

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HATRED

by

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Abstract

Hatred is fostered with stories of atrocities by members of out-groups. History tells us that the truth of these stories is largely irrelevant. Instead, hatred is better seen as the result of an equilibrium in which political entrepreneurs supply stories of past crimes, and consumers listen to them. The supply of hatred is a function of the degree to which hatred complements particular party platforms. Groups that are particularly policy-relevant are likely to be hated. Hatred is rarer if individuals have a private incentive to learn the truth about out-groups. Hatred is most likely against groups that are politically relevant and socially absent, like Americans in the Middle East.

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I. Introduction

From the Thirty Years' War to the Holocaust to the contemporary wars in Rwanda and the Balkans, much human misery is due to religious and ethnic conflicts. Easterly and Levine (1997) find that ethnic conflict is a major cause of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. Alesina and LaFerrara (2000) document that racial heterogeneity decreases social capital. Ethnic conflict increases corruption (Mauro, 1995) and decreases the quality of government (LaPorta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999). People support redistribution less when that redistribution aids people of different races (Luttmer, 2001); there is less income redistribution in countries or states that are ethnically divided (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). Suicidal acts of terror, such as those of September 11, 2001, in which members of one group die to destroy members of another group, underscore the importance of inter-group hatred. In this paper, I try to understand the formation of group-level hatred, defined as the willingness of members of one group to pay to harm members of another group.

Some suggest that ethnic conflict automatically accompanies visible group differences (Caselli and Coleman, 2002), but history shows that a great deal of hatreds are quite volatile. Hatred can arise between groups that resemble each other closely, such as American northerners and southerners in 1860, and peoples who look quite different often coexist peacefully in many settings. Hatreds rise and fall. Before 1945, Franco-German hatred was a regular part of European life; it is no longer. Anti-Americanism was absent from the Islamic world until the 1970s; it is now ubiquitous. White hatred of African-Americans has fallen since its Jim Crow heyday. Even anti-Semitism, among the most permanent forms of hatred, has declined substantially in the West since 1945.

As I discuss in Section II, hatred is almost always internally consistent: people say that they hate because the object of their hatred is evil. This fact leads some observers to think that hatred is caused by the crimes of the object of hatred. Chomsky (2001) argues that American behavior is the cause of anti-Americanism. Yet the relationship between

hatred and the criminality of the hated group is often minimal. While Nazis may have believed stories of Jewish atrocities and southern racists may have thought that Blacks presented a threat to southern womanhood, freed slaves and German Jews were relatively innocent. The best evidence that: “anti-Semitism has fundamentally nothing to do with the actions of Jews, and therefore fundamentally nothing to do with an anti-Semite’s knowledge of the real nature of Jews, is the widespread historical and contemporary appearance of anti-Semitism, even in its most virulent forms, where there are no Jews, and among people who have never met Jews” (Goldhagen,1997, p. 41). And if hatred were closely connected to the military actions of a country, why would the French dislike the U.S. more than the Vietnamese do? (See Table 1).

In fact, anti-Semitism, anti-Black hatred, and anti-Americanism have all been fostered by false stories manufactured and spread by “entrepreneurs of hate.” C. Vann Woodward describes how race hatred in the post-bellum South “was furthered by a sensational press that played up and headlined current stories of Negro crime, charges of rape and attempted rape, and alleged instances of arrogance.... Already cowed and intimidated, the [Black] race was falsely pictured as stirred up to a mutinous and insurrectionary pitch” (Woodward, 2002, p. 123). German politicians spread anti-Semitic stories for political reasons. Joseph Goebbels emphasized that the power of Nazi anti-Semitism stemmed from repetition, not accuracy: “If you repeat a lie often enough, it becomes the truth.” Today, 89 percent of Kuwaitis and 86 percent of Pakistanis do not believe that Arabs destroyed the World Trade Center; in these countries, the modal respondent said that Israelis were to blame.

This paper investigates when political entrepreneurs will supply hate-creating stories to further their own objectives. In Section III, I present a model in which politicians with the resources and incentives to supply hate-creating stories interact with people who may lack the incentives to properly question these stories. In the model, politicians differ in their income redistribution policies, and can spread hate-creating stories about the dangerous character of a minority group. Voters who hear these stories think they might be true, but will only choose to investigate those stories if there are private benefits from

learning the truth. When politicians spread hate-creating stories they increase the supply of hatred. The willingness of voters to accept these stories without inquiry can be seen as the demand-side of hatred.

The model's equilibrium level of hatred reflects both the politicians' incentives to spread hatred and private citizens' incentives to learn the truth. The supply of hatred depends upon the policy-relevance of the minority. In the case of income redistribution, the minority is particularly relevant if it is either poor or rich. If the minority is poor, the model predicts that hatred will become a tool of right wing politicians who oppose redistribution (as in Woodward, 2002); if the minority is rich, hatred will be used by populist egalitarians (as in Chua, 2003).

The demand-side of hatred is shaped by the costs and private benefits of information about the out-group. Hatred will not spread among groups with ready access to knowledge about the true nature of the minority. Integration may deter the spread of hatred because it creates a demand for correct information, and also increase the supply of hatred because integration makes a threat from minorities more salient.

At the end of Section III, I examine the effects of specific policies that target minorities and that fight hatred by "hating the haters." Anti-minority policies can either dampen or exacerbate the incentive to spread hatred, depending on whether they decrease or increase the gap between the parties' treatment of minorities. When politicians villainize their hate-mongering opponents, improvements in communications technology can deter hatred. However, anti-hate messages are less effective once many in-group members hate, creating increasing returns to hatred.

In Section IV, I use the model to explain the time-series of anti-Black hatred in the American South. I follow Woodward (1951), who argues that hatred of Blacks was low before the Civil War, rose in the Jim Crow period, and then muted after World War I. The model explains the rise of hatred as a predictable political response to the redistributionist Populist movement of the 1880s. Populists proposed redistribution from

rich to poor that would have helped the overwhelmingly poor Black population, and Populists, like Tom Watson, sought support from Black voters. The opponents of the Populists turned to racial hatred as a means of discrediting redistribution. Later, as left-wing politicians in the south embraced anti-Black Jim Crow policies, the incentive to spread hatred declined, and racial demagoguery appears to have fallen.

In Section V, to allow the study of anti-Americanism in the Arab world and anti-Semitism in nineteenth-century Europe, I elaborate on the model by allowing for two individual characteristics, each of which might be influenced by government policy. In nineteenth-century Europe, these dimensions might represent income and religious adherence. If one candidate favors minorities along both dimensions, then these minorities are a particularly tempting subject of hatred. In this case, as minorities become more different along either dimension, the incentive to spread hatred increases. Conversely, minorities can be safe even if they are very different, if no party is particularly favorable or unfavorable to them.

This multi-issue framework connects political extremism with hatred. If the minority is particularly different along one dimension, then increased polarization along that dimension is likely to increase the incentive to spread hatred. Political systems that minimize the differences among parties, especially along dimensions that are particularly relevant for minorities, are likely to limit hatred. Finally, I turn to policies that limit contact with minorities, such as bans on immigration, segregation, or genocide. These policies complement hatred, and their proponents will also be attracted to hate.

In Section VI, I use the model to study the differences across Europe in the spread of political anti-Semitism in nineteenth-century Europe. The model can help explain why anti-Semitism was rife in Germany, Russia, and Austria, rarer in France, and almost entirely absent in England, Italy, and the U.S. in the nineteenth-century. In the late nineteenth century, Germany, Russia, Austria and even France, right wing monarchists, whose ideologies depended on Church support, battled left wings that ranged from liberal to communist. Within this divide Jews were invariably on the left, and “from Stoecker to

Hitler, rightists rarely attempted to refute socialism, preferring to cite the high percentage of intellectuals of Jewish origin among socialist publicists as proof of its subversion” (Weiss, 1996). In England and the U.S., the debate over democracy and rule by divine right was long over. In Italy, the Pope excommunicated all participants in post-unification Italian politics, removing religion from political debates. In these three countries, Jews were not particularly aligned with one party and they were not attractive political targets.

Section VII discusses the rise of anti-Americanism in the Middle East and its political roots. For many Middle Eastern leaders, such as the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud, alliance with the U.S. forms their most important foreign policy. Liberals and Westernizers within these countries, such as the students who helped bring down the Shah, preferred even closer ties to the U.S. The Islamic Fundamentalists, by contrast, oppose closeness to any non-Islamic nations, which would violate their interpretation of the Koran and might undermine their social policies. As the United States would lose in an Islamic Fundamentalist takeover, the model predicts that Islamic Fundamentalists will use anti-Americanism for their political benefit.

The central message of this paper is that hatred is particularly likely to spread against groups that are politically relevant and socially isolated. Thus, anti-Americanism in the Middle East is more inevitable than surprising. Political entrepreneurs in the Middle East differ significantly in their policies towards the U.S. and few residents of the Middle East actually interact with Americans.

II. The Formation of Hatred

Charles Darwin pinpointed the roots of hatred in self-defense and vengeance: “if we have suffered or expect to suffer some willful injury from a man, or if he is in any way offensive to us, we dislike him; and dislike easily rises into hatred” (Darwin, 1979, p. 239). Hatred is an emotional response to the belief that a person or group is dangerous

and violates social norms. As Ruth Dozier writes, “hate is a primitive emotion that marks for attack or avoidance those things which we perceive as a threat to our survival or reproduction...” (Dozier, 2002, p. 16).

Baumeister’s (1995) lengthy overview of human evil emphasizes that hatred stems from “seeing oneself under attack.” He documents that people who “carry out the massacres see themselves as victims of mistreatment and injustice,” and “bullies, wife-beaters, tyrants, and other violent people tend to think that other people are attacking or belittling them.” Erich Fromm (1973) describes aggression as a “defense against threats to man’s vital interests.”² Daly and Wilson (1988) document that most murders are between acquaintances (especially spouses) and almost always have an element of self-defense or retribution.³

Researchers are beginning to understand the physical processes that underlie vengeance. Nisbett and Cohen (1996) examine testosterone and cortisol levels in subjects before and after a provocation, and they find that a provocation causes production of these hormones to increase. The production of these chemicals is linked to aggressive activity.⁴ This rise in testosterone is similar to the increase in this hormone that is usually found in people anticipating conflict (Mazur and Booth, 1998). As Neihoff (1999) details, when people are threatened, their hormonal systems rapidly produce emotions that help us with an occasionally violent response. Darwin himself sees this emotion as a simple aid to self-defense: “The excited brain gives strength to the muscles, and at the same time energy to the will” (Darwin, 1979, p. 239).⁵

² One modern psychological literature on hatred emphasizes the role of “threatened egotism” or “identity uncertainty,” where “violence results when a person’s favorable image of self is questioned or impugned by someone else” (Baumeister, 1995, p. 376). While this theory emphasizes vengeance against slights to one’s identity (as in Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), instead of slights to one’s income, it is still a model of hatred based on perceived past transgressions.

³ Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) argue that vengeance drives sentencing for homicides.

⁴ More precisely, Nisbett and Cohen separate subjects into Northerners and Southerners and they hypothesize that Southerners are more vengeful. Testosterone increases in both groups, but a much larger increase among Southerners. Cortisol increased on average, but among Northerners, cortisol fell. Southerners displayed more aggressive actions with provocation, but less aggression in the control sample.

