \) as low wage firms, and those offering wage above \( \bar{w} \) as high wage firms. The problem for each individual firm is to maximize \((1 - e^{-\mu(w)})(1 - w)\) under the constraint that \( \mu(w) \) is given by (11), (12) and (13). This is a standard maximization problem. Writing the profit function as \( \pi(w) = \mu(w)p(w)(1 - w) \), we can use the constraint to substitute out the wage and write profits as a function of the effective queue length

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi(\mu) &= 1 - e^{-\mu} - \mu u_1 \quad \forall \mu \in [\mu, \bar{\mu}], \\
\pi(\mu) &= (1 - e^{-\mu})(1 - u_1) - \mu(u_2 - u_1) \quad \forall \mu \in [\bar{\mu}, \mu(1)],
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \bar{\mu} = \mu(\bar{w}) \) and \( \mu = 0 = \mu(u_1) \). We can interpret this as follows. Firms that offer a wage below \( u_1 \) “buy” a queue length of zero and make zero profits. Low wage firms that offer wages in \([u_1, \bar{w}]\) “buy” a queue length according to (12) and obtain profits as in (14), while high wage firms with wages in \([\bar{w}, 1]\) ”buy” a queue length as in (13) and obtain profits as in (15). Since at wages above \( u_1 \) there is a one-to-one relation between the wage and the effective queue length, we can view the individual firm’s problem as simply a choice regarding the preferred effective queue length.

The profit function is continuous, but has a kink at \( \bar{w} \) (respectively \( \bar{\mu} \)). This is due to the fact that workers trade off the effective queue length against the wage differently for high and low applications. At high wages the queue length responds stronger to a wage change since workers are more “risky” due to the fallback option at low wages. This kink implies immediately that it cannot be profitable for any individual firm to offer wage \( \bar{w} \), because raising the wage induces many additional effective applications while reducing the wage induces only a relatively small reduction in effective applications. Therefore either it is profitable to offer a higher wage, or if that is not profitable then it is profitable to offer a lower wage.

This rules out an equilibrium in which some workers send more than one application but all firms offer the same wage, because the offered wage would coincide with the cutoff wage and individual firms would want to deviate.

**Proposition 3.2** There does not exist an equilibrium with \( \gamma_2 > 0 \) in which only one wage is offered, i.e. in which \( \mathcal{V} \) is a singleton.

We should note that the argument that rules out one-wage equilibria is different from those in most other papers on wage dispersion with homogenous
workers and firms. Usually there is an appeal to a discontinuity of the following kind: If all firms offer the same wage, there is a strictly positive probability that a firms’ offer is rejected because the worker accepts some other equally good offer; so if a devianting firm offers a slightly higher wage, at least as many workers apply, and all applicants accept an offer for sure. This yields a jump in profits.\(^{21}\) In this model there is no discontinuity despite the fact that workers accept an offer for sure at a slightly higher wage. This positive jump in profits is offset by the fact that fewer workers apply to the deviant.\(^{22}\) Workers internalize that only effective applications imply competition. At the market wage, only a fraction of the (other) applications are effective, while at the deviant all applications are effective. If the deviants’ wage is only slightly higher, less workers apply because otherwise the competition would make an application unattractive. As a consequence profits change continuously. Nevertheless, the kink in the profit function induced by a different ”risk-return”-tradeoff of workers implies wage dispersion.

Next we show that in an equilibrium in which some workers send two applications exactly two wages will be offered, one strictly below and one strictly above \(\bar{w}\). This immediately implies that workers with one application send it to the low wage, and workers with two applications send one to each of the wages.

**Proposition 3.3** In any equilibrium with \(\gamma_2 > 0\), exactly two distinct wages will be offered, i.e. \(V = \{w^*_1, w^*_2\}\). It holds that \(w^*_1 < \bar{w} < w^*_2\).

Proof: Since wage dispersion implies that not all wages are zero, \(u_2 > u_1 > 0\). Individual firms take \(u_1\), \(u_2\) and \(\bar{w}\) as given. For low wage firms we can write the profits as a function of the queue length as in (14). The function is strictly concave on \([0, \bar{\mu}]\). Therefore all low wage firms will offer the same wage. For high wage firms profits can be written as in (15), which is strictly concave on \([\bar{\mu}, \mu(1)]\). Therefore all high wage firms will offer the same wage. Finally, assume one group, say low wage firms, offered the wage \(\bar{w}\). Since there is wage dispersion, high wage firms will offer \(w^*_2 > \bar{w}\). But since their

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\(^{21}\)This happens e.g. in Burdett and Judd (1983), Burdett and Mortensen (1998), the basic version of Acemoğlu and Shimer (2000) and Galenianos and Kircher (2005).

\(^{22}\)In the introduction we explained ”directedness” as the ability to attract more applications when offering higher wages. By this we mean more effective applications. As shown here, gross applications do not need to be higher.
problem is strictly concave on \([\bar{w}, 1]\), they make strictly higher profits than firms at \(\bar{w}\), which yields the desired contradiction. A similar argument rules out that \(\bar{w}\) is offered by high wage firms. Q.E.D.

Given that only two wages are offered in equilibrium, we will for notational simplicity index variables referring to low wage firms by 1 and those referring to high wage firms by 2.\(^{23}\) Let \(d_1\) be the equilibrium fraction of firms offering the low wage, and \(d_2\) the fraction offering the high wage. Then \(v_i = vd_i\) denotes the measure of firms at the respective wage, and equation (3) implies gross queue lengths \(\lambda_2 = \gamma_2/v_2\) and \(\lambda_1 = (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)/v_1\). At high wages workers only apply strictly lower, so that \(\mu_2 = \lambda_2\). At low wages, a fraction \(\gamma_2/(\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)\) applies to the high wage, and so by (7) we have \(\psi_2 = p_2\gamma_2/(\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)\), with \(p_2 = (1 - e^{-\mu_2})/\mu_2\). Therefore \(\mu_1 = (1 - p_2\gamma_2/(\gamma_1 + \gamma_2))\lambda_1\). With these notational simplifications we establish

**Corollary 3.1** In an equilibrium with \(\gamma_2 > 0\) profits and wages for high and low wage firms respectively are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_1 & = 1 - e^{-\mu_1} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1}, \quad (16) \\
w_1^* & = \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1}/(1 - e^{-\mu_1}), \quad (17) \\
\pi_2 & = (1 - e^{-\mu_2} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1})(1 - e^{-\mu_1}), \text{ and } (18) \\
w_2^* & = \mu_2 e^{-\mu_2}(1 - e^{-\mu_1})/(1 - e^{-\mu_2}) + e^{-\mu_1}. \quad (19)
\end{align*}
\]

Proof: We know that neither low wage nor high wage firms are constrained, because the equilibrium wages are different from \(\bar{w}\), and it is easy to see that \(w_1 > 0\) (otherwise workers would not apply) and \(w_2 < 1\) (otherwise high wage firms would make less profits than low wage firms). Therefore wages are given by first order conditions. For low wage firms, the first order condition of (14) with respect to \(\mu\) leads to

\(u_1 = e^{-\mu} = e^{-\mu_1}\). \quad (20)

The second equality follows since in equilibrium all low wage firms will choose the same queue length, or rather the wage associated with it. When substituted into (14) this leads to the expression for the profits. By (12) we know

\(^{23}\)That is, let \(\pi_i\) be the profit, \(w_i\) the wage, \(\lambda_i\) the gross queue length, \(\mu_i\) the effective queue length, \(\eta_i\) the hiring probability, \(p_i\) the probability of getting an offer when applying at a type-i firm, and \(\psi_i\) the probability that a worker accepts another offer, where \(i = 1\) when we refer to low wage firms and \(i = 2\) when we refer to high wage firms.
that \( w_1^* = u_1/p_1 \) and we immediately get the corresponding wage. For high wage firms, the first order condition of (15) implies

\[
  u_2 - u_1 = e^{-\mu}(1 - u_1) = e^{-\mu_2}(1 - e^{-\mu_1}).
\]  

(21)

Substitution back into (15) yields the expression for the profits. By (13) we know that \( w_2^* = (u_2 - u_1)/p_2 + u_1 \), and substitution leads to the expression for the high wage. \( Q.E.D. \)

In the case of a single application (\( \gamma_1 > 0 \) and \( \gamma_2 = 0 \)) the arguments above easily establish that only one wage is offered according to (17), yielding profits given by (16). Obviously in this case the probability that an offer leads to a hire is one, i.e. \( \mu_1 = \lambda_1 \). This is also the result obtained in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). The introduction of a second application essentially establishes two markets. The profits in each are given by (1 − \( e^{-\mu_i} - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i} \))(1 − \( u_i - 1 \)). In the low market \( u_0 \) is identical to the workers’ true outside option of zero, but there is some connection to the high market induced by the strictly positive probability that an offer is rejected. In the high market the rejection probability is zero, but \( u_1 \) is greater than zero as it reflects the workers’ endogenous outside option induced by the presence of the low market. Apart from these spillovers, each market operates essentially as a single one-application market.

The findings in the last sections are summarized in figure 1. The workers’ indifference curve \( IC_1 \) for the low wage applications is given by (12). Low wage firms take this into account and offer a wage \( w_1 \) such that no individual firm wants to deviate, which means their isoprofit curve \( IP_1 \) is tangent to \( IC_1 \). The indifference curve \( IC_2 \) for the high application is by (13) steeper than for the low application because of the fallback option due to the low application. The actual queue length that firms expect is the dashed line. High wage firms take this into account and offer wage \( w_2 \) in such a way that no firm wants to deviate, i.e. such that their isoprofit curve \( IC_2 \) is tangent to \( IP_2 \). Note that a single wage \( w_1 = w_2 = \bar{w} \) cannot be an equilibrium, because at the kink of the indifference curves it is impossible to place the isoprofit curve tangent, and therefore firms would want to deviate. The isoprofit curves for low and high wage firms have to coincide to provide equal profits for firms. In the next section we prove that this is possible.
3.3 Equilibrium Outcome

In this section we derive the equilibrium outcome. Before we turn to the full equilibrium, it will be a useful first step to exogenously fix the number of applications that workers send. We will show existence and uniqueness of an (appropriately adjusted) equilibrium with and without free entry.\footnote{Note that the equilibrium definition does not tie down $F$ in case $\phi = 0$ and $G_i$ in case $\gamma_i = 0$. For the discussion of uniqueness, assume that in these cases the respective distribution takes on some unique form. As a technical detail, note that here we fix $\gamma$ but in the Market Utility Assumption the costs still show up. To ensure consistency, assume that when $\gamma_2 = 0$ only one application plays a role (e.g. $c_1 = 0$ and $c_2 = \infty$) while when $\gamma_2 > 0$ both play a role (e.g. $c_1 = c_2 = 0$).}

Lemma 3.2 For given $(\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2)$ with $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 > 0$ it holds that

1. for given $v > 0$ there exists unique $(F, G)$ such that equilibrium conditions 1a), 2a) and 3 hold;

2. with free entry there exists unique $(\phi, F, G)$ such that equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 hold.
Proof: We will show part 2 here, part 1 is relegated to the appendix. The effective queue length $\mu_1$ at the low market wage is according to (18) determined by

$$1 - e^{-\mu_1} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1} = K.$$ (22)

Since the left hand side of (22) is strictly increasing in $\mu_1$ and is zero for $\mu_1 = 0$ and one for $\mu_1 \to \infty$, $\mu_1$ is unique. The wage is given by (17).

If $\gamma_2 > 0$, the queue length at high wage firms is by (18) given by

$$(1 - e^{-\mu_2} - \mu_2 e^{-\mu_2})(1 - e^{-\mu_1}) = K.$$ (23)

Since $\mu_1$ is unique, $\mu_2$ is unique. The high wage is given by (19). Since $\mu_1^* = (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 - \gamma_2 p_2)/v_1$ and $\mu_2^* = \gamma_2/v_2$, both $v_1$ and $v_2$ are uniquely determined, which characterizes the equilibrium entry and the randomization over the two wages.

Clearly firms are willing to offer these wages. The wages were determined by the appropriate first order conditions and therefore no other wage in either the high wage or the low wage region can offer a higher profit. Since (12) and (13) were used as constraints to construct the profits, they remain valid and workers are indeed willing to apply in the prescribed way. Q.E.D.

