

# Cultural Differences and Institutional Integration\*

**Luigi Guiso**   **Helios Herrera**   **Massimo Morelli**  
EIEF & CEPR   HEC Montréal   Università Bocconi, IGER & NBER

This Version: June 5, 2015. First Version: November 2011.

## Abstract

If citizens of different countries belonging to an economic union adhere to different and deeply rooted cultural norms, when these countries interact their leaders may find it impossible to agree on efficient policies, especially in hard times. Political leaders' actions are bound to express policies that do not violate these norms. This paper provides a simple positive theory and a compelling case study of the importance of cultural clashes when economies integrate, as well as a normative argument about the desirability of institutional integration. We argue that a political union, with a common enforcement agency, is the more beneficial the greater is cultural diversity in an economic union.

**Keywords:** Cultural Norms, Institutions, Crisis Mismanagement.

**JEL** classification numbers: D72

---

\*This paper previously circulated under the title "A Cultural Clash View of the Euro Crisis." We thank Sascha Becker, Alberto Bisin, Serra Boranbay, Gilat Levy, Elias Papaioannou, John Patty, Giacomo Ponzetto, Enrico Spolaore, Francesco Squintani, Livio Stracca, Sebastian Turban, Philippe Weil and participants at various workshops for great suggestions and comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

*‘Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises’ (Jean Monnet).*

## 1 Introduction

Over the past 20 years there has been a remarkable increase in economic unions and trade integration driven by the prospect that integrating countries would benefit from economies of scale and access to a larger market. This process has taken a variety of forms. Some, like the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements, are relatively contained in scope and have very limited impact on the nature of the interactions between the countries striking the deal. At the other extreme, economic and currency unions, such as those set up by the Caribbean countries and most notably by the Euro area countries, have far reaching implications for the nature of the interactions in the merged pool of heterogenous populations. These latter agreements can be viewed as part of a process that leads geographically close but still institutionally and culturally different countries to dismantle barriers to trade and allow their people to interact with each other while each country maintains political control and sovereignty. This implies that national governments rather than cross-country institutions are in charge of and are responsible for macroeconomic decisions and outcomes. A step further in the integration process is to delegate some of the power of the national governments to federal institutions designed to manage the decision process of area-wide relevant issues which would find contrasting solutions when left to single and heterogeneous countries. Switzerland is an example of such a political integration arrangement: a set of culturally distinct countries (the cantons) share a common currency and a common market while federal institutions are designed to manage area relevant decisions, including the re-composition of conflicts that the different cultures may give rise to (Bertola, 2014). In this paper we study the problem faced by a pool of countries that are culturally distant from each other and face the opportunity to join a union. We will call *economic* union any economic integration where constraints to international exchanges and relationships are lifted, but no power is given to any central institution in terms of fiscal policy, political decisions, regulations, etc.; we will call *political* union, a union where every citizen of the various countries in the union comes to consider the central institutions as the only relevant one vis à vis key policies of relevance for the whole union, eliminating continuous negotiations between the leaders of the members of the union. We will argue that an economic union offers great prosperity opportunities for each side but also entails the risk of exposing their populations to a "clash of cultures" - i.e. a conflict arising from the interaction of people with different cultural values. The contrast we describe happens at the level

of private interactions between individuals as well as at the level of political leaders, since leaders themselves are affected by the different culture: political leaders of different countries must conform to the cultural norms and beliefs of their electorate. Namely, leaders cannot pursue strategies that go against deeply rooted norms and beliefs even when doing so could be welfare-improving for their citizens. We call this a *conformity constraint*.<sup>1</sup> This conformity constraint becomes salient when leaders of two countries with different cultures come to negotiate about policies or rules that do not fit well with some traits of their original cultures. The possibility that the optimal course of action entails policies welcomed by one electorate but opposed by the other on cultural grounds, is a major political impasse which we denote as *cultural clash*. As noted in Huntington (1996), cultural conflict is one of the most important types of conflict to consider going forward, and our goal is to examine how it interacts and evolves with economic integration and institutional development.

We develop a simple evolutionary theory of culture formation in order to evaluate what happens when two countries, which previously had converged on different cultural steady states, merge into an economic union. When the economies merge, the primary problem is the clash between citizens of different cultures and between their political leaders (who face a very similar clash due to the conformity constraint). We analyze how the choice itself of the level of economic integration may depend on the cultural distance and on the business cycle. In particular, we show that provided the economic benefits from integration are relatively large and cultures not too distant, a successful economic union may be formed. Furthermore, the formation of an economic union *without* common institutions may be the optimal outcome initially. However, if the ex-post realization of the economic benefits turns out to be lower than initially anticipated - i.e. a "crisis" realizes - then the cultural clash, which may threaten its very existence, may surface. In fact, the generalized loss of welfare due to the clash which is increasing in the degree of cultural heterogeneity, becomes more salient during bad economic times and cannot vanish rapidly given the inertia of cultural norms. In such circumstances countries may reconsider participation in the union facing either the choice of breaking up and reverting to autarchy or otherwise provide it with a set of federal institutions which grant greater political integration. The latter solution, we show, is more desirable the higher is the cultural distance, that is the costs of the clash, and thus the benefit of mitigating it. Thus, for instance,

---

<sup>1</sup>For example, it would be very difficult for India's leaders to pass a law that forces Indian food firms to produce beef formula when a famine hits the country. Even if political representatives knew this may be the best policy from a nutritional point of view, it would simply fail to pass or, even if passed, it would fail to succeed because it would not be followed by most of the people. Anticipating this reaction, the leader would just avoid proposing it.

the fact that Europe has countries with more heterogeneous cultures than it was the case for individual states within the US at the time of the US Constitution should push towards an a *fortiori* argument in favor of centralization of fiscal policy, rather than the other way round, which is the common sense.

We treat agent interactions not as symmetric bilateral *exchanges*, but as principal-agent interactions, thus highlighting the counterparty risk. In fact, these are the type of interactions where the cultural traits we want to highlight matter the most. A culture is represented in our framework as “what strategies people play when they interact.” This way we capture the notion developed in North (1991), that culture constrains human interactions when cooperation is hard to achieve. The focus on interactions allows us to trace the evolution of culture using replicator dynamics (as in Boyd and Richerson, 1985 and 2005).<sup>2</sup> Given this view of an economy as a collection of principal-agent relationships (state vs. tax payer, bank vs. borrower, firm vs. employee, etc.), we model interactions as sequential move games where the agent can cheat and the principal can punish, and the cheat-punish outcome is always suboptimal. We show that evolution can bring a population to multiple steady states with low or high levels of efficiency, cheat-forgive and no-cheat respectively. Our focus is on what happens when two populations acting in accord to different steady states representing different cultural norms integrate into one economy. In this case the integrated economy faces a cultural clash, which takes the form of a cheat-punish outcome in many interactions, an outcome not observed in the steady state of a culturally homogeneous country. The normative results we derive are based on a key aspect of cultural norms. That is, cultural norms evolve very slowly compared to the speed of change of formal institutions, particularly those related to governance (Williamson, 2000): while culture evolves gradually institutions can jump. This feature is what makes the creation of a new institution a viable response to mitigate a cultural clash, which would otherwise persist in time.

Our view of the cultural clash and its consequences for the debate about new institutions has a clear application to the Euro crisis context. In Europe, a greater frequency and salience of principal agent relationships between individuals or agencies rooted in different cultures was clearly determined by the lower transaction and mobility costs associated to the introduction of the common currency. Merging into an economic union carries benefits in terms of enlargement of the total available opportunities due to economies of scale and scope (see e.g. Baldwin, 2006) which

---

<sup>2</sup>We ignore instead the evolution of individual values that does not relate directly to behavior in strategic situations. For models on the transmission of individual values, see Tabellini (2008b), Bisin and Verdier (2000b, 2001), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008), possibly accounting for learning through socialization (Bisin and Verdier, 2000a).

translate in larger (expected) payoffs to interacting parties. The cost is the potential exposure to a cultural clash which increases with the cultural distance between the merging countries. The discovery in October 2009 that the previous Greek government cooked the books, hiding half of the government fiscal deficit, raised the awareness in Germany about the pervasiveness of moral hazard at all levels in Greece, and the anger led to a clear desire to punish. According to various observers, early action would have contained the crisis both in scope and length, but the culture of responsibility, enforcement and punishment present in Germany made it almost impossible even for the political leaders to go against that sentiment and help the situation right away. A survey by Emnid, a polling agency, in February 2010 reveals that nearly 70% of the Germans opposed aid to Greece. One of the consequences was a delay in the adoption of the rescue packages, an aggravation of the Greek crisis, a rise of risk premia on the Greek debt which worsened Greece ability to repay the debt, and a propagation of the crisis to the other PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). Ultimately the Greek crisis has threatened the very survival of the Euro, an event that according to many observers would have had extremely costly consequences not only for the Mediterranean countries in the Euro area but for Germany as well. Why would Germany be willing to run the risk of paying this cost? We argue that, at least partly, this is a reflection of a cultural clash. German political leaders understand well the dangers of their actions and foresee the possible consequences of the “punishment” strategy for their own country (they are informed representatives), but are bound by a conformity constraint: the need to conform with the widely shared and deeply rooted cultural norms of their fellow citizens that, as we document in detail in the paper, establishes punishment of the group “cheaters”, which in this case happen to be the Greeks.<sup>3</sup>

One of the messages of this paper is that if an economic union is complemented by forms of political union, then we should expect much better management of cultural clashes. The choice to form an economic union in Europe rather than a political union is now being criticized on multiple grounds, but still, we argue, the importance of managing cultural clashes is an important and largely overlooked problem. Culturally heterogeneous countries economically united without joint political and legal institutions are more clash prone and this clash becomes more intense and apparent in times of crisis. The sequential integration choices in Europe as well as other monetary unions such as the African Monetary Union project<sup>4</sup>, are far from ideal and

---

<sup>3</sup>Undoubtedly, political leaders may try to ease the conformity constraint by steering public opinion, but this usually takes time, which unavoidably delays action.

<sup>4</sup>The 1991 Abuja treaty created the African Economic Community and called for an African Economic Community (AEC) with a single currency, now planned for 2023. The AEC would

can only be explained by a reluctance to lose sovereignty by the individual states.<sup>5</sup>

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the relationship with the literature. In section 3 we develop our evolutionary model of culture in any economy, our theory of the cultural clash and conformity constraint that keeps local institutions bound by the local culture, and then our results on the relationship between the business cycle and the incentives to form new and common institutions at the cost of loss in sovereignty. In section 4 we apply the model to interpret the recent European history focusing on the cultural clash between Greece and Germany. Section 5 concludes.

