Does Monetary Policy Help Least Those Who Need It the Most?

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Current version: July 16, 2004

**Abstract**

We estimate the effects of U.S. monetary policy on the cross-sectional distribution of state economic activity variables for a 35-year panel. Our results indicate that the effects of policy have a significant history dependence, in that depressed regions contract more to contractionary monetary shocks. Moreover, policy is asymmetric, in that expansionary shocks have less of a beneficial impact upon depressed areas. As a result, we conclude that slower growing regions benefit relatively less from monetary expansions and decline relatively more following monetary contractions.

**JEL Categories:** E32, E59, R10.

**Keywords:** monetary policy, asymmetric effects, state dependence, regional business cycles.

Thanks to seminar participants at Wesleyan University for helpful comments. Please do not cite this preliminary draft without the authors’ prior consent.
1 Introduction

Milton Friedman’s oft-quoted observation that monetary policy has “long and variable lags” implies a more complicated propagation mechanism than is typically incorporated in aggregate linear macroeconomic models. Most common approaches to quantifying the effects of monetary policy changes on the economy ignore the possibility that these effects might be asymmetric, in that the economic impact of contractionary policy might not be the mirror image of expansionary policy\(^1\) — or state dependent, in that the transmission mechanism might differ depending on the stage of the business cycle. Put another way, the consequences of a monetary policy shock might depend both on the sign of that shock and on the history of other macroeconomic shocks that preceded it.

Identifying these types of non-linearities is difficult in aggregate time series variables: in a given sample, how does one distinguish similarly-sized policy shocks that have differential effects from differently-sized shocks, if one must estimate the nature of both the shock and the subsequent dynamic effects? Due to changes in the practice of monetary policy and the nature of the economy, even a long time series may not be sufficient to recover the true nature of the impulse and propagation mechanisms.

While monetary policy, as practiced in the U.S. and other large countries, is determined at the national level in response to national events, it does not necessarily have uniform effects throughout the country\(^2\). Recently, several authors have documented differential effects of monetary policy on U.S. regions and states. Our work complements that literature, suggesting that monetary policy can have important distributional consequences. However, in our approach the main distinguishing characteristic is not the industrial mix or other fixed attribute of the state or region, but rather the relative position of economic activity within the state prior to the policy change. By examining the effects on the cross-sectional distribution of state activity of common monetary policy actions through time, we can better ascertain the extent and import of history dependence for the monetary transmission mechanism.

Any distributional consequences not only are likely to be of interest to U.S. politicians and policy makers; such an investigation also may be informative for the design of institutions in the Euro zone: the U.S. states can be thought of as small open economies with their exchange rates fixed through a currency

\(^1\) Such an asymmetry is implicit in another oft-repeated quip: “monetary policy cannot push on a string.”

\(^2\) Although policy could be a function of regional data instead of, or in addition to, national aggregates, rarely is U.S. Federal Reserve policy conceptualized in such a manner. Indeed, Frantantoni and Schuh (2003) make note of a video game in the visitors’ lobby at the Board of Governors called “You Are the Chairman.” In that simulation the suggested monetary policy response to a rise in unemployment in only one region of the country (several farm-belt states) is “no change.” (See endnote 7 of Frantantoni and Schuh, 2003.)
union that eliminates monetary independence. While there are some important differences between the
U.S. states and members of EMU — fiscal federalism, factor mobility, etc. — the broad similarities may
allow useful inference from the U.S. states’ experiences for current and future participants in EMU.

Our empirical estimates of the interaction of monetary policy changes with the recent history of local
activity in a panel of U.S. state-level data suggests a resoundingly affirmative answer to the question
proposed by the title of this paper: monetary policy is less beneficial for areas that are depressed relative
to the average position of states at the time of the policy shock. Moreover, we find that the strength of
the answer may differ depending on whether the policy action is expansionary or contractionary, thus
introducing an additional asymmetry into the transmission of monetary policy.

Finally, while the regional consequences are interesting and important in their own right, we view
the implications for the modeling of monetary policy more generally to be particularly significant. The
existence of these non-linearities in the transmission of monetary policy shocks suggests a misspecification
of policy in aggregate, linear models. Additionally, we interpret the existence of these asymmetric,
state dependent results as suggestive of the credit channel of monetary policy, broadly construed.

The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we discuss related research; our approach can be viewed
as merging concepts from different literatures, notably on the regional effects of monetary policy and on
asymmetric policy models, with an emphasis on the lending or credit channel. Section 3 discusses how
and why state dependence of monetary policy might arise at the sub-national level, and motivates the
search for differential effects of expansionary versus contractionary policy. Section 4 incorporates these
considerations into a statistical model, and section 5 reports the empirical results from U.S. state-level
data. Section 6 concludes.