Knowing the equilibrium interaction for a fixed number of applications, we can turn to the analysis of the equilibrium interaction when the number of applications is endogenous. $c_1$ and $c_2$ may take any non-negative values as long as $c_1 \leq c_2$. In analogy to the free entry conditions (22) and (23) we will define the following four numbers $\mu_1^*$, $\mu_2^*$, $u_1^*$ and $u_2^*$ recursively as follows: $(1 - e^{-\mu_2} - \mu_2 e^{-\mu_2})(1 - u_1^* - 1) = K$, where $u_1^* - u_{i-1}^* = e^{-\mu_1^*}(1 - u_{i-1}^*)$ and $u_0^* = 0$. These numbers are uniquely determined by the exogenous parameter $K$. Moreover, (20) established that the marginal utility of the first application in equilibrium is always $u_1^*$ whenever at least some workers send out applications, and by (21) the marginal utility of the second application is $u_2^* - u_1^*$ whenever at least some workers send two applications. This is independent of the exact structure of $\gamma$. We will establish the following proposition, which is a stronger version of summary 3.1 with which we started the section.

**Proposition 3.4** An equilibrium exists. Furthermore

1. For $c_1 > u_1^*$ the unique equilibrium has $v = 0$ and $\gamma = 0$. 

20
2. For $c_1 < u^*_1$ and $c_2 > u^*_2 - u^*_1$, in the unique equilibrium all workers send one application and one wage is offered.

3. For $c_1 < u^*_1$ and $c_2 < u^*_2 - u^*_1$, in the unique equilibrium all workers send two applications, two wages are offered, and each worker applies to each wage.

Proof: In case 1 the marginal utility is too low to induce any worker to send the first application. Therefore $v = 0$ and $\gamma = 0$. This is consistent with the Entry Assumption.

In cases 2 and 3, the marginal utility is strictly higher than the marginal cost of the first application. By the Entry Assumption there will be positive entry: At queue length $\mu'$ such that $e^{-\mu'} = c$ and wage $w' = \mu' e^{-\mu'}/(1-e^{-\mu'})$, it holds that $U_1(w') = c$ and profits $\pi' = 1-e^{-\mu'}-\mu' e^{-\mu'} > K$. Given positive entry, clearly each worker will send at least one application.

Now we have to analyze if it can be the case that workers only apply once, and firms only offer one wage. Assume this is the case. For $c_2 < e^{-\mu_1^*} (\mu_1^* - 1 + e^{-\mu_1^*})/\mu_1^*$ it can be shown that we get a contradiction, because a worker strictly prefers to apply twice at the unique market wage than to send only one application. Yet even if $c_2$ is not that small, firms might not be willing to offer only one wage - despite the fact that the wage is determined by their first order condition. At high (not offered) wages the queue length might increase fast because workers would send their high application if these high wages were offered, which is reflected in $\bar{w} < 1$ in the second part of proposition 3.1. Since the queue length is continuous, and the offered wage is strictly optimal on $[u_1, \bar{w}]$, a firm that is looking for a profitable deviation has to find the optimal wage in the interior of $[\bar{w}, 1]$. Since $u_2 = c_2 + u_1$ according to proposition 3.1, we have by (15) the profit $\pi(\mu) = (1-e^{-\mu})(1-e^{-\mu^*_1}) - \mu c_2$ for a deviant that offers a wage in $(\bar{w}, 1)$. If there is a profitable deviation, it must be profitable to deviate to $\hat{\mu}$ given by the first order condition $e^{-\hat{\mu}} (1 - e^{-\mu_1^*}) = c_2$, which implies $\hat{\mu} < \mu_2^*$ in case 2 and $\hat{\mu} > \mu_2^*$ in case 3. Substitution leads to an optimal deviation profit of

$$\pi(\hat{\mu}) = (1-e^{-\hat{\mu}} - \hat{\mu} e^{-\hat{\mu}})(1-e^{-\mu_1^*}).$$  \hspace{1cm} (24)

Comparing (24) with (23) establishes that $\pi(\hat{\mu})$ is strictly smaller than $K$ in case 2, making a deviation unprofitable, and strictly larger than $K$ in case 3, yielding a strictly profitable deviation (the wage associated with $\hat{\mu}$ is indeed
above \( \bar{w} \) in case 3). Therefore an equilibrium with one wage is possible in case 2 and not in case 3.

Finally, it is immediate that in case 2 an equilibrium with two wages cannot exist because by \( u_2^* - u_1^* < c_2 \) the marginal utility of the second application is too low, while an equilibrium with two wages can exist in case 3 since \( u_2^* - u_1^* > c_2 \). Therefore in case 2 everyone sends one application to the unique wage, while in case 3 every worker sends two applications, one to each of the two wages. Uniqueness is then ensured by lemma 3.2. Q.E.D.

For the case \( c_2 < u_2^* - u_1^* \) it is worth emphasizing that two wages are offered because firms anticipate that workers will send an additional application when they offer a high wage (this is captured by the Market Utility Assumption). If we consider a candidate equilibrium in which all firms offer a single wage, it is this feature that leads to a high queue length for a deviant with a high wage and makes such a deviation profitable.

In the case where \( c_1 = e^{-\mu^1} \) we have multiplicity of equilibria: for any \( \gamma_1 \in [0, 1] \) and \( \gamma_0 = 1 - \gamma_1 \) an equilibrium exists, and workers are exactly indifferent between applying once and not applying. If \( c_2 = e^{-\mu^2}(1-e^{-\mu^1}) \) an equilibrium exists in which workers randomize between one and two applications, i.e. it exists for any \( \gamma_2 \in [0, 1] \) and \( \gamma_1 = 1 - \gamma_2 \).

### 4 Efficiency

To discuss the efficiency properties of the equilibria just characterized, we will follow Pissarides (2000) and others by using the following notion of constrained efficiency: An equilibrium is constrained efficient if it maximizes the output minus entry and application costs, given the frictions in the market. The frictions stem from the requirement that workers and firms use some symmetric strategies \((\gamma, G)\) and \((\phi, F)\). Denoting by \( \Upsilon \) the set of cumulative distribution functions over \([0, 1]^i\) and by \( \Delta_3 \) the three-dimensional unit simplex, the strategy spaces of workers and firms are \( G = \Delta_3 \times \Upsilon^1 \times \Upsilon^2 \) and \( F = [0, 1] \times \Upsilon^1 \). Then an equilibrium \( \{\phi, F, \gamma, G\} \in F \times G \) is constrained efficient if it maximizes

\[
\max_{(\phi', F') \in F, (\gamma', G') \in \Upsilon} \left( M(\phi', F', \gamma', G') - \phi' V K - \gamma'_1 c(1) - \gamma'_2 c(2) \right), \tag{25}
\]

where \( M(\phi', F', \gamma', G') = \phi' V \int_0^1 \eta(w) dF' \) is the number of matches when \( \eta(w) \) is determined by (3) - (7) using the relevant parameters \( \{\phi', F', \gamma', G'\} \).
As discussed in the introduction, efficiency may fail on several dimensions:
(1) Search Inefficiency: For a given vector of applications and a given number of firms the number of matches is suboptimal. (2) Entry Inefficiency: For a given vector of applications too many or too few firms enter. (3) Application Inefficiency: Workers apply too much or too little given the costs. While these inefficiencies arise without recall, we will show that with recall directed search balances all these margins.\(^{25}\)

Shimer (1996) explains the efficiency property for the one-application case roughly as follows: The workers’ response to a change in the wage yields an implicit price for the desired queue length, therefore firms can price the queue length of applicants exactly at its marginal cost. In this model two variables matter: The gross queue length \(\lambda(\cdot)\) and the retention probability \(1 - \psi(\cdot)\). Both have to be adjusted by a single-dimensional wage. This is possible because for firms and for workers only the combination of both matters. The workers respond to a change in the wage by changing their applications such that the effective queue length \(\mu(\cdot)\) rises to a new level of indifference. Therefore the same logic holds here. The effective queue length is priced at marginal cost.

**Proposition 4.1** *The equilibrium market outcome is constrained efficient.*

We will prove the proposition in the next three subsections that are dedicated to different margins. For a given number of firms and a given vector of applications, we will show that the search outcome \(M(\phi, F, \gamma, G)\) is constrained optimal. Then we show that for a given vector of applications the constrained optimal number of firms enter, given that subsequent search is optimal. And finally we will establish that workers send the constrained optimal number of applications, taking account of optimal entry and search.

### 4.1 Search Efficiency

For a given vector of applications \(\gamma = (\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2)\) and firms \(v\), we will show that the search outcome as characterized in the first part of lemma 3.2 is constrained efficient. As we will see, this depends on the ability of the market to generate different wages for low and high applications.

For \(\gamma_2 > 0\) we start by analyzing a narrower concept that we will call 2-group-efficiency. We will assume that there are two groups of firms, one

\(^{25}\)See section 6.2 for the discussion of restricted recall.
preferred over the other, and all workers who send at least one application send one at random to the non-preferred group, and workers who send two applications send the second one at random to the preferred group. This setup corresponds to the equilibrium outcome. Let \( d \in [0, 1] \) be the fraction of firms in the preferred group. Search is two-group-efficient if \( d \) is chosen optimally given the assumptions just made.

**Lemma 4.1** For a given \( v > 0 \) and \( \gamma = (\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2) \) with \( \gamma_2 > 0 \), the strategy combination implied by equilibrium conditions 1a), 2a) and 3 yields two-group-efficient search.

Proof: The optimization problem is given by

\[
\max_{d \in [0, 1]} M(d) = vd(1 - e^{-\mu_2}) + v(1 - d)(1 - e^{-\mu_1}),
\]

where \( \mu_1 = (1 - \gamma_2 p_2 / (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)) \lambda_1 \), \( \mu_2 = \lambda_2 = \gamma_2 / (vd) \), \( p_2 = (1 - e^{-\lambda_2}) / \lambda_2 \) and \( \lambda_1 = (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) / (v(1 - d)) \). The first derivative is given by

\[
\frac{\partial M}{\partial d} = v \left[ 1 - e^{-\lambda_2} - (1 - e^{-\mu_1}) + de^{-\lambda_2} \frac{\partial \lambda_2}{\partial d} \right] + \frac{e^{-\mu_1}}{v \lambda_1} \left[ -\gamma_2 \frac{\partial p_2}{\partial d} \lambda_1 + (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 - \gamma_2 p_2) \frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial d} \right].
\]

Noting that \( \frac{\partial \lambda_2}{\partial d} = -\gamma_2 / (d^2 v) = -\lambda_2^2 v / \gamma_2 \), \( \frac{\partial \lambda_1}{\partial d} = \lambda_1^2 v / (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2) \), and then \( \frac{\partial p_2}{\partial d} = (1 - e^{-\lambda_2} - \lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2}) v / \gamma_2 \) we obtain by substitution that the last expression in the first line equals \( -\lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2} \) and the second line equals \( e^{-\mu_1} \left[ -(1 - e^{-\lambda_2} - \lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2}) + \mu_1 \right] \). This yields

\[
\frac{\partial M}{\partial d} v = \left( 1 - e^{-\lambda_2} - \lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2} \right) (1 - e^{-\mu_1}) - (1 - e^{-\mu_1} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1}) = 0,
\]

where the last equality yields the first order condition. (27) coincides with the equal profit condition between high and low wage firms. By the proof of proposition 3.2 part 1 we know that this uniquely determines the measure of firms in the high and the low group. Boundary solutions cannot be optimal because one application would be waisted (global concavity follows mathematically from \( \frac{\partial^2 M}{\partial d^2} = -v [\lambda_2^2 e^{-\lambda_2} (1 - e^{-\mu_1}) / d + e^{-\mu_1} (1 - e^{-\lambda_2} - \lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2} - \mu_1)^2 / (1 - d)] < 0 \). Q.E.D.

Next we show that the search outcome is constraint efficient. The proof relies on establishing that two groups are sufficient to obtain the optimal allocation.
Proposition 4.2 For given \( v = \phi V \) and given \( \gamma \), the search process is constrained efficient, i.e. it holds that

\[
M(\phi, F, \gamma, G) = \max_{F' \in \Upsilon^1, G' \in \Upsilon^1 \times \Upsilon^2} M(\phi, F', \gamma, G'),
\]

where \( \{G, F\} \) conform to equilibrium conditions 1a), 2a) and 3.

Finally, we show that two groups are indeed necessary to obtain the optimal allocation when a fraction of workers send two applications. One group of firms that all have equal hiring probability is not efficient. This implies that a unique market wage is not able to yield the optimal allocation.

Proposition 4.3 For given \( v = \phi V \) and given \( \gamma \) with \( \gamma_2 > 0 \), identical hiring probabilities for all firms cannot be constrained efficient, i.e. if \( F \in \Upsilon^1 \) and \( G \in \Upsilon^1 \times \Upsilon^2 \) such that \( \eta(w) = \bar{\eta} \forall w \in V \) then \((G, F) \notin \arg \max_{F' \in \Upsilon^1, G' \in \Upsilon^1 \times \Upsilon^2} M(\phi, F', \gamma, G')\).