## 2 Relation to the literature

This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to a burgeoning set of studies on the role of culture in explaining differences in economic prosperity across countries and communities (see among others Greif, 1994; Landes, 1999; Mokyr, 2012; Tabellini, 2008a; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004, 2013); Roland, 2010; and Nunn, 2012). These papers rely on the persistence of culture to explain enduring effects of old historical episodes on current differences in economic success. While we retain cultural persistence, we focus on the role that slow-to-change cultural norms and beliefs can play in dealing with shocks that are likely to occur at the business cycle frequency. Hence it bears a link with the few papers that have attempted to insert culture into macroeconomic models (e.g. Akerlof, 2007) or test empirically whether culture can be a cause of macroeconomic imbalances (Buetzer et al, 2012). Furthermore, while most of these papers view cultural norms as affecting economic prosperity because they support cooperation and thus facilitate exchange among people (e.g. Tabellini, 2008a; GSZ, 2004, 2012; Landes, 1999), or because they enhance individual motivation (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011a), or because they dictate directly individual behavior (Akerlof, 2007), in our case cultural

---

absorb the two regional currency unions in Africa (the West African CFA franc and the Central African CFS franc), an example of staged integration.

<sup>5</sup>The current political debate in Europe is consistent with the implications of the theoretical model. During the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area the creation of a more integrated fiscal union has gained momentum as a policy option (see, e.g. Marzinotto, Sapir and Wolff (2011) and Ferguson and Barbieri (2012)). and policy makers. Most interestingly, in reaction to the crisis, in January 2014 the EU has decided to adopt a single banking supervisory mechanism and a single banking crisis resolution authority - what is called the banking union. Though the scope and reach of this institution is still being hotly debated, its adoption is exactly what our model captures when predicting the adoption of a single enforcement federal authority, in the direction of a political union.

norms affect macroeconomic outcomes because they act as a conformity constraint on policy makers and institutions, limiting their freedom to adopt the best policy in the given circumstances. This is a clear example of the more general view that we propose, that cultural norms can be a potentially important source of friction in political economy. These frictions need to be studied even if one had the general belief that the main source of cross country differences in prosperity stem from differences in institutions design (see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012): in fact, the type of problems we identify and deal with relate to the consequences, rather than the causes, of cultural clashes.

Second, our work relates to various papers that rely on cultural distance to explain patterns of international trade (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2009; Fisman, Hamao and Wang, 2012). We highlight the fact that the conformity constraint is more likely to be identified when two (or more) cultures are merged - as when a pool of countries decide to enter an economic or monetary union - and thus a cultural clash can occur and become visible.

Third, the paper relates to a number of contributions that study the interplay between cultural norms (informal institutions) and legal norms (formal institutions) and their mutual influences. Several papers stress the fact that culture and legal institutions tend to coevolve (Tabellini, 2008b; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011b; Bisin and Verdier, 2012). In our model too in the long run institutions and culture may move together, but the process may be far from smooth. In our model institutions can change discretely - or at least at a much faster speed than culture. Hence, they may adjust in response to a potentially harmful cultural clash when a culturally heterogeneous community is hit by a shock. Culture may subsequently and slowly adapt, possibly affected by the new institutional set up.

Finally, our contribution is related to the literature on the formation and integration of states. As in the literature on the formation and integration of states (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003 and Spolaore, 2013) we also emphasize the trade off between economies of scale from merging economies and the costs of combining heterogeneous populations (in our case heterogeneity in cultures). We argue that the desire to improve the terms of this trade off provides a basis for a novel argument in favor of a political/ fiscal union. Fiscal union can be beneficial for a variety of reasons; because it may produce greater equality (Morelli, Yang and Ye, 2012); because it provides stability and insurance (e.g. Luque, Morelli and Tavares, 2014; Fahri and Werning, 2012); or because it may have a discipline effect - in the sense that when the policy is conducted at the union level the scope for local moral hazard by the participant countries is reduced. We stress the importance of fiscal union as a way of tempering and managing frictions in a culturally non homogeneous community that

is already bound by a single currency or a free trade agreement. Said differently, faster to change institutions can be the solution to the costs imposed by slow to adjust cultural norms in response to a change in the environment.

## 3 Theory

### 3.1 The Role of Culture

We develop a simple evolutionary theory of the integration of cultures and institutions. There is evidence that: (1) culture evolves slowly;<sup>6</sup> (2) different cultures can (and often must) coexist.<sup>7</sup> We adopt a simple evolutionary model where indeed (1) cultures, simply defined as profiles of strategies in an economy, evolve slowly and (2) may have to coexist. In particular, (1) is achieved by assuming that behavior adjusts following replicator dynamics, as in Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005). In our setup, as in many others with different frictions (see e.g. Tabellini 2008b), the presence of different cultures is described as different steady states in the evolutionary process.

However, while there are many models of multiplicity of cultures as multiple equilibria or multiple steady states, the first innovation here is that we ask what happens when two different cultures have to "merge", for example due to an economic or monetary union between countries. Our broad view is that while cultures of countries evolve slowly, countries may suffer sudden shocks. Lastly, we give the leaders of countries with different cultures the ability to *agree* on a change of institutions if the respective countries merge. The institutions in a country have the potential to change quickly and ideally mitigate the effects of these shocks.<sup>8</sup> Our leading example is the Eurozone: the creation of the Eurozone is a shock among a set of culturally

---

<sup>6</sup>A growing literature provides models of how culture is transmitted and why it persists. In Bisin and Verdier (2000a) cultural transmission is explained by parents' desire to transmit to their children their own traits. Tabellini (2008b) identifies the source of cultural persistence in the fact that parents use their own preferences in deciding which set of values to instill in their children. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008b) model persistence in trust beliefs as opposed to norms. A parallel empirical literature documents the persistence of cultural attitudes over several centuries by showing that current cultural traits are correlated with long-gone historical episodes (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Voigtlander and Voth, 2012; Grosjean (2011); Alesina et al., 2011; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2013)) or across three or four generations (e.g. Tabellini, 2008a), Algan and Cahuc (2010).

<sup>7</sup>Coexistence of cultures is a common phenomenon documented for many countries. A few examples are the US "melting pot", modelled in Bisin and Verdier (2000a), Switzerland multiple religions (Basten and Betz, 2012), Italys' North-South cultural divide (Putnam, 1993).

<sup>8</sup>According to Williamson (2000), while cultural norms typically change at a frequency (in years) between  $10^2$  to  $10^3$ , governance institutions can change every 10 years.

heterogeneous Euro area countries. Additional national or international institutions might help mediate and mitigate this shock.

### 3.2 The Economic Interactions

We describe an economy as a set of bilateral interactions between pairs of agents that are programmed to play specific strategies. We assume that an economy is described as a set of bilateral principal-agent transactions, as in North (1991). In each match of two players, there is one having to choose first between a *responsible action* (e.g. when an agent chooses the action desired by the principal without moral hazard or simply when an agent decides to respect the law) and a *cheating action* (e.g. when an agent shirks or falls for the temptation of short run gains); then the second player (a principal or a counterpart in a contract of whatever kind or the State itself) having to decide (or implementing) a reaction, which we describe by the choice between *punishment* and *forgiveness*. We divide the many types of private exchanges and public relationships that constitute an economic system in two sets  $j = A, C$ , described below. The representation of the basic principal-agent interaction for every type of game  $j$  is as follows:




Figure 1: Basic Game Structure

**Assumption 1:**  $u_1(cp) < u_1^j(r)$ ;  $u_2(cp) < u_2(cf) < u_2^j(r)$ .

The first part of assumption 1 states that for any agent in any game the utility of cheating and being punished is always lower than the utility of a responsible action, an assumption necessary in order to make the punishment action payoff relevant. The second part of assumption 1 states that for a principal punishing is costly and,

of course, the utility of a responsible action by the agent is higher than the utility of forgiving a cheating action.

What remains unspecified is the relationship between  $u_1(cf)$  and  $u_1^j(r)$ . We assume that  $u_1^j(r)$  varies with the type of game  $j$ :

$$u_1^C(r) < u_1(cf) < u_1^A(r).$$

That is, we distinguish between:

1. **Aligned-interest games** ( $A$  games, henceforth) where  $u_1(cf) < u_1^A(r)$ ; and
2. **Cheating-prone games** ( $C$  games, henceforth), where  $u_1(cf) > u_1^C(r)$ .<sup>9</sup>

Economies can differ in terms of the fraction and relative importance of  $A$  trades with respect to  $C$  trades: denoting by  $\theta \in (0, 1)$  the fraction of  $A$  trades, an economy with a higher  $\theta$  is less exposed to the consequences of moral hazard compared to an economy with a lower  $\theta$ . In a given economy, the frequency of  $C$  trades and  $A$  trades depends, intuitively, on the state of the economy: when things go well and the economy is in a boom, there are more opportunities and hence higher opportunity costs of cheating. So our premise is that  $\theta$  is larger in good times. However, the incentive to cheat tends to be higher when opportunities of enrichment are lacking from the market. Thus, we will assume that  $\theta$  is positively correlated with the business cycle. In other words, the scope of cheating grows during crises.<sup>10</sup>

Type  $A$  games trivially lead to responsible actions in every culture: the unique equilibrium outcome is  $r$ . Given assumption 1,  $C$  games have two Nash Equilibria: The first Nash Equilibrium,  $(c, f)$ , is subgame perfect; the other equilibrium,  $(r, p)$ , is not subgame perfect as it involves the commitment by player 2 to punish the cheating action of player 1. Responsible actions are in most interpretations associated with higher total welfare, hence we assume that:

---

<sup>9</sup>Some bilateral relationships are more cheating prone than others: incentive to cheat on taxes or free riding on contributions greatly vary across cultures and levels of institutional enforcement, but the moral hazard temptation is often there. In private exchanges of observable goods or services the gains from trade are more symmetric, and hence alignment of interest in exploiting the gains from trade tends to prevail. Borrowing money and effort provision by employees are part of private exchanges that are sort of in between, in the sense that there is an element of gains from trade and an element of moral hazard opportunity, which once again may vary with culture and with institutional enforcement.

<sup>10</sup>Several papers document a countercyclical relation of crime activities broadly interpreted (e.g. Cook, P.J and G. Zarkin, 1985; Fougère, Kramarz and Pouget. 2009; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001) and some are able to show a causal effect of a deterioration of economic opportunities on dishonest or illegal activities (Bignon, Caroli and Galbiati, 2014).