2 Literature Review

Recently, several authors have investigated whether monetary policy might have different effects across
U.S. regions or states. Because estimation over a panel at the state level quickly uses up degrees of free-
dom, especially in a vector autoregressive (VAR) or simultaneous-equations framework, many authors
aggregate to a smaller number of regions. For example, Carlino and DeFina (1998) estimate a regional
VAR model for the eight Bureau of Economic Analysis regions. They find that contractionary shocks to

3The BEA’s eight U.S. regions are: New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), Mideast (DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, PA), Southeast (AL,
AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV), Great Lakes (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI), Plains (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD), Rocky...
the Federal Funds rate affect states in the Great Lakes region more, and states in the Rocky Mountain and Southwest regions less, than the remaining regions or the country as a whole. Their results are robust to common alternative monetary policy variables, and to using employment growth instead of real personal income growth as the activity measure. While such aggregation might be thought to mask some important aspects of the local economic relationships or to confound others, Carlino and DeFina (1999) find similar results with separately estimated VARs for the lower 48 states.

More recently, Owyang and Wall (2004) report evidence of structural breaks in the regional impacts of monetary policy by estimating a large regional VAR specification separately over pre-Volcker (1960Q1 – 1978Q4 in their paper) and post-Volcker (1983Q1 – 2002Q4) sub-samples. Our model generalizes this idea by investigating the state dependent nature of monetary policy conditional on the distribution of the history of local shocks, rather than on a finite set of discrete changes in the propagation mechanism.

In a paper close in spirit to our own investigation, Frantantoni and Schuh (2003) investigate the effects of monetary policy through regional housing markets. They develop a “heterogenous agent VAR” approach which allows them to estimate a two-stage model: first the regional dynamics are estimated taking the national variables as given, then the aggregated regional variables and national variables are estimated in a traditional VAR framework. As the dynamics of the aggregate stage are influenced by the distribution and history of shocks in the regional stage, their approach embodies a particular kind of state dependence for monetary policy. They use their estimates to simulate how the monetary transmission mechanism changes in the midst of a coastal housing boom versus a more homogeneous regional distribution. Due to constraints on the scope of available data (they collect a balanced panel of 27 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas observed quarterly from 1986Q3 to 1996Q2), they present their results as suggestive of the potential consequences of ignoring regional heterogeneity and state dependence for monetary policy.

Both Frantantoni and Schuh (2003) and Owyang and Wall (2004) find that the lengths of monetary-induced downturns generally are much shorter at the regional level than are those estimated with national data. They both posit that aggregation bias may cause national VARs to over-estimate the actual duration of the response of the activity variable. Consistent with our approach, each pair of authors proposes that non-linearities in the relationship between the policy variable and local activity measures might explain this apparent bias.

Mountain (CO, ID, MT, UT, WY), Southwest (AZ, OK, NM, TX), and Far West (AK, CA, HI, OR, NV, WA).
In addition, our approach allows the magnitude and duration of the responses of activity to a monetary shock to differ between expansionary and contractionary actions. Our approach to modeling these asymmetric effects is related to earlier work by Cover (1992), in which innovations to the policy instrument are separated into positive and negative components that are entered jointly into the estimation. Alternative approaches, such as threshold VAR models (see, e.g., Choi, 1999), place even greater demands on the data and therefore are not practical for our panel of state observations. Details of the treatment of the asymmetries in the model are presented in sections 4 and 5.

3 Policy Transmission at the Sub-National Level

Several papers cited previously establish significant variation in business cycles across regions of the U.S. Asynchronized fluctuations in real economic activity could be due to idiosyncratic shocks or to common shocks with different propagation mechanisms. State-level differences in the industrial mix or structure of the financial sector are often cited as potential sources of this variation, although differences in local labor markets, natural resource endowments, expenditure and tax policies, regulatory environments and so forth could also be contributing factors. However, like many of the above papers, we are interested primarily in the role the banking sector plays in the differential transmission of monetary policy among sub-national areas.

At the national level, numerous authors have found evidence supporting the importance of the banking sector for the transmission of monetary policy; Bernanke and Gertler (1995) provide an overview. Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) and Owyang and Wall (2004) use proxies for a traditional interest rate channel of monetary policy as well as for various definitions of the credit channel to test which are systematically related to the cross-regional (or state) differences in the response to monetary shocks. Their results are decided mixed. Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) report only weak support for the broad credit channel and none for the narrow credit channel in their sample. Owyang and Wall (2004), by contrast, find that the narrow credit channel can account for the depth of the income response to monen-

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4 Choi (1999) also focuses on distinct policy regimes, whereas we consider differential effects of policy actions.
5 Hanson McPherson and Waller (2000) provide evidence that bank lending is more a local than national activity, so complete smoothing across regions is not possible.
6 For the interest rate channel, the fraction of employment in manufacturing is used as the proxy. For the broad credit channel — that small firms have more limited access to non-bank sources of funds — some measure of the concentration of firms by size (usually employment) is used. For the narrow credit (or bank lending) channel — that smaller banks have difficulty adjusting their balance sheets and thus constrain loans more during tight monetary policy, as in Kashyap and Stein (2000) — a measure of bank deposit or loan shares is employed.
tary shocks, but not their cumulative cost (income loss), during their post-Volcker sample. For their full sample, all three channel proxies have significant explanatory power for the cumulative loss, but none for the depth of monetary-induced recessions. Reconciling these differences is difficult, as the studies investigate different sample periods, regional definitions, and policy experiments.

