# Offshoring and Inflation

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### Questions

- Has globalization (trade integration) suppressed inflation? Corollary: will deglobalization let the inflation genie out of the bottle?
- 2. How has the rise of offshoring shaped the answer to question 1?

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# Has globalization suppressed inflation?

Policymakers think so: "The integration of low-cost producers into the global economy has imparted a steady disinflationary bias." [Carney (2019)]

Existing theory and evidence is incomplete (more in a bit).

We study trade & inflation in a New Keynesian framework with:

- 1. Offshoring: imported intermediate inputs.
- 2. Persistent (permanent?) changes in trade, phased in over time.
- 3. Trade shares as "sufficient statistics."
  - Changes in domestic sourcing proxy for relative price changes.
  - In data: domestic sourcing shares  $\rightarrow$  producer and consumer prices.
  - ln model: domestic sourcing shares = shocks  $\rightarrow$  inflation.

We deploy the framework to study how rising trade has influenced inflation in the United States from mid-1990s to present.

# Road Map

- 1. Motivation: linking trade to inflation in US data.
  - Output price inflation is lower for industries exposed to offshoring.
  - Accounting: consumer price level is 2-8% lower due to trade.

But, data alone can't answer macro-counterfactual question.

- 2. In NK model with offshoring and imported final goods, observed historical trade integration raises inflation.
  - Reason 1: Trade dynamics shape inflation. Integration is persistent and phased-in over time.
  - Reason 2: In the US, offshoring is an important shock.
- 3. Three extensions to baseline model:
  - (a) Financial shocks & US trade deficits.
  - (b) Variable markups & pro-competitive effects of trade.
  - (c) Multisector model to revisit motivating evidence.

# Abbreviated Tour of Literature

#### **Import Competition & Industry Prices**

- ▶ Diff-in-diff design: import penetration  $\uparrow \rightarrow$  sector-level prices  $\downarrow$ .
- Consumer Prices: Bai and Stumpner (2019), Jaravel and Sager (2019).
   Producer Prices: Auer and Fischer (2010), Auer et al. (2013).

#### Monetary Literature on Globalization & Inflation

- Phillips Curve: slope/shifts, 'global slack', inflation synchronization. Romer (1993), Rogoff (2003), Ball (2006), IMF WEO (2006), Rogoff (2007), Bianchi and Civelli (2015), Carney (2017), Auer et al. (2019), Forbes (2019).
- Existing work studies temporary shocks, mostly without input trade.

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#### Trade Dynamics & Policy

- Real models with perfect foresight dynamics: Eaton et al. (2011), Reyes-Heroles (2016), Kehoe et al. (2018), Ravikumar et al. (2019).
- Trade in NK Models: Barbiero et al. (2018), Erceg et al. (2018), Barattieri et al. (2019), Rodríguez-Clare et al. (2020).

### From Trade to Consumer Prices

Consumer prices  $\leftrightarrow$  bundle of domestic and imported final goods.

- 1. The "Old" Channel: Trade in Consumption Goods
  - Falling prices for imported consumption goods, and substitution of imports for domestic goods, lowers consumer price level.
  - Import competition may also lower markups on domestic goods.
- 2. The "New" Channel: Offshoring and Trade in Inputs
  - Falling prices for imported inputs reduce domestic production costs. Substitution from domestic to foreign suppliers amplifies decline.

- Lower production costs  $\Rightarrow$  lower prices for domestic goods.
- Exposure to offshoring: imported inputs + network linkages.

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For motivation, let's go look for these in US data...

### Production-Side Prices

Two countries (H/F) and many industries ( $s \in S$ ).

**Output Price**:  $P_{Ht}(s) = \mu_t(s)MC_t(s)$ 

Marginal Costs:  $MC_t(s) = Z_t(s)^{-1}W_t^{1-\alpha(s)}P_{Mt}(s)^{\alpha(s)}$ 

**Composite Input**:  $P_{Mt}(s) = \prod_{s} P_t(s', s)^{\alpha(s', s)/\alpha(s)}$ 

**Sourcing**: 
$$P_t(s',s) = \left[ \gamma_H(s',s) P_{Ht}(s')^{1-\eta(s')} + \gamma_F(s',s) (\tau_{Mt}(s') P_{Ft}(s')) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta(s')}}$$

Domestic Sourcing Share:  $\Lambda_{Ht}^{M}(s',s) = \frac{P_{Ht}(s')M_{Ht}(s',s)}{P_t(s',s)M_t(s',s)} = \left(\frac{P_{Ht}(s')}{P_t(s',s)}\right)^{1-\eta(s')}$ .

Comment 1: We'll discuss complete multisector model with nominal rigidities later. Comment 2: Cobb-Douglas assumptions simplify argument, but neither is necessary.

### Price Changes for Domestic Output

$$\hat{\mathbf{p}}_{Ht} = [\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}']^{-1} [\mathbf{I} - \alpha] \, \hat{\mathbf{p}}_{Vt} + \left(\frac{1}{\eta - 1}\right) \underbrace{\left[\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}'\right]^{-1} \left[\mathbf{A}' \circ \left(\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{M}\right)'\right]}_{\text{Offshoring Shock}} \iota.$$

where  $\hat{x}_t = \ln X_t / X_0$ ,  $\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}$  is a matrix with elements  $\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^M(s, s')$ , and **A** is the IO matrix.  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}_{Vt}$  is vector of sector-level GDP deflators. We set  $\eta(s) = \eta$ , for simplicity.


Plot  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}_{Ht}$  vs. Offshoring Shock from 1997-2018 by industry.

Data from BEA Industry Economic Accounts

- Price of Gross Output by Industry.
- Annual Input-Output data for 71 industries. Includes data to compute **A** and  $\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{M}$ .

# **Producer Price Changes**

Plot  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}_{Ht}$  vs. Offshoring Shock by industry in long differences (1997-2018).




Slope yields naive estimate  $\eta \approx 1.5$ .

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# The Relative Price of Manufacturing

Plot relative price and relative offshoring shock for manufacturing over time.



Relative price:  $\frac{1}{|M|} \sum_{s \in M} \hat{\mathbf{p}}_{Ht}(s) - \frac{1}{|N|} \sum_{s \in N} \hat{\mathbf{p}}_{Ht}(s)$ . Relative offshoring defined similarly.

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### **Consumer Prices**

Consumers have nested CES preferences.

Price Level:  $\hat{p}_{Ct} = \sum_{s} \gamma(s) \hat{p}_{Ct}(s)$ .


Sector-Level Prices:  $\hat{p}_{Ct}(s) = \hat{p}_{Ht}(s) + \left(\frac{1}{\eta(s)-1}\right)\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{C}(s).$ 

Combine and substitute for  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}_{Ht}$ :

$$\begin{split} \hat{\rho}_{Ct} &= \gamma \left[ \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}' \