**Assumption 2:**  $\sum_i u_i(cf) < \sum_i u_i^C(r) < \sum_i u_i^A(r)$

The unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a  $C$  game in the absence of commitment is suboptimal in the utilitarian sense. The equilibrium  $(c, f)$  is preferred by a player in role 1, but it does not maximize total welfare. We think of different cultural values as crucial ingredients that may generate different equilibria. In particular, certain cultural values may generate the ability to commit to enforce contracts, laws and responsibility, hence allowing to achieve the higher welfare Nash Equilibrium. As standard in the literature, we consider different cultures as different equilibria. In what follows our notion of equilibrium will be evolutionary stability.

### 3.3 Culture-based Selection

We analyze the evolution of strategies in  $A$  and  $C$  games starting from any initial condition, i.e. starting from any set of initial strategies according to standard replicator dynamics. Consider first an economy in isolation. Suppose that such an economy is large, in the sense that there are a large number of random matches between players, and in every such random match one player is in the position of player 1 and the other one in the shoes of player 2. Pairs of individuals, one from the population of agents (role 1) and one from the population of principals (role 2), are randomly matched to play the game above. Each individual is programmed to play one of the two pure strategies available to her. Denote by  $x \in [0, 1]$  the fraction of first movers programmed to play Cheat, and by  $y$  the fraction of second movers programmed to play Forgive. A state of the world is fully characterized by the population split  $(x, y)$ . Starting from any initial population split  $(x, y)$ , we want to see how this population split evolves over time and whether it converges to a steady state. The replicator dynamics logic implies that for any given population split  $(x, y)$  the proportion of individuals playing Cheat ( $x$ ) increases if and only if the average payoff to playing Cheat is larger than the average payoff of first movers. More precisely, the relative change in  $x$  is proportional to the fitness of the strategy Cheat, i.e. the difference in payoffs between Cheat and the current average payoff of first movers, namely

$$\frac{\dot{x}}{x} = (u_1(cf)y + u_1(cp)(1 - y)) - (u_1^j(r)(1 - x) + u_1(cf)xy + u_1(cp)x(1 - y))$$

Likewise, according to replicator dynamics the relative change in  $y$  is proportional to the fitness of the action Forgive relative to the average fitness, namely:

$$\frac{\dot{y}}{y} = (u_2(cf)x + u_2^j(r)(1 - x)) - (u_2^j(r)(1 - x) + u_2(cf)xy + u_2(cp)x(1 - y))$$

where the first term is the payoff of Forgive against a proportion  $(x, 1 - x)$  of first movers, the second is the average fitness or payoff of the population  $(y, 1 - y)$  against a proportion  $(x, 1 - x)$ . Normalizing, without loss of generality,  $u_i(cp) = 0 \quad \forall i$ , the system can be written as

$$\frac{\dot{x}}{x} = (u_1(cf)y - u_1^j(r))(1 - x), \quad \frac{\dot{y}}{y} = (u_2(cf)x)(1 - y)$$

Starting from any initial interior population split  $(x_0, y_0)$  the system evolves in the following way:  $y$  is non-decreasing always,  $x$  decreases (and eventually reaches zero) as long as  $y < \bar{y}^j$ , with  $\bar{y}^j = u_1^j(r)/u_1(cf)$ , otherwise  $x$  increases (and eventually reaches one) if  $y > \bar{y}^j$ . In words, *a high enough population of Forgivers makes the Cheaters survive and thrive, a high enough population of Punishers makes the Cheaters die and the Responsible thrive*. Note that  $\bar{y}^C \in (0, 1)$  and that  $\bar{y}^A > 1$ , hence:

**Lemma 1** *For each economy in isolation there are two types of steady states in C games. **Steady state 1:** all Cheaters and Forgivers ( $x = 1, y = 1$ ); and **Steady state 2:** all Responsible first movers and a mass  $(1 - y_2)$  of Punishers:  $x = 0, y_2 \in [0, \bar{y}^C]$ . In A games only **Steady state 2** exists.*

**Proof.** Omitted. ■

To understand the above result, note that any mutation in a population that arrived to steady state 1, e.g. a small percentage of Punishers or of Responsible agents, would die out. Similarly, any mutation in a population that arrived to steady state 2, e.g. a small percentage of Cheaters first movers would die out because they faced costly Punishment (this punishment is costly to the second movers as well). Here is an illustration of the evolution and of the two types of evolutionary stable equilibria for C games (in which  $\bar{y}^C \in (0, 1)$ )




Figure 2: Evolutionary Dynamics and Steady-States

For A games there is only one type of equilibrium, as can be seen because the horizontal boundary  $\bar{y}^j$  (dashed line) for  $j = A$  lies above 1.

Summarizing the above analysis, if a first mover is presented with an A type interaction, he always acts honestly regardless of the second mover response. In steady state, if a first mover is presented with a C type interaction he may act differently depending on the environment: the propensity of an agent whose economy has converged to steady state 2 is to act honestly and the propensity of an agent whose economy of observation has converged to steady state 1 is to cheat. This is supported by the different propensities of second movers to punish in different cultures, as prescribed by the different evolutionary stable strategies in C games. The different steady states represent different cultures that may prevail in different countries.

### 3.4 Merging Cultures: Economic Union

We want to analyze here the welfare effects of an economic union, as when countries decide to join a new single currency area for instance. This situation corresponds to one in which transactions between players (agents and principals) of two countries previously isolated (or with large frictions making cross-country matches unlikely or undesirable) become all of a sudden much more desirable and hence more frequent. Our goal is understand what happens when interactions between agents of different countries emerge without new institutions appropriately created to regulate or mediate these new interactions.

We label with superscript  $k = 1, 2$  the country which converged to steady state  $k$  in the C game, i.e. the country with culture  $k$ . The cultural diversity between the

two economies that reached the two different steady states in C interactions can be defined as  $D \equiv (1 - y_2)$ . When the two economies are separate, their welfare is

$$\begin{aligned} U^1 &= \theta (u_1^A(r) + u_2^A(r)) + (1 - \theta) (u_1(cf) + u_2(cf)) \\ U^2 &= \theta (u_1^A(r) + u_2^A(r)) + (1 - \theta) (u_1^C(r) + u_2^C(r)) \end{aligned}$$

**Lemma 2** For any  $\theta \in (0, 1)$ : 1.  $U^2 > U^1$ ; 2.  $\frac{dU^k}{d\theta} > 0 \quad \forall k$ ; 3.  $\frac{d(U^2 - U^1)}{d\theta} < 0$

**Proof.** Omitted. ■

Consider now the problem of merging the two economies. The matches between players of different cultures may provoke what we call a *cultural clash*: when an agent coming from culture 1 interacts with a principal from culture 2, and they match up in a C game, their actions clash, generating an inefficient cheating and punishment outcome. This outcome is costly for both players and yields the worst possible outcome. We characterize now the total welfare from integration.

**Proposition 1** The total welfare from an economic union decreases with: cultural difference  $D$ ; the frequency of C games  $(1 - \theta)$ ; and, if  $N^2 > N^1$ , the relative size of the populations  $N^1/N^2$ .

**Proof.** See Appendix. ■

This simple result establishes that the cultural clash due to economic integration of countries is costly, and it qualifies when it is more costly. The cultural clash is stronger the greater the cultural difference, as it generates more Cheat-Punish welfare reducing matches. Moreover, the cultural clash is exacerbated during bad times when the cheating prone C matches become more frequent. Lastly, the welfare improves the larger  $N^2/N^1$ , as long as  $N^2 > N^1$ . If on the contrary  $N^2 < N^1$ , then increasing  $N^2$  while improving responsible actions, exacerbates the cultural clash (i.e. the frequency of cheat-punish matches) hence may reduce welfare.

Economic integration of two countries typically generates a surplus due to additional gains from trade and only if there is an enlargement of the total available opportunities due to economies of scale or scope, can both countries enjoy mutual benefit from merging the economies. The surplus boost from the economic union can be easily modelled with a surplus multiplier parameter (say,  $\lambda > 1$ ), which has the effect of scaling up the payoff from cross country interactions.<sup>11</sup> The presence of a surplus multiplier ( $\lambda > 1$ ) mitigates the effect of the cultural clash as it enhances payoffs when the clash does not arise, while not mitigating the frequency of

---

<sup>11</sup>Alternatively we could assume that not only the cross-country ones but all interactions are scaled up with the union. This would not change our results.

the clashes. Absent this additional surplus creation, forming a union would make sense possibly for the country with a culture corresponding to steady state 1, but not for the other. Namely, it is easy to show that if an economic union does not imply additional surplus ( $\lambda = 1$ ), then the citizens of the economy starting from the cheat and forgive culture are the only ones that may benefit from the union.<sup>12</sup>

### 3.5 From Culture to Institutions: Political Union

We assume now that different cultures translate into different institutions in the two countries which conform to the two cultures. In particular, a culture of higher forgiveness breeds institutions with looser rules and/or less efficient enforcement of these rules, while a culture of higher punishment breeds institutions with stricter rules and/or more stringent enforcement of these rules.<sup>13</sup> Let us call the different institutional equilibria corresponding to the two different cultural steady-states

$$I_1 = 1, \quad I_2 = y_2.$$

If the enforcement of punishment is relegated to these institutions then the evolution of the propensity to cheat  $x$  can be written as

$$\frac{\dot{x}}{x} = u_1(cf) (I_k - \bar{y}^j) (1 - x)$$

where the role of principal i.e. the role of  $y$ , that is the level of punishment (or enforcement thereof) is replaced by the country specific institution  $I_k$  which conforms to the country's prevailing culture. The different institutions  $I_k$  have impact on economic outcomes in C games but not in A games, as respectively:

$$\bar{y}^A \geq 1 \geq I_k, \quad I_1 \leq \bar{y}^C \leq I_2$$

---

<sup>12</sup>Intuitively, from matching with a first mover from a responsible culture in a  $C$  game, a principal from the opposite culture always benefits with respect to "matching at home"; but matching with principals with the punishing culture the agents from a cheating culture suffer an expected punishment loss, which is smaller the more lenient are the institutions and private agents of the responsible culture.

<sup>13</sup>This assumption can be seen, for instance, as a reduced form of a full fledged model where parents choose optimally the cultural norms to transmits to their kids given the amount of enforcement chosen by the available institutions and the latter is chosen through voting, given the prevailing norms. Tabellini (2008b) shows that in equilibrium communities with strong norms of cooperation choose high level of enforcement, and vice versa, in communities with high enforcement (strong institutions) families choose tight norms of cooperation.

Hence in C interactions the evolution of the propensity to bypass the rules  $x$  is different in the two countries. That is, cheating behavior in bad times may thrive ( $x^C \rightarrow 1$ ) in the country with institution  $I_1 = 1$  characterized by leniency and low enforcement of rules, but not in the country with institution  $I_2 = y_2$  where the level of punishment/enforcement is higher, implying that cheaters disappear in the long run ( $x^C \rightarrow 0$ ).