⁵ Authors such as Posner (1980), Frank (1985) and Romer (1993), is that vengeance evolved because a taste for vengeance protects individuals against expropriation.

Even economists have increasingly documented behavior that has the logic of hate, where “people are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to punish those who are being unkind” (Rabin, 1993). In an experimental ultimatum game where a first player suggests a division of some prize, such as 10 dollars, and the second player can either accept this division or reject the division and get nothing, “a robust result in [the ultimatum game], across hundreds of trials, is that proposals that give the Responder less than 30 percent of the available sum are rejected with a very high probability” (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).⁶ This behavior is known as reciprocity, reciprocal altruism, fairness, or spite, but in substance (if not in degree) negative reciprocity looks like hate.⁷

The formation of hatred involves a cognitive process in which “evidence” about hateful actions is processed into beliefs about the “evil” of a person, creating a desire to weaken or avoid that person. In the ultimatum game experiments described above, the evidence is the unfair offer. Most inter-personal hatreds are based on personal experience, but inter-group hatreds are generally based on stories about crimes of the hated group. These stories range from elaborate novels about international Jewish conspiracies to anecdotes of Blacks or Jews raping white or gentile women. In the model presented in Section II, the desire to weaken and avoid a hated group is entirely rational, if the group is considered dangerous. What is not rational is that voters are willing to believe stories politicians spread about the dangers of an out-group. Hyper-rational individuals would expect false stories demonizing out-groups and discount them entirely.

Political history provides many examples of people giving some weight to false, hate-creating stories. For example, the young Hitler’s lifelong anti-Semitism was apparently primed by materials such as his “favorite tabloid [which] ‘revealed’ that ‘Jewish’ pimps, brothel owners, and white slavers seduced Aryan virgins in order to pollute their blood” (Weiss, 1996, p. 198). Hitler then convinced thousands of others to support him by blaming the Jews for the “stab in the back,” that allegedly caused Germany to lose World

⁶ Some authors have argued that these experiments only show a dislike of inequality or a preference for relative payoffs (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), but Blount (1995) finds that subjects are willing to accept worse offers when they are generated by a computer.

War I. Given the absence of Jews from German political or military leadership, this widespread and often accepted story is patently absurd.⁸ Hitler also disseminated *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, shown conclusively by the *Times of London* to be a forgery in 1921, which described the supposed Jewish conspiracy for world domination (Cohn, 1967).

Stalin started his 1953 anti-Semitic pogrom with a false allegation that Jewish doctors were poisoners. The story was effective and “patients refused to accept treatment from Jewish doctors, contending that they would be poisoned” (Heller and Nekrich, 1986, p. 503). Today, the modal belief in many Arab countries is that the Mossad, not Al Qaeda, destroyed the World Trade Center. In other cases, hate-creating stories are true, but offer little current information about the threat posed by a hated group. Slobodan Milosevic galvanized his Serbian killers by reminding them of the Turkish victory, and the “martyrdom” of Prince Lazar, at Blackbird’s Field in 1389.

Why are hate-creating stories powerful even when they are false? Perhaps it is just prudent to pay attention to information suggesting that a group is dangerous.⁹ In most contexts people tell the truth and as a general rule, it makes sense to give some weight to everything we hear. In addition, entrepreneurs of hate are often skillful at making their claims seem genuine and at hiding their ulterior motives. An alternative view is that emotions like hatred involve feeling, not thinking, so that usual Bayesian rules don’t exactly apply (as in Romer, 2000). Whatever the cause, people can be convinced that out-groups represent a threat.

A particularly important aspect of group hatred is that people attribute evil to all members of a group, not just specific perpetrators of past crimes. Indeed, hate is often formed using true stories; the cognitive error comes not from believing the story, but rather in leaping from the evil of the specific people to the inference that an entire group is evil.

⁷ There are differences between economic models of hatred. For example, Rabin (1993) focuses on spiteful responses to actions, while Levine (1998) focuses on spiteful responses to the preferences of others.

⁸ The one Jew who occupied a position of leadership in the war was the industrialist Walter Rathenau, who was the target of the Freikorps slogan “Shoot Down Walter Rathenau, the God-Damn Dirty Jew,” and who was assassinated in 1922.

⁹ This aspect of the demand for hatred is close to the witch hunt model of Mui (1999).

Dozier (2002) suggests that this inference relies on the natural human tendency to group people into categories like “us vs. them.” Another view is that humans leap readily to the view that crimes are caused by something intrinsic in the criminal (such as race) rather than by his circumstances.

III. The Model

I focus on hatred by an in-group toward an out-group. The out-group may be a minority, as with Jews or Blacks, or a group that lives outside the country’s borders, such as the Americans hated in the Middle East. The heart of this model is that politicians spread hatred when their policies are relatively detrimental to an out-group, because hatred creates a desire to impoverish or exclude the out-group. Voters’ beliefs about the dangers of interacting with the out-group are determined by politicians’ hate-creating messages and the degree to which voters scrutinize these messages.

I assume two politicians with fixed political programs. Candidate i maximizes his electoral support minus c_i times his electoral spending. The variable c_i reflects the difficulty of raising funds. Candidates who have better access to funding will have lower values of c_i . Candidates with better access to funding, i.e. who are richer, will have lower values of c_i . Politicians can spread hate-creating stories among in-group members at a cost K . These stories fan fears that members of another group are harmful, and these fears create hatred, a desire among in-group members to weaken and segregate the out-group. Hatred generates political support for politicians whose policies either deprive out-groups of resources or reduce the in-group’s interactions with the out-group.

The model has six periods:

- (1) Politicians decide whether to spend K on a hate-creating message,
- (2) In-group members decide whether or not to investigate this message,
- (3) All citizens vote for their preferred politicians,
- (4) The winning politician’s policies are implemented,

- (5) In-group members decide whether to engage in self-protection from out-group members,
- (6) With some probability (potentially reduced by self-protection), in-group members interact with out-group members.

Politicians make one decision, whether to spread hatred, in the first stage of the game, and the outcome of their decision is decided in period 3. I consider these two periods in Section IV, which focuses on the politicians. Out-group members decide only which politician to support. In-group members make three decisions: whether to investigate the politician's stories, whom to vote for, and whether to engage in self-protection from the out-group. These decisions are made in periods 2 and 5, and yield outcomes in period 6. I focus on these three periods and the decisions of the in-group members first.

In-group members make their decisions while trying to maximize their expected utility:

$$(1) \text{ Utility} = \text{Income Net of Taxes and Transfers} + \text{Expected Net Benefits from Interacting with the Out-Group} - \text{Search Costs}$$

Net income includes endowed income, denoted y , government transfers, and taxes. Net income does not include the costs and benefits of interactions with the out-group.

In period 6, in-group members interact with out-group members with probability " m " if they have not engaged in self-protection and probability $\delta m < m$ if they have engaged in self-protection. Self-protection includes actions such as avoiding commercial or social interactions with the out-group, moving into a segregated neighborhood, or avoiding certain forms of travel. Interactions yield economic and social gains from trade or social connection with the outgroup; these are denoted as B .

In-group members may believe that interactions with out-group members might be harmful and I refer to this belief as hatred. In this model, hatred means increasing the expected damage that comes from interacting with out-groups. If D denotes the expected

damage associated with interacting with out-groups, then in-group members will engage in self-protection in the fifth period whenever they believe that D is greater than B .

Voters' beliefs about the size of D are determined by decisions made in periods one and two of the model. In period one, the politicians decide whether or not to send a hate-creating message. If no message is sent, then D equals zero.¹⁰ Such hate-creating messages emphasize the past and future crimes of the out-group and portray the outgroup as a menace; formally, these messages suggest that an interaction with an out-group member yields expected damage of \bar{D} .

In-group members who hear these stories do not automatically accept these stories as truth. Instead, they believe that hate-creating stories are false with probability ϕ . The parameter ϕ is exogenous, and since all of the hate-creating stories in the model are false, this represents the "irrational" aspect of the model.

For a cost " C ," people can investigate (search) the truth of these stories. A justification of this assumption is that in most contexts stories have some truth to them. It is only in this particular setting that all stories are false. If people do not investigate the hate-creating stories, in-group members believe that interactions with minorities have expected costs of $(1-\phi)\bar{D}$, which may be monetary or social. If they do investigate, they learn with probability one that the story is false, and then they believe that $D = 0$. To eliminate unnecessary cases, I assume that interactions are expected to have negative net benefits for people who have heard but not investigated hate-creating stories, or $(1-\phi)\bar{D} > B$. This assumption ensures that self-protection will be optimal for people who hear these stories and who don't investigate them.

The investigation decision in period two is based on the potential gains from making wiser decisions about self-protection. If the individual searches, then he protects himself

¹⁰ I am precluding any non-political sources of hatred. While these sources exist and are important, including them here would only clutter the model.

only when the story is true, and as such he expects to receive net benefits from interactions equal to $m(\phi B + (1 - \phi)\delta(B - \bar{D}))$. If an individual doesn't search, he always protects himself and receives net benefits of $m\delta(B - (1 - \phi)\bar{D})$. The net gain from search equals $m\phi(1 - \delta)B$ and search is optimal whenever this is greater than C . I assume that C differs among members of the in-group, and this distribution is characterized by density function $h(C)$ and cumulative distribution $H(C)$. The benefits of learning the truth will check politicians' ability to spread lies about the out-group:

Proposition 1: Learning the truth of the hate-creating story is optimal if and only if C is less than $m\phi(1 - \delta)B$, so the share of the in-group that will end up hating is $1 - H(m\phi(1 - \delta)B)$, which is falling with m , ϕ , and B , and rising with δ .

This proposition suggests that some in-group members will accept the stories told by the population, and others will investigate and learn that these stories are false. People who do not search expect to lose $\delta m((1 - \phi)\bar{D} - B)$ from their interactions with out-groups. This loss will create the desire to isolate and impoverish out-groups. Those who hear the hate-creating stories and don't investigate them are "haters." Those who don't hear the story or who investigate the story will see no advantage in impoverishing or isolating out-groups.

When it is inexpensive to acquire information, hate-creating stories will be harder to spread. This may explain why hatred sometimes falls with education. In the U.S. General Social Survey, for example, racist opinions are much lower among more educated groups. Of course, education need not deter hatred, especially if the education consists of indoctrination in hate-creating myths (as in the case of many Madrassas, see Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004). Information costs can also decline for people who have contact with the out-group, as interactions make it easier to acquire the truth. People who interact with out-group members have a greater incentive to learn the truth about them; as m rises, so do the benefits of learning the truth. This incentive will stem the impact of hate-creating stories. The amount of hate among in-group members falls with ϕ : the

more likely that the story is false, the more likely that investigation will reduce hate. The amount of search rises with B and falls with δ , as these variables increase the benefits of knowing the truth about the out-group.