Frantantoni and Schuh (2003) examine mortgage interest rates as their link between aggregate activity and regional heterogeneity, and find evidence of state dependence in monetary transmission via the housing market. Our approach is less direct, but arguably more general. As Frantantoni and Schuh (2003), we seek to determine how the monetary transmission mechanism changes over the business cycle. While there are likely numerous possible interactions, we focus on the credit channel in general. Changes in the value of collateral held by borrowers — or, equivalently, the asset side of banks’ balance sheets — will affect the level of lending activity in a region.\footnote{Notice that this scenario has aspects of both the broad and narrow credit channels.} Such changes are likely to be highly correlated with the stage of the business cycle — consider the value of residential real estate, for example. From the lender’s perspective, the distribution of potential borrowers — or the expected return on investment projects — may also vary over the business cycle. If banks tend to ration the supply of loans when such adverse selection or moral hazard problems are more prevalent, then areas experiencing recessions are more likely to suffer as a result. Our approach does not require us to separately identify loan supply and demand shocks, which can be difficult and thus represents an advantage for our approach.\footnote{For perspectives on the challenges of identifying changes in loan supply, see, e.g., Peek et al. (2003) and Driscoll (2004).}

These effects describe the conditions existing in local markets prior to a change in monetary policy. In this environment, contractionary monetary policy should disproportionally affect those localities already experiencing a slowdown. As has been emphasized in the lending channel literature (see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), contractionary monetary policy is likely to result in a reduction of lending activity due to the asymmetric information or balance sheet issues raised above. For regions that are relatively well-off, such effects are likely to be minimal, whereas for an area in which collateral is undervalued or banks are already nervous about lending, contractionary policy could have even greater effects. In concrete terms, contractionary policy might be expected to depress activity even more in a relatively slow growth area such as the Midwest in the mid-1980s, whereas the impact on the booming coasts might be proportionally smaller.

The same logic should hold for expansionary policy as well: for regions already experiencing a boom, a loosening of policy should result in a greater expansion of lending activity (many more consumers...
who can benefit from mortgage refinancing, for example) than for regions mired in recession. Thus, for a region that is in a boom the positive effects of expansionary monetary policy changes are amplified, while the negative effects of contractionary changes are mitigated. The converse is true for regions that are experiencing slowdowns. As a result, the logic of the state-dependent nature of policy also suggests an important asymmetry between expansionary and contractionary policy changes. Our goal in this paper is to quantify the impact of monetary policy changes in these four potentially different cases. In section 4 we formalize the above discussion into an econometric specification, which is then estimated on a panel of U.S. state data. Those results are discussed in section 5.9

4 Empirical Model

Let $y_{it}$ represent observations on the endogenous measure of economic activity for state $i$ in time period $t$. Note that $y_{it}$ could be a vector, although we currently use only a single series in our estimates below. Let $z_i$ be a vector of national variables, including the monetary policy instrument. A general dynamic representation for $y_{it}$ can be written as

$$y_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^{q} \alpha_j y_{it-j} + \sum_{k=0}^{p} \beta_k z_{t-k} + \sum_{k=0}^{p} \sum_{j=k+1}^{q} \gamma_{jk} (y_{it-j} \cdot z_{t-k}) + \epsilon_i + \mu_t + \nu_{it}$$  (1)

where the composite error term includes state fixed effects ($\epsilon_i$), a stochastic time trend ($\mu_t$), and idiosyncratic state-level shocks ($\nu_{it}$).

Notice that we have included the interaction of the lagged endogenous variable with the vector of national variables. These terms allow for the possibility of state dependence in the effects of the aggregate variables on the activity measure. Based on our discussion above, we are most interested in the $\gamma_{jk}$ terms that measure the importance of the interaction with the monetary policy instrument in $z_t$.

As written, equation (1) is like to suffer from endogenous regressors. Like Frantantoni and Schuh (2003), we could presume the national variables are predetermined with respect to the state-level dynamics. The dimensionality of our data set prohibits applying their HAVAR approach, in which an aggregation equation transmits the cumulative effects of changes in the local endogenous variables back to the national level. Alternatively, like much of the regional VAR literature, we could assume that monetary

\footnote{Additional recent research on the bank financing channel that may be relevant to our project include Kashyap and Stein (2000), Campello (2002) and Morgan et al. (2003). We plan to integrate this literature into our analysis in a subsequent draft.}
policy only affects activity variables with a lag, and replace $k = 0$ with $k = 1$ in the above specification. However, our interaction terms are not conducive to standard VAR estimation techniques, which presume a linear model.

Therefore we take an alternative approach. As we are interested in the differential effects of policy across geographical areas, we subtract the cross-sectional average of the endogenous activity variable from each state observation at every point in time: $	ilde{y}_{it} = y_{it} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} y_{it}$. This geographically de-meaned variable captures the cross-state dispersion of the activity measures.