In the proof we show that two groups can achieve the same hiring probabilities as a random process. But the non-preferred group is too small compared to the optimum. All workers would take a job from a firm in the preferred group. For those that end up taking jobs with firms in the non-preferred group this is their last chance to avoid unemployment. Increasing workers’ matching probability in the non-preferred group at the cost of decreasing their matching probability in the preferred group improves matching for those workers for whom it is the last option to avoid unemployment at the expense of a lower matching probability for those who still might have another option.

This result is surprising because with one application different hiring probabilities for firms are only warranted when there are productivity differences.\(^{26}\) Here the source for different hiring probabilities is a sorting externality. Figure 2 illustrates this. At a unique market wage representing a random application behavior, the indifference curve \( IC_1 \) for the low and \( IC_2 \) for the high applications cross at the same point as the firms isoprofit curve \( IC \). Since the actual (dashed) indifference curve is kinked, it is not possible to achieve tangency with the isoprofit curve. Area \( A \) indicates mutual

\(^{26}\)Shimer (2005) analyzes productivity differences when only one application is possible. If workers and firms are homogenous only one hiring probability would be efficient (similar to our case for \( \gamma_1 > 0 \) but \( \gamma_2 = 0 \)), and only with heterogeneities of firms or workers different hiring probabilities are efficient.
gains for workers and firms from sending the low applications to firms with different queue length and wage. Similar gains are indicated by area $B$ for the high applications. The exact choice of $w$ influences which gains are more prominent, but due to the kink it is never possible to eliminate both. Figure 1 shows that it is possible to achieve tangency with two wages.$^{27}$

Figure 2: Inefficiencies at a unique market wage. Areas A and B indicate mutual benefits for both workers and firms.

### 4.2 Entry efficiency

We now turn to the efficiency of the entry decision. Let $M^*(v, \gamma)$ be the number of matches when there are $\gamma$ applications and $v$ firms and search is

$^{27}$ Neither the figure nor the intuition apply to the case without recall. Without recall, it is not possible to graph all relevant aspects in two dimensions, because next to the wage both the gross queue length $\lambda(\cdot)$ and the retention probability $\psi(\cdot)$ remain separately important. Regarding the intuition, without recall equal hiring probabilities for workers mean that the number of workers who have their last option in either group is the same. Only with recall the rejected positions in the low group become available again for yet unmatched workers, which induces a proportionally larger number of workers employed without another option in the non-preferred group, yielding a positive externality when placing relatively more firms in the non-preferred group.
constrained efficient. For given $\gamma$ we have determined in the second part of proposition 3.2 the unique entry in the (appropriately adjusted) equilibrium. This entry is constrained efficient given the application behavior.

**Proposition 4.4** Given $\gamma$, entry is constraint efficient. That is

$$M^*(v, \gamma) - vK = \max_{v' \in [0, \infty)} M^*(v', \gamma) - v'K, \quad (28)$$

where $v$ arises when equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 are fulfilled.

Proof: The number of matches is given by $M^*(v, \gamma) = 1 - \gamma_2 \prod_{i=1}^{2} (1 - p_i) - \gamma_1 (1 - p_1)$, where $p_1$ and $p_2$ are the probabilities of getting a job at less preferred and the more preferred group under two-group-efficient search. If $\gamma_0 = 1$, then $v = 0$ arises and is clearly optimal. If $\gamma_0 < 1$, clearly $v = 0$ is not optimal given $K < 1$. Obviously $v \to \infty$ is also not optimal. The first order condition to the problem is

$$K = \gamma_2 [\partial p_1 / \partial v](1 - p_2) + \gamma_2 [\partial p_2 / \partial v](1 - p_1) + \gamma_1 [\partial p_1 / \partial v]$$

$$= [\partial p_1 / \partial v](\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)(1 - \psi_1) + [\partial p_2 / \partial v](1 - p_1). \quad (29)$$

$p_i$ depends on $v$ directly since the measure $d_i v$ of firms in group $i$ depends directly on $v$. It also depends on $v$ indirectly since the two-group-efficient fraction $d_i$ is a function of $v$. Yet by the envelop theorem the indirect effect is zero and we can neglect the effect on $d_i$. Consider the first term on the right hand side first. We can write $\partial p_1 / \partial v = [\partial p_1 / \partial \mu_1][\partial \mu_1 / \partial v]$. One can show that $[\partial \mu_1 / \partial v](\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)(1 - \psi_2) = -d_1 \mu_1^2 - \gamma_2 \mu_2 [\partial p_2 / \partial v]$. Noting that $[\partial p_1 / \partial v] = -[(1 - e^{-\mu_1} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1})/\mu_1][\partial \mu_1 / \partial v] = -[(p_1 - e^{-\mu_1})/\mu_1][\partial \mu_1 / \partial v]$ we obtain

$$[\partial p_1 / \partial v](1 - p_2) = d_1 (1 - e^{-\mu_1} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1}) + \gamma_2 (p_1 - e^{-\mu_1})[\partial p_2 / \partial v].$$

Then (29) reduces to

$$K = d_1 (1 - e^{-\mu_1} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1}) + \gamma_2 (1 - e^{-\mu_1})[\partial p_2 / \partial v]$$

$$= d_1 (1 - e^{-\mu_1} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1}) + d_2 (1 - e^{-\mu_1})(1 - e^{-\mu_2} - \mu_2 e^{-\mu_2})$$

$$= 1 - e^{-\mu_1} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1},$$

where the second line follows by taking the appropriate derivative and the last line follows as a consequence of two-group-efficient search (see (27)).
line also denotes the profits of low wage firms in equilibrium. Applying (27) again yields a condition equal to the profits of high wage firms. The first order condition is unique by the same argument that established that a unique $v$ implies zero profits, and the entry implied by equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 coincides with the entry implied by the first order condition. Since the first order condition is unique and boundary solutions are not optimal, it describes the global optimum. *Q.E.D.*

**4.3 Application Efficiency**

The number of applications that workers send in equilibrium is also constrained efficient. We will account for the associated entry of firms and the search outcome, and therefore also immediately establish the overall constrained efficiency of the equilibrium as in Proposition 4.1.

To gain intuition, consider the case of an individual worker who sends one application rather than none. By the above analysis his marginal benefit is $e^{-\mu_1} - c_1$. The benefit for society comprises the cost $-c_1$ and the additional production of one unit of output in the case that the firm did not have another effective applicant, the probability of which is $e^{-\mu_1}$. Therefore private and social benefits coincide. Similarly, if two wages are offered and a worker sends a second application rather than only a single one, his private marginal benefit is $e^{-\mu_2}(1 - e^{-\mu_1}) - c_2$. Additional production arises only if the high firm does not have another effective applicant but the low firm does, which has a probability $e^{-\mu_2}(1 - e^{-\mu_1})$. Again social and private benefits coincide. Note that the marginal benefit is essentially independent of $\gamma$, and therefore the decisions of other workers summarized in $\gamma$ provide no externality on other workers. This is due to the fact that any positive externality on firms is dissipated in free entry, and the entry compensates any negative effects on other workers.\footnote{This argument applies equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 for different $\gamma$, i.e. we compare partial equilibria for different $\gamma$.}

Let $v(\gamma)$ be the entry for a given vector $\gamma$ of applications as implied by equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3. Then $M^{**}(\gamma) = M^{*}(v(\gamma), \gamma)$ denotes optimal number of matches for a given vector $\gamma$ of applications given optimal entry and optimal search.

**Proposition 4.5** The equilibrium vector $\gamma$ of applications is constrained efficient, i.e. $\gamma \in \text{arg max}_{\gamma' \in \Delta_3} M^{**}(\gamma') - K v(\gamma') - \gamma'_1 c(1) - \gamma'_2 c(2)$.\footnote{This argument applies equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 for different $\gamma$, i.e. we compare partial equilibria for different $\gamma$.}
Proof: For a given $\gamma$ we know that equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 yield the optimal entry and the optimal number of matches. Moreover, under these conditions firms always receive zero profits and all surplus accrues to workers. Comparing different $\gamma$, it is immediate that each worker always attains a marginal utility of $u_1^* - c_1$ for his first application, and $u_2^* - u_1^* - c_2$ for his second application. Clearly the equilibrium conditions in Proposition 3.4 specify the socially optimal entry. For the case where $c_1 = u_1^*$ (or $c_2 = u_2^* - u_1^*$) the privat and social benefits of the first (or second) application are zero, and therefore every equilibrium for this case is constrained efficient. $Q.E.D.$

5 Generalization to $N > 2$ applications

In this section consider the case where workers can send any number $i \in \mathbb{N}$ of applications, at a cost $c(i)$. We retain the assumption that $c(0) = 0$ and that marginal costs $c_i = c(i) - c(i - 1)$ are weakly increasing. We also assume $c(i) > 0$ for some $i \in \mathbb{N}$. We will establish existence, (generically) uniqueness and constrained efficiency of the equilibrium. The analysis in the preceding sections is a special case for $c(i) = \infty$ for all $i > 2$. Since many arguments are straightforward generalizations of that special case, we focus mainly on the changes that are necessary to adapt the prior setup. At the end of this section we show convergence to the outcome of a competitive economy when the costs for applications vanish.

5.1 Extended Setup and Main Result

The extension mainly requires adaptations of the workers’ setup, while it remains essentially unchanged for firms. Define $N$ as the largest integer such that $c(N) \leq 1$. Clearly, it is neither individually nor socially optimal to send more than $N$ applications. Then the workers strategy is a tuple $(\gamma, G)$, where $\gamma = (\gamma_0, \gamma_1, ..., \gamma_N) \in \Delta_N$ and $G = (G^1, G^2, ..., G^N) \in \times_{i=1}^N \mathcal{T}^i$. $\gamma_i$ denotes the probability of sending $i$ applications, and $G^i$ denotes the cumulative distribution function over $[0, 1]^i$ that describes to which wages the applications are sent. Let again $(w_1, ..., w_i)$ satisfy $w_1 \leq w_2 \leq ... \leq w_i$ and let $G^i_j$ denote the marginal distribution of $G^i$ over $w_j$. Then we can define $W$ as the union of the support of all $G^i_j$ with $\gamma_i > 0$. A worker who applies to $(w_1, ..., w_i)$ attains in analogy to (2) the utility
\[ U_i(w_1, \ldots, w_i) = \sum_{j=1}^{i} \left( \prod_{k=j+1}^{i} (1 - p(w_k)) \right) p(w_j) w_j - c(i). \tag{2'} \]

A worker who applies nowhere attains \( U_0 = 0 \). Instead of (3) the relevant condition is now
\[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left[ \gamma_i \sum_{j=1}^{i} \sum_{k=j+1}^{i} \left( 1 - p(w_k) \right) \right] = v \int_{0}^{w} \lambda(\tilde{w}) \ dF(\tilde{w}). \tag{3'} \]

To specify \( \psi(w) \) in the extended setup, consider a firm at wage \( w \) that receives an application and let \( \tilde{\text{G}}(\tilde{w}|w) \) denote probability that the sender applied with his other \( N-1 \) applications to wages weakly below \( \tilde{w} \). If the sender only sent \( i < N-1 \) other applications, then we code (only for this definition) the additional \( N-1-i \) applications as going to wage \( -1 \). So \( \tilde{w} = (\tilde{w}_1, \ldots, \tilde{w}_{N-1}) \in ([0, 1] \cup \{-1\})^{N-1} \). Let \( h(\tilde{w}|w) \) count the number of applications sent to wage \( w \) when the worker applies to \( \tilde{w} \) and \( w \). Replacing (7) we now specify
\[ \psi(w) = \int \left[ 1 - \frac{1 - (1 - p(w)) \ h(\tilde{w}|w)}{p(w) h(\tilde{w}|w)} \ \prod_{\tilde{w}_j > w} [1 - p(\tilde{w}_j)] \right] d\tilde{\text{G}}(\tilde{w}|w). \tag{7'} \]

The product \( \prod_{\tilde{w}_j > w} [1 - p(\tilde{w}_j)] \) describes the probability that the applicant will not take a job at a strictly better wage. Its multiplier gives the probability that a worker will not turn down a job offer because of a job at another firm with the same wage, conditional on failing at higher wages (see the appendix for a derivation). Then the integrand gives the probability that the worker takes the job at a different firm, which is integrated over the relevant wages to which workers apply.