An economic union involves a slow and costly adjustment process, due to the fact that agents from one culture may clash in C games with institutions of the other culture. Therefore an agreement that replaces the local institutions with a new set of appropriately designed institutions is desirable to mitigate the clash. A political union, instead, involves the creation of new institutions which, among other functions, have the crucial role of enforcement authority. The extent of such authority should be agreed upon by all countries. We show that both countries prefer to choose a political union with a joint institution  $I' \in (I_1, I_2)$  providing a level of punishment/enforcement which is intermediate between the two countries. We now show that political union may be beneficial even if the new authority entails a cost  $S > 0$  which can be thought of as both the cost of creation of such an institution and the cost of lost sovereignty.<sup>14</sup> The higher the initial cultural difference  $D$ , the greater the space of parameters where an authority with exogenous forgiveness  $I'$  can be beneficial.

**Proposition 2** *Countries in an economic union prefer the creation of a new enforcement authority – political union – only if  $I' \geq y_2$ . The welfare from a political union increases with  $(1 - \theta)(I' - y_2)$ .*

**Proof.** See Appendix. ■

Intuitively, the political union is more desirable: (1) with low  $\theta$  (i.e. the harsher or the more often the crisis can occur and hence the more the cultural clash becomes salient); (2) the larger the cultural difference  $D$ . The optimal institution depends on several factors, such as the long run versus the short run, as well as the good versus bad times, as it easy to see from the evolution of  $x$

$$\frac{\dot{x}}{x} = u_1(cf) (I_k - \bar{y}^j) (1 - x)$$

In bad times  $\bar{y}^j = \bar{y}^C < 1$ , hence the institution that mitigates the clash in the short run while not allowing cheating behavior to grow is  $I' = \bar{y}^C$ . In good times

---

<sup>14</sup>The literature in political economy is full of seminal works emphasizing the importance of strategically targeting different groups in society – see e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1995), Lizzeri and Persico (2001). Giving up fiscal policy determination is therefore costly for politicians.

$\bar{y}^j = \bar{y}^A > 1$ , hence institutions only affect the speed of convergence. In the long run harsher institutions (i.e. with low  $I'$ ) may speed up the convergence to the desired efficient steady state with responsible behavior.

### **3.6 Discussion: which Union is Preferable?**

The advantage of a newly created institution is that it guarantees an agreed upon enforcement level, such that clashes between agents of one country following one cultural norm and institutions of the other country based on another cultural norm can be mitigated. Of course, the main cost of a supra-national institution is a partial loss of sovereignty. If  $\theta$  is expected to be high (good economic perspectives), the cultural clash, which applies to  $C$  games only, is unlikely to worry countries' leaders enough to pay the cost of lost sovereignty: a high enough expected  $\theta$  is enough to rationalize a union where no international new institutions are created to regulate the new matches. However, if ex post an unanticipated economic crisis hits the area, i.e.  $\theta$  is revealed to be low, then the cultural clashes may surface as a major and salient issue. When a lower  $\theta$  materializes, countries may realize that the economic union is dominated by a political union with new common institutions or reverting to separate economies. Even if such an option of going back is available (an option which might be very costly as exit strategies have not been anticipated in the original design), the decision to form new institutions to mitigate the cultural clash may be preferable in some cases even if it entails loss of sovereignty. In particular, if a crisis (low realization of  $\theta$ ) is perceived to be temporary, the need for new institutions is less important, but if  $\theta$  low is perceived to be permanent, then the need for new institutions is paramount.

## **4 Application: Cultural Clash in the Euro Area**

We will now apply the simple theory of culture and institutions developed in the previous section to an important and recent cultural clash in the Euro area and related it to the Euro area prolonged economic crisis. All figures and tables we refer to are in the Appendix.

## 4.1 Evidence of cultural difference between Greece and Germany

We start by documenting a significant cultural distance between Germany and Greece - a precondition for the cultural clash.<sup>15</sup> Table 1 panel A shows summary statistics on several measures of cultural traits in a sample of Germans and a sample of Greeks taken from the World Values Survey. We report about three sets of values and beliefs: measures of civic values, measures of cultural norms constructed by Tabellini (2008a) and a measure of people trust in other fellow citizens. The last two columns report the difference in these measures between Germany and Greece and the value of the  $t$ -test for the differences. The table documents a remarkable systematic difference between the values that are shared by the Germans and those shared by the Greeks: with the exception of whether accepting a bribe is justifiable (which is equally not justifiable in Germany as in Greece) all other values are highly statistically different in the two countries. The Germans tend to have higher civic values and stronger cultural traits (respect, obedience and control) that ought to encourage welfare enhancing social interactions (Tabellini, 2008a). Furthermore, the Germans tend to trust other Germans more than the Greeks trust other Greeks by a large margin (14 percentage points more).

However, these data do not say much on whether and how the two populations differ in their attitudes when it comes to the decision to punish others, a feature which seems to have played a critical role in affecting Germany's position on how to manage the Greek crisis. Panel B sheds some light on this. It shows answers provided by the Greeks and the Germans to three questions asked in the European Social Survey that reveal their willingness to punish (or help the punishment of) wrongdoers. The first is: "How likely are you to call the police if you see a man get his wallet stolen?", the second, "How willing are you to identify the person who had done it?", the third "How willing are you to give evidence in court against the accused?". Answers are provided on a scale from 1 to 4, ranging from "not at all willing" (coded 1) to "very willing" (coded 4).

On each of the three accounts the Germans are significantly more willing to punish wrongdoers than the Greeks. The difference appears neatly in Figure 3 which shows the distribution of the answers for the samples in the two countries. For example, 79% of the Germans compared to 59% of the Greeks are "very willing" to call the police and 70% of the Germans are "very willing" to identify the person compared

---

<sup>15</sup>Similar differences (and potential clashes) can probably be documented for other bilateral comparisons between other northern and southern countries in the Euro zone (see Buetzer et al (2012) for evidence), but the Greece Germany clash is the most evident, as documented in the text.

to only 45% of the Greeks.

Yet, rather than reflecting different cultures the difference in willingness to report and collaborate with the police or the court may reflect other features - e.g. a more efficient German police which increases Germans motivation to collaborate as they can see the benefit of their effort. A very interesting experiment conducted by Herrmann et al. (2008) provides evidence that is free from this objection and is thus able to isolate the cultural difference. They run a public good game experiment using 16 comparable participant samples from countries around the world, including Greece and Germany. The public good game aims at mimicking situations that require some degree of cooperation to achieve a socially beneficial outcome - as with the financing of a public good. They endowed participants with 20 tokens and let them play in groups of four. Each participant had to decide how many tokens to keep for themselves and how many to contribute to a group project. As with typical public good games payoffs are such that keeping all own tokens was always in any participant's material individual interest, irrespective of how much the other three group members contributed. Besides the contribution decision, in one of the treatments of the games each participant was given also the possibility to punish each of the other group members after they were informed about the others' contributions to the public investment. The punishment was in the form of an economic loss imposed on the punished by the punisher, who retained his anonymity.

When no punishment is available the Germans tend to contribute more to the public good than the Greeks, thus showing that the latter tend to free ride more frequently. The Germans produce more public good than the Greeks. When players are given the possibility to punish the other players upon seeing their contributions, what they find is striking. The Germans overwhelmingly use part of their endowment to punish those who contributed less. The Greeks, on the contrary, not only do not punish those who free ride but tend instead to punish those who contribute more than them! That is, they exhibit what Herrmann et al. (2008) label antisocial punishment. Put differently, Germany seems to be characterized by a culture of responsibility and social punishment that endows people with behavioral rules that ask them to contribute to the public good and to punish those who do not, thus providing a mechanism to enforce cooperative behavior. In Greece it seems to prevail a weak culture of cooperation that justifies free riding behavior and where cooperators, not free riders, are given a hard time. It may not sound surprising that these two cultures may clash when forced to interact with each other as the management of a financial crisis under a common currency requires.

## 4.2 Evidence of cultural clash consequences

The cultural distance described above generates, according to our model, opportunities for costly cultural clashes, that we claim to be responsible for some key aspects which exacerbated and prolonged the Euro area crisis. We first briefly relate the mismanagement of the Greek crisis to the cultural clash; then we discuss various sources of evidence about the empirical relevance of the cultural clash elements; finally, we compare the cultural clash view with alternative explanations; we conclude this section with some references to the current debate on the necessity of common agencies determining banking union and fiscal union, namely political institutions beyond the simple economic and monetary union.

## 4.3 The mismanagement of the Greek crisis

The Greek debt crisis, which subsequently triggered the European sovereign debt crisis, started after the announcement in October 2009 that Greece government deficit was twice as large as the figure reported by the previous government - de facto admitting that the government cheated on the budget. This announcement was immediately followed by a widening of bond yield spreads (Figure 6) vis a vis Germany, starting a confidence crisis. In a matter of months Greek government debt was downgraded to junk bond status (April 2010) and rates on bonds climbed reflecting that private capital market practically were no longer accessible for Greece, forcing a first aid package to Greece in May 2010. There is widespread agreement that governments in Europe mismanaged the crisis, showing first an unwillingness to intervene promptly when the Greek crisis started and was still manageable and never willing to devote enough resources to make sure that intervention could be resolute and final (see among others, Johnson, 2010; Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Eichengreen, 2013; Wren-Lewis, 2013). Inefficient management was lately admitted by the IMF in a June 2013 strictly confidential report leaked to the Wall Street Journal. Besides recognizing that the plan understated the macroeconomic impact of the austerity measures imposed on Greece, it is stressed that frictions among the leading European countries were behind the late reaction. In particular, it appears that Germany was paralyzed and afraid of breaking a tabu: helping an euro area country that was very likely insolvent. As Rajan (2012) puts it “European politicians are failing Europe by being forever behind the curve. Why do they find it so hard to lead?”. The answer he provides to the question he raises is that when faced with novel problems that the public has never experienced before, policy makers may fail because they may not have the mandate to tackle them. Even if policy makers perfectly foresee the adverse consequences of a problem (such as a delayed reaction to the Greek crisis), it

may be hard to convince the electors that it is worth incurring the short term cost of intervention (e.g. financial help to Greece). Lack of past experience prevents electors to assess the size of these costs and only an appreciation of the latter can convince them to offer the necessary consensus for policy makers to act. In other words, even if politicians are fully aware of the disaster that awaits if nothing is done...”they may have little ability to persuade voters: talk is cheap and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the status quo usually appears comfortable enough”. Rajan’s explanation rests on two ingredients: a) prompt action was not feasible for lack of consensus and the latter is needed to set policy in motion; b) voters may fail to see the general equilibrium consequences of their unwillingness to bear the short run cost of intervention which politicians can instead see. Our explanation provides a ground for both ingredients: voters reactions are guided by (automatic) application of cultural norms which, in the particular setting, proved dysfunctional in the presence of the cultural clash; politicians fail because, being subject to the conformity of institutions to culture, they cannot bypass the prevailing voters opinions.