Transforming the other variables in equation (1) in a similar manner yields:

$$
\tilde{y}_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^{a} \alpha_j \tilde{y}_{i,t-j} + \sum_{k=0}^{p} \sum_{j=k+1}^{a} \gamma_{jk} (\tilde{y}_{i,t-j} \cdot z_{t-k}) + \tilde{\xi}_i + \tilde{\nu}_{it}
$$

(2)

Notice that this transformation eliminates all terms that do not vary across space (namely $z_t$ and $\mu_t$). As these variables are the source of the potential endogeneity problem for equation (1), the transformation results in a specification that can be estimated by OLS — provided the central bank does not set policy in response to the dispersion of regional activity. Based on the discussion in section 2, we find this assumption both plausible and consistent with Federal Reserve behavior. Thus, while equation (2) still includes the contemporaneous macroeconomic variables interacted with the vector of lagged endogenous variables, OLS estimation will be consistent. Put another way, even if $z_t$ were correlated with $\nu_{it}$, it is unlikely to be correlated with $\tilde{\nu}_{it}$. Equation (2) is the basis for our empirical results in section 5. Notice that, relative to the regional VAR models discussed in section 2, our approach can consistently estimate the effects of contemporaneous policy innovations on the cross-sectional distribution of state economic activity.$^{10}$

4.1 Computation of Responses to Monetary Shocks

To estimate the dynamic effects of a monetary policy shock for the dispersion of real state activity, we start by assuming that the local economy is in its steady-state. Then, in the absence of any changes to monetary policy, state-specific shocks ($\tilde{\nu}_{it}$) lead to temporary business cycle effects as the state economy converges back to the steady state. These cycles are protracted, however, so that a state that experiences

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$^{10}$In section 5 we generally cannot reject that null hypothesis that the interaction terms involving the contemporaneous funds rate are jointly zero, nor the null that they sum to zero. These results provide some support of the common practice in VAR models to use the lagged response of activity variables to a monetary policy as an identifying assumption.
an idiosyncratic shock can expect to remain away from trend for many quarters. In section 5 we shock the system with a one standard deviation shock (positive or negative) one or more quarters prior to the monetary policy shock to create a recessionary (negative shock) or expansionary (positive shock) local environment, relative to the average state, prior to the change in monetary policy.\(^{11}\)

So long as the central bank does not respond to regional dispersion in economic activity, as argued above, conceptually we can employ a two-step procedure: we can recover the dynamics of an exogenous monetary policy shock on the policy instrument from a model estimated with national data (such as a VAR), then feed the response of the instrument into the moving average representation of the de-meaned state activity variable to find its dynamics.\(^{12}\)

From the first stage we can recover the policy instrument as a function of all the structural shocks at the national level, including the monetary policy shock. For the purposes of measuring the impact of monetary policy shocks, we normalize the other shocks to zero at all horizons. Then the policy variable can be written as

\[
z_t = \Theta(L) \mu_t = \sum_{m=0}^{\infty} \theta_m \mu_{t-m},
\]

where \(\mu_t\) is the structural shock to monetary policy. The impulse response to a one-time monetary shock then can be expressed simply as

\[
\frac{\partial z_{t+h}}{\partial \mu_t} = \theta_h.
\]

To find the impact of a one-time shock to monetary policy on the cross-sectionally demeaned state activity variable, \(\tilde{y}_{it}\), we first lead equation (2) by \(h\) periods (after normalizing the steady state and leads of the idiosyncratic shock to zero)

\[
\tilde{y}_{it+h} = \sum_{j=1}^{a} \alpha_{j} \tilde{y}_{it-j+h} + \sum_{k=0}^{p} \sum_{j=k+1}^{q} \gamma_{jk} (\tilde{y}_{it-j+h} \cdot z_{t-k+h})
\]

From equation (3), a one-time monetary shock at time \(h = 0\) implies

\[
z_{t-k+h} = \begin{cases} 
\theta_{h-k} & \text{for } h \geq k \\
0 & \text{for } h < k 
\end{cases}
\]

\(^{11}\)Recall that the monetary policy shock is orthogonal to the state idiosyncratic shock by construction.

\(^{12}\)This technique accounts for national non-monetary factors in one of two ways: those that have no distributional consequences are eliminated by geographically de-meaning the data as in equation (2); those that do are correctly captured by the regional shocks, \(\tilde{\nu}_{it}\).
Thus, equation (5) can be written as

\[
\tilde{y}_{it+h} = \sum_{j=1}^{q} \alpha_j \tilde{y}_{i,t-j+h} + \mu_t \min(p,h) \sum_{k=0}^{\min(p,h)} \theta_{h-k} \sum_{j=k+1}^{q} \gamma_{jk} \tilde{y}_{i,t-j+h}
\]

Collecting common terms for \(\tilde{y}_{i,t+h}\) yields a recursive formula for the impulse responses to a one-time monetary policy shock \((\mu_t)\), given the previously estimated lag polynomial \(\Theta(L)\) for the dynamics of the Fed Funds rate with respect to the policy shock from equation (3) and the estimates of \(\alpha_j\) and \(\gamma_{jk}\) from equation (2).

\[
\tilde{y}_{i,t+h} = \sum_{j=1}^{q} \left( \alpha_j + \sum_{k=0}^{j-1} \theta_{h-k} \gamma_{jk} \right) \mu_t \cdot \tilde{y}_{i,t+h-j}
\] (7)

Equation (7) forms the basis for the simulation of the impulse responses. With multiple observations at the same point in time, one can hold constant the nature of the monetary impulse and monitor how different localities react as a function of their current economic conditions. If similar shocks have systematically different effects conditional on this information, this provides evidence that monetary policy is state dependent.