The definitions for all other variables, i.e. \( \mu, p \) and \( \eta \) and \( \pi \) remain unchanged. The definition of the Market Utility Assumption now has to take into account the expanded possibilities of workers. Let \( U_i^* = \sup_{w \in \mathcal{V}_i} U_i(w) \). Then \( U^* = \max_{i \in \{0, \ldots, N\}} U_i^* \) denotes the Market Utility. Let \( X_i(w) \subset [0, 1]^i \) denote the set of i-tuples \( (w_1, \ldots, w_i) \) with \( w_j = w \) for some \( j \in \{0, \ldots, i\} \) and \( w_k \in \mathcal{V} \) for all \( k \neq j \). Then we can define \( \hat{U}_i(w) = \sup_{w \in X_i(w)} U_i(w) \) as the optimal utility if the worker applies to wage \( w \) and to \( i-1 \) other offered wages. The Market Utility assumption then states that for \( w \notin \mathcal{V} \cup \mathcal{W} \) we have \( \mu(w) > 0 \) if and only if \( U^* = \max_{i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}} \hat{U}_i(w) \). With these adjustments the equilibrium definition extends to this section.
We are now in the position to extend the result from the previous section. Again we recursively define $\mu^*_i$ and $u^*_i$ as functions of the exogenous parameter $K$. Let $u^*_0 = 0$. For all $i \in \mathbb{N}$ let $(1 - e^{-\mu^*_i} - \mu^*_i e^{-\mu^*_i})(1 - u^*_{i-1}) = K$ and $u^*_i = e^{-\mu^*_i}(1 - u^*_{i-1}) + u^*_{i-1}$. Note that $u^*_i - u^*_{i-1}$ is strictly decreasing in $i$, while $c_i$ is weakly increasing. We will show

**Proposition 5.1** An equilibrium exists. It is constrained efficient. Generically it is unique: if $c^*_i < u^*_i - u^*_{i-1}$ and $c^*_{i+1} > u^*_{i+1} - u^*_i$, every workers sends $i^*$ applications, $i^*$ wages will be offered, and every worker applies to each wage.

The proof relies essentially on an induction of the arguments presented in sections 3 and 4 to higher numbers of applications. The workers again partition the wages into intervals relevant to each of their applications. The equilibrium interaction in each interval corresponds to that in the one application case, again with the adjustment that the workers "outside option" incorporates the expected utility that can be obtained at lower wages, while the queue length incorporates the fact that some applicants are lost to higher wage firms. Efficiency obtains again for similar reasons, only that now $i^*$ wages are necessary to obtain the optimal allocation in the search process.

### 5.2 Convergence to the Competitive Outcome

We will now show that the equilibrium allocation converges to the unconstrained efficient allocation of a competitive economy when application costs become small. For $K < 1$ the competitive outcome has an equal number of workers and active firms, i.e. $v = 1$, each active firm and each worker is matched, and the market wage is $1 - K$ and coincides with the utility of each worker.

We will consider a sequence of cost functions such that the marginal cost of the $i$th application converges to zero for all $i \in \mathbb{N}$. Rather than looking at these functions directly, it will be convenient to simply consider the associated equilibrium number $i^*$ of applications that each worker sends.\(^{29}\) Vanishing costs amounts to $i^* \to \infty$. Let $v(i^*)$ denote the equilibrium measure of active firms, $\eta(i^*) = \int \eta(w) dF$ and $\eta(i^*) = v(i^*)$ the average probability of being matched for a firm and a worker in the economy. Let $w(i^*)$ denote

\(^{29}\)For the case of multiple equilibria, consider for simplicity the case where all workers send the same number of applications.
the average wage conditional on being matched and $U^*(i^*) = u^*_i - c^*(i^*)$ the equilibrium utility when $i^*$ applications are sent, where $c^*(\cdot)$ denotes some cost function that supports an equilibrium with $i^*$ applications per worker. We will show that

**Proposition 5.2** The equilibrium outcome converges to the competitive outcome, i.e. $\lim_{i^* \to \infty} v(i^*) = 1$, $\lim_{i^* \to \infty} \eta(i^*) = \lim_{i^* \to \infty} g(i^*) = 1$ and $\lim_{i^* \to \infty} w(i^*) = \lim_{i^* \to \infty} U^*(i^*) = 1 - K$.

The structure of the proof uses the intuition for the competitive economy: For a given measure $v$ of active firms the competitive economy implies that (only) the long side of the market gets rationed and the short side appropriates all surplus. We will show that for small frictions ($i^*$ large) this still holds approximately. Then it trivially follows that $v(i^*) \to 1$ because otherwise the firms either generate too much or too little profits to cover entry. Since nearly all agents get matched, zero profits imply a wage of $1 - K$.

## 6 Discussion and Outlook

### 6.1 Discussion of Main Assumptions

The paper builds on a micro-foundation of frictional markets based on coordination problems between agents. One underlying assumption is that firms treat similar workers alike and do not condition on applicants’ names, which seems plausible in larger markets. The other assumption is that workers cannot coordinate to each apply to a different firm. This is modeled by the requirement that in equilibrium workers use symmetric strategies, which has the advantage that a worker does not need to know his “role” in the application process and can deploy the same strategy as everybody else. That such coordination problems actually arise even in small groups has been shown experimentally by Ochs (1990) and Cason and Noussair (2003). A deeper discussion can be found e.g. in Shimer (2005). It is worth mentioning that anonymity of the worker’s strategy is not a crucial restriction. If firms do not condition their hiring on workers’ names and workers use symmetric strategies, than all firms with the same wage have to have the same effective queue length (otherwise workers could get a higher utility by applying to those firms with the lower queue lengths). This arises in essentially all papers in
this field, and the anonymity assumption saves some notational complexities in making the point precise.\footnote{See e.g. Shimer (2005) for the infinite economy case. Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) demonstrate this property nicely in a finite economy.}

When we allow workers to choose their search intensity by sending multiple applications, new modeling choices arise that are absent in one-application models. After the application stage every worker is "linked" to the multiple firms to which he applied. A firm might be "linked" to multiple workers who applied to it (others might only have one worker or no worker at all). Since each firm can only hire one worker, and each worker can only work for one firm, any multiple application model has to specify how matches between firms and workers are formed given those links. It also has to specify the division of surplus for a given match.

For the allocation the main novelty in this paper is to allow firms to contact additional applicants when their offer is rejected. The analysis of this recall process remains tractable because of the assumption that workers can reconsider their options when they receive a better offer. This is the case for example when workers receive a job contract and have a certain time period to sign and return that contract. If they get a better offer during this time period, they can switch their future employer essentially costlessly. This has the convenient feature that it takes most strategic considerations out of the worker’s acceptance decision in the extensive form matching process.

For the division of the surplus this paper assumes wage commitments. That is, the wage paid in the final period is the posted wage, and firms cannot counter the proposals of other firms. This again has the advantage of keeping the matching process tractable.\footnote{Burlow and Levin (forthcoming) make similar assumptions. See section 6.2.} It might be a good approximation in environments in which firms are able to make their offers non-verifiable to other firms in order to avoid counter-proposals. It might also be reasonable if individual company (or university) rules do not allow more than the allocated budget for hiring decisions. A final case for this assumption arises in environments in which market rules require binding job and wage descriptions ahead of the final matching. One example of such an environment is the market for hospital interns in the United States. Roth (1984) shows that the algorithm used to match interns with hospitals coincides with the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm by Gale and Shapley (1962), on which the allocation in this paper is based. He points out that participating hospitals have to
specify wages and job descriptions way in advance of the actual matching. Similar to the assumption in this model, the algorithm only matches those hospitals and interns that have established contact in a preceding application and interview process.

6.2 Relation to the Literature

Equilibrium directed search models resemble competitive economies in their assumption that prices (or wages) are observable to everybody. Yet instead of a Walrasian Auctioneer that facilitates trade, the agents have to individually try to find a trading partner. This leads to frictions if agents cannot coordinate their strategies. Coordination frictions were introduced by Montgommery (1991) and Peters (1991) through the assumption that workers use symmetric application strategies. The symmetry assumption creates coexistence of unemployment and unfilled vacancies; the wage offers direct more applications to higher offers. Most models are restricted to one application per worker. For this case Montgommery already provides an argument for constrained efficiency induced by the wage announcements, which has been substantiated in subsequent contributions. Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) provide a detailed derivation of the equilibrium properties in a finite economy with homogenous workers and firms. With one application recall is not an issue because every job offer generates a match due to the workers’ lack of alternatives. When costs in the model presented here are such that workers apply only once, our equilibrium reduces to the (limit) equilibrium in Burdett, Shi and Wright. Even with multiple applications the equilibrium interaction within each segment induced by the workers’ response resembles the interaction in the one application model, with some adjustments for the spillovers of one segment onto the other (see section 3.2).

The only other directed search models that allow for multiple applications are Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming) and Galenianos and Kircher (2005). Both models consider a fixed number of applications per worker. The main difference arises in the allocation of workers to firms on the given network. Both models restrict recall. If a firm has at least one applicant, it makes exactly one job offer to one applicant. If that applicant takes another job the firm remains vacant. This has the immediate feature

\[32\text{See the introduction.}\]
\[33\text{No recall corresponds to } T = 1 \text{ in the matching stage of this paper.}\]
that in both models too many applications lead to congestion because too often several firms offer a job to the same worker and one of the firms remains vacant. Therefore these models cannot converge to the (unconstrained efficient) competitive outcome with increasing numbers of applications.

Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman also differ in their assumption regarding the division of surplus. They assume that firms pay at least the posted wage, but engage in Bertrand competition if two of them offer a job to the same worker. They consider equilibria with a single posted wage, and show that the equilibrium wage offer equals the workers’ outside option. This arises because a higher posted wage does not yield any advantage if the worker gets two offers. While paid wages are in part higher due to the Bertrand competition, the low offered wage nevertheless leads to excessive entry. This remains even in an extension in which firms can recall one additional worker.

Galenianos and Kircher is closer to the model considered here in assuming commitment to the offered wage. Firms make a single offer, and workers take the highest one. Despite the difference in recall, the equilibrium interaction also features wage dispersion with the number of wages corresponding to the number of applications. While the worker’s problem is quite different in the way that strategies of other agents translate into the relevant hiring probabilities, the structural trade-offs for each worker are in fact similar, implying the separation property (lemma 3.1) in both models. This suggests a robustness of the equilibrium structure to the specifics of the recall process. The search process in Galenianos and Kircher is inefficient because wage dispersion leads to different hiring probabilities, but efficient search would equalize the hiring probabilities. That is, one wage would be optimal.\textsuperscript{34}

This paper incorporates search costs from the outstart, and introduces a tractable recall process for models with multiple applications. Constrained efficiency obtains because firms can ”price” their productive input, which is the queue of effective applications. As explained in section 4, this arises because workers also care about the effective queue length and adjust it in response to the wage announcements.

Without recall, firms and workers care about different things. Firms are interested in effective applications. But workers now care about all applications, no matter if these are effective or non-effective: If another worker applies and gets an offer, the job is lost even if that worker takes a better position. If a firm raises the wage (keeping the other wages constant), work-

\textsuperscript{34}See footnote 27 for the difference in terms of search efficiency.
ers adjust their applications such that the gross queue length reaches a new level of indifference. Therefore firms can only "price" the gross queue length, but not the effective queue length that they really care about. The model considered here shows that a more efficient allocation on the given network translates into efficient market interaction in earlier stages of entry, wage setting and applying.

The recall process that we specify is a limit version of the deferred acceptance algorithm, introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) to obtain stable matchings in the marriage market. Bulow and Levin (forthcoming) also study non-cooperative wage commitments prior to non-transferable utility matching. Like most papers on the marriage market, they allow for heterogeneities but neglect limited "links". Exceptions are Roth and Perason (1999) and Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), who consider a random network of links. This study neglects heterogeneities other than through wages, but treats link formation as an active choice. The equilibrium wage dispersion leads to a structure on the network that strictly improves the number of matches over a fully random network.

6.3 Conclusion

This paper incorporates a microfoundation for search intensity into a directed search framework. Directed search can here be interpreted as strategic but frictional link formation between workers and firms. Search intensity can be viewed as a choice on the number of links that the worker wants to obtain. We consider a stable allocation on the network arising from a process in which firms contact ("recall") additional applicants if their offer gets rejected. Firms’ wage announcements price the network efficiently, given the workers’ coordination problem. Equilibrium wage dispersion turns out to be the optimal response of the market to the presence of frictions, since it allows for a network structure that minimizes coordination failure. While other work has shown that multiple applications lead to inefficiencies in a directed search setting when recall is restricted, we show that constrained efficiency prevails in the presence of strategic search intensity when recall is allowed.  