The Supply of Hatred

I now turn to stages one and three of the model: the politician's decision to spread hatred and its impact on voting. I first determine the impact that hatred will have on voting. Majority group members who believe that out-groups are harmful expect the costs from interacting with out-group members to be $m\delta(1-\phi)(\bar{D}-B)$. Thus, they benefit from reductions in m or \bar{D} . In Section V, I consider policies such as segregation or limits on immigration which would reduce m . In this section I consider policies that will change \bar{D} . The key assumption is that haters believe that \bar{D} is increasing with out-group resources--that depriving out-group members of resources limits their ability to do harm. I assume that $\bar{D} = d_0 + d_1\tilde{y}_O$, where $d_1 > 0$ and \tilde{y}_O is the average after-tax income level of the out-group. Higher income levels lead to higher expected levels of damage. If after-tax out-group income is reduced by some quantity Q , then hateful in-group members expect that their damage levels are reduced by $m\delta(1-\phi)d_1Q$.

The assumption that the expected damage from the out-group rises with its income runs counter to the view that good behavior increases with wealth. In contrast, the essence of hatred is the belief that the out-group is intrinsically evil. People who argue that enriching out-groups, such as Blacks or possible terrorists, makes these groups less of a threat, are usually trying to reduce hatred. By contrast, people who truly hate these out-groups believe that they would use additional resources to cause harm.

Government policies take the form of redistribution on the basis of income. The mean income of the out-group is denoted y_O and the mean income of the in-group is denoted y_I . The income distribution of the in-group is characterized by density function $f_I(y)$ and cumulative distribution $F_I(y)$; the income distribution of the in-group is

characterized by density function $f_O(y)$ and cumulative distribution $F_O(y)$. Let Δ_y denote $y_I - y_O$. The out-group represents a proportion “p” of the tax-payers and the electorate, and the average income across tax-payers is denoted

$$\hat{y} = (1-p)y_I + py_O = y_O + (1-p)\Delta_y.$$

The two candidates propose tax levels that are both exogenous and binding. A tax rate of τ implies that people must pay $\tau(y - \hat{y})$, so that people who are poorer than average receive transfers. The tax levels proposed by the two candidates are denoted τ_R and τ_A , where $\tau_R > \tau_A$. The politician with redistribution level τ_R is the pro-redistribution candidate; the one with redistribution level τ_A is the anti-redistribution candidate.

Regardless of group membership or hatred, individuals gain financial returns of $(\tau_R - \tau_A)(y - \hat{y})$ from supporting the anti-redistribution candidate. Out-group voters, and majority voters who think that $D = 0$, will vote for the pro-redistribution candidate if and only if $(\hat{y} - y)(\tau_R - \tau_A)$ is positive, or if y is less than \hat{y} .

Haters have an added reason for voting—tax policies will impact the out-groups’ income. The gap between average income and average out-group income is $(1-p)\Delta_y$, so the anti-redistribution candidate reduces out-group income by $(\tau_R - \tau_A)(1-p)\Delta_y$ relative to the pro-redistribution candidate. A policy that reduces out-group income by “x” raises the utility of majority group members who believe that $D = (1-\phi)\bar{D}$ by $m\delta(1-\phi)d_1x$.

Thus, haters will only support the pro-redistribution candidate if

$$(\tau_R - \tau_A)(\hat{y} - y - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y)$$

is positive; that is, if y is less than

$$\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y.$$

I denote the proportion of majority group members who believe that $D = (1-\phi)\bar{D}$ as \bar{P} , which equals $1 - H(m\phi(1-\delta)B)$. The share of the population that supports the pro-redistribution candidate is:



$$(2) \quad pF_0(\hat{y}) + (1-p)\left((1-\bar{P})F_I(\hat{y}) + \bar{P}F_I(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y)\right).$$

Differentiation of equation (2) yields:

Proposition 2: The pro-redistribution candidate benefits from the existence of hatred if and only if $\Delta_y < 0$.



That is, politicians benefit from hatred when their policies complement hatred. Pro-redistribution candidates will spread hatred against rich out-groups, anti-redistribution candidates will spread hatred against poor out-groups. Hatred can be a tool of either the left or the right. For example, socialist and labor leaders in the early twentieth-century often eagerly spread hatred against wealthy capitalists and the bourgeois whom their policies would weaken. Chua (2003) describes the current proliferation of hatred spread by populist politicians against wealthy out-groups throughout the world.

Conversely, when the minority is poor, i.e. when $\Delta_y > 0$, then hatred becomes a tool of the right wing. Left wing policies will tend to enrich the out-group, and the right will likely suggest that the out-group poses a danger that will only rise with its wealth and power. In Section IV, I argue that this logic captures the rise of anti-Black hatred in the post-bellum south. The candidate who opposes redistribution can appeal even to voters who lose economically from his policies because these policies will also weaken the out-group. Figure 1 shows the impact of hatred against a poor out-group. Very rich majority group members always support the anti-redistribution candidate; very poor members always support the pro-redistribution candidate. Voters with moderate incomes support the anti-redistribution candidate only when they hate the out-group.

I assume that $\Delta_y > 0$, so that only the anti-redistribution candidate will spread hatred.

The financial cost of spreading hatred is denoted K , and the cost of funds to the anti-redistribution candidate is c_A . These assumptions imply:

Proposition 3: There exists a value of K , denoted K^* , at which the anti-redistribution candidate is indifferent between sponsoring hatred and not sponsoring hatred. For values of K above K^* the anti-redistribution candidate prefers routine electioneering. For values of K below K^* the anti-redistribution candidate prefers sponsoring hatred.

(a) The value of K^* is rising with Δ_y , d_1 , and δ , and falling with p , B , and c_A .

(b) If $C = \hat{C} + \eta$, where \hat{C} is a constant and η is distributed with cumulative distribution $\Gamma(\eta)$, then K^* is rising with \hat{C} .

(c) The value of K^* is rising with m if and only if

$$\frac{(m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y)f_I(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y)}{(F_I(\hat{y}) - F_I(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y))} > \frac{m\phi(1-\delta)Bh(m\phi(1-\delta)B)}{(1 - H(m\phi(1-\delta)B))}$$

(d) If the out-group represents a proportion p of the tax base, but a proportion λ of the electorate, then the value of K^* falls with λ .

Changes in K change the candidate's cost to spread hatred. Increases in K reflect changes in communications technology that make it easier to spread hateful stories about the past and future crimes of out-groups, which should be a significant factor in determining the spread of hatred. For example, the spread of anti-Black hatred in the South and anti-Semitic hatred in Germany both coincided with the rise of cheap newsprint and increased literacy, which made it easier for entrepreneurs of hate to disseminate false tales of Black and Jewish crimes and threats. Likewise, religious leaders who specialize in the spread of hatred such as Christian anti-Semitism, and Islamic anti-Americanism, often have a comparative advantage in transmitting stories, whether hate-creating or not.

An increase in K^* —the maximum that the anti-redistribution candidate is willing to spend to spread hatred—can be interpreted as an increase in the supply of hatred (at a given price). As c_A falls, K^* rises and hatred becomes more attractive. The value of c_A is the candidate's marginal cost of spending, which declines as the financial resources of the candidate increase. The comparative static on d_1 shows that hatred will be attractive when haters believe that the threat can be reduced by impoverishing the out-group. The

spread of hatred becomes more likely as Δ_y increases because the out-group stands to gain more from redistribution as it becomes poorer. Whenever an out-group would gain relatively more from one candidate's policies, then it will be attractive for that candidate's opponent to build hatred against the out-group.

Changes in B , δ , and \hat{C} change the degree to which in-group members will accept hate-creating stories at face value. As B rises, the cost to in-group members of isolating themselves from out-group members increases. As a result, the in-group members will be more likely to investigate hate-creating messages. Strong economic gains from interacting with out-group members check the spread of hatred.

Increases in p have two effects. First, an increase in p decreases the size of the in-group in the electorate, reducing its influence on the election's outcome. Second, an increase in p decreases the gap between out-group income and average income, thus reducing the degree to which pro-redistribution tax policies shift income to the out-group. Both effects make hate less attractive.

The impact of the in-group's contact with the out-group has two effects. First, it increases the amount of investigation so that the in-group is less likely to believe hate-creating stories. Second, contact increases the in-group's potential losses from the out-group, increasing the desire to impoverish the out-group among haters. The first effect dominates if $h(C^*)$ is particularly large, which means that increases in m (the probability that in-group members interact with out-group members) greatly increase the amount of investigation. The second effect dominates if $h(C^*)$ is small and only a little more investigation occurs with increased contact with the out-group.

The parameter λ , defined in section d of the proposition, allows the out-group to have less or more political power than its numbers would suggest. The amount of hatred declines as the minority's electoral power increases. Disenfranchised out-groups, or foreigners without votes, will be particularly vulnerable to hatred.

Anti-Minority Policies

I now consider policies that directly penalize out-groups. In addition to its redistributive policies, I assume that the pro-redistribution party offers a proposed poll tax of χ_R on each out-group member and the anti-redistribution party offers a proposed poll tax of χ_A on out group members. These taxes are then distributed across the majority population. These taxes are meant as a proxy for policies such as Jim Crow schools or laws excluding Jews from public services or particular occupations. I assume that all minority members are rich enough to pay these taxes.

If the income densities are uniform, and if there is no hatred in society, then neither candidate gains votes from supporting anti-out-group policies. Without hatred, expropriating the out-group causes a candidate to lose as many votes as he gains. However, with hatred (and uniform densities), support for either candidate rises when they penalize the out-group. This suggests that once hatred starts, politicians may quickly endorse specific policies that target the object of hatred.

Support for the anti-redistribution candidate will rise with the level of hatred if and only if the anti-redistribution candidate is less generous to out-groups, i.e.

$\chi_A + (\tau_R - \tau_A)(1 - p)\Delta_y > \chi_R$, which I assume. In this case:

Proposition 4: If $f_I\left(\hat{y} + \frac{p}{1-p}v\right)$ is less than $1 + \frac{(1-p)m\delta(1-\phi)d_1}{p}$

times $f_I\left(\hat{y} + \frac{p}{1-p}\phi - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1((1-p)\Delta_y - v)\right)$, where $v = \frac{\chi_R - \chi_A}{\tau_R - \tau_A}$, then K^* , the

maximum cost that the anti-redistribution candidate is willing to spend to spread hatred, is rising with χ_A and falling with χ_R .

Anti-minority policies generally increase the supply of hatred when proposed by the anti-redistribution party, and decrease the supply of hatred when proposed by the pro-

redistribution party. As χ_A rises, the anti-redistribution candidate becomes even less favorable to the out-group, increasing the candidate's incentive to spread hate. As χ_R rises, the pro-redistribution party becomes relatively less favorable to the out-group, decreasing the anti-redistribution candidate's incentive to spread hate. The impact of anti-minority policies depends on whether they mute or exacerbate the differences in how the candidates treat out-groups.

Hating the Haters

One way to fight hatred would be to broadcast messages that debunk hate-spreading messages about the out-group. Such strategies run the risk of suggesting that the pro-out group messenger is a tool of the hated group. A probably more common strategy is to build hatred against the hate-creating politician. This strategy of hating-the-haters is a mainstay of fights against discriminatory systems. The nonviolent protest movements of Gandhi and King were effective, in part, because they built hatred against their opponents. The power of nonviolent protest comes from images in which racists can be seen as violent attackers instead of victims. The pictures of Bull Conner turning the hoses and dogs on Civil Rights marchers became etched into the minds of liberal northerners. Likewise, the Holocaust made the evil of the Nazis so apparent that the haters of Jews themselves became the objects of hatred.