5 Results

5.1 Data Measurement and Transformations

The raw data for the state activity variable used in the estimates below is personal income for all 50 states since 1969Q1, as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Because price indexes are not available for individual states, we convert these data into real 2000 dollars by the U.S. implicit price deflator for GDP. We further divide by quarterly state population to get per capita real income.\(^{13}\) Our measure of state economic activity, \(y_{it}\), is the annualized one-quarter growth rate of real per capita personal income.\(^{14}\) Our preferred measure of the monetary policy instrument is the effective Federal Funds rate; we use the final month of each quarter for our quarterly observation.\(^{14}\) After accounting for lags and the computation of the income growth rate, our base model is estimated over the period 1970Q2 – 2003Q4. In total,  

\(^{13}\)Annual state population estimates come from the U.S. Census Bureau. We linearly interpolate a quarterly series with the third quarter observation set to the value reported by Census each July, save for the decadal observations of 1970, 1980 and 1990; these are reported in April and coded as the second quarter observation for those years.

\(^{14}\)In a future draft, we plan to examine alternative measures of state economic performance and monetary policy.
our sample consists of a balanced panel of 6,550 observations.

Figure 1 plots the growth rate of real per capita personal income averaged over the cross-section at each point in time, along with the corresponding plus and minus one standard deviation interval (the grey dashed lines) computed per quarter. For our full sample, the annualized mean quarterly growth rate of real per capita income for the country as a whole is 2.1% with an annualized standard deviation of 2.3%. However, some of the smaller states (in terms of population) exhibit far more volatile quarterly growth rates. For example, the average annual rate of income growth for South Dakota is 2.4% in our sample, while the standard deviation is a whopping 13%. By contrast, California (the largest state by population) has an average annual income growth of 2.1% with a standard deviation of 1.9%, closely mirroring the national figures. To avoid having the observations from the smaller states unduly influence our results, we use a weighted estimation technique. The weights are each state's population as a proportion of the total national population in period $t$.\textsuperscript{15}

### 5.2 Quantifying the State Dependence Effect

We begin by estimating equation (2) above. The geographically de-meaned activity measure, $\tilde{y}_{it}$, is the one-quarter income growth rate in state $i$ at date $t$ less the average growth rate across all 50 states at time $t$. We use $p = 4$ lags of demeaned income growth and $q = 3$ lags of the Funds rate (plus the contemporaneous observation) in estimation. Notice that the monetary policy instrument only enters equation (2) interacted with lagged observations of the dependent variable.

Our main hypothesis is that states that are doing relatively worse than the national average will have a larger negative response to a monetary contraction than the average state. In other words, a “depressed” state will move farther away from the average following a negative monetary policy shock. For our specification, this hypothesis implies a positive sum of the $\gamma_{jk}$ terms in equations (1) and (2).\textsuperscript{16} Collectively, the $\hat{\gamma}_{jk}$ sum to $-0.01$ ($p$-value $= 0.39$). However, the coefficients on the more recent lags of the Fed Funds rate interactions are larger and highly significant. Specifically, the sum of $\hat{\gamma}_{10}$ through $\hat{\gamma}_{51}$ is 0.06 ($p$-value $= 0.02$) and the sum of $\hat{\gamma}_{10}$ through $\hat{\gamma}_{62}$ is 0.03 ($p$-value $= 0.17$). We conclude that increases in the Federal

\textsuperscript{15}We also experimented with excluding the most volatile states from the sample entirely (usually Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota) and with an unbalanced panel formed by truncating the top and bottom 1% of the individual observations on demeaned state income growth. In the majority of these cases the truncation and exclusion methods made our results below stronger and more statistically significant. For exposition, we only report the results from the weighted regressions.

\textsuperscript{16}Each interaction term is the product $\gamma_{jk} \times \tilde{y}_{it-j} \times z_{t-k}$. A contractionary Funds rate shock (positive $z_{t-k}$) interacting with a “depressed” state (negative $\tilde{y}_{it-j}$) yields a lower than average impulse response if $\gamma_{jk} > 0$. 

\[10\]
Funds rate during the contemporaneous or immediately previous quarter cause states with relatively low growth rates in the recent past to diverge even more from the national average.

As in the VAR literature, the large number of coefficient estimates in equation (2) are difficult to interpret individually, or even jointly. To really uncover the dynamic effects of a monetary policy shock on the distribution of state income growth in our model, we compute impulse responses for $\tilde{y}_{it}$. Due to the state dependency represented by the interaction terms, the magnitude and duration of the computed responses depends on the assumed initial conditions for the lagged values of $\tilde{y}_{i(t-j)}$, which in turn are a function of the history of spatially demeaned idiosyncratic shocks, $\tilde{\nu}_{it-j}$.\textsuperscript{17}

Therefore, as proposed in section 4 above, we presume a state first experiences a one-time exogenous shock to $\tilde{\nu}_{it-j}$. This process creates a deviation from the steady-state that can then give rise to non-trivial effects of a monetary policy change working through the interaction terms. It is important to recognize that the time $t-j$ idiosyncratic shock and the time $t$ monetary policy shock are independent; this framework merely allows a simple, straight-forward way to quantify the significance of the state dependence terms. In the figures shown below, we let $j = 4$ and $\tilde{\nu}_{it-j}$ equal one standard deviation below the average state income growth rate in our sample.