## **4.4 Evidence in support of the cultural clash explanation**

### **4.4.1 Evidence from polls**

We use two recurrent polls sponsored by public TV stations. The ARD, which runs the Deutschland-TREND survey, and the ZDF sponsors Politbarometer survey data gathering information on German citizens feelings and opinions about the management of the crisis as well as confidence and support for their leader Angela Merkel. Table 2 shows answers provided by participants in the polls to different type of questions asked at various points in time between 2010 and 2011; we have organized these questions in groups according to topic and numbered them for ease of reference. Some of these questions have been asked also at various times in 2012 with very similar patterns of responses. The first set of questions (1 to 6) shows people opinions about whether Greece deserves being helped and how Greece should be treated. Already in February 2010, few months after it became public that the previous Greek government cheated on the budget and when the debate was around the potential size of the aid required to avoid Greece default, a poll by Emnid reveals that 67% of the Germans oppose any aid (question 1). Again, in July 2011, when governments were discussing about the second tranche of transfers to Greece, the vast majority of the Germans (60%) is against giving Greece a second round of rescue loans (question 1) and in October they continue to express a negative opinion about whether the other European governments (not the German) should continue to give support to Greece. In addition, more than 80% report that Greece should be forced to leave the Euro

if they did not accept the decisions on the euro rescue (question 3). The pattern of answers is consistent with the idea that the opinions of the Germans were guided by the desire to punish the Greeks (or Greece) for their Government deceptive behavior. Interestingly, we can exclude that this opinions are driven by stereotypes towards the Mediterranean countries because the vast majority of the Germans (70%) when asked in September 2011 support the idea that Germany helps economically Libya's reconstruction following the liberation war fought against Gaddafi (question 8). And we can also exclude that the opposition to support Greece reflects a generic punishment towards European countries with problematic public finances, because when the Germans are asked which country among the PIIGS should be allowed to continue to be part of the Euro area, only a minority of them report that Greece should remain in the Euro while the vast majority answers that Spain, Italy and Ireland should stay in the Euro (with percentages in support of each country equal to 77%, 73% and 67% respectively; question 5). It seems again that it is the desire to punish Greece that leads the vast majority of the Germans (77%, question 8) to dislike the expansion of the funds of the European Financial Stability Fund.

This is further confirmed by the Pew Research Center report who asks a sample of Germans to report whether they have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Greece and several other European countries. In the Spring of 2010, 70% of the Germans have an unfavorable opinion of Greece and this is even higher two years later in the Spring of 2012 (79%, Table 3). Germans have instead only mild unfavorable opinions towards Italy and Spain despite their troubled public finances: in the Spring of 2012, 33% of the Germans have an unfavorable opinion of Italy and 26 of Spain and these opinions are not different from those expressed in early 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis had not yet extended to these countries. Interestingly, the judgement of the Germans vis a vis Italy and Spain is not different from the opinion they have of the British (Table 3, Panel A), again suggesting that Germans unfavorable opinion of the Greeks reflects a *specific* reaction in Germany to the cheating behavior of the Greek government rather than a judgement for the high level of debt of poorly performing economies during the European sovereign debt crisis.<sup>16</sup>

These sentiments, besides being widespread among representative samples of the general population and thus very likely to reflect the opinions of the German median

---

<sup>16</sup>The Berlin correspondent from the italian daily newspaper "La Stampa" reports casual evidence from the Berlin commercial rental market. Opening a shop in the crowded streets of Prenzlauer Bergin Berlin costs differently depending on nationality: Germans and Dutch pay 3 months of rent as advance payment; French 6 months; "club med" countries 12 months, except Greeks who must pay 18 months upfront. The rule is take it or leave.

voter, are shared also by specific segments of the German population, namely the business community which was particularly sensitive to a quick resolution of the Greek crisis. As Figure 4 shows, the vast majority of the German managers (81%) think that the most serious risks for the German economy come from the euro crisis (Panel A); at the same time two out of three argue that the best response to this crisis is to impose heavier sanctions to the debt transgressors - that is to punish Greece.<sup>17</sup>

These opinions, we argue, have to be followed by Mrs. Merkel who is bound by the conformity constraint.<sup>18</sup> One then expects that if she conforms to the constraint this should be reflected in the consensus polls. Indeed, as Angela Merkel has insisted in her severe policy towards Greece<sup>19</sup>, approval of her policy has increased steadily:

---

<sup>17</sup>There also several pieces of casual evidence suggesting that cultural factors are an integral part of the way Germany has handled the Greek crisis. An interesting one is the following reconstruction of Thomas Wieser's interpretation of the German government behavior in the management of the crisis. At the time, Thomas Wieser is the Chairmen of the Economic and Financial Committee of the European Union. The committee in charge of preparing the agenda for the European Finance meetings where negotiations on how to tackle the European sovereign debt crises take place. In private talks he has argued that all the problems that Europe has faced in dealing with the Greek crisis can be explained in terms of religious background, and has provided the following rationale. In countries with a relevant presence of Protestantism, such as Germany, moral and religious precepts are so severe that one will never be forgiven for his sins, nor will people grant forgiveness to the sinners. In Catholic dominated countries, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland - four of the five PIIGS - behavior is such that if one sins he/she can always be forgiven if he/she repents and so make it into paradise. Finally, according to Wieser, Orthodox religion is so loose that in countries dominated by it - of which Greece is the leading one - if one sins there is not even a need for him/her to repent to make it into paradise. This story is perfectly consistent with ours but goes a step further, as it provides a rationale for *why* the Germans feel obliged to punish the Greeks (the "sinners") and why the Greeks cheated on the budget: their religious background, dominated by Protestantism in Germany and by the Orthodox church in Greece.

<sup>18</sup>Direct evidence of the conformity constraint is hard to obtain. One piece is request that Germany Finance Minister during the crisis, Wolfgang Schauble, made to Timothy Geithner - US secretary of the Treasury at the time - to support kicking Greece out of the Euro. In his book, Geithner (2014) reports the he met Schauble in July 2012 at the peak of the crisis who argued that there where many in Europe who "thought kicking the Greeks out of the . Eurozone was a plausible - even desirable - strategy". Geithner writes that Shaulble justified the proposal by arguing that "...with Greece out, Germany would have been more likely to provide the financial support the eurozone needed, because *the German people would no longer perceive aid to Europe as a bailout for the Greeks*" (p. 483, italics added). This is both consistent with a German/Greek cultural clash and the comformity constraint.

<sup>19</sup>Mrs Merkel severe policy culminated in January 2012 in a proposal made informally to the other member countries of the Eurozone to appoint a European commissioner with veto power on budget decisions taken by the Greek government - Financial Times, January 27 2012 - as a condition for approving the new rescue plan; this proposal was subsequently openly supported by the President

in September 2011 45% of the Germans were satisfied with the way Angela Merkel was handling the crisis; the proportion increases to 56% in November 2011 and 80% in the Spring of 2012 (Table 2, question 9). Interestingly, this is consensus towards Merkel not towards her party as the vote intentions show little change (Table 2, question 10). This is consistent with another implication of our story: whatever party or leader is in charge should be equally subject to the conformity constraint. Hence, political opinions should be little affected.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, if punishment by the Germans has played a role in the management of the crisis, then one would expect: a) that since people do not like to be punished, we should observe some resentment of the "punished" - the Greeks - towards the "punisher" - the Germans. This should be even more true if the culture of the punished is one of forgiveness rather than punishment, so that the latter will look unjust or excessive - another symptom of the cultural clash; b) the unfavorable opinions towards Greece should be stronger in countries with a stronger culture of punishment.

As for the first implication, according to the Pew Research Center May 2012 Global Attitudes Report, anti-German sentiment has become prevalent in Greece, where a majority (78%) has an unfavorable opinion of Germany, and nearly half (49%) of the Greeks say they have a very unfavorable view. This contrasts with the fact that in all the other countries sampled (except the UK) Germany scores the lowest fraction of unfavorable opinions (Table 3, Panels C-F). Greece is the only country where a majority (84%) thinks German Chancellor Angela Merkel is doing a bad job dealing with the economic crisis. And they are intensely critical: 57% say she is doing a very bad job and the Greeks are the least likely among Europeans surveyed to say the Germans are hardworking.

To provide some suggestive evidence on the second implication we correlate the share of people of different European countries that, according to Pew Research have an unfavorable opinion of Greece in the Spring of 2012 with the share of people that are ready to participate in punishing. As a proxy for the latter we use the share of people in each country that say they are very likely to call the police if they see a man get his wallet stolen (see Table 1, Panel B). As shown in Figure 5, though based

---

of the ECB -Spiegel, October 28 2012.

<sup>20</sup>Our model is consistent also with the fact that the Greek voters "punished" Papandreu in 2012 elections rather than the conservative party that was responsible for cheating on the budget and thus for the subsequent German reaction. One can interpret Greek voters behavior in terms of the anti-social punishment that characterizes Greece culture documented by Herrmann et al. (2008): they "punished" the person who revealed that cheating occurred rather than punishing the cheaters. This is not to say that this was the main driver of the vote; for instance, the Greeks may have voted against Papandreu also because they did not like his austerity policy.

on very few observations, the correlation is clearly positive (correlation coefficient = 0.57), and is thus consistent with this implication.

#### 4.4.2 Cultural Clash pre-crisis?

Since the evidence discussed so far draws on views expressed in the months after January 2010, it may be argued that the unfavorable opinions that the Germans have of the Greeks vis à vis the other PIIGS reflect an anti-Greek sentiment of the Germans that pre-dates the crisis rather than the Germans cultural reaction to the deceptive behavior of the Greeks. And a similar objection could be raised for the unfavorable opinions that the Greeks have of the Germans. Unfortunately the questions summarized in the previous tables were only asked after the discovery that Greece cheated on the budget. To address this objection we use data on bilateral trust - that is the trust citizens in a European country have towards citizens of another European country - collected by Eurobarometer well before the Great Recession and countries opinions about Greece admission to the European Union at the end of 1980. In a sequence of surveys run up to 1995 Eurobarometer has asked participants in the survey the following question : "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all". Details about the surveys are reported in Guiso et al (2009). To summarize the answers we have computed the average percentage share of Germans and Greeks that report they trust a lot people of each of the other countries included in Eurobarometer. Table 4 shows this measures of trust for the average of all countries (last row) and for a selected group of countries that overlap as much as possible with those in Table 3.