Let $\chi_L = \chi_R = 0$, and assume that at a cost Z , the pro-redistribution candidate can take advantage of the anti-redistribution candidate's spreading of hatred by suggesting that the candidate himself is evil. If the anti-redistribution candidate spreads hatred and if the pro-redistribution candidate pays Z , then the out-group members will believe that the anti-redistribution candidate will impose costs of $\omega > 0$ on them and non-hateful majority group members will believe that the anti-redistribution candidate will impose costs on them of $\sigma\omega$, where $1 > \sigma > 0$. These costs are not monetary; instead they are the penalty of having a "bad," hate-mongering leader who will do bad things in addition to the policies already proposed. Haters cannot be convinced to "hate-the-hater"; they believe their hatred is entirely reasonable.

Proposition 5: There exists a value of Z , denoted Z^* , at which the pro-redistribution candidate is indifferent between villainizing a hate-spreading anti-redistribution candidate; at values of Z below Z^* the pro-redistribution candidate strictly prefers villainizing the hate-spreading anti-redistribution candidate; and at values of Z above Z^* , the pro-redistribution candidate strictly prefers not villainizing that candidate.

The value of Z^* is falling with c_R , \bar{P} , and $\tau_R - \tau_A$, and rising with ω , and σ .

Proposition 5 shows that the same logic that applies to hating the out-group applies to hating the hate-mongering leader. The pro-redistribution group is likely to hate the hater when the costs of spreading hate are low or when its costs of funds are low. Widespread hate makes it less appealing to spread hate against the hater because the in-group members who hate will not respond to this appeal. This implies that hatred displays increasing returns that might generate multiple equilibria in a richer, dynamic setting. Once a large enough share of the population becomes hateful, the price of fighting hatred rises. This sheds light on why hateful regimes rarely seem to disappear without external pressure—once the level of hatred is sufficiently high, it is hard to induce people to hate the haters.

The valued Z^* falls with $\tau_R - \tau_A$ because a wider spread in tax rates makes personal attacks less important than economic policies. In countries with small differences in parties' economic platforms, personal animosity will be more likely than in countries where these differences are larger.

Proposition 6: If $Z < Z^*$, then the anti-redistribution candidate may avoid spreading hatred, even if it is free. The maximum amount that the anti-redistribution candidate is willing to pay to spread hatred (which may be negative) is declining with ω and σ , and rising with $\tau_R - \tau_A$.

Reducing the costs of transmitting hatred increases the level of hate; reducing the costs of villainizing hate-mongers decreases the level of hate. Thus, better information technology can either increase or decrease the amount of hate.

IV. Example #1: Racism in the U.S.

Southern white America's hatred of blacks has not been constant. Prior to the Civil War, the usual Southern stereotype was that blacks were inferior but not evil. For example, in 1854, George Fitzhugh defended slavery by arguing that the black man "is but a grown up child, and must be governed as a child, not as a lunatic or criminal." W. E. B. DuBois wrote of this period, "when all the best of the Negroes were domestic servants in the best of the white families, there were bonds of intimacy, affections, and sometimes blood relationship, between the races."

C. Vann Woodward's *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* documents (and explains) the rise of anti-Black hatred in the American South between 1870 and 1900. He concludes that "wide agreement prevailed in the early [1900s] that there was less sympathy, tolerance, and understanding between the races than there had been during the Reconstruction period..." (Woodward, 2002, p. 96). Woodward documents an evolution in political rhetoric, scholarship, and the arts, where the "patronizing, sentimentalized and paternalistic" image of blacks during the ante-Bellum period is replaced by "intensive propaganda of white supremacy, Negrophobia and race chauvinism." Hatred rose in response to a "daily barrage of Negro atrocity stories." The familiar image of an inferior but not malign black was replaced by the image of a lustful, violent, aggressive black who had been guilty of crimes against whites (and would commit them again, given the chance). Woodward quotes turn-of-the-century figures such as John Spencer Bassett, who wrote in 1903 that "there is today more hatred of whites for blacks and blacks for white than ever before," and John Graves of Georgia, who wrote that "the races are wider apart, more antagonistic than 1865" (Woodward, 2002, p. 96).

Woodward's description is supported by other evidence. I searched the electronic version of the Atlanta Constitution from 1868 to 1920 for the keywords "negro murder" and "negro rape" to document Woodward's "barrage of Negro atrocity stories."¹¹ I counted the number of stories with these keywords and divided them by the number of stories with the keyword "January," to control for changes in the size of the paper and the completeness of the data base.

Figures 2 and 3 show the patterns for both series. The incidence of stories focusing on "negro rape" and "negro murder" rose steadily after the Civil War. While there are unquestionably issues with this evidence (for example, it would be helpful to control for the actual number of murders by Blacks, if such data existed), it does support Woodward's depiction of the rise of hate. This rise mirrors the rise of lynchings of Blacks (see Figure 4).¹² All three series also show a decline in the prevalence of these stories starting in 1900, which the model should also be able to explain.

Why did anti-Black hatred rise after the Civil War? In the ante-Bellum period, slaveowners had little interest in spreading hatred against their own slaves. No party in the South favored helping these slaves, and hatred might inspire those who did not own slaves to actually damage valuable slaves. Negrophobia might have led voters to support Republicans, who favored sending slaves back to Africa, rather than pro-slavery Democrats, who wanted to keep a large slave population living close to whites. Thus, the apologists for slavery argued that slaves were not evil but inferior and that slavery was actually beneficial for African-Americans. As Eugene Genovese writes, "Southerners from social theorists to divines to politicians to ordinary slaveholders insisted fiercely that emancipation would cast blacks into a marketplace in which they could not compete and would condemn them to the fate of the Indians or worse." Southern hatred focused on their political opponents, the Abolitionists, not slaves.¹³

¹¹ This is available at www.ancestry.com

¹² Lynching data comes from Project HAL and is available at <http://people.uncw.edu/hinese/HAL/HAL%20Web%20Page.htm>.

¹³ For example, when South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks physically attacked the legendary abolitionist Charles Sumner on the floor of the Senate, he justified himself by saying "whatever insults my state insults me," and his voters agreed, re-electing him after he resigned.

The model presented above suggests that the rise of hatred can be explained by specific changes in the political landscape, and in particular the rise of redistributive policies. After the Civil War, two political movements emerged whose policies would have improved Black welfare. In the immediate post-war period, freed slaves joined northern Republicans (“carpetbaggers”), and Republicanism dominated the South during Reconstruction. The Republicans had been the party of abolition and continued to represent the interests of freedmen during the 1870s. The traditional Southern elites, which favored Blacks less than their Republican opponents, used hatred to discredit their opponents: “to gain power to overthrow the carpetbaggers, the conservatives had enlisted the support of the aggressively anti-Negro whites in the struggle for redemption” (Woodward, 1951). During this period the first Ku Klux Klan flourished, and negrophobic orators like Ben Tillman, who claimed that reconstruction was an attempt to “put white necks under black heels,” first came to prominence.

After Republicanism was defeated in the late 1870s, the Populists championed policies that would benefit Blacks. The depression of the 1880s created fertile ground for this first American party committed to redistribution from rich to poor. The early Populists’ pro-poor policies would help blacks, and they sought support among poor farmers, regardless of race. C. Vann Woodward writes “more important to the success of Southern Populism than the combination with the West or with labor was the alliance with the Negro;” as a result, “populists of other Southern states followed the example of Texas, electing Negroes to their councils and giving them a voice in the party organization.”

Tom Watson, a leading Populist, declared “I have no words which can portray my contempt for the white men, Anglo-Saxons, who can knock their knees together, and through their chattering teeth and pale lips admit that they are afraid the Negroes will ‘dominate us.’” Two elements in this sentence are particularly interesting. First, Watson defends blacks, who are natural supporters of the Populists for economic reasons.

Second, Watson ridicules allegations that blacks are a threat; that suggests that hatred was being built through allegations of black danger.

The alliance between Populist and black was the crucial factor leading to the reappearance of elite support for race hatred: “Alarmed by the success that the Populists were enjoying with their appeal to the Negro voter, the conservatives themselves raised the cry of ‘Negro domination,’ and white supremacy, and enlisted the Negrophobe elements” (Woodward, 1951, p. 79). As always, hatred was built on stories of past and present attacks by blacks on the white community. “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman said that “we will not submit to [an African American] gratifying his lust on our wives and our daughters without lynching him,” that among black males “murder and rape become a monomania,” and that “the negro becomes a fiend in human form.” Vardaman, a Governor of Georgia, “won office by campaigning against negro education” (Bauerlein, 2001, p. 30), and said, in support of whites who had attacked blacks in the Atlanta Riot of 1906, “I have no word of censure for the man who kills that character of destroyer of the home,” and that “civilization cannot be suited to low-browed, veneered, semi-savage negroes.”

But if the Populists’ opponents won elections through hatred, why does hatred moderate after 1900? The answer to this puzzle appears to be a further political realignment. Accepting the power of racial hatred, the Populists dropped their attempts to recruit Black voters and endorsed both anti-Black policies and racial hatred. By 1906, Tom Watson said that the black man “grows more bumptious on the street, more impudent in his dealings with white men, and then, when he cannot achieve social equality as he wishes, with the instinct of the barbarian to destroy what he cannot attain to, he lies in wait, as that dastardly brute did yesterday near this city, and assaults the fair young girlhood of the south.”¹⁴ The model suggests that hatred declines when there is little difference in parties’ policies toward the out-group, and this subsequently occurred. As the Jim Crow

¹⁴ Watson’s strategic switch to race hatred mirrors the later opportunism of George Wallace, who first ran as racial moderate, and then switched to race hatred, vowing never to be “out-niggered” again.

consensus developed across the South, Blacks ceased to be politically relevant and the incentive to supply anti-Black hatred declined.

Ironically, both the fight against slavery during the Civil War and against Jim Crow during the 1960s Civil Rights Era depended on their own forms of hatred. Abolitionists emphasized the crimes of Southerners against blacks, and Uncle Tom's Cabin remains a classic of hate creation. Union soldiers fought for many reasons (most unrelated to slavery), but a hard core of abolitionist soldiers saw violence as the only just retribution for the evils of slavery. For example, in 1861, an infantry captain (and Harvard graduate) wrote "I want to sing 'John Brown' in the streets of Charleston, and ram red-hot abolitionism down their unwilling throats at the point of a bayonet" (cited in McPherson, 1997, p. 19). Robert Gould Shaw (made famous in the movie *Glory*) wrote that he wanted to see the confederates "running before us hacked to little pieces" (McPherson, 1997, p. 153). The inability of the two sides to reach a compromise involving compensated emancipation in the 1850s was surely connected to the growing hatred of North and South for one another.