To further isolate the quantitative significance of the interaction terms, we can simulate the impulse response to the $\tilde{\nu}_{it-j}$ shock alone, without any subsequent monetary policy shock. This response is a function solely of the $\hat{\alpha}_j$ parameters, and provides the baseline dynamics for a state that is shocked away from its steady-state growth rate (normalized to zero). These natural “business cycle” dynamics of the endogenous activity variable will eventually return state $i$ to its long-run average growth rate; in our sample the initial shock is approximately 5 percentage point and the own response of $\tilde{y}_{it-j+h}$ persists for about $h = 12$ quarters on average.\textsuperscript{18}

Given these underlying dynamics, what is the additional impact of a contractionary shock to monetary policy for a state that experienced a negative idiosyncratic shock four quarters ago? To measure this effect, we compute the impulse responses from a one-time 25 basis point increase in the Fed Funds rate and subtract the natural dynamics as specified in the previous paragraph. The resulting response is shown in figure 2. Note that this response is not exactly the one given by equation (7), as it ignores the persistence of the Funds rate (the $\theta_h$ terms for $h \geq 1$). As it turns out, a one-time 25 basis point shock

\textsuperscript{17}Notice that if a state with $\tilde{y}_{i(t-j)} = 0$ for all $j > 0$ were to experience a monetary policy shock, there would be no distributional consequences: the $h$-period ahead interaction terms all would still be zero.

\textsuperscript{18}Figure 8 plots this impulse response for a negative $\tilde{\nu}_{it-4}$ over the subsequent 20 quarters.
to the Fed Funds rate has nearly the same quantitative effect as simulating a persistent response of the Funds rate to an exogenous monetary policy shock, as represented by equation (3). Therefore, to simplify the exposition we focus our discussion on the impulse responses from the one-time shock.

Like Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999), we report the cumulative responses of the state activity variables to a one-time monetary policy shock. Figure 2 shows the cumulative effect of the contractionary monetary policy shock on the growth rate of a “depressed” state — one that experienced a negative shock to $\bar{\nu}_{lt}$ four quarters earlier. To reiterate, this response has been purged of the underlying natural dynamics of the system and thus plots the incremental dynamic response due to the policy interaction terms only. The shaded region represents the bias-corrected bootstrapped 90% confidence interval for the estimated response.

Recall that by virtue of the earlier negative shock to $\bar{\nu}_{lt+h}$, the “depressed” state in this experiment will be growing more slowly than the average state. The one-time contractionary policy shock at $h = 0$ further slows growth in this state, as shown in figure 2. By $h = 8$ quarters after the innovation to the Funds rate, most of the impact has been felt, and the cumulative additional reduction in the “depressed” state’s growth rate is nearly $-0.11$ percentage points. This response is statistically discernible from zero at all forecast horizons greater than zero.

Carlino and DeFina (1999) estimate state-by-state VARs and report an average cumulative reduction in state personal income growth from a 100-basis point contractionary shock to be $1.16$ percentage points at an 8-quarter forecast horizon. Scaling proportionally, our 25 basis point shock should imply a $0.29$ percentage point cumulative fall in state income growth after 8 quarters for a state at the mean cross-sectional growth rate. For a state that was growing more slowly than average when the 25 basis point shock occurred, output growth slowed an additional $0.11$ percentage points, or $0.40$ percentage points overall. We interpret this additional state-dependent effect as sizable relative to the established results in the literature.

Conversely, the specification of model implies that a state that starts out one standard deviation above the mean growth rate four quarters prior to the contractionary policy shock experiences a positive

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19The $\hat{\theta}_h$ estimates are generated by a 6-variable structural VAR on U.S. macroeconomic data as in Christiano et al. (1999).
20Our bootstrap program re-estimates equation (2) 500 times by re-sampling our original data with replacement. After the regression was estimated, the program re-computes the incremental effect of a 25 basis point increase in the Federal Funds rate as described above.
21Conceptually, they embedded our equation (1) in a VAR framework and estimate under the assumption that all $\gamma_{jk}$ are identically zero. Their sample period is 1958Q1 – 1992Q4; in a future draft we plan to re-estimate their model over our sample period to compare.
incremental response of 0.11 percentage points. Again taking the Carlino and DeFina (1999) estimates as our baseline, such a state would still experience a reduction in its growth rate from the contractionary policy shock, but the net cumulative effect would be only a $0.29 - 0.11 = 0.18$ percentage point decline. Notice that the 0.22 percentage point disparity between states with “high” and “low” initial conditions relative to the average is comparable in magnitude to the estimated average response itself.

In summary, monetary contractions lead to larger declines in income growth for states experiencing relatively worse economic growth in the recent past as compared with the average state. By contrast, states experiencing relatively better economic growth in the recent past have smaller declines in income growth as compared with the average state.