35This is likely to arise with any finite recall, i.e. finite $T$: In the final period $T$, the firm cares about effective applicants while the workers’ care about all applicants. Since only few firms make offers in the final period as $T$ becomes large, this effect disappears in the limit.
While we focused our attention on efficiency properties, the relative ease with which search intensity and recall can be incorporated suggests that the model can be applied to answer wider questions. In a first step we considered the connection between productivity and search intensity: Lower search costs (or equivalently higher productivity) imply more search and in the limit the equilibrium outcome approximates the unconstrained efficient competitive allocation. Additional interesting questions concern the interaction between simultaneous and sequential search in a repeated labor market interaction.\textsuperscript{36} We expect simultaneous search to dominate in markets with long time-frames between applications and final hiring decisions. The introduction of heterogeneity is also left for future research. If only firms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity, it seems likely that higher productivity firms will offer higher wages, and we expect firms’ wage offers to be clustered with the number of clusters equal to the number of applications (similar to the mass points in this analysis). For two-sided heterogeneity the matching process will have to be adapted to account for the firms preferences over different workers.

7 Appendix

Properties of the extensive form matching process:

We consider the following matching process. There are $T$ substages. In the first substage, all firms that have at least one applicant choose one and make an offer. We assume firms choose their applicant at random. Workers can accept at most one offer and reject the others. We assume they accept the most attractive offer weakly larger than zero. In every subsequent period, any firm who do not have an offer that is currently accepted can make a new offer. We assume that only those firms that have at least one applicant whom they did not yet make an offer choose one of these applicants at random and make them an offer (the others remain vacant). Workers can accept either one of the new offers or keep accepting a non-rejected offer from an earlier period. We assume they accept the highest offer weakly greater zero.

First observe that the assumed behavior about the firm’s decision to make an offer and the worker’s decision to accept or reject is individually optimal\textsuperscript{36}By an approach similar to the extension in Galenianos and Kircher (2005) one can show that with exogenous separations the steady-state of a repeated interaction looks similar to the one-shot interaction analyzed here.
given the other agents’ behavior. Since workers are identical and we have assumed that workers use symmetric application strategies, choosing at random about whom to make an offer next is an optimal strategy for firms. It is also optimal for workers to always accept higher offers over lower offers: It does not affect the offer decisions of firms with even higher wages, and so does not preclude any chance of receiving an even better offer in the future.

To discuss convergence for \( T \to \infty \), consider some network that formed from the agents strategies \( \{ \phi, F, \gamma, G \} \) (for this notation see section 2.2 and section 5.1). Let \( N \) be the maximum number of applications that workers send (\( N = 2 \) in the basic setup, some finite \( N \in \mathbb{N} \) in the extended setup). The focus on workers strategies that are symmetric and anonymous significantly simplifies the analysis. It implies that gross applications are randomly distributed to firms at a given wage. Together with the assumption that the agent space is sufficiently large such that each choice is undertaken by a continuum of agents leads in our specification to a Poisson distribution of gross applications to firms at each wage level. It also allows us to apply the law of large number convention to each wage level, i.e. at each wage the population share of currently matched and unmatched firms and workers develop deterministically. Moreover, note that the process "rolls forward", i.e. the exact end date does not influence the evolution of the system.

We will show that the process converges to a solution in which almost all agents are matched stably. We call a firm stable at the beginning of a given period if one of two conditions holds: Either it is currently matched to a worker whose other applications are with firms that offer a weakly lower wage or that offer a higher wage but are currently matched; or it is unmatched and already offered the job to all its applicants. We call the measure of stable firms at the beginning of subperiod \( t \) \( s_{t} \). Similarly, we call workers stable if they have not applied to any firm with a strictly higher wage that is currently vacant (unemployment is coded as wage zero), and call their measure at the beginning of period \( t \) \( s_{t}^{w} \). We will show convergence in the following sense: \( s_t \to v = \phi V \) and \( s_t^{w} \to 1 \). Note that our notion of stability is a local concept involving only the immediate partners in the interaction. Yet the convergence implies that we attain (weak) stability globally if we remove a small (and in the limit measure zero) set of agents from the economy.

To provide some intuition, consider first the case where only a discrete set of wages is offered by workers. At the highest wage let \( \lambda_{H} \) be the ratio of gross applications to firms. Then the fraction of highest wage firms that are stable at the beginning of the first period is \( 1 - e^{-\lambda_{H}} \), as they did not receive any
applications. The other highest wage firms make an offer. They either get matched (and then stay matched), run out of applicants or keep proposing the job to additional applicants. If each worker only sends one application to the highest wage, all high wage firms are stable after the first subperiod. Even if not, the fraction of highest wage firms that are not stable in period $t$ is bounded above by $1 - \sum_{\tau=1}^{t} (\lambda_H^\tau e^{-\lambda_H / \tau})$ by Poisson matching (as this is the fraction that has applicants left even if no worker ever accepts). This fraction converges to zero. Since for $t$ large nearly all firms at the highest wage are stable, at the second highest wage those firms that are matched are with very high probability stable (because only the highest wage firms could attract the worker away, and most of them are stable). And those second-highest-wage firms that are unmatched propose until they run out of applicants or get matched themselves. If each worker sends at most one application to each of the highest two wages, all firms at the second highest wage are matched after the second subperiod. In any case the fraction of non-stable firms at this wage goes to zero because they exhaust their applicants or get matched with a stable worker. By induction this applies to all offered wages.

Induction does not work with a continuum of offered wages. Nevertheless we can show convergence. It is still straightforward to show that the measure of proposals per period converges to zero. Let $\bar{S}_t$ be the set of currently unmatched firms at the beginning of period $t$ that still have applicants to whom they did not propose yet, i.e. the set of firms that propose in period $t$. Denote its measure by $\gamma_t$. Since there are less applications than proposals, i.e. $\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \gamma_\tau \leq N$, we have $\sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \gamma_\tau \to 0$ and $\gamma_t \to 0$. Let $a_t$ denote the measure of new acceptance in period $t$. Since there are less new acceptances than offers, we also have $\sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} a_\tau \to 0$ and $a_t \to 0$.

That means that almost all unmatched firms have no applicants left to propose to when $t$ becomes large. We will show that this implies $s_t \to v$. Assume not, i.e. $s_t \not\to v$. Then there exists $\delta > 0$ and subsequence $\{t_m\}_{m=1}^{\infty}$ such that $\bar{s}_m := v - s_{t_m} > \delta \forall m \in \mathbb{N}$, where we denote by $\bar{s}_m$ the measure of unstable firms. Of these firms only the subset $\bar{S}_{t_m}$ is unmatched. Since their measure $\gamma_{t_m}$ converges to zero, the measure of unstable but matched firms has to be greater than $\delta$ for all $m > M$ for some $M \in \mathbb{N}$, and all these firms have positions filled with unstable workers who also applied to firms in $\bar{S}_{t_m}$ and would rather take a job there. Call the set of these workers $\bar{S}_{t_m}^1$. We will show a contradiction because all these workers apply to the few firms in $\bar{S}_{t_m}$, therefore firms in $\bar{S}_{t_m}$ get matched quickly and therefore a large fraction of
the $S^1_m$ workers (who were unstable before) then become permanently stable. Call the set of applications which make the $S^1_m$ workers unstable "unstable applications (in $t_m$)". The measure of unstable applications in $t_m$ is obviously larger than $\delta$ for all $m > M$. Let $S^2_m \subseteq S_m$ denote the subset of firms that hold at least one of the unstable applications (in $t_m$). These firms hold on average some number, say $x_m$, of unstable applications. Let $S^3_m \subseteq S^2_m$ be the subset of firms that hold at least $x_m/2$ unstable applications. Note that any fraction $\alpha$ of the firms in $S^3_m$ receives at least $\alpha\delta/2$ unstable applications. Of these $S^3_m$ firms, we consider the half which have the least gross applications and call it $S^4_m$. They receive at least $\delta/4$ unstable applications. Of these $S^4_m$ firms, we consider the half which have the highest probability of hiring an $S^1_m$ worker permanently, conditional on making an offer to him, and call it $S^5_m$. Firms in $S^4_m$ (and thus in $S^5_m$) have a probability of making an offer to an $S^1_m$ worker of at least $(\delta/4)/(2N)$, since each fraction $\alpha'$ of these firms have at least $(\delta/4)\alpha'$ unstable applications and at most $2N\alpha'$ other applications (otherwise the firms in $S^3_m \setminus S^4_m$ would hold a measure of unstable applications greater than $N$, but at most a measure of $N$ applications is sent). Let $M$ satisfy $\sum_{r=M}^{\infty} a_r \leq \delta/8$. A firm in $S^5_m$ that makes an offer to a worker in $S^1_m$ has a probability larger than $1/2$ that its offer is accepted permanently. Therefore at least a fraction $\delta/(16N)$ of $S^5_m$ firms gets matched permanently in period $t_m$. Since each fraction $\alpha''$ of $S^5_m$ firms receives at least $\ delta/8)\alpha''$ unstable applications, at least $(\delta/8)(\delta/(16N))$ unstable applications are no longer unstable because they are now with firms that are permanently matched. Since in each period $t_m$, $m > M$, we permanently "loose" a strictly positive measure of unstable applications, we would need an infinite measure of unstable applications to sustain $S_{t_m} > \delta \forall m > M$, yielding the desired contradiction. Therefore $s_t \rightarrow v$.

Similarly, $s^w_t \rightarrow 1$, because otherwise we would again have a set of unstable workers similar to $S^1_m$ that applies to the few firms in $S_{t_m}$, and the same argument applies.

This establishes convergence. In the limit this implies that almost all firms get matched only when the higher wage firms to which their applicants applied are matched, i.e. we can remove firms "top-down" from the market. Since the random application and offer process at each wage implies that all firms at a given wage have equal chance of being the first to propose to a worker that applied to both, the process works as if we select one at random to make the offer first.
**Proof of Proposition 3.1:**
For wages strictly below $u_1$ the result is immediate because the Market Utility cannot be obtained. At wage $w = u_1 \mu(w) > 0$ would imply that the Market Utility cannot be reached. Wages strictly above $u_1$ have $\mu(w) > 0$, as otherwise $p(w)w = w > u_1$ and workers would receive more than the Market Utility when applying there.

We have shown that it is optimal to send low applications to wages below $\bar{w}$, which implies that (9) has to hold for all wages in $(u_1, \bar{w})$ in order to provide the Market Utility. $u_1 \equiv \sup_{w \in V} p(w)w$ since the optimum has to be obtained at some wage that is actually offered.

For $\gamma_2 > 0$, it is optimal to apply with the high application to wages above $\bar{w}$, and the effective queue length is therefore governed by (10). Again the optimum is attained for wages that are actually offered. The effective queue length has to be continuous at $\bar{w}$, as otherwise the job finding probability $p(w)$ for workers would be discontinuous and some wage in the neighborhood of $\bar{w}$ would offer a utility different from the Market Utility. Therefore $\bar{w}$ is determined as the wage where both (9) and (10) hold.

For $\gamma_2 = 0$, all wages above $u_1$ that are in the offer set $V$ have to conform to (9) because they receive single applications. So $\bar{w} \geq \sup V$. But if a higher (not offered) wage would be offered, workers might prefer to send a second application there rather than relocating their first one. Assume the queue length would be governed by (9) for all wages in $(u_1, 1]$. If $p(w)w + (1 - p(w))u_1 - c_2 \geq u_1$, workers would like to send a second application. Therefore $\bar{w}$ is the smallest wage for which that inequality holds (but at most 1). At higher wages the inequality would be strict, i.e. workers would get a utility higher than the Market Utility by sending a second application. To fulfill the Market Utility Assumption the additional utility of the second application has to equal its cost, so $u_2 - u_1 = c_2$ has to hold at high wages and the effective queue length is again governed by (10). Q.E.D.