In the Civil Rights Era, hatred of Southern racists was again a political tool. African-American leaders publicized the suffering of blacks to Northern whites. Southern leaders like Bull Conner powerfully helped the civil rights cause when he violently subdued peaceful civil rights demonstrators in front of cameras. Indeed, during the 1960s and 1970s opinion polls regularly revealed a powerful anti-Southern bias. The haters of hatred were also powerfully aided by the propaganda machine that had gone to war against Hitler. As Frederickson (2002) writes, "the civil rights movement in the United States, which succeeded in outlawing legalized racial segregation and discrimination in the 1960s, was a beneficiary of revulsion against the Holocaust as the local extreme of racism." After all, the strongest charge against the Nazis was their racist genocide. Once the country had hated one racist hater, it was only a small step to hating our own racist haters. It is a strange lesson of the fight against race hatred that this fight was not won with tolerance, but rather with another form of hate.

V. Extending the Model to Multi-Issue Elections and Exclusionary Policies

In this section, I exclude specific anti-out-group policies and hating the haters, and concentrate on the case where voters differ along two dimensions, denoted x and y . This addition to the model will allow it to address richer policy spaces and shed light on how different forms of political polarization can increase the tendency to spread hate. For simplicity I assume that x and y are uniformly distributed among in-group members across a circle with radius one, centered on the origin. The mean value of x for out-group members is $-\Delta_X$ and the mean value of y for out-group members is $-\Delta_Y$.

The candidates are labeled 1 and 2, and each candidate offers a pair of transfer policies denoted (τ_1^x, τ_1^y) and (τ_2^x, τ_2^y) and normalized so that $\tau_1^y > \tau_2^y$ and $\tau_1^x > \tau_2^x$: candidate 1 is more redistributive along both dimensions. In principle, this can always be achieved by labeling candidate 1 as the candidate with the higher tax on y , and then normalizing multiplying x by -1 . Since the mean value of x across the entire population is $-p\Delta_X$ and the mean value of y is $-p\Delta_Y$, an individual with characteristic (x, y) receives a net transfer of $\tau_1^x(-p\Delta_X - x) + \tau_1^y(-p\Delta_Y - y)$ from candidate 1 and $\tau_2^x(-p\Delta_X - x) + \tau_2^y(-p\Delta_Y - y)$ from candidate 2. I assume that each candidate gets some support from in-group members who don't hate.

Candidate 1's policies will increase the average income of the out-group by:

$(1-p)((\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)\Delta_x + (\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)\Delta_y)$. Thus, hatred will increase support for candidate 2 by: $m\delta(1-\phi)d_1$ times this amount. Proposition 7 follows:

Proposition 7: If $(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)\Delta_Y + (\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)\Delta_X > 0$, there exists a value of K , denoted K^* , at which the anti-redistribution candidate is indifferent between sponsoring hatred and not sponsoring hatred. For values of K above K^* , the anti-redistribution candidate

prefers routine electioneering. For values of K below K^* , the anti-redistribution candidate prefers to sponsor hatred. The value of K^* is falling with c_2 .

$$\text{If } \frac{\left((\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)^2 + (\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)^2 \right)^{.5}}{\sqrt{2} \left(p + m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p) \right)} > (\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)\Delta_Y + (\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)\Delta_X, \text{ then:}$$

(a) The value of K^* is rising with both Δ_Y and Δ_X .

(b) If $\Delta_Y(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x) > \Delta_X(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)$, then K^* is rising with $(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)$ and falling with $(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)$. If $\Delta_Y(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x) < \Delta_X(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)$, then K^* is falling with $(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)$ and rising with $(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)$.

The condition $(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)\Delta_Y + (\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)\Delta_X > 0$ ensures that candidate 2 is less generous to out-group members. As a result, for sufficiently low values of K , spreading hatred will be an attractive strategy since it increases the demand to impoverish out-group members. The more elaborate condition essentially ensures that a significant number of haters support both candidates. This condition is helpful (although not necessary) because if candidate 2's control over the hating in-group members is too complete, further parameter value changes don't increase politicians' incentives to spread hatred.

Result (a) implies that spreading hatred becomes more attractive when either Δ_Y or Δ_X increases. This occurs because candidate 2 has been defined as being less generous along either dimension, and increases in either of these parameters increase the difference in the degree to which the candidates impact out-group members.

Changes in tax rates have two opposite effects on the incentive to spread hatred. First, the difference in tax rates determines the amount of redistribution between the races that occurs. Second, the difference in tax rates determines the number of in-group members who are led to change their vote as a result of hatred. For example, if Δ_Y is positive and large and Δ_X is zero, increases in $\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y$ will increase the degree that candidate 1 favors

the out-group, but increases in $\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x$ will not. The only effect of increases in $\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x$ will be to increase the degree to which in-group members with high values of x vote for party 1, and those with low values vote for party 2. As $\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x$ increases, the share of voters who are close to the margin and likely to be affected by anti-out-group hate declines.

When $\Delta_Y(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x) > \Delta_X(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)$, then Δ_Y is relatively high and the primary effect of increasing $\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y$ is to raise the amount that candidate 1 favors the out-group. When this condition holds, Δ_X is relatively low and the primary effect of increasing $\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x$ is to reduce the number of in-group members who are close to the margin and likely to be impacted by hatred. Thus, if the out-group is politically different than the in-group along characteristic “ y ,” then increases in the degree of political polarization in that variable will tend to increase the degree of hatred of the out-group. Conversely, increases in the degree of polarization along the characteristic “ x ,” which is less related to out-group status, will tend to diminish politicians’ incentive to use hatred. The results where $\Delta_Y(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x) < \Delta_X(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)$ are symmetric and have the same logic.

Excluding the Out-Group

As a final perturbation, I now drop all policies relating to income redistribution and focus only on policies aimed at reducing contact with the out-group. These policies can include barring immigrants, Jim Crow segregation, and even genocide. I assume a status-quo candidate who will keep the probability of interacting with an out-group member at “ m ,” and an anti-out-group candidate who propose reducing the value of “ m ” to $m-z$, where $z > 0$. Candidates differ only in their policy on m , and as before, these policy proposals are binding commitments. The pro-segregation candidate maximizes his share of votes minus c_s times expenditures. The only expenditure will be fostering hatred at a cost of K .

In-group members who hear a story about crimes of the out-group will have the opportunity to learn the truth of the story at a cost C . As before, the gain from searching is an improved self-protection decision. When in-group members consider their search decision, they will understand that if the anti-out-group candidate wins, the value of m will drop to $m-z$. This means that the expected unconditional probability of interacting with an out-group member becomes $m - \pi_s z$, where π_s is the probability that the segregationist politician will win. This parameter is endogenous. The value of search equals $(m - \pi_s z)\phi(1-\delta)(B - D)$. To simplify things, I assume that C is distributed discretely, and for a fraction θ of the majority population, $C = \underline{C}$, and among the remainder $C = \bar{C}$.

I further assume that $\bar{C} > m\phi(1-\delta)(B - D) > (m - z)\phi(1-\delta)(B - D) > \underline{C}$. This assumption ensures that individuals with high values of C will never search, regardless of how likely they consider a victory by the anti-out-group politician, and individuals with low values of C will always search. Therefore, the share of the majority population that will believe that out-groups are a risk, once they have heard a hate creating story, will equal $1 - \theta$.

All out-group members will support the pro-minority candidate. Without hatred, the anti-out-group candidate has no support. After spreading hatred, the anti-out-group candidate will have support equal to $(1-p)$ times $(1 - \theta)$. This yields:

Proposition 8: There exists a value of K , denoted K^* , at which the candidate who favors excluding out-groups will be indifferent between spreading hatred and not spreading hatred. For values of K above K^* , the anti-redistribution candidate prefers not to spread hatred. For values of K below K^* , the anti-redistribution candidate prefers to sponsor hatred. The value of K^* is declining with p , θ , and c_s .

Proposition 8 yields the result that spreading hatred will appeal to politicians whose policies favor excluding out-groups. The incentive of these politicians to spread hatred

falls as the size of the minority population rises and as the number of in-group members with low search costs rise.

VI. Anti-Semitism in Nineteenth Century Europe

Like American hatred of Blacks, European hatred of Jews displays remarkable variation over time and space. In this section, I try to use the model to understand the geographic variation in anti-Semitism in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe and America. In Germany, Austria and Russia, virulent anti-Semitic hatred grew over the late nineteenth century. France followed a similar pattern, but anti-Semitic hatred never grew as strong. While England, the U.S., Italy, and Spain had anti-Semites, anti-Semitic hatred was never a major element of political discourse.

The politically motivated hatred of Jews that flared in the late nineteenth century had deep roots in stories of Jewish crimes told over two millennia. Jews have been accused of “supernatural powers, international conspiracies, and the ability to wreck economies; using the blood of Christian children in their rituals, even murdering them for their blood; being in league with the Devil; controlling simultaneously both the levers of international capital and of Bolshevism” (Goldhagen, 1997, p. 39). One eleventh-century rabbi wrote that the Crusaders who perpetrated the first pogroms said to themselves “let us first avenge ourselves on [the Jews] and exterminate them” (quotation in Armstrong, 1988, p. 73). Of course, the ultimate alleged crime was deicide. Historically, vilification of Jews was primarily religious. It served the purposes of the early Church, which wanted to eliminate competition, and laymen, who used hatred to legitimize expropriation of Jews’ property. For example, James Carroll writes:

Of all the characters in the Jesus story, none are more vilified by the Christian imagination than the Pharisees, and not because they would have so opposed what Jesus represented, or because they actually challenged him during his lifetime. While Jesus lived, the Pharisees would have been relatively powerless missionaries, teachers, and low-level administrators. It is only with the elimination of the Temple, and its priesthood that the Pharisees emerge as rivals – not of Jesus, but of his movement a full generation removed. That is why they are

cast as enemies in the Gospels, which is why, in turn, almost nothing said by Christians about these particular Jews is true. (Carroll, 2001, p. 110).

Thus, the original anti-Semitic component of Christianity can be interpreted as a strategic message by the Church to discredit the competing religion of Judaism. This historical hatred paved the way for the nineteenth-century anti-Semites, both because it led to Jewish social segregation and lent credibility to stories of Jewish conspiracies and malevolence.

Germany

German anti-Semitism did not start with Hitler. It rose steadily throughout the late nineteenth century as right wing politicians used hatred to discredit Jewish left wing politicians and left-wing policies that would help Jews. In the late nineteenth century, political debates in Germany (and in Russia) put Jews solidly on the left side of the political aisle. Since Jews would benefit from leftist policies, and there were some prominent Jewish left-wing politicians such as Rudolph Virchow and Eduard Lasker, right-wing leaders turned to anti-Semitic hatred.

Why did the political divisions in nineteenth-century Europe place Jews so squarely on the left? Today, we associate left-right divides with income redistribution, but the left-right divide in the nineteenth century concerned the issue of monarchy. Right-wing politicians, like Bismarck in Germany and Metternich in Austria, fought not against income redistribution, but against constitutions and democracy. Traditional monarchs refused to accept that their power came from a constitutional contract with the people, and inevitably claimed that their power came from God.¹⁵ As Kann (1974, p. 321) wrote about the Austrian empire, “a political system so flagrantly out of step with the spirit of the times needed at least one strong ideological ally; this ally by a process of elimination could only be the Church.” These words could have written about any number of Europe’s nineteenth-century monarchies.