5.3 Asymmetric Policy Effects

Equation (2), like most linear dynamic models (including VARs), also is symmetric in the policy shock: the model specification implies that a 25 basis point expansionary policy shock should result in an identical impulse response, just opposite in sign, to that shown in figure 2. Yet as explored in sections 2 and 3, both theory and some related evidence support the proposition that contractionary policy might have different effects than expansionary policy for a state away from the cross-sectional average. To test this conjecture, we divide the policy innovations into positive and negative changes in the Funds rate, and re-estimate equation (2) with separate coefficients on the interaction terms for positive innovations as for negative ones:

$$\tilde{y}_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^{q} \alpha_j \tilde{y}_{it-j} + \sum_{k=0}^{P} \sum_{j=k+1}^{q} \gamma^+_{jk} (\tilde{y}_{it-j} \cdot z^+_{t-k}) + \sum_{k=0}^{P} \sum_{j=k+1}^{q} \gamma^-_{jk} (\tilde{y}_{it-j} \cdot z^-_{t-k}) + \tilde{\varepsilon}_i + \tilde{\nu}_{it} \quad (8)$$

where $z^+_{t-k}$ and $z^-_{t-k}$ are the contractionary and expansionary changes to monetary policy, respectively, and $\gamma^+_{jk}$ and $\gamma^-_{jk}$ are the corresponding coefficients on the interaction terms to be estimated.

The sum of the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms for contractionary policy shocks (i.e. increases in the Fed Funds rate) is similar to the above results: $\sum_{j,k} \hat{\gamma}^+_{jk} = 0.04$ ($p$-value of 0.16). However, for the expansionary shocks (i.e. decreases in the Fed Funds rate) the sum of the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms is $\sum_{j,k} \hat{\gamma}^-_{jk} = -0.05$ ($p$-value = 0.02). The sign of these accumulated coefficients confirms our intuition about the nature of the effect: an expansionary shock ($\Delta z_t < 0$) for a relatively slow-growing state ($\tilde{y}_{it} < 0$) still results in a fall in income growth relative to the average state.
Moreover, the magnitude is larger than the estimated effect for negative shocks or the overall effect reported for the previous symmetric model, and is strongly statistically significant. Interestingly, these results contradict the old saw that “monetary policy cannot push on a string” — at least when it comes to the impact on the regional distribution of economic activity.22

Again we conduct policy experiments for our hypothetically “depressed” state, defined as above, this time to compute the dynamic responses separately for contractionary and expansionary policy shocks, respectively. Figure 3 shows the cumulative effect on the “depressed” state’s growth in per capita income in response to a 25 basis points increase in the Fed Funds rate, along with the bootstrapped bias-corrected 90% confidence region. Figure 4 plots the cumulative response for the “depressed” state following a Fed Funds decrease of 25 basis points. The figures look very similar, yet have the striking interpretation that expansionary shocks are not the mirror image of contractionary shocks — in fact, the economic performance of relatively “depressed” states worsens in response to both expansionary and contractionary shocks! Put another way, compared to the average state, states initially in a “low” position (i.e. recently have experienced negative idiosyncratic shocks) experience larger economic contractions in response to Federal Fund rate increases and smaller economic expansions in response to Fund rate declines. Likewise, states that start in a “high” position (i.e. recently have experienced negative idiosyncratic shocks) experience larger economic expansions in response to rate declines and smaller economic contractions in response to rate increases.

5.4 Robustness: Sample Period

Owyang and Wall (2004) document much smaller effects of monetary policy on US regions following the Volcker disinflation.23 Estimation of equation (2) for the post-Volker sample, 1984Q1 – 2003Q4, generates similar impulse responses as in the full sample (1970Q2 – 2003Q4). Figure 5 is analogous to figure 2, corresponding to the model with state dependency but symmetric policy effects. Figures 6 and 7 show the estimates from our asymmetric model estimated over the post-Volker sub-sample. Poor performing states still experience greater output declines in response to a monetary contractions and smaller output gains in response to a monetary expansion, relative to the average state. The cumulative effects after 20 quarters estimated using the post-Volker sample are larger than those estimated using the full sample.

22 We conjecture that the consumer credit channel, particularly mortgage refinancing, plays an important role in the transmission of expansionary monetary policy. We intent to investigate this channel further in subsequent research.

23 Hanson (2004) reports similar results in VARs estimated with aggregate U.S. data.
However, given the confidence bands, we cannot reject the null that the estimated magnitudes across the two samples are different.

Given the noticeable difference between the estimated average effects (nearly zero) and distribu-
tional effects (sizable) we intend to expand our investigation of this issue in a subsequent draft.

5.5 **Robustness: Alternative Variable Definitions**

We are currently exploring other measures of the monetary policy instrument as well as measures of state economic activity. Examples of the latter include the unemployment rate, real per capita personal income (level or growth), and indicators of state economic activity (see Crone, 2003 for details).