Interestingly, 11% of the Germans report that they trust the Greeks a lot - a figure that is somewhat below how much the Germans trust on average people of all other European countries (16%), but higher than the trust they have towards the Italians (8%) and comparable to the trust they have towards the Portuguese (11%) and the Irish (13%). This suggests that there was no specific unfavorable view of the Germans towards the Greeks before the specific event - the cheating on Greece budget - that has triggered the crisis. Similarly, there was no pre-existing unfavorable Greek view towards the Germans: 18% of the Greeks trusted the Germans a lot, somewhat above how much the Greeks trusted other Europeans (last row of Table 4) and more than the trust the Greeks had towards the Italians, the British or the Portuguese. Thus, the Greeks unfavorable judgment towards the Germans in 2012 that we document in Table 3 is likely to reflect not a pre-existing Greek anti-German sentiment but the

reaction to the German punishment. This conclusion is further strengthened by the evidence in Figure 7 showing the fraction of people in various countries that in 1980 argue that Greece entry into the EU is a good thing. Interestingly, Germans are, after Italy the strongest supporters of Greece admission.

## 4.5 Dealing with alternative explanations

In this section we discuss possible alternative and more standard explanations behind the inefficient delay in managing the Greek crisis. Our purpose is not to dismiss these factors and argue that they were unimportant, but rather to show that what we interpret as a cultural clash is not just the reflection of some other force.

### 4.5.1 Different incentives to save Greece

A first objection to our proposed explanation is that countries had different incentives to save Greece because they could have been differentially affected by a propagation of the Greek crisis; namely, the Mediterranean countries had stronger incentives to bail out Greece because they feared a contagion of the crisis while this fear was absent in Germany. Hence, Germany could safely (and selfishly) oppose costly transfers for the German taxpayer, and the Germans hostile opinions towards Greece just reflect these economic incentives. To address this objection notice first that the different reaction of the Germans (and the position of the German government on the Greek crisis) compared to that of other European citizens/governments emerges soon after it becomes public that Greece cheated on the budget. As shown in Table 2, (first row), already in February 2010 the vast majority of the Germans oppose transfers to Greece. At the time, however, interest rate spreads show no evidence of a risk of contagion to other European countries, with or without budget problems. Figure 6 compares the spread on the Greek 10-year government bond with respect to the German Bund with that of the other PIIGS (Panel A) and of France (Panel B). Greece spread starts to increase right after the new Socialist government announced in October 2009 that the true deficit was about twice as large as the figure diffused by the previous government (the first vertical line). The spread of the other PIIGS, however, shows initially little change. For instance, up until March 2010, while Greece spread increases by about 300 basis points, Ireland spread is constant or slightly decreasing. The spread of PIIGS starts to increase in proximity of and right after the adoption of the first aid package in April-May 2010, suggesting that markets fear of contagion as reflected in the spreads was induced by a perceived failure of the bail out policy. Another and perhaps more compelling way to address the objection is to notice that it cannot explain the different views of the French and the Germans

vis a vis Greece. France spread is essentially flat all through until June 2011, that is until the Greek crisis evolves into an Euro crisis. Until then, markets anticipate no risk of contagion to France. Hence, France and Germany are, along these dimension fully comparable. Yet, Germans sentiments are much more unfavorable to Greece than French sentiments already in the Spring of 2010: while 35% of the French have an unfavorable opinion of Greece the fraction of unfavorable is twice as large among the Germans (see Table 3, Panel A and Panel C). This is instead consistent with a German-Greek cultural clash, even more so in light of the fact the French have a weaker attitude to punish than the Germans - as shown by the willingness to participate in punishment (Table 1, Panel B).

A second concern is that the reaction of the Germans towards Greece compared to that of other European countries may just reflect a *lower* exposure of the German banks (and German investors) to the Greek sovereign debt, weakening any incentive Germany may have had to bail out Greece. However, the data seem to tell a different story. At the end of 2009 French and German banks were in Europe the most exposed to Greece, accounting for 76% of total Greek debt to European banks (split 53% French banks and 22% German banks). The banks of these two countries together held 66% of the Greek government debt in the hands of Euro area banks, of which 28% held by German banks (Table 5). Thus, it was in Germany's interest, as much as France, to push towards a bail out of Greece, sharing the cost with the other European countries in proportion to their GDP. We see the opposite (it is Germany that more than France and the other EU countries that opposed the bailout). The culture-based explanation is instead consistent with the angry reaction of the Germans towards Greece once they discovered that the debtor hid his ability to repay by concealing the overall size of his debt. Models of betrayal aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) indeed predict that individuals suffer a greater utility loss (and thus get angrier) when the loss springs from the misbehavior of a person rather than nature; furthermore, sensitivity to betrayal is likely to vary across countries (Bohnet, Greig, Herrman and Zeckhauser, 2008) and be greater in countries where keeping promises (and punishing those who do not) is a key part of their culture, as it seem to be the case in Germany. Hence, *ceteris paribus* one would expect a stronger reaction in Germany than in France.

#### 4.5.2 Moral hazard stories

Another possibility is that Germany desire to "punish" Greece arises as an optimal strategy to discipline future moral hazard by the Greeks (and indeed by any other member of the union). Punishment may reflect an *ex ante* agreement among

the members of the economic union to discipline countries that with their behavior threaten the stability of the union. Without denying that moral hazard concerns may have played a relevant role in the reluctance of some of the European countries to help out Greece, we argue that it is unlikely that it can explain all without any role for cultural clash considerations. In fact, the moral hazard story, literally taken, implies that all countries should be involved and share the punishment strategy, which seems to be contradicted by the tougher German positions.

A possible criticism to our explanation is that the cultural clash instead of stemming from a clash of behavioral norms is the reflection of the dominant economic thinking in Germany that can be traced back to the *ordo-liberalism* principles (Schnyder and Siems, 2013). These principle stress the importance of disciplining moral hazard and containing debt. We have three answers to this criticism. First, this criticism does not seem to question the role of a cultural clash as a critical element in the crisis, but whether it is a clash of economic ideas or a clash of interpersonal behavioral rules. Second, it raises the issue of why the *ordo-liberalism* principles emerge and succeed in Germany; our answer would be that the "responsible/punisher" characterization of the German culture is the ideal humus where these type of principles can spread out. Third, the *ordo-liberalism* principles predict punishment of moral hazard when countries run high debt; our characterization predicts punishment of cheaters. The data are better consistent with our story: Germans sentiments deteriorated vis-à-vis Greece when it was discovered that they cheated. Their view about Italy, whose debt was high and increasing during the crisis, do not show a comparable deterioration.

Second, the moral hazard story has an implication for the time profile of Germans sentiments that differs from the cultural clash explanation. Under moral hazard, Germans' sentiments towards Greece should be mitigated by the introduction of the balance budget rules and more sever monitoring of *future* fiscal policies in member countries adopted with the Fiscal Compact agreement in the Spring of 2012. Under the cultural clash explanation because these sentiments are a reaction to the past behavior of the Greeks, they should either be constant or even amplified by the bail out packages decided meanwhile. The data in Table 3, Panel A seem to be more consistent with the latter than with the former explanation: if anything, Germans views towards Greece have deteriorated between the Spring of 2010 and that of 2012.

In a recent article, Ardagna and Caselli (2012) have pointed out the difficulties of negotiations among heads of States at the European Council as a potential source of inefficient solutions for the Greek crisis, and they conclude that perhaps the best way to avoid negotiation-related political economy frictions would have been to let the IMF handle the Greek crisis. The type of political economy failures we identify are

different and so is the solution: the failures stem from heterogeneous cultures, and the clash that this heterogeneity in culture creates would be best addressed by the creation of a new type of institution - like a political/fiscal union - free from the need to conform to the culture of any single country in the union. At the positive analysis level, we do not think the friction was (mainly) one of negotiation costs, because from the beginning the problem has basically been "what does Germany think", which therefore concerns more understanding Germany than understanding the negotiation process between Euro-area heads of state. At the normative analysis level, the cultural reasons why the Germans do not want to save the Greeks unless the Greeks' sovereignty is suspended have to do with moral hazard (cheating expectations), and hence Germany would have opposed such saving even through the IMF. On the other hand, a fiscal union, which means elimination of the game between sovereign States, finds Germany more willing to help because not threatened by future moral hazard and finds Greek debt "less" punished. In other words, while IMF would still make donors upset about helping out countries who could be prone to moral hazard, going for a fiscal union that requires transfer of power from national finance ministers to a European finance minister would avoid the inefficient punishments as well as the risk of moral hazard and hence the worries and cultural clashes.

#### **4.6 Current debate on the future of the Euro area**

Our model suggests that the creation of a monetary union without a fiscal/political union can be justified in a scenario of optimism regarding the incidence/frequency of interests aligned interactions and the value of integration in terms of economies of scale and/or scope. However, we have also shown that the presence of a cultural clash and a crisis together may determine an impetus towards the creation of new common institutions, like a fiscal union or banking union. The current political debate in Europe is consistent with this implication of the theoretical model. Indeed, with the aggravation of the euro area crisis, the fiscal union seems to have become again a policy option, advocated by scholars (see, among others, Marzinotto, Sapir and Wolff (2011) and Ferguson and Barbieri (2012) and policy makers. During the crisis, Trichet (2011) was the first to openly speak about the creation of a European Finance Minister. Interestingly, and consistent with our model, the European Ministry of Finance, as Trichet stresses is "not necessarily a ministry of finance that administers a large federal budget"; its main role is in fact to move power from the national countries - Germany and Greece in our simplified set up - so as to avoid the impasse caused, in our interpretation, by the cultural clash. That the motivation for relying on a fiscal union to address the current euro crisis is not exclusively driven by an

insurance motive, but by a governance motive, as in our model, is also supported by the German view on the issue. Germany conceives the fiscal union as a set of new rules that help prevent future crisis and clashes (see the view expressed by Ludger Schuknecht, the director general for Interlineation Fiscal, Financial and Monetary Policy at the German Ministry of Finance, 2013).

## 5 Conclusions

Cultural norms can affect economic outcomes through several channels, indeed they affect many layers of society: private relationships, institutional differences and elected policy makers as well. Cultural clashes become salient whenever two (or more) cultures have to merge in terms of economic activities. The cultural difference and the different behaviors that each culture commands can result in a political impasse. Though policy makers are bound by the cultural norms over which they have no control and that evolve slowly, they can still design common institutions which can temper the effects of the clash. We apply these ideas to shed light on the (mis)-management of the European sovereign debt crisis. Besides rationalizing the German/Greek contrast and why Germany has shown resistance to bail Greece out, our model has much more general features regarding the interplay between culture and institutions. In our set up the slow moving nature of cultural norms should be sped up through a process of convergence of institutions when the cultural clash results in particularly costly outcomes, such as political stalemates which prolong and exacerbate a crisis.