¹⁵ For example, King Frederick William IV of Prussia refused to become Emperor of Germany in 1848 because that title was being offered by an elected assembly.

Religious support for the monarchy was naturally accompanied by monarchical support for the church. The church-crown partnership led to restrictions on Jews and other religious minorities. In addition, the traditional monarchies were bound to a whole series of long-standing rules, such as those that enshrined aristocratic privileges, which often reflected Europe's ancient restrictions on Jewish activities. As Cohn (1956) wrote, "the Right (conservative, monarchical, 'clerical') maintained that there must be a place for the Church in the public order; the Left (democratic, liberal, radical) held that there can be no (public) Church at all," and as a result, "Jews supported the Left, then, not only because they had become unshakeable partisans of the Emancipation, but also because they had no choice; as far as the internal life of the Right was concerned, the Emancipation had never taken place, and the Christian religion remained a prerequisite for political participation."

In the 1870s, during the Kulturkampf, when Bismarck allied himself with the National Liberals against the church, Bismarck's right-wing opponents attacked him, saying that "Jews actually govern us now" (Stern, 1977, p. 187). Bismarck's Catholic opponents also used anti-Semitism against him; one wrote that "whosoever makes laws in our country and has the decisive voice in finance, science, art, and the press has Semitic blood in his veins" (Stern, 1977, p. 502). The official Catholic journal *Germania* urged its readers to "buy not from Jews" (Weiss, 1996, p.85).

These scattershot attacks had limited effect because Bismarck's opponents were weak and Bismarck was far too pure a Junker to be convincingly tarred as a Jewish pawn. But in 1878, when Bismarck ended the Kulturkampf, he turned on his former liberal allies. After this point, the traditional political alignment reappeared: Bismarck, the Junkers, and the Catholic Center party on the right, and the liberals and increasingly the Social Democrats on the left. This rearrangement meant that Jews were no longer in the center with the Iron Chancellor himself, but on the left with the socialists. After 1878, anti-Semitism became the right wing's weapon of choice.

Adolph Stoecker, an Evangelical pastor, court chaplain, and right-wing politician, was a typical anti-Semitic political entrepreneur. He “founded the Christian Social Workers party, hoping to win proletarian votes for the right” (Weiss, 1996, p. 90), and announced that “the social problem is the Jewish problem” and “Israel must renounce its ambition to be master of Germany” (both quotations from Weiss, 1996, pp. 90-91). In particular, “Stoecker shouted at leftists who disrupted his campaigns that the founders of German socialism, Ferdinand Lassalle and Karl Marx, were Jewish” (Weiss, 1996, p. 94). After anti-Semitism won Stoecker the election, others followed and Conservative Party candidates also denounced the Jews (Weiss, 1996, p. 91).

By 1892, the Conservative Party platform embraced anti-Semitism and pledged to “do battle against the many-sided aggressive, decomposing, and arrogant Jewish influence on the life of our people” (Weiss, 1996, p. 116). Kaiser Wilhelm II institutionalized barriers against Jews. In 1870, Germany was an old-fashioned anti-Semitic regime with deep prejudices but limited race hatred; by 1914, the country was laced with venom against the Jews. In 1919, the Kaiser himself insisted that no German “should rest until [the Jews] have been destroyed and exterminated” (Weiss, 1996, p. 126).

After the First World War, the apostles of anti-Semitism became even more aggressive. Hitler and the Nazis used the standard tools of hatred-formation: “the Jews, as Hitler and the Nazis intoned obsessively, were seen to be the root cause of all of Germany’s other afflictions, including the loss of the First World War, the evisceration of Germany’s strength by the imposition of democracy, the threat posed by Bolshevism, the discontinuities and disorientations of modernity and more” (Goldhagen, 1997, p. 85). In Hitler’s own words, “the Jew would really devour the peoples of the earth” (Hitler, 1971, p. 452).

Like his nineteenth-century predecessors, Hitler turned anti-Semitism into a political tool by claiming that Jews lay behind almost all of his political opponents. According to Hitler, the Social Democrats were Jews (“I gradually became aware that the Social Democratic press was directed predominantly by Jews”), the communists were Jews (“the

Jewish doctrine of Marxism”), and indeed the entire Weimer Republic was, according to Hitler, a Jewish state. As such, his commitment to ending the republic became a crusade against a Jewish form of politics. Naturally, since Hitler’s policies were so fervently destructive to the Jews, anti-Semitism was a natural complement to Nazi policies.

Just as the model suggests, Germany’s anti-Semitism rose as a political tool used by opponents of policies such as equality before the law that might have helped the Jews. Openness to hatred was surely exacerbated by the fact that the Jews were such a small minority in Germany (about 1 percent). Far from being a freak occurrence, German anti-Semitism seems almost predictable, because the important political battles stood to impact Jews and because Jews were a small and relatively segregated minority.

Russia

The ideological justification for imperial rule in Russia hinged on the mystical relationship, supposedly inherited from the last Byzantine Basileus, between the Tsar (the “little father”) and God (the “big father”). As Pipes writes (1974, p. 232) “the entire ideology of royal absolutism in Russia was worked out by clergymen who felt that the interests of religion and church were best served by a monarchy with no limits to its power.” The Church was not independent, but instead the Tsar’s “authority extended over the church in all but doctrinal matters; he was the church’s temporal ruler and the clergy had to obey him” (Pipes, 1974, p.233). The tight connection between Tsar and Church meant that Jews had limited rights and were constrained to the Pale of Settlement. Inevitably, anti-Tsarist platforms were more generous to Jews, and as a result “Russified Jews were playing a conspicuous role in all the main radical movements; the revived Populist party (the Social Revolutionaries), anarchism (a force during the 1905 upheavels) and Marxism (the Social Democrats)” (Seltzer,1980, p.238).

Anti-semitism exploded in Russia after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 and the succession of his far more conservative heir Alexander III. The first large-scale pogroms in Russia occurred in 1881 during the chaos following the assassination. There is doubt

about whether the first pogroms were deliberately encouraged by the new Tsar, but consensus that “the police and army stood aside for several days while rioters looted and destroyed Jewish property” and that from this point began “the overt manipulation of Jew-hatred by the Russian government” (Seltzer, 1980, p.630). In 1882, the Tsar put forth the May Laws, which further restricted Jewish rights. These laws began the tsarist support for anti-Semitic hatred that lasted until the revolution. The Tsar’s agents spread stories of Jewish crimes ranging from international conspiracies to ritual murders. The *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which was written by a tsarist agent in the 1890s, is the most famous example of tsarist attempts to build hatred against Jews. The tsarists also organized groups, such as the Black Hundreds, who led pogroms.

The link between the Tsar and the Church was much stronger than the link between the Kaiser and the Church, making religious policies far more important in Russia than in Germany. As the model predicts, there was even more incentive for the right to spread anti-Semitic policies in Russia than in Germany, and tsarist anti-Semitism was more virulent than its Wilhelmine counterpart. Indeed, German New York Jews demonstrated to support entering World War I in 1914 on the German side. Without the left-wing revolution in 1917, which was at least temporarily committed to fighting anti-Semitism, it seems quite possible that the holocaust would have happened in Russia, not Germany.

Austria

Austria was Hitler’s home and also home of some of the most virulent anti-Semitic demagoguery. In Austria, political division that encouraged the spread of hate concerned its multi-ethnic empire. The Hapsburgs and their allies were committed to a greater Austro-Hungary that included over one million Jews in Galicia and the Bukovina alone. Not surprisingly, many Jews from the East immigrated into the more prosperous western cities, and between 1857 and 1910 the Jewish population of Vienna rose from 6,000 to 175,318 (Hamann, 1999). German nationalists who opposed the Hapsburgs favored a divorce between the German areas of Austro-Hungary and the rest of the polyglot empire. This separation would stop the westward flow of Jews.

German nationalists, like Georg Schonerer, whose Linz program advocated the restructuring (if not dissolution) of the empire, pioneered anti-Semitic politics in Austria. Schonerer's early speeches of the 1870s were not particularly anti-Semitic, and it seems likely his anti-Semitism was strategic, not heartfelt. But hatred of Jews clearly complemented his policies, and in the 1880s Schonerer started uttering sentiments like "every German has the duty to help eliminate the Jews as much as he can" and "we consider anyone a renegade of his people who knowingly supports the Jews and their agents and comrades." Like all advocates of hatred, he emphasized Jewish crimes, likening the Jews to "vampires" and saying that they wanted "to suck their vital force from the strength of the German people." Eventually, the Hapsburgs struck back. In 1888, "Schonerer was put before a court, with the active help of Crown Prince Rudolph, and sentenced to four months in high-security prison"(Weiss, 1996). He was also barred from politics for five years, and during this period his political star faded.¹⁶

Karl Lueger, another German nationalist, stepped into the political vacuum created by Schonerer's political banishment. He called for an end to legal equality within the Empire and wanted "to pass laws on the elimination of equal rights for Jews, on the confiscation of Jewish property, and the expulsion of the Jews" (Hamman, 1999, p. 286). Naturally, he pushed his policies by fomenting hatred. He accused Jews of "practicing a kind of terrorism," and claimed that "the Jews are not the martyrs of the Germans, but the Germans, the martyrs of the Jews." He called Jews "Christ-killers" and talked about how Jews "hatch cockatrice's eggs, and weave the spider's web." In private, Lueger admitted that anti-Semitism was "only a slogan used to bait the masses, and that he personally respected and appreciated many Jews and would never deliberately do an injustice to any of them" (Hamann, 1999). Even though anti-Semitic hatred in Austria was not the result of the same political divide as in the other countries, it was just as effective and eventually produced the 20th century's most destructive hater of Jews.

¹⁶ Upon his return, he became more focused on anti-Catholic hatred, again as a way to fight the monarchy. These appeals were much less successful.

France

As in Germany, Austria, and Russia, religion was a defining characteristic of the right in France. The *Ancien Regime* was buttressed by the Church; the eighteenth-century revolutionaries had expropriated the monasteries and not coincidentally emancipated the Jews. The counter-revolutionaries of the Vendee were often led by priests. The restored Bourbon monarchs tied themselves to the Church; Charles X insisted on being anointed at Rheims with pre-revolutionary holy oil. Napoleon III based his legitimacy, in part, on his role as defender of the Papacy. Through the 1870s, the monarchists were a dominant party and their royal candidate, the Comte de Chambord, was both absolutist and highly religious. Throughout this period, the left was often violently opposed to the church, and “a feud between clericals and anti-clericals poisoned the atmosphere for a generation and left a heritage of bitterness that endured until the mid-twentieth century” (Wright, 1981, p.241).

As a result, French Jews strongly associated with the left and, as the model predicts, the right turned to anti-Semitism. Journals like *Le Libre Parole* kept up a steady stream of hate-creating tales of Jewish crimes. Hate-building reached its apogee in the Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s in which the Army falsely accused a Jewish officer of being a German spy. Given the history of rising anti-Semitism in Wilhelmine Germany, it seems odd that the French right accused Jews of being German spies, but logic is not important in building hate. In 1898, when the military freed Esterhazy and confirmed its view of Dreyfus’ guilt, cities throughout France erupted in anti-Semitic riots. It seemed that France might become as anti-Semitic as Germany.