6 **Conclusion**

In this paper we establish some new facts about the effects of monetary policy at the state level in the U.S. Unlike other research on the regional effects of monetary policy, our approach focuses on how policy affects the distribution of real economic activity in the cross-section of U.S. states over time. State business cycles are not synchronized: at any given point in time, some states are performing much better and some states are performing much worse than the average. The Federal Reserve, however, conducts monetary policy to stabilize the national business cycle. One of the questions we investigate in this paper is whether this environment leads to differential effects across states, conditional on their initial business cycle position, in response to a common change in Fed policy.

Our results are striking. In our estimates, monetary contractions lead to larger declines in economic activity for states experiencing relatively worse economic growth in the recent past compared to the average state. The estimated effects are sizable: for a relatively low-growth state — defined as a state whose real per capita income growth was one standard deviation below the average state four quarters prior to the monetary contraction — a 25 basis point increase in the Fed Funds rate leads to a cumulative 0.4 percentage point decline in income growth relative to the average state. Other authors have estimated the average state-level effect of the same contractionary policy experiment to be around a 0.29 percentage point cumulative reduction in real state income growth. Likewise, we estimated that relatively high-growth states – those with real per capita income growth one standard deviation above the average state four quarters prior to the monetary contraction — experience only an 0.18 percentage point decline in
real per capita income growth in response to the 25 basis point increase in the funds rate. Thus, the
distribution effects appear to be on the same order of magnitude as the mean effects, and work against
those states initially in worse economic shape.

We also provide strong evidence that impact of expansionary monetary policy is not symmetric with
contractionary policy in our specification. Relatively low-growth states experience smaller increases in
economic activity in response to a monetary expansion than does the average state. Collectively, we con-
clude that monetary policy has large distributional implications across regions of the United States. Our
results suggest that monetary policy does, in fact, help least those areas that need the help the most, in
that their local economic conditions were worse relative to a national average when the policy was en-
acted. Put another way, while expansionary monetary policy may lead to an overall increase in aggregate
output, the majority of that increase will occur in the parts of the country that were already perform-
ing better than average. There will be much less stimulus in those parts of the country that had been
performing relatively worse than average.

To reiterate, our results are distinct from existing research that estimates the effect of monetary policy
to vary systematically across states — say, to have a greater effect in Michigan than in Arizona. While
others have posited that banking regulations and industrial mix determine a given state's responsiveness
to monetary policy, we investigate the interaction between the recent business conditions in a state and
changes in monetary policy after controlling for these state fixed effects. Speaking loosely, our research
addresses the differential effects of monetary policy in either Michigan or Arizona at times that state is
booming (relative to the national average) in comparison with the effects when that same state is in a
slow down (again, relative to average).

The broader implications of our research are several. First, our results suggest an important role
for history-dependence and asymmetries in the impact of monetary policy. State-level data provide a
natural environment to investigate such components, which commonly are absent from estimates with
national data — as well as existing regional research. Second, these distributional effects likely generalize
to European Monetary Union; as with the U.S. states, members of EMU face a common monetary policy
implemented (at least in formal terms) at the aggregate Euro-zone level. As the cross-country disparities
in growth among the EMU member countries appear to be larger on average than those for the U.S.
states, the effects identified by our research are likely to be even stronger.

Finally, while our work in this area is very preliminary, we believe our results provide additional evi-
dence for the importance of the credit channel, broadly defined, in the transmission of monetary policy. We intend to explore this issue in more depth in a future version of this paper. We also plan to investigate further the robustness of our results to alternative variable definitions and sample periods.
References


Figure 1: Distribution of Annualized Quarterly Growth Rate of Real State Per Capita Personal Income

Cross-Sectional Mean Growth Rate per Period (with One Standard Deviation Bands)
Figure 2: Cumulative Response of Growth in State Income Per Capita, Relatively Poorly Performing State

Model: Symmetric Policy Response
Sample: 1970Q1 – 2003Q4
Experiment: 25 Basis Points Increase in Funds Rate
Figure 3: Cumulative Response of Growth in State Income Per Capita, Relatively Poorly Performing State

Model: Asymmetric Policy Response
Sample: 1970Q1 – 2003Q4
Experiment: 25 Basis Points Increase in Funds Rate
Figure 4: Cumulative Response of Growth in State Income Per Capita, Relatively Poorly Performing State

Model: Asymmetric Policy Response
Sample: 1970Q1 – 2003Q4
Experiment: 25 Basis Points Decrease in Funds Rate
Figure 5: Cumulative Response of Growth in State Income Per Capita, Relatively Poorly Performing State

Model: Symmetric Policy Response
Sample: 1983Q1 – 2003Q4
Experiment: 25 Basis Points Increase in Funds Rate
Figure 6: Cumulative Response of Growth in State Income Per Capita, Relatively Poorly Performing State

Model: Asymmetric Policy Response
Sample: 1983Q1 – 2003Q4
Experiment: 25 Basis Points Increase in Funds Rate
Figure 7: Cumulative Response of Growth in State Income Per Capita, Relatively Poorly Performing State

Model: Asymmetric Policy Response
Sample: 1983Q1 – 2003Q4
Experiment: 25 Basis Points Decrease in Funds Rate
Figure 8: Impulse Response of Growth in State Income Per Capita, Relatively Poorly Performing State

Sample: 1970Q1 – 2003Q4

Experiment: No Policy Innovations