**Proof of Proposition 3.2:**
Proof: Consider a (candidate) equilibrium in which all active firms offer wage $w^* \in (0, 1)$. Almost all applications are sent to $w^*$ because of (3) and worker optimality 2b). $w^* > 0$ then implies $u_1 = p(w^*)w^* > 0$. Moreover $w^* = \bar{w}$. If not, i.e. $\bar{w} > w^*$ or $\bar{w} < w^*$, then a mass of applications would be sent strictly above or below the offered wage, yielding a contradiction. Then profits for wages above $w^*$ are given by (15), for wages in $[p(w^*)w^*, w^*]$ by (14), and for wages below $p(w^*)w^*$ profits are zero.
The left derivative of the profits with respect to the queue length at \( \bar{\mu} = \mu(w^*) \) is obtained by differentiating (14) to get
\[
\pi'_-(\bar{\mu}) = e^{-\bar{\mu}} - u_1,
\]
and the right derivative by differentiating (15) which yields
\[
\pi'_+(\bar{\mu}) = e^{-\bar{\mu}}(1 - u_1) - (u_2 - u_1).
\]
In equilibrium it needs to hold that firms will neither want to increase their wage nor decrease their wage. This leads to
\[
\pi'_+(\bar{\mu}) \leq 0 \leq \pi'_-(\bar{\mu}).
\]
But \( \pi'_+(\bar{\mu}) \leq \pi'_-(\bar{\mu}) \) implies
\[
-e^{-\bar{\mu}}u_1 - (u_2 - u_1) \leq -u_1.
\]
For a single market wage it holds that \( u_2 = u_1 + (1 - \bar{p})u_1 \) with \( \bar{p} = \frac{1 - e^{-\bar{\mu}}}{\bar{\mu}} \).
We can therefore write \( u_2 - u_1 = (1 - \bar{p})u_1 \). Then (30) reduces to
\[
(1 - e^{-\bar{\mu}} - \bar{\mu}e^{-\bar{\mu}})u_1 \leq 0.
\]
We know that \( u_1 > 0 \). It is easily shown that the term in brackets is strictly positive for any \( \bar{\mu} > 0 \), yielding the desired contradiction.

For the extremes, consider \( w^* = 1 \) first. At \( w^* = 1 \) firms make zero profits. Since the effective queue length at wages close to 1 is positive by (12), wages below one provide profitable deviations. Now consider \( w^* = 0 \). Equilibrium profits are strictly smaller than one because not all firms get matched. (13) implies that at wages \( w' > 0 \) firms can hire for sure, i.e. the effective queue length at wages above zero is infinity. Therefore, small increases in the wage are profitable. Q.E.D.

Proof of Lemma 3.2, part 1:

Instead of equations (22) and (23), we now have
\[
1 - e^{-\mu_1} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1} = \pi^*, \quad (32)
\]
\[
(1 - e^{-\mu_2} - \mu_2 e^{-\mu_2})(1 - e^{-\mu_1}) = \pi^*, \quad (33)
\]
for some endogenous profit \( \pi^* \). Consider \( \pi^* \) as a free parameter. For a given \( \pi^* \) (32) and (33) uniquely determine the measure \( \hat{\nu}_1 \) and \( \hat{\nu}_2 \) of firms in the low and high group. That is, \( \pi^* \) is supported by a unique measure \( \hat{\nu} = \hat{\nu}_1 + \hat{\nu}_2 \) of firms. We want to show that there is only a single \( \pi^* \) that is supported by \( \hat{\nu} = \nu \), which then establishes uniqueness \( \nu_1 \) and \( \nu_2 \) (and thus of \( F \) as in part 2). By (32) \( \mu_1 \) strictly increases in \( \pi^* \). Equal profits at high and low wage firms implies
\[
1 - e^{-\mu_2} - \mu_2 e^{-\mu_2} = 1 - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1}/(1 - e^{-\mu_1}), \quad (34)
\]
which implies that $\mu_2$ is strictly increasing in $\pi^*$, since $\mu_1 e^{-\mu_1}/(1 - e^{-\mu_1})$ is strictly decreasing in $\mu_1$. Since $\mu_2 = \gamma_2/\hat{v}_2$, $\hat{v}_2$ is strictly decreasing in $\pi^*$. We have proven the lemma if we can show that also $\hat{v}_1 + \hat{v}_2$ is decreasing in $\pi^*$. Since $\mu_2 = \gamma_2/\hat{v}_2$, $\hat{v}_2$ is strictly decreasing in $\pi^*$. Since $\mu_1 = (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 - \gamma_2 p_2)/\hat{v}_1$, we get $\partial \mu_1/\partial \pi^* = -[\mu_1/\hat{v}_1][\partial \hat{v}_1/\partial \pi^*] - (1/\hat{v}_1)(1 - e^{-\mu_2} - \mu_2 e^{-\mu_2})[\partial \hat{v}_2/\partial \pi^*]$. By the prior argument this derivative has to be strictly positive, which together with $\mu_1 > 1 - e^{-\mu_2} - \mu_2 e^{-\mu_2}$ holds because it is by (34) equivalent to $\mu_1 > 1 - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1}/(1 - e^{-\mu_1})$, which is equivalent to $1 > (1 - e^{-\mu_1})/\mu_1$. The latter is true for all $\mu_1 > 0$. Since for $\pi^* \to 0$ we have $\hat{v} \to \infty$ and for $\pi^* \to 1$ we have $\hat{v} \to 0$, there is exactly one $\pi^*$ supported by a measure $\hat{v} = v$ of firms. Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 4.2:

For $\gamma_0 = 1$ or $v = 0$, the result is trivial as matches are always zero. When workers send one application ($\gamma_2 = 0$), one group of firms with equal hiring probability is optimal because of strict concavity of the matching probability $1 - e^{-\lambda}$ (this is a special case of Shimer (2005)).

For $\gamma_2 > 0$ we will prove that two groups of firms of which one receives all high applications and the other all low applications will be sufficient to achieve the same number of matches as any other optimal wage setting and application behavior $\{F, G\}$.

Take $\{F, G\}$ as a starting point. Consider some wage $w \in V \cup W$ with queue length $\mu(w)$ (other wages do not contribute to the matching). By assumption a continuum of firms offer this wage, and all face the same queue length. We will split the firms at this wage into two subgroups, and reshuffle the application behavior of the workers that send applications to this wage, such that their high application is randomly sent to some firm in the first and their low applications to some firm in the second subgroup. Workers that send both applications to $w$ send one to each group, and accept offers from the first over offers from the second. We leave the application behavior towards other wages unchanged. We will show that for an appropriate choice of the relative size of the subgroups the overall matching is unchanged. Let $\lambda_h(w)$ denote the ratio of workers that only send their high application to wage $w$ to firms offering $w$ under $\{F, G\}$. Let $\lambda_h(w)$ denote the worker/firm ratio for workers that send both applications to $w$. Let $(1 - \tilde{\psi})\lambda_l(w)$ be the ratio of worker/firm ratio for workers who send their low or single application to $w$ and do not get a strictly better offer. If $\{F, G\}$ is optimal, then neither of these ratios is infinity, and not all of them are zero (except possibly for some
wages that attract a zero measure of agents, which we can neglect without loss of optimality). If only $\lambda_h(w)$ (respectively $(1 - \bar{\psi})\lambda_l(w)$) is strictly positive, then we can trivially avoid to change the matching by having a zero fraction of the firms in the second (resp. first) subgroup. Therefore consider the case where at least two of the ratios are strictly positive.

First, we will show that if the two subgroups of firms face some identical effective queue length $\mu'$, then $\mu' = \mu(w)$. In this case we clearly have not changed the overall matching in the economy. The prove is by contraposition: Assume $\mu' > \mu(w)$. That means that strictly more firms then before get matched at wage $w$. On the other hand it becomes strictly harder for workers to get an offer, and since we did not change the application behavior at other wages, strictly less workers get matched at wage $w$. Since workers and firms are matched in pairs, this yields the desired contradiction. Similarly $\mu' < \mu(w)$ can be ruled out.

Next, we will show that we can indeed equalize the effective queue lengths for both subgroups. Let the fraction of firms in the first subgroup be $d$. Then the effective queue length for these firms is $\mu_h(d) = \frac{\lambda_h(w) + \lambda_m(w)}{d}/2$, because all applications are effective. For those firms in the second group it is $\mu_l(d) = \frac{(1 - \bar{\psi})\lambda_l(w)}{1 - d} + \frac{1 - e^{\mu_h(d)} - \lambda_m(w)}{2}$. For $d$ close to zero $\mu_h(d) > \mu_l(d)$, while for $d$ close to 1 $\mu_h(d) < \mu_l(d)$. By the intermediate value theorem it is possible to equalize both at some $d(w)$.

This shows that for any wage we can conceptually split the firms into some that only receive high and some that only receive low applications without altering the overall matching. Doing this for all wages, we are left with a group of firms comprising all subgroups that only receive high applications (and have $d(w) > 0$), and a group of firms comprising all subgroups that only receive low applications (and have $d(w) < 1$). This resembles two-group matching except for the fact that firms in the same group but from different subgroups may still face different $\psi$’s and $\lambda$’s.

Consider low (or single) application firms first. Consider two subgroups, one with matching probability $1 - e^{-(1 - \psi)\lambda}$, and one with $1 - e^{-(1 - \psi')\lambda'}$. From the larger of the subgroups select a subset of firms with equal size to the smaller subgroup. We will show that in an optimal allocation both have the same queue length by shifting firms from one group to the other while leaving the applications that each group receives the same. Let $d$ be the fraction of firms in the first subgroup, and $\gamma$ and $\gamma'$ the gross queue length
per group. Then the average matchings across both groups is given by

\[ d(1 - e^{-(1-\psi)\frac{\gamma}{\nu d}}) + (1 - d)(1 - e^{-(1-\psi')\frac{\gamma'}{\nu(1-d)}}). \]  

(35)

Since both subgroups have a strictly positive effective queue length, it cannot be optimal to place all firms in only one subgroup (as otherwise few firms placed in the other would be matched nearly for certain). Therefore, to achieve optimal matching \(d\) is characterized by the first order condition

\[ \nu [(1 - e^{-\mu}) - (1 - e^{-\mu'}) - \mu e^{-\mu} + \mu' e^{-\mu'}] = 0, \]

(36)

where \(\mu = (1 - \psi)\frac{\gamma}{\nu d}\) and \(\mu' = (1 - \psi')\frac{\gamma'}{\nu(1-d)}\). Since \(1 - e^{-\mu} - \mu e^{-\mu}\) is strictly increasing in \(\mu\) (and similar for \(\mu'\)), we have \(\mu = \mu'\) in the optimal allocation of firms. That means that almost all low or single application firms have the same effective queue length. Reshuffling all effective applications randomly over all firms in the group that receive low or single applications without changing the applications to other firms does therefore not change the overall matching, and we have for this group matching as for the non-preferred group under two-group search.

By this construction, for low and single application firms only the average matching probability at high application firms matters. If we keep the size of low and single application firms constant and leave the gross queue length for them unchanged, but match more workers already at high wage firms, this clearly improves the matching (despite some negative externality on the low or single application firms). By the strict concavity of \(1 - e^{-\lambda}\) the average matching probability at high wage firms is maximized if the gross queue length (and thus the effective queue length) is identical for all of them. Therefore the optimal allocation can be achieved by having one group of high wage firms to which workers randomly send their high application, which corresponds to the preferred group in two-group search.

By the two-group-efficiency of the equilibrium matching, the equilibrium matching is constrained efficient. Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 4.3:

Given \(\nu\) and \(\gamma\) with \(\gamma_2 > 0\), consider two tuples \(\{F', G'\}\) and \(\{F'', G''\}\) that lead to equal hiring probabilities \(\eta'\) respectively \(\eta''\) for all firms. Similar to the argument in the previous lemma \(\eta' = \eta'' = \eta\), since otherwise one tuple would match more workers but fewer firms than the other.
We can again split the firms into two groups, called first and second, all workers send their high application to the second and their low or single application to the first, and accept offers from the second over those from the first. Let $d$ be the fraction of firms in the second group. Again $\mu_2 = \lambda_2 = \gamma_2/(vd)$ and $\mu_1 = [1 - \gamma_2p_2/(\gamma_1 + \gamma_2)]\lambda_1 = [\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 - \gamma_2(1 - e^{-\lambda_2})]/(v(1 - d))$. Since for $d \approx 0$ clearly $\mu_2 > \mu_1$ and for $d \approx 1$ $\mu_2 < \mu_1$, there exists a $\hat{d}$ such that effective queue length and thus the hiring probability of both groups is equalized. It is easy to show that $\mu_1 - \mu_2$ is strictly increasing in $d$ around $\mu_2 \approx \mu_1$, so that $\hat{d}$ is unique. This two-group process has $\mu_1 = \mu_2$, but the optimal two group process fulfills (27), which requires $\mu_1 < \mu_2$, i.e. a strictly smaller preferred group. Q.E.D.

**Explanation to equation (7):**

Consider a particular worker who applies to $h$ firms that offer wage $w$. For simplicity assume he applies to no other firms. Conditional on the fact that a firm makes an offer to the worker sometime during the recall process, we want to determine the probability $\sigma$ that this firm hires the worker. The unconditional probability that the worker does not get any offer is $(1 - p(w))^h$, and so the unconditional probability that he gets an offer is $\varsigma = 1 - (1 - p(w))^h$. The unconditional probability of getting an offer from any specific firm is $\varsigma/h$. This unconditional probability can also be written as the probability of hiring conditional on making an offer multiplied by the unconditional probability of making an offer. So we have $\sigma p(w) = \varsigma/h$, or $\sigma = [1 - (1 - p(w))^h]/[hp(w)]$, which explains the formula used for equation (7'). The argument is based on insights from Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).