However, twenty-seven years of Republican government had given the French left many more resources than its German counterpart. Naturally, the left tried to build hate against the haters. In his famous tract *J’Accuse*, the writer Emile Zola indicted the government and turned the rhetoric of vengeance and hatred against the anti-Semites. Tapping into the long French tradition of anti-Royalism and anti-Clericalism, Zola describes the War Office that convicted Dreyfus as a “nest of Jesuits” prone to

“inquisitorial and tyrannical methods.” Zola accuses the anti-Semites as poisoners who would kill France. Hannah Arendt writes that Zola excited the passions of the mob “by raising the bogy of ‘Secret Rome’” (Arendt, 1958, p. 113). *J’Accuse* is a remarkable document that taps into vengeance and hatred in an attempt to stop anti-Semitism.

The success of *J’Accuse* is both a result and symbol of the power of the left in France. Since the 1870s, a deeply anti-clerical, anti-monarchist regime had been in power. During this period, the French educational system had emphasized the dangers posed by enemies of the republic, such as church and king. Thus, when Zola connected anti-Semitism to the enemies of France he hit fertile soil. By the 1930s, France had a Jewish premier leading its first socialist government. France was certainly wracked with the diatribes of anti-anti-Semites and anti-Semites, but just as in Russia the left won and with its victory came the defeat of large-scale political anti-Semitism.

Spain, Italy, England, and the English Colonies

I now turn to the countries where anti-Semitic hatred did not flare in the nineteenth century: Spain, Italy, and England and its colonies. Spain is perhaps the easiest case to explain. Its political divide pitted King and Church against the left, which elsewhere led to right-wing anti-Semitism, but Spain had almost no Jews. The expulsion of Jews in 1492 and the subsequent inquisition ensured that Jews were so rare in Spain that there were no prominent left-wing Jews in Spain who could be exploited as a plausible threat. Instead, the right instead built hatred against the masons, who were liberal and anti-clerical. Indeed, “Franco himself publicly referred to the machinations of a world ‘Masonic superstate’ that lay behind Spain’s ills” and his regime actively prosecuted Masons (Payne, p. 357 and p. 222).

Political anti-Semitism was also generally absent from Italy from 1860 to 1935. The right-wing did not use anti-Semitism before World War I, and in World War II Mussolini never used anti-Semitism until Hitler bullied him into cooperation. Italian cooperation

with the Holocaust was always weak: Jews in Italy had a higher survival rate during the holocaust than Jews in any other major country.

The absence of anti-Semitism in Italy is the result of a historical quirk: the right wing was anti-clerical. Like Germany, Italy was unified by a king whose supporters were the post-unification right, but Italy's right wing was implacably opposed by the Church. The royal unification of Italy in 1871 had involved the expropriation of Papal property and a revolution that toppled the far more clerical Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and Pope. Pius IX excommunicated the King and pretty much anyone else involved in Italian politics. Since both the right and left were anti-clerical, Jews were spread across the aisle and were politically irrelevant. As the model suggests, when the out-group doesn't differ in a policy-relevant way, hatred is not an attractive strategy.

In both England and the United States, anti-Semitic hatred never became a significant political force in the nineteenth century. Why? After 1689, Church-based divine right monarchism was a dead force in England and its colonies. The English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution had firmly established the principle of parliamentary ascendancy, and after 1689 the major political parties in England and the U.S. favored an essentially secular state.

Because religion was not a crucial issue, English and American parties divided on economics, foreign policy and abolition of slavery. Jews were not strongly tied to one side of any of these issues, and throughout the nineteenth century Jews could be found on both sides of the political aisle in both countries. The Tories could not espouse anti-Semitism; their most prominent leader, Benjamin Disraeli, was proud of his Jewish heritage. In the United States, Judah Benjamin was a Democratic member of the confederate cabinet, and in 1906 a Republican, Theodore Roosevelt, appointed the first Jew to the U.S. cabinet. As the model suggests, when out-groups are spread between the two parties, there is little incentive to spread hatred.

Jews became disproportionately Democratic only after the migration of Jews from Russia and Austro-Hungary and after the Republican Party abandoned its liberal wing. In principle, this should have made anti-Semitism increasingly popular for the right. However, the Nazi experience made it extremely easy to build hate against anti-Semites, so it seems unlikely that any mainstream U.S. party would use anti-Semitic hatred.

VII. Example # 3: Islamic Hatred of Americans

September 11, 2001, shocked the American population both because of the tragedy and because it revealed a depth of hatred against the U.S. that had gone unnoticed by most Americans. Table 1 documents the extent of American unpopularity in the Islamic world. As with anti-Semitic hatred in Europe and anti-Black hatred in the South, anti-American hatred is built on stories of past and future crimes. Typical comments from Palestinian activists include “the U.S. and Israel are the source of terrorism in the world,” “Palestinian children stand with Iraqi children against U.S. barbarism,” and the “United States is a fundamental enemy which takes part and holds responsibility to the elimination of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian villages.”

Hatred of the west, as opposed to hatred of America, has its roots in the struggle against the colonial empires of France and England that dominated the Middle East after the First World War. Some anti-colonial groups, such as the Society of Muslim Brothers founded by Hassan Al-Bannah in 1928 were Islamic, but most of these groups were secular, some even militantly secular communists or nationalistic modernizers. The anti-colonialists preached hatred against the colonial powers of England and France (as the U.S. did against England in 1776), and some groups supported the Nazis. For example, the “Green Shirts of the Young Egypt party had been received as fraternal delegates to the Nazi Congress in Nuremberg,” and during the war “the main chant of the crowds was not meant to improve the morale of British soldiers: *Ila’l-amam ya Rommel!* (Forward Rommel!)” (Ali, 2002, p. 97).

Yet as late as the 1960s, anti-colonial and anti-West hatred was not particularly directed against the United States. As Fareed Zakaria wrote in *Newsweek* (quoting Mohamed Heikel, a prominent Egyptian journalist), while “Britain and France were fading, hated empires,” the U.S. was not hated: “in the 1950s and 1960s it seemed unimaginable that the United States and the Arab world would end up locked in a cultural clash.” The U.S. was not particularly relevant to the internal political struggles in the Middle East, so hating the U.S. was not an advantageous strategy.

This pattern changed as the U.S. became more strongly associated with particular Middle Eastern regimes. When the U.S. would become an ally of the regime, the regime’s opponents turned to hatred of the U.S. It can be no surprise that anti-American hatred first flared with the revolution against the Shah. No leader in the Persian Gulf area was as closely associated with the United States: the C.I.A. had led his coup against Mossadegh in 1953 and the United States supported his military, and in return, the Shah’s policies were pro-America. Opposition to the Shah was the cause of communists (who were naturally anti-U.S.) and religious activists. The communists relied on the time-tested messages against capitalist exploitation. Khomeini focused on how the Americans had, through the Shah, worked to destroy traditional Islam.

Anti-U.S. propaganda exploded after the revolution. Initially, the Ayatollah and his Islamic Revolutionary Council seemed unlikely to rule post-revolution Iran. However, the Islamic Revolutionary Council used anti-U.S. sentiment to discredit their more moderate competitors and establish control over the country. The Ayatollah preached against the more moderate elements in the revolution, emphasizing their pro-western elements and connections to the “Great Satan”—America.

The taking of American hostages was called an act of righteous retribution, “protesting the Shah’s admission to the United States for treatment of the cancer that would kill him

shortly afterward.”¹⁷ (Kepel, 2002, p. 114). The takeover of the embassy produced evidence of “U.S. contacts with a number of middle-class liberals,” and “these revelations were promptly used as a pretext for new trials, executions, and confiscations of property.” Indeed, since 1979, the religious leaders of Iran have regularly used hatred against the U.S. as a political weapon to fight against moderate opponents whose policies would lead to a reconciliation with the U.S.

Elsewhere in the Arab world, anti-Americanism exploded only in the 1990s, serving a variety of political interests. Dictators who are enemies of the U.S., such as Saddam Hussein, naturally built support for their regimes by fomenting hatred. As Arafat brought the P.L.O. closer to the U.S. and Israel, first by accepting the existence of Israel in 1988 and then with the Madrid Conference (in 1991) and the Oslo Accords (1994), Arafat’s rival Hamas “appealed to those opposed to the PLO’s diplomatic initiative, calling the organization a hostage to ‘Israeli duplicity,’” (Kepel, 2002, p. 156) and generally increased its support by emphasizing the evils of the Israelis and the Americans.

In Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where the regimes are allied with the U.S. for financial and security reasons, opponents of the regimes also preach hatred against the U.S. as a means of discrediting the incumbent regimes. In Egypt, groups such as the Gamaat Islamiya have used hatred to build support against the Mubarak regime. This group particularly specializes in hatred against the Egyptian Christians (Copts), and spreads rumors such as “Christians had surreptitiously sprayed the veils of Muslim women with a mysterious aerosol that made the veils display the sign of the cross after the first wash” (Kepel, 2002). In Saudi Arabia, Osama Bin Laden “invites the faithful to forgo their differences and unite against the Al-Saud family, who have ‘collaborated with the Zionist-Crusader alliance.’” The spread of hatred has been so effective that the Saudi regime itself—which is closely tied to the U.S.—has echoed the anti-U.S. mantras of its opposition.

¹⁷ The fact that the U.S.’s crime in this case was admitting a sick man for medical treatment underscores my previous claim that it appears possible to be able to make almost any act appear vicious and worthy of

Anti-American hatred become so widespread in the Middle East for two reasons. First, the Gulf's oil means that policies of Gulf countries towards America can really hurt or help the U.S.. The U.S. has therefore become closely tied to a number of regimes for strategic and economic reasons. Second, very few Americans are actually involved directly with citizens of the Middle East's countries. The social interactions which make hatred costly don't exist. This combination of America's political relevance (which creates the incentives for supply) and the absence of interactions (which ensures that there is little desire to know the truth) fosters the spread of hatred in this region.

Why did Islamic anti-Americanism balloon only in the 1990s (outside of Iran)? Until the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was a major player in the Middle East, and communists and nationalists (like Nasser) had strong ties to the Soviet Union. In this era, it was the communists, not the Islamic Fundamentalists, who proposed policies that were most hostile to U.S. interests. If the clerics had nurtured hatred against the U.S., they would have only pushed support toward their communist opponents. Only after the communists disappeared politically did the Islamic Fundamentalists become the most anti-U.S. party, and only then did they start fomenting hatred.

VIII. Conclusion

The history of hatred suggests that when people are willing to listen, political entrepreneurs can create hatred. By telling tales of past crimes or current falsehoods, people can be convinced that some out-group is populated with dangerous criminals. This paper identifies conditions under which we should expect to see the congruence of a supply of hatred and a willingness to listen to hatred (the demand). The supply of hatred is created by political competition. When policy alternatives would have disparate impact on the minority group, then the politicians supporting the anti-minority policy will tend to use hatred. Anti-minority policies can take the form of standard income redistribution, or targeted expropriation of minorities' property, or international policies

vengeance.

that will affect the out-group or expel minorities. Hatred will increase support for policies that weaken or segregate minorities.