About the desirability of a political union in general, and hence fiscal union or banking union in Europe in particular, we have highlighted several conceptual points. First and most importantly, a political union's main role is to replace multiple authorities subject to cultural clash with a unique new authority, hence facilitating convergence, commitment, and enforcement. Second, an important message of the paper is that the value of a political unification is greater the higher the cultural heterogeneity.

## Appendix

**Proof of Proposition 1.** The payoff (average fitness) for a merged population (under an economic union (U)), characterized by the population  $(x_0, y_0)$  in a C game, is for each mover:

$$U_{UC}^1 = u_1^C(r)(1 - x_0) + u_1(cf)x_0y_0, \quad U_{UC}^2 = u_2^C(r)(1 - x_0) + u_2(cf)x_0y_0$$

Hence total welfare in a C game is:

$$U_{UC}^T = (u_1^C(r) + u_2^C(r))(1 - x_0) + (u_1(cf) + u_2(cf))x_0y_0$$

If the population of the country with culture  $k = 1, 2$  is  $N^k$ , we have:

$$x_0 = \frac{N^1}{N^1 + N^2}, \quad y_0 = \frac{N^1 + y_2N^2}{N^1 + N^2}$$

Hence total welfare is:

$$\begin{aligned} U_U^T &= \theta U_{UA}^T + (1 - \theta) U_{UC}^T \\ &= \theta [(u_1^A(r) + u_2^A(r))] + (1 - \theta) \left[ \begin{aligned} &(u_1^C(r) + u_2^C(r)) \frac{N^2}{N^1 + N^2} \\ &+ (u_1(cf) + u_2(cf)) \frac{(N^1 + y_2N^2)N^1}{(N^1 + N^2)^2} \end{aligned} \right] \end{aligned}$$

so it is decreasing in  $D = (1 - y_2)$  and in  $\theta$ .

Total welfare depends on the population sizes only through the ratio  $N^2/N^1$ , namely (omitting the term independent from  $N^2/N^1$ ) we have:

$$U_U^T \propto (1 - \theta) \left[ (u_1^C(r) + u_2^C(r)) \frac{N^2/N^1}{1 + N^2/N^1} + (u_1(cf) + u_2(cf)) \frac{1 + y_2(N^2/N^1)}{(1 + N^2/N^1)^2} \right]$$

It is easy to show that the first term is increasing in  $N^2/N^1$  always, the second term is increasing if  $y_2 > 2 \frac{N^1 - N^2}{N^1}$ . ■

**Proof of Proposition 2.** A political union is preferred by both countries if the gain over the economic union exceeds the cost  $S$  of the State-like union creation. Namely<sup>21</sup>

$$U_{SU}^1 - U_U^1 = (1 - \theta) (I' - y_2) u_1(cf) \frac{N^2}{N^1 + N^2} > S$$

$$U_{SU}^2 - U_U^2 = (1 - \theta) (I' - y_2) u_2(cf) \frac{N^1}{N^1 + N^2} > S$$

■

---

<sup>21</sup>Recall that the subscript  $k = 1, 2$  in  $U_k$  refers to the country that reached steady state  $k$  before the merger.

## References

- [1] Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2012), "Why Nations Fail", Crown Publishing Company, New York
- [2] Akerlof, George A. (2007), "The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics", *American Economic Review*, 97(1): 5–36.
- [3] Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn (2011), "On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough," NBER WP 17098.
- [4] Alesina, Alberto and Enrico Spolaore (2003), "The Size of Nations", MIT Press Boston.
- [5] Algan Yann and Piere Cahuc (2010), "Inherited Trust and Growth", *American Economic Review*,
- [6] Ardagna Silvia and Francesco Caselli (2012), "The Political-Economy of the Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts" *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, forthcoming
- [7] Avdjiev Stefan, Christian Upper and Karsten von Kleist (2010), "Highlights of international banking and financial market activity", *BIS Quartely Bullettin*, September
- [8] Baldwin, Richard, (2006), "The Euro Trade Effects", Working Paper Series 594, European Central Bank.
- [9] Basten, Christoph Carl and Frank Betz (2012), "Beyond Work Ethic: Religion, Individual and Political Preferences", KOF WP N. 309.
- [10] Bertola, Giuseppe, "Switzerland: Relic of the Past, Model for the Future?", *The EEAG Report on the European Economy*, CESifo Munich pp 55-73
- [11] Bignon V. , Caroli E. and R. Galbiati, (2014) "Stealing to Survive: Crime in XIXth Century France", *Economic Journal* (forthcoming)
- [12] Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2000a), "Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural Transmission, Marriage and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115, 955-88.
- [13] Bisin, A. and T. Verdier (2000b): "Models of Cultural Transmission, Voting and Political Ideology," *European Journal of Political Economy*, 16, 5-29.

- [14] Bisin, A and T. Verdier (2001): "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 97, 298-319.
- [15] Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2012), "On the Joint Evolution of Culture and Institutions ", New York University WP.
- [16] Bohnet, Iris and Richard Zeckhauser, (2004), "Trust, Risk and betrayal", *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization*", 55(4): 467-484
- [17] Bohnet, Iris, Fiona Greig, Benedikt Herrmann and Richard Zeckhauser, (2008) "Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States", *American Economic Review* 98:1, 294-310
- [18] Bottazzi, Laura, Thomas Hellmann and Marco Da Rin (2007), "The importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital", NBER WP 16923
- [19] Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson (1985), "Culture and the Evolutionary Process", London: University of Chicago Press.
- [20] Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson, (2005), "The Origin and Evolution of Cultures", Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [21] Buetzer, Sasha, Christina Jordan and Livio Stracca (2012), "Euro Area Imbalances: A Matter of Culture?", European Central Bank WP.
- [22] Caselli, Francesco, Tom Cunningham, Massimo Morelli and Inges Moreno de Barreda (2012), "Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Rules", LSE working paper
- [23] Cook, P.J and G. Zarkin. 1985. "Crime and the business cycle.", *Journal of Legal Studies*, 14, 115-128.
- [24] Dixit, Avinash K., and Londregan, John B. (1995) "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency" *American Political Science Review* 89, 856-66.
- [25] Eichengreen Barry, (2013), "Lessons of a Greek Tragedy", Project Syndicate, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/what-greece-should-have-done-differently-by-barry-eichengreen>
- [26] Herrmann, Benedikt, Christian Thöni and Simon Gächter (2008), "Antisocial Punishment Across Societies", *Science*, 319, pp: 1362-1367
- [27] Fahri, Emmanuel and Ivan Werning (2012), "Fiscal Unions", NBER WP 18280

- [28] Ferguson, Niall and Pierpaolo Barbieri (2012), "Merkel can achieve fiscal union in Europe" *Financial Times* May 2.
- [29] Fernandez, Raquel.(2007). "Women. Work and Culture". *Journal of the European Economic Association*. 5(2-3). pp. 305-332.
- [30] Fisman, Raymond , Yasushi Hamao and Yongxiang Wang, (2012), "The Impact of Cultural Aversion on Economic Exchange: Evidence from Shocks to Sino-Japanese Relations, Columbia University working paper
- [31] Fougère, D., F. Kramarz and J. Pouget. 2009. "Youth Unemployment and Crime in France." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 7(5), 909-938.
- [32] Geithner, Timothy F. (2014), "Stress Test", Crown Publishers, New York.
- [33] Grosjean, Pauline (2011), "A History of Violence: The Culture of Honor as a Determinant of Homicide in the US South", Austrian School of Business WP.
- [34] Greif, Avner. 1994. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(5):912–950.
- [35] Gorodnichenko, Y., and G. Roland (2011a) "Which Dimensions of Culture Matter for Long Run Growth?" *American Economic Review*. Papers and Proceedings (forthcoming)
- [36] Gorodnichenko, Y., and G. Roland (2011b), "Culture, Institutions and the Wealth of Nations", working paper
- [37] Guiso, Luigi. Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (2004). "The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development." *The American Economic Review*. 94(3). 526-556.
- [38] Guiso, Luigi. Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (2006). "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?". *Journal of Economic Perspectives* (2006) 20: 23-48.
- [39] Guiso, Luigi. Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (20013). "Long-Term Cultural Persistence." University of Chicago, previously circulated as NBER Working Paper W14278, 2008.
- [40] Guiso, L. P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales (2008): "Social Capital and Good Culture," Marshall Lecture, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6(2-3), 295-320.

- [41] Guiso, Luigi. Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (2009). "Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?". *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. (124) 3: 1095-1131.
- [42] Huntington, Samuel P. (1996): "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" New York: Simon and Schuster.
- [43] Johnson, Simon (2010), "Will Greece go to the IMF?", Project Syndicate 17 February [http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/will-greece-go-to-the-imf-](http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/will-greece-go-to-the-imf)
- [44] Landes, David (1999), "The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor ", W.W. Norton, New York.
- [45] Lindbeck, A., Weibull, J., (1987) "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition" *Public Choice* 52, 273-97.
- [46] Lizzeri, A., Persico, N., (2001), "The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives". *American Economic Review* 91, 225–245.
- [47] Luque, J., M. Morelli and J. Tavares (2014): "A Volatility-based Theory of Fiscal Union Desirability," *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 112-C, PP. 1-11;
- [48] Marzinotto, Benedicta, Andrei Sapir and Guntram B. Wolff (2011), "What kind of fiscal union?", Bruegel Policy Brief, Issue 2011/06
- [49] Mokyr, Joel (2012), "The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain 1700-1850. Penguin Press, forthcoming
- [50] Morelli, Massimo, Huanxing Yang and Lixin Ye (2012), "Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice", *American Economic Journal* 4, 142-75.
- [51] North, Douglass C. (1991), "Institutions", *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 1., pp. 97-112.
- [52] Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon (2011), "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 101, No. 7, December 2011, 3221-3252
- [53] Nunn, Nathan (2012), "Culture and the Historical Process", NBER WP 17869.
- [54] Pisani-Ferry, Jean (2012), "Who Lost Greece", Project Syndicate , 28 February, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/who-lost-greece->

- [55] Putnam, Robert, Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti (1993), "Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy", Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey
- [56] Rajan, Raghuram (2012), "The Public and Its Problems", Project Syndicate 13 February, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-public-and-its-problems>
- [57] Raphael, S. and R. Winter-Ebmer, 2001. "Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime", *Journal of Law and Economics*, 44(1), 259-283.
- [58] Schnyder Gerhard and Mathias M Siems (2013) "The Ordoliberal Variety of Neoliberalism" *Banking Systems in the Crisis: The Faces of Liberal Capitalism*, Abingdon: Routledge. 250-268
- [59] Schuknecht, Ludger (2013), "Mastering the Euro Crisis. A Rule Based Approach", presentation at the conference 2013 *Lectio Minghetti*, Florence.
- [60] Spolaore, Enrico (2013), "What is European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, forthcoming.
- [61] Tabellini, Guido (2008a). "Institutions and Culture." Presidential address, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6,(2-3),255-94.
- [62] Tabellini, Guido (2008b). "The Scope of Cooperation: Norms and Incentives." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3), 905-50 *Association*, 6,(2-3),255-94.
- [63] Trichet Jean Charles, (2011) 'Building Europe, building institutions', *Karlspreis* speech, <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110602.en.html>
- [64] Voth, Joachim and Nico Voigtlijoender (2012), "Persecution Perpetuated: The Medieval Origins of Anti-Semitic Violence in Nazi Germany", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 2012, 127(3): 1339-1392.
- [65] Williamson, Olivier (2000), "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead", *The Journal of Economic Literature*, 38(3): 595-613.
- [66] Wren-Lewis, Simon (2013), "How a Greek Drama Became a Global Tragedy", *Mainly Macro Thursday*, 13 June 2013

# Appendix

**Table 1. Greece and Germany: cultural difference**

In Panel A Variables are obtained from the 1999-200 World Values Surveys (WVS).