**Proof of Proposition 5.1:**

We start out by fixing $\gamma$ and denote by $\hat{i}$ the highest integer for which $\gamma_i > 0$; i.e. $\hat{i}$ is the maximum number of applications that workers send. By straightforward extension of the analysis of the workers’ best response in section 3 it can be established that the workers’ best response to a wage offer distribution is now given by $\hat{i}$ intervals such that every worker sends exactly one application to each interval. More specific, let the utility from sending the first $i$ applications optimally be defined recursively by $u_i \equiv \max_{w \in [0,1]} p(w)w + (1 - p(w))u_{i-1}$ for all $i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, \hat{i}\}$, with $u_0 \equiv 0$. Then for any wage offer distribution the effective queue length is characterized by
\( (u_1, ..., u_n, \bar{w}_0, ..., \bar{w}_N) \) such that

\[
p(w) = 1 \quad \forall w \in [0, \bar{w}_0], \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{p}(w) \quad \forall w \in [\bar{w}_{i-1}, \bar{w}_i] \quad \forall i \in \{1, ..., N\},
\]

where \( \bar{w}_0 = u_1 \) and \( \bar{w}_N = 1 \). The indifference implies \( \bar{w}_i = u_{i-1} + [u_i - u_{i-1}]^2/(2u_i - u_{i-1} - u_{i+1}) \) for intermediate \( i \in \{1, ..., \hat{i}\} \). Clearly \( \bar{w}_i \geq \sup \mathcal{W} \), because any wages that are actually offered receive applications from workers that at most send \( \hat{i} \) applications. At higher (not offered) wages, workers might start sending additional applications. The Market Utility Assumption implies that they cannot receive more than the Market Utility, which implies that \( u_i - u_{i-1} = c_i \) for \( i > \hat{i} \). The indifference then yields \( \bar{w}_i = u_{i-1} + [u_i - u_{i-1}]^2/(u_i - u_{i-1} - c_i + 1) \). If this is in \([0, 1]\) then this gives the appropriate boundary, otherwise \( \bar{w}_i = 1 \) and workers would strictly refrain from sending this many applications.

Using (38), we can rewrite the profit function for a firm who offers a wage \( w \in [\bar{w}_{i-1}, \bar{w}_i] \) with \( \bar{w}_{i-1} < 1 \) as

\[
\pi(\mu) = (1 - e^{-\mu})(1 - u_{i-1}) - \mu(u_i - u_{i-1}),
\]

where \( \mu = \mu(w) \). The logic is similar to (15). If \( \bar{w}_{i-1} = 1 \) the profit is trivially zero. Proposition 3.2, stating that there exists no equilibrium in which only one wage is offered, can now easily be shown with similar techniques whenever \( \gamma_i > 0 \) for some \( i > 1 \). By a similar argument it is straightforward that at least \( i \) wages have to be offered in equilibrium whenever \( \gamma_i > 0 \). Given that (39) is strictly concave, it is also immediate that all firms within the same interval will offer the same wage, yielding exactly \( \hat{i} \) wages when workers send at most \( \hat{i} \) applications.

We call the group of firms that ends up offering the \( \hat{i} \)'th highest wage as group \( i \) and will index all their variables accordingly. It will be convenient to denote by \( \Gamma_i = \sum_{k=i}^{\hat{i}} \gamma_k \) the fraction of workers who apply to at least \( i \) firms. Then at wage \( i \) the probability of retaining an applicant is \( (1 - \psi_i) = \sum_{j=i}^{\hat{i}} \frac{\gamma_j}{\Gamma_i} \prod_{k=i+1}^{j} (1 - p_k) \), since a fraction \( \gamma_j/\Gamma_i \) of applicants sends \( j \) applications and does not get a better job with probability \( \prod_{k=i+1}^{j} (1 - p_k) \). The effective queue length at wage \( i \) is given by \( \mu_i = (1 - \psi_i) \lambda_i \), where \( \lambda_i = \Gamma_i / \nu_i \) is the gross queue length. For \( i < \hat{i} \) the unique offered wage in \([\bar{w}_{i-1}, \bar{w}_i]\) is obtained by the first-order-conditions of (39), which are given by

\[
u_i - u_{i-1} = e^{-\mu_i}(1 - u_{i-1}).
\]
Therefore (39) can be rewritten as

$$\pi_i = (1 - e^{-\mu_i} - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i})(1 - u_{i-1}).$$

(41)

Free entry implies that $\pi_i = K$, which together with (40) implies that $\mu_i = \mu_i^*$ and $u_i = u_i^*$ as defined above. By a similar argument as for (22) and (23) the condition $\pi_i = K$ defines for a given vector $\gamma$ of applications the unique measure $v_i$ of firms in each group, and the wage $w_i = u_{i-1}^* + (u_i^* - u_{i-1}^*)/p_i$ that each group of firms offers (when $i < i^*$). Therefore the profit for a deviating firm is (at least) even be larger if workers send two or more additional applications to not-offered high wages. Therefore a deviating firm has to consider a deviation within $(\bar{w}_i, 1)$. In this region the effective queue length is (at least) given according to $p(w)w + (1 - p(w))u_i^* = u_i^* + c_{i+1}$ (it may even be larger if workers send two or more additional applications to not-offered high wages). Therefore the profit for a deviating firm is (at least) $\pi(\hat{\mu}) = (1 - e^{-\hat{\mu}} - \hat{\mu}e^{-\hat{\mu}})(1 - u_i^*)$, where $\hat{\mu}$ is given by the first order condition $c_{i+1} = e^{-\hat{\mu}}(1 - u_i^*)$. Since $c_{i+1} < e^{-\mu_i^*+1}(1 - u_i^*)$, we have $\hat{\mu} > \mu_i^*$. This implies $\pi(\hat{\mu}) > (1 - e^{-\mu_i^*+1} - \mu_i^* e^{-\mu_i^*+1})(1 - u_i^*) = K$, where the equality follows from the definition of $\mu_i^*$. The optimal deviating wage can indeed be shown to lie above $\bar{w}_i$ and therefore the deviation is profitable.

Clearly also $\hat{i} > i^*$ cannot be an equilibrium, because for workers who send $\hat{i}$ applications the marginal costs of the last application do not cover its marginal benefit.

For the case where $\hat{i} = i^*$ all workers want to send exactly $i^*$ applications. We will show that $\bar{w}_{i^*} = 1$, which implies that firms do not have a profitable deviation, which establishes the existence and uniqueness result. If $\bar{w}_{i^*} = 1$, it means that the queue length in $[\bar{w}_{i^*-1}, 1]$ is determined by $p(w)w + (1 - p(w))u_{i^*-1} = u_{i^*}$. Note that is implies $p(1) = [u_{i^*} - u_{i^*-1}]/[1 - u_{i^*-1}^*] = e^{-\mu_i^*}$, where the second equality follows from the definition of $\mu_i^*$. Determining
the effective queue length this way is in accordance with the Market Utility Assumption if and only if it is not profitable to send an additional application. If an additional application is sent, by a logic similar to lemma 3.1 it is optimal to send it to the highest wage. The marginal benefit would be \( p(1) + (1 - p(1))u_i^* - u_i^* \), or \( e^{-\mu_i^*}[1 - u_i^*] \). Since \( c_{i+1}^* < e^{-\mu_{i+1}^*}[1 - u_i^*] \) and \( \mu_{i+1}^* > \mu_i^* \); it is not profitable for workers to send another application to a deviant firm. Therefore \( \bar{w}_{i^*} = 1 \) is indeed the correct specification.

By similar arguments it is easy to see that for \( c_i^* = u_i^* - u_{i-1}^* \) equilibria exist if and only if \( \gamma \) has \( \gamma_{i^*} + \gamma_{i^*-1} = 1 \), \( \gamma_{i^*} \in [0, 1] \); i.e. workers randomize over \( i^* \) and \( i^* - 1 \) applications.

To show constrained efficiency, we will first consider search efficiency for given \( \gamma \) and \( v \). Let \( i \) still denote the maximum number of applications that workers send. Consider \( i \) groups of firms, with \( d_i v \) firms in each groups, which are ordered by their attractiveness for workers. That is, a worker who applies to \( i \) firms applies once to each of the lowest \( i \) groups and accepts an offer from a higher group over an offer from a lower group. We call an allocation of firms across groups that leads to the maximum number of matches \( \hat{i} \)-group-efficient. Compare two adjacent groups \( i \) and \( i - 1 \) with total measure \( v = v_i + v_{i-1} \). We show that the only efficient way of dividing this measure up between the two groups is the equilibrium division. The maximal total number of matches within these groups is given by

\[
\max_{d \in [0,1]} M(d) = v d (1 - e^{-\mu_i}) + v (1 - d) (1 - e^{-\mu_{i-1}}). \tag{43}
\]

It can be shown that a boundary solution cannot be optimal, as it means that one application is waisted. Noting that \( (1 - \psi_{i-1}) = \gamma_{i-1}/\Gamma_{i-1} + (1 - \psi_i)(1 - p_i)\Gamma_i/\Gamma_{i-1} \) we can write \( \mu_i = (1 - \psi_i)\lambda_i \) and \( \mu_{i-1} = [\gamma_{i-1}/\Gamma_{i-1} + (1 - \psi_i)(1 - p_i)\Gamma_i/\Gamma_{i-1}]\lambda_{i-1} \). The first derivative is then

\[
\frac{\partial M(d)}{\partial d} \frac{1}{\nu} = 1 - e^{-\mu_i} - (1 - e^{-\mu_{i-1}}) + e^{-\mu_i} d (1 - \psi_i) \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial d} + e^{-\mu_{i-1}} (1 - d) (1 - \psi_{i-1}) \frac{\partial \lambda_{i-1}}{\partial d} - \frac{\Gamma_i}{\Gamma_{i-1}} (1 - \psi_i) \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d} \lambda_{i-1}.
\]

We can use similar substitutions as for (27), with the adjustment that now \( \partial \mu_i / \partial d = -\mu_i d = -\nu \mu_i^2 / [(1 - \psi_i)\Gamma_i] \), to show that the last term in the first line equals \( -\mu_i e^{-\mu_i} \), and the second line reduces to \( e^{-\mu_{i-1}} [\mu_{i-1} - (1 - e^{-\mu_i} -
Therefore we again have

\[ \frac{\partial M(d)}{\nu \partial d} = (1 - e^{-\mu_i} - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i})(1 - e^{-\mu_{i-1}}) - (1 - e^{-\mu_{i-1}} - \mu_{i-1} e^{-\mu_{i-1}}) = 0. \] (44)

The first order condition implies equality with zero. For given \( \nu \) this uniquely characterizes the optimal interior \( d \), since similar substitutions as above yield

\[ \frac{\partial^2 M}{\partial d^2} = -\nu(\mu_2^2 e^{-\mu_2}(1 - e^{-\mu_1})/d + e^{-\mu_1}(1 - e^{-\mu_2} - \mu_2 e^{-\mu_2} - \mu_1)^2/(1-d)) < 0. \]

It is straightforward to show that for a given measure \( v \) of firms there exists an \( \hat{i} \)-group efficient allocation across all \( \hat{i} \) groups. A similar construction as in the proof of proposition 4.2 shows that \( \hat{i} \) groups are sufficient to achieve the constrained optimal search outcome. A similar construction as in proposition 4.3 shows that the outcome of a random process (i.e. one wage) could also be achieved with \( \hat{i} \) groups, but the division of firms across groups would not be optimal. More generally, such an argument establishes that the optimal allocation cannot be achieved with less than \( \hat{i} \) wages given the number of applications summarized in \( \gamma \).

It is very tedious to analyze whether (44) - which coincides with profit equality as in (42) - determines the allocation of firms to the \( \hat{i} \) groups uniquely for any \( v \). Therefore we will not consider the efficiency of search in the case without free entry. We will establish that the overall entry of firms and the measure of firms in each group under equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3) yields optimal entry and optimal search simultaneously, taking \( \gamma \) as given. The important insight from the previous analysis of constrained optimal search is that (44) has to hold in the optimal search outcome for all \( i \in \{2, ..., \hat{i}\} \), and that we can apply the envelop theorem. Let \( d(v) = (d_1(v), d_2(v), ..., d_{\hat{i}}(v)) \) be the fraction of firms in each of the \( \hat{i} \) groups under constrained optimal search given \( v \) and \( \gamma \). Again let \( M^*(\gamma, v, d(v)) \) denote the constrained efficient number of matches given \( v \) and \( \gamma \). Similar to (28) the objective function is given by \( \max_{v \geq 0} M^*(\gamma, v, d(v)) - vK \). When \( \hat{i} > 0 \), then \( K < 1 \) ensures that the optimal solution is in the interior of \([0, V]\). We will show that the first order condition uniquely determines the solution and corresponds to the free entry condition.