Citizens' willingness to accept hate-creating stories is determined by the costs of being hateful. People who interact frequently with minorities in peaceful setting will be less willing to accept stories and more interested in learning the truth. Thus, hatred is particularly likely when out-groups are politically relevant, but socially segregated.

Appendix: Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1: The benefits from search equal $m\phi(1-\delta)B$ so search is therefore optimal if and only if C is less than this amount. The number of people who search equals $H(m\phi(1-\delta)B)$, so Proposition 1 follows immediately from differentiation.

Proof of Proposition 2: Differentiating equation 1 with respect to \bar{P} yields:

$$(1-p)\left(F_I(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y) - F_I(\hat{y})\right), \text{ and}$$

$$F_I(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y) > F_I(\hat{y}) \text{ if and only if } \Delta_y < 0.$$

Proof of Proposition 3: If the anti-redistribution candidate chooses not to spread hate, then his support equals $1 - pF_0(\hat{y}) - (1-p)F_I(\hat{y})$. If he chooses to spread hate, then his support equals:

$$1 - pF_0(\hat{y}) - (1-p)\left(H(m\phi(1-\delta)B)F_I(\hat{y}) + (1 - H(m\phi(1-\delta)B))F_I(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y)\right)$$

So the gain in support from spreading hate is

$$(1-p)(1 - H(m\phi(1-\delta)B))\left(F_I(\hat{y}) - F_I(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y)\right), \text{ making hate optimal if}$$

and only if this gain is greater than $c_A K$.

Let K^* denote:

$$\frac{(1-p)(1 - H(m\phi(1-\delta)B))\left(F_I(\hat{y}) - F_I(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y)\right)}{c_A}.$$

Differentiation shows that $\frac{\partial K^*}{\partial \Delta_y} > 0$, $\frac{\partial K^*}{\partial d_1} > 0$, $\frac{\partial K^*}{\partial \delta} > 0$, $\frac{\partial K^*}{\partial p} < 0$, $\frac{\partial K^*}{\partial c_A} < 0$,

and $\frac{\partial K^*}{\partial B} < 0$.

(c) If $C = \hat{C} + \eta$, where \hat{C} is a constant and η is distributed with cumulative distribution

$$\Gamma(\eta), \text{ then } K^* \text{ is } \frac{(1-p)\left(1 - \Gamma\left(m\phi(1-\delta)B - \hat{C}\right)\right)\left(F_I(\hat{y}) - F_I\left(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y\right)\right)}{c_A}$$

which is rising with \hat{C} .

(b) Further differentiation gives us:

$$\frac{\partial K^*}{\partial m} = \frac{(1-p)}{c_A} \left(\frac{(1-H(C^*))\left(\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y f_I\left(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y\right)\right)}{-\frac{C^*}{m}h(C^*)\left(F_I(\hat{y}) - F_I\left(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y\right)\right)} \right), \text{ where}$$

$C^* = m\phi(1-\delta)B$, which is positive if and only if

$$\frac{(m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y) f_I\left(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y\right)}{\left(F_I(\hat{y}) - F_I\left(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y\right)\right)} > \frac{C^* h(C^*)}{(1-H(C^*))}$$

(d) In this case, when the anti-redistribution candidate does not spread hate his support equals :

$1 - \lambda F_0(\hat{y}) - (1-\lambda)F_I(\hat{y})$ and when he does spread hatred, his support equals:

$$1 - \lambda F_0(\hat{y}) - (1-\lambda)\left(H(m\phi(1-\delta)B)F_I(\hat{y}) + (1-H(m\phi(1-\delta)B))F_I\left(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y\right)\right)$$

So the gain in support from spreading hate is

$$(1-\lambda)(1-H(m\phi(1-\delta)B))\left(F_I(\hat{y}) - F_I\left(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y\right)\right), \text{ so that } K^* \text{ equals } \frac{1}{c_A}$$

times this amount, which is falling with λ .

Proof of Proposition 4: The gains from spreading hatred for the candidate who proposes little redistribution is:

$$(1-H(C^*))(1-p) \text{ times } F_I\left(\hat{y} + \frac{P}{1-p}v\right) - F_I\left(\hat{y} + \frac{P}{1-p}v - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1((1-p)\Delta_y - v)\right),$$

and the maximum amount that this candidate will spend on redistribution equals $1/c_A$ times this amount. Differentiation then shows that

$$(A1) \quad \frac{\partial K^*}{\partial v} = \frac{p}{1-p} f_I \left(\hat{y} + \frac{p}{1-p} v \right) - \left(\frac{p}{1-p} + m\delta(1-\phi)d_1 \right) f_I \left(\hat{y} + \frac{p}{1-p} v - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1((1-p)\Delta_y - v) \right)$$

which is always negative as long as $f_I \left(\hat{y} + \frac{p}{1-p} v \right)$ is less than

$$1 + \frac{(1-p)m\delta(1-\phi)d_1}{p} \text{ times } f_I \left(\hat{y} + \frac{p}{1-p} v - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1((1-p)\Delta_y - v) \right).$$

It then follows that K^* is decreasing with $\frac{\chi_R - \chi_A}{\tau_R - \tau_A}$, so K^* will be rising with χ_A ,

falling with χ_R , and rising with $\tau_R - \tau_A$ if and only if $\chi_A > \chi_R$.

Proof of Proposition 5: The gain in support for the pro-redistribution candidate from villainizing a hate-spreading, anti-redistribution candidate equals:

$$p \left(F_0 \left(\hat{y} + \frac{\omega}{\tau_R - \tau_A} \right) - F_0(\hat{y}) \right) + (1-p)(1-\bar{P}) \left(F_I \left(\hat{y} + \frac{\sigma\omega}{\tau_R - \tau_A} \right) - F_I(\hat{y}) \right). \text{ This quantity is}$$

strictly positive and the value of Z^* , at which the pro-redistribution candidate is

indifferent between hating the hater and not, is equal to this quantity times $\frac{1}{c_R}$. Since

the utility of the pro-redistribution candidate is strictly declining in costs, for values of Z above Z^* , the candidate will prefer not to spend on villainization and for values of Z below Z^* , the candidate will prefer to spend on villainization. Differentiation then yields that the value of Z^* is falling with c_R , \bar{P} , and $\tau_R - \tau_A$, and rising with ω , and σ .

Proof of Proposition 6: If $Z < Z^*$, then spreading hatred will necessarily engender a backlash of vilification. The net gain from spreading hatred, including the later vilification, which will be anticipated, equals:

$$p \left(F_0(\hat{y}) - F_0 \left(\hat{y} + \frac{\omega}{\tau_R - \tau_A} \right) \right) + (1-p) \left(F_I(\hat{y}) - (1-H)F_I \left(\hat{y} + \frac{\sigma\omega}{\tau_R - \tau_A} \right) - HF_I(\hat{y} - m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)\Delta_y) \right).$$

The value of K^* equals this amount divided by c_A . If d_1 is sufficiently small then this quantity may be negative, so that the anti-redistribution candidate will not spread hatred even if it is costless. Differentiation shows that this quantity, and hence the value of K^* , is declining with ω and σ , and rising with $\tau_R - \tau_A$.

Proof of Proposition 7: Non-hating majority group members will support candidate 2 if $(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)x + (\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)y + p((\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)\Delta_x + (\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)\Delta_y) > 0$, and hating majority group members will support candidate 2 if

$$(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)x + (\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)y + (p+q)((\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)\Delta_x + (\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)\Delta_y) > 0, \text{ where}$$

$q = m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p)$. These inequalities define areas of the unit circle delimited by two chords. This area is defined uniquely by the minimum distance between the chord and the origin, and this distance is $p\Theta$ for non-hating in-group members and

$$(p+q)\Theta \text{ for hating in-group members where } \Theta = \frac{((\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)\Delta_y + (\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)\Delta_x)}{\sqrt{(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)^2 + (\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)^2}}.$$

The difference in the two areas equals:

$$(A2) \quad 2(1-p)P \int_{\xi=p\Theta}^{\text{Min}(1,(p+q)\Theta)} (1-\xi^2)^{.5} d\xi.$$

As q and Θ are positive as long as $(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)\Delta_y + (\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)\Delta_x > 0$, and as long as $p\Theta < 1$ (which is implied by the assumption that some non-hateful majority voters support both candidates) then equation (A2) is a strictly positive amount that must be greater than costs when K is sufficiently low and less than costs when K is sufficiently



high. The value of K^* that equates costs and benefits from spreading hatred for candidate 2 equals $\frac{1}{c_2}$ times equation (A2). It immediately follows that K^* is declining in c_2 .

Variables (denoted “z”) that affect these returns only by changing Θ will increase Candidate 2’s returns from spreading hatred if and only if (A2) is increasing in Θ . If $1 > (p + q)\Theta$, the derivative of (A2) with respect to Θ equals

$$2(1-p)\sqrt{p+q}(1 - ((p+q)\Theta)^2)^{.5} - p(1 - (p\Theta)^2)^{.5}, \text{ which is positive whenever}$$

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} > (p+q)\Theta \text{ or } \frac{\left((\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)^2 + (\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)^2 \right)^{.5}}{\sqrt{2} \left((\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)\Delta_Y + (\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)\Delta_X \right)} > p + m\delta(1-\phi)d_1(1-p), \text{ which I}$$

assume. The value of Θ is always rising, and hence K^* is rising, with both Δ_Y and Δ_X .

The value of Θ is rising with $(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)$ if and only if $\Delta_Y(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x) > \Delta_X(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)$ and

the value of Θ is rising with $(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x)$ if and only if $\Delta_Y(\tau_1^x - \tau_2^x) < \Delta_X(\tau_1^y - \tau_2^y)$.

Proof of Proposition 8: Without spreading hatred, the anti-minority candidate has no support. When it spreads hatred the anti-minority total support equals $(1-\theta)(1-p)$ at a cost K . If K equals $(1-\theta)(1-p)/c_s$ then the candidate is exactly indifferent between spreading hatred and not doing so, and I denote this quantity K^* . If K is greater than this amount then the candidate prefers not to spread hate. If K is less than this amount, then the candidate prefers to spread hate. Differentiation shows that the value of K^* is declining with p and θ and rising with c_s .


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Figure 1: Hatred and Support for Redistribution






Figure 2: 'Negro Murder'/'January' in the Atlanta Constitution




Figure 3: 'Negro Rape'/'January' in the Atlanta Constitution




Figure 4: Lynchings 1882-1930

Table 1: Anti-Americanism around the World

Question: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States.

	Very Unfavorable	Somewhat Unfavorable
Canada	8%	19%
Argentina	23%	26%
Brazil	11%	24%
Bolivia	11%	24%
Mexico	10%	15%
Guatemala	3%	10%
Venezuela	3%	11%
Honduras	2%	3%
U.K.	4%	12%
France	8%	26%
Germany	4%	31%
Bulgaria	5%	13%
Poland	1%	10%
Russia	6%	27%
Angola	7%	16%
India	16%	11%
Japan	3%	23%
Vietnam	4%	23%
Indonesia	9%	27%
Egypt	59%	10%
Jordan	57%	18%
Lebanon	38%	21%
Pakistan	58%	11%
Turkey	42%	13%
Uzbekistan	4%	2%

Source: Pew Research Institute.