**A. Civic values, cultural norms and trust beliefs**

Variables	Germany	Greece	Difference Germany- Greece	t-test for the difference
<i>Measures of civic values</i>				
Claiming Government benefits you are not entitled to	9.00	6.96	2.04	24.7
Avoiding a fare on public transport	9.04	7.57	1.47	19.19
Cheating on taxes	8.63	7.83	0.80	9.27
Accept a bribe	9.06	9.07	-0.01	-0.14
<i>Tabellini (2009) cultural norms indicators</i>				
Respect	0.71	0.52	0.19	10.42
Obedience	0.14	0.11	0.03	2.51
Control	7.25	7.00	0.25	3.70
Unselfishness	0.09	0.26	-0.18	-13.32
<i>Beliefs</i>				
Generalized Trust	0.38	0.24	0.14	7.58

**B. Willingness to participate in punishment of wrongdoers**

Variables	Germany	Greece	Difference Germany- Greece	t-test for the difference
<i>Measures of participation in punishment</i>				
How likely to call the police if you see a man get his wallet stolen?	3.75	3.47	0.28	16.61
How willing to identify person who had done it?	3.66	3.24	0.42	22.32
How willing to give evidence in court against the accused?	3.55	2.90	0.65	29.07

Variables	Germany	France	Difference Germany-France	t-test for the difference
<i>Measures of participation in punishment</i>				
How likely to call the police if you see a man get his wallet stolen?	3.75	3.60	0.15	8.35
How willing to identify person who had done it?	3.66	3.45	0.21	10.65
How willing to give evidence in court against the accused?	3.55	3.27	0.28	12.39

**Table 2. Germans opinions during the crisis**

The table shows the answers provided by a sample of Germans to questions concerning the management of the European sovereign debt crisis. Variables are obtained from two recurrent polls sponsored by public tv stations. The ARD, which runs the Deutschland-TREND survey, and the ZDF sponsors the Politbarometer survey (denoted Politb in the table).

Question	Question wording	Yes	No
1	<i>Support to Greece</i> "Should Greece receive financial aid?" (February, 2010, Emnid)	33%	67%
	Should Greece be given a second round of rescue loans? (June 2011, Politb)	36%	60%
2	Should the other European-States continue to support Greece? (October 2011, D-T)	42%	53%
3	Will Greece have to leave the Eurozone if it does not accept the decisions on the euro rescue? (November 2011, D-T)	82%	15%
4	Would Greek bankruptcy entail negative consequences for Germany? (September 2011, Politb)	30%	68%
5	Who should continue to be a member of the euro zone? (July 2011, Politb)		
	- Greece	47%	53%
	- Spain	77%	23%
	- Italy	73%	27%
	- Ireland	67%	33%
6	Do you think that new government in Greece helps overcoming the crisis ? (November 2011, Politb)	23%	60%
7	<i>Support funding the European Financial Stability Fund</i> Should the funds of the EFSF be expanded? (September 2011, Politb)	20%	76%
8	<i>Support to Libya</i> Should Germany support economically Libya's reconstruction? (September 2011, D-T)	70%	27%

---

	<i>Support to Merkel</i>		
9	Are you satisfied with Angela Merkel's handling of the crisis? (Politb)		
	- September 2011	45%	65%
	-October 2011	51%	49%
	-November 2011	56%	44%
	- January 2012	63%	37%
	- Spring 2012 (PEW Global Attitudes Project, May 2012)	80%	20%
10	<i>Support to Merkel political party</i>	Christian Democrat	Social Democrat
	- Vote intentions: September 2011	35%	28%
	- Vote intentions: October 2011	32%	30%
	- Vote intentions: November 2011	34%	31%
	- Vote intentions: January 2012	35%	30%
	- Vote intentions: November 2012	39%	30%

---

**Table 3. Germans, Greeks and other countries views during the clash**

The various Panels of the table show the answers provided by a sample about 1,000 people in each of the countries the panel refers to, that was asked in the Pew Research Center May 2012 Report of the Global Attitudes Project.

A. German View					
Variables	Greece	Italy	Spain	France	UK
			<b>Spring 2012</b>		
Somewhat unfavorable	50	31	25	17	27
Very unfavorable	23	2	1	2	2
Total unfavorable	79	33	26	19	29
			<b>Spring 2010</b>		
Somewhat unfavorable	45	24		16	29
Very unfavorable	12	4		3	3
Total unfavorable	70	28		19	32
B. Greek View					
Variables	France	Italy	Spain	Germany	UK
			<b>Spring 2012</b>		
Somewhat unfavorable	28	21	14	29	36
Very unfavorable	17	10	11	49	26
Total unfavorable	45	31	25	78	52
C. French View					
Variables	Greece	Italy	Spain	Germany	UK
			<b>Spring 2012</b>		
Somewhat unfavorable	32	26	23	11	18
Very unfavorable	22	7	6	5	5
Total unfavorable	54	33	29	16	23
			<b>Spring 2010</b>		
Somewhat unfavorable	27	18		7	
Very unfavorable	8	5		2	
Total unfavorable	35	23		9	
D. British view					
Variables	Greece	Italy	Spain	Germany	France
			<b>Spring 2012</b>		
Somewhat unfavorable	33	18	14	14	21
Very unfavorable	12	5	3	7	8
Total unfavorable	55	23	17	21	29
			<b>Spring 2010</b>		
Somewhat unfavorable	16	7		10	

Very unfavorable	4	2	5
Total unfavorable	20	9	15

E. Italian view (Spring 2012)

Variables	Greece	France	Spain	Germany	UK
Somewhat unfavorable	45	30	31	21	21
Very unfavorable	22	13	23	7	7
Total unfavorable	67	43	54	28	28

F. Spanish view

Variables	Greece	Italy	France	Germany	UK
			<b>Spring 2012</b>		
Somewhat unfavorable	33	28	20	13	17
Very unfavorable	32	12	10	8	9
Total unfavorable	65	40	30	21	26
			<b>Spring 2010</b>		
Somewhat unfavorable	30	11		10	
Very unfavorable	10	3		1	
Total unfavorable	40	14		11	

**Table 4. Germany and Greece bilateral trust views before the clash**

The table shows the fraction of Germans and Greeks that report that they trust a lot citizens of the other European countries. Trust is calculated from the average response to the following question asked in Eurobarometer in a sequence of surveys run up to 1995: "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries.

Country receiving trust	Fraction of Germans trusting a lot	Fraction of Greeks trusting a lot
The Greeks	0.11	-
The Germans	-	0.18
The Italians	0.08	0.12
The Spanish	0.14	0.21
The Portuguese	0.11	0.17
The Irish	0.13	0.17
The French	0.21	0.26
The British	0.15	0.16
Other European countries	0.16	0.17

**Table 5. Exposures of Germany and France to Greece and other PIIGS countries**

The table shows the value of the claims of German and France banks towards Greeks, Ireland, Portugal and Spain at the end of Quarter 4 2009. Data are in billions of US Dollars. *Source*: BIS Quarterly Bulletin.

		<i>Claims toward</i>				Total claims to the four countries
		Greece	Ireland	Portugal	Spain	
<i>Claims of</i> Germany	Total	44.4	176.9	41.0	202.4	464.8
	Public sector	22.8	2.5	10.3	32.7	68.3
France	Total	108.3	84.8	52.0	248.2	493.3
	Public sector	30.6	6.1	20.8	48.1	105.6


### Figure 3. Differences in willingness to punish among Germans and Greeks

The figure shows the distribution of responses given by a sample of German citizens and a sample of Greek citizens in the 2010 Wave II of the European Social Survey to the following questions: “Imagine that you were out and saw someone push a man to the ground and steal his wallet. How likely would you be to call the police?”


#### A. Willingness to call police




#### B. Willingness to identify person





C. Willingness to give evidence in court



France vs Germany







**Figure 4. Risk and solutions for the Euro crisis perceived by German managers**

The figures shows the percentages of responses chosen by a sample of German managers interviewed in the December 2012 IFO German Managers Survey. Panel A shows the chosen answers to the questions: “Which risks do firms see for the economy?” Panel B the answers to the question.” Which solutions to the Euro crisis do firms prefer?”

Panel A : Risk perceived by German managers




Panel B : Preferred solutions for the euro crisis



### Figure 5. Unfavorable view of Greece and punishing attitude


The figure shows the relation between the fraction of people in some European countries with an unfavorable view of Greece and the attitude towards punishing in this country. The latter is measured by the fraction of people who answer “very likely” to the question: “Imagine that you were out and saw someone push a man to the ground and steal his wallet. How likely would you be to call the police? Would you be”...(possible answers coded from 1 to 4: not at all likely, not very likely, likely, very likely)” asked in the second wave of the European Social Survey. Correlation between the two variables is 0.57.




**Figure 6. Interest rate spreads vis-à-vis the Germans Bund**

The figure shows interest rates spreads on 10-years government bonds of Greece and a set of other European countries vis-à-vis the German Bund. Panel A compares Greece spreads with Belgium and France; Panel B Greece spreads with Italy, Spain and Portugal.

A. Greece spread versus France and Belgium spread



A. Greece spread versus Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal



**Figure 7. Supports for Greece entering the common market. Fraction of people saying Greece entry is a good thing.**

The figure shows the fraction of people in various countries saying that Greece admission to the common market in 1981 is a good thing. *Source* : Eurobarometer, 1980.