By the envelope theorem the impact of a change of the fraction \( d_i(v) \) of firms in each group on the measure of matches can be neglected, i.e.

\[ \frac{\partial M^*}{\partial d_i} \frac{\partial d_i}{\partial v} = 0 \] at the \( \hat{i} \)-efficient \( d_i \). We get as first order condition

\[ \partial M^*(\gamma, v, d)/\partial v = K, \] (45)
where \( d = d(v) \). Writing \( M^*(\gamma, v, d) = [1 - \sum_{i=1}^{\hat{i}} [\gamma_i \prod_{j=1}^{i} (1 - p_j)] \) we have

\[
\frac{\partial M^*(\gamma, v)}{\partial v} = \sum_{i=1}^{\hat{i}} \left[ \gamma_i \sum_{j=1}^{i} \frac{\partial p_j}{\partial v} \prod_{k \leq i \neq j} (1 - p_k) \right]
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{\hat{i}} \left[ \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial v} \Gamma_i (1 - \psi_i) \prod_{k < i} (1 - p_k) \right].
\]  

(46)

where the second line is obtained by rearranging the terms for each \( \partial p_i / \partial v \).

To simplify notation, define the partial sum

\[
\xi' = \sum_{i \geq i'}^N \left[ \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial v} \Gamma_i (1 - \psi_i) \prod_{k < i} (1 - p_k) \right].
\]  

(47)

Since \( p_i = (1 - e^{-\mu_i}) / \mu_i \) we have \( \partial p_i / \partial v = -(1/\mu_i^2)(1 - e^{-\mu_i} - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i})(\partial \mu_i / \partial v) \).

Since \( \mu_i = \frac{\gamma_i}{(d_i v)} \), we have \( \partial \mu_i / \partial v = -\frac{\gamma_i}{d_i v^2} = -d_i \mu_i / \gamma_i \). So we get \( \partial p_i / \partial v = -d_i (1 - e^{-\mu_i} - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i}) / \gamma_i \). Noting that \( \Gamma_i (1 - \psi_i) = \gamma_i \), we have established that

\[
\xi_i = d_i (1 - e^{-\mu_i} - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i}) \prod_{k < i} (1 - p_k).
\]  

(48)

By induction we can establish the following lemma, which we will prove subsequently because it would distract from the argument at this point.

**Lemma A1** For all \( i \) it holds that

\[
\xi_i = (\sum_{k=1}^{N} d_k) (1 - e^{-\mu_i} - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i}) \prod_{j < i} (1 - p_k).
\]  

(49)

This implies that \( \xi_1 = 1 - e^{\mu_1} - \mu_1 e^{-\mu_1} \). The first order condition \( \xi_1 = K \) uniquely defines \( \mu_1 \), and corresponds to the free entry condition of the lowest wage firms. By (44) (or respectively by (42)) it also determines \( \mu_i \) uniquely for all \( i \in 2, \ldots, \hat{i} \), which in turn determines \( v_i \) uniquely for all \( i \in 1, \ldots, \hat{i} \). Thus, the measure of firms in each group under equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3) coincides with the measure of firms in each group implied by the first order conditions for optimal entry (incorporating optimal subsequent
search). Since there is only one allocation fulfilling the first order conditions, and boundary solutions are not optimal, this again characterizes the global maximum. Thus equilibrium entry and search is constrained optimal given \( \gamma \).

Finally, when we endogenize \( \gamma \), again note that the number of applications of other workers in equilibrium is not important for the marginal benefits of each individual worker, which are always \( u_i^* - u_{i-1}^* \). Therefore again the decision on the number of applications is constrained efficient, establishing constrained efficiency overall. Q.E.D.

Proof of Lemma A1:

We are left to show that the following holds for all \( i \in \{1, ..., \hat{i} - 1\} \):

\[
\xi_{i+1} = \left( \sum_{k=i+1}^{\hat{i}} d_k (1 - e^{-\mu_{i+1}} - \mu_{i+1} e^{-\mu_{i+1}}) \prod_{j<i+1} (1 - p_k) \right) (1 - e^{-\mu_{i+1}} - \mu_{i+1} e^{-\mu_{i+1}}) \prod_{j<i+1} (1 - p_k). \tag{50}
\]

It clearly holds for \( i = \hat{i} - 1 \) by (48). Now assume it holds for some \( i \). We will consider \( \xi_i \). We know that

\[
\xi_i = \xi_{i+1} + \Gamma_i (1 - \psi_i) \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial v} \prod_{k<i} (1 - p_k). \tag{51}
\]

The second summand can be written as

\[
\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial v} \prod_{k<i} (1 - p_k) = -\frac{1 - e^{-\mu_i} - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i}}{\mu_i^2} \left[ \frac{\partial \mu_i}{\partial v} \prod_{k<i} (1 - p_k) \right] \tag{52}
\]

Since \( \mu_i = \lambda_i (1 - \psi_i) = \lambda_i \left( \sum_{j=i+1}^{\hat{i}} \frac{\gamma_j}{\Gamma_j} \prod_{k=i+1}^{j} (1 - p_k) \right) \) we can write the term in square brackets in (52) as

\[
\frac{\partial \mu_i}{\partial v} \prod_{k<i} (1 - p_k) = \frac{\Gamma_i (1 - \psi_i)}{d_i v^2} \left[ \prod_{k<i} (1 - p_k) \right] + \xi_{i+1} \frac{\lambda_i}{\Gamma_i (1 - p_i)} \tag{53}
\]

\[
= -\frac{d_i \mu_i^2}{\Gamma_i (1 - \psi_i)} \left[ \prod_{k<i} (1 - p_k) \right] + \xi_{i+1} \frac{\lambda_i}{\Gamma_i (1 - p_i)}. \tag{54}
\]

Observing that \( \frac{1}{\mu_i} (1 - e^{-\mu_i} - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i}) = p_i - e^{-\mu_i} \), we can substitute the prior equation into (52) and multiply by \( \Gamma_i (1 - \psi_i) \) to get

\[
\Gamma_i (1 - \psi_i) \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial v} \prod_{k<i} (1 - p_k) = \frac{p_i - e^{-\mu_i}}{1 - p_i} \xi_{i+1} + d_i (1 - e^{-\mu_i} - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i}) \prod_{j<i} (1 - p_j). \tag{55}
\]
We can substitute this into (51), and use (50) and the property of i-group-efficient search in (42) to obtain

\[ \xi_i = \left( \sum_{k=i}^{N} d_k \right) (1 - e^{-\mu_i - \mu_i e^{-\mu_i}}) \prod_{j<i} (1 - p_k). \]  

(53)

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 5.2:

First we show that for \( i^* \to \infty \) the (weakly) shorter side of the market gets matched with probability approaching 1. Since equilibrium search is always more efficient than a process of random applications and acceptances, we will show this for the latter. As \( i^* \to \infty \) it cannot happen that workers and firms both are matched with probabilities bounded away from one. If that were the case, than some fraction \( \alpha > 0 \) of firms would always remain unmatched. But then the chance that a worker applies to such a firm with any given application is \( \alpha \), so that the probability that he applies to such a firm with at least one of his applications converges to 1, yielding a contradiction. With unequal sizes it is obviously the shorter side whose probability of being matched converges to one; with equal sizes the probability of being matched is the same and agents from both sides get matched with probability converging to one.

For the next arguments, recall that the marginal utility gain (excluding the marginal application cost) of the \( i^* \)th application, given by \( u_{i^*} - u_{i^* - 1} \), converges to zero as \( i^* \to \infty \). We will use this to establish the limit for the average wage if firms are either on the long or on the short side of the market.

Case 1: We will show that \( w(i^*) \to 0 \) if firms are strictly on the short side of the market. Assume there exists a subsequence of \( i^* \)'s such that \( v(i^*) < 1 - \epsilon \) for all \( i^* \) and some \( \epsilon > 0 \). That implies \( \mathcal{G}(i^*) < \alpha \) for some \( \alpha < 1 \). If \( w(i^*) \to 0 \), then there exists a subsequence such that \( w(i^*) \to \omega > 0 \) and \( \pi(i^*) \to 1 - \omega \) (since \( \eta(i^*) \to 1 \)). Now consider a deviant firm that always offers wage \( w' = \omega/2 \). As workers send more applications, the hiring probability for the deviant has to converge to 1. This is due to the fact that for workers the marginal utility of sending the last application converges to zero, which implies that the probability of getting the job at the deviant firm has to become negligible as otherwise each worker would like to send his last application there to insur against the \( 1 - \alpha \) probability of not being hired. With the hiring probability approaching 1 the profit of the deviant converges.
to $1 - \omega/2$, i.e. the deviation is profitable. Thus it has hold that $w(i^*) \to 0$.

Case 2: We will show that $w(i^*) \to 1$ if firms are strictly on the long side of the market. Assume there exists a subsequence of $i^*$’s such that $v(i^*) > 1 + \epsilon$ for all $i^*$ and some $\epsilon > 0$. In this case $\eta(i^*) < \alpha$ for some $\alpha < 1$ and all $i^*$. If $w(i^*) \to 1$, then there exists a subsequence such that $\omega(i^*) \to \omega < 1$ and $\pi(i^*) \to \pi < \alpha(1 - \omega)$. Consider a firm that always offers wage $w' \in (\omega, 1)$ such that $1 - w' > \alpha(1 - \omega)$. Again the hiring probability of the deviant converges to 1, because if there were a non-negligible chance of getting the job at $w'$ worker’s would rather send there last application to this higher than average wage. But then the deviant’s profit converges to $1 - w'$ and the deviation is profitable. So $w(i^*) \to 1$.

This immediately implies that $v(i^*) \to 1$. Otherwise a subsequence of $i^*$’s according either to case 1 or to case 2 has to exist, but in case 1 profits are above entry costs and in case 2 they are below entry costs, violating the free entry condition. Finally, since $v(i^*) \to 1$ and firms get matched with probability close to one, $\pi = K$ implies that the average paid wage $w(i^*)$ has to converge to $1 - K$. This directly implies that $u_{i^*} \to 1 - K$.

To show that the individual search effort converges to zero, i.e. that also $U^*(i^*) = u_{i^*} - c^*(i^*) \to 1 - K$, rewrite the workers’ utility as $U^*(i^*) = \sum_{i=1}^I [u_i^* - u_{i-1}^* - c_i^*] = \sum_{i=1}^I [u_i^* - u_{i-1}^* - c_i^*] + \sum_{i=I+1}^\infty [u_i^* - u_{i-1}^* - c_i^*]$ for some $I \leq i^*$, where $c_i^* = c^*(i) - c^*(i-1)$ again denotes marginal costs. For a given $i$ the difference $u_i^* - u_{i-1}^*$ is simply a number independent of $i^*$ (and the associated cost function). It converges to zero for large $i$, which entails that $u_i^* - u_{i-1}^* \to_{i^* \to \infty} 0$. Moreover $c_i^* \leq c_{i^*}^* \leq u_i^* - u_{i-1}^*$ for all $i \leq i^*$, which only restates that that we consider changing cost functions with $c_i^* \to_{i^* \to \infty} 0$. Therefore the partial sum $\sum_{i=1}^I [u_i^* - u_{i-1}^* - c_i^*] \to_{i^* \to \infty} \sum_{i=1}^I [u_i^* - u_{i-1}^*]$, for any fixed $I \in \mathbb{N}$. On the other hand we have $0 \leq \sum_{i=I+1}^\infty [u_i^* - u_{i-1}^* - c_i^*] \leq \sum_{i=I+1}^\infty [u_i^* - u_{i-1}^*]$, but $\sum_{i=I+1}^\infty [u_i^* - u_{i-1}^*] \to_{I \to \infty} 0$ since $\sum_{i=1}^\infty [u_i^* - u_{i-1}^*] \leq 1$. Therefore $\lim_{i^* \to \infty} U(i^*) = \lim_{I \to \infty} \lim_{i^* \to \infty} \sum_{i=1}^I [u_i^* - u_{i-1}^*] = \lim_{i^* \to \infty} u_i^* = 1 - K$. Q.E.D.

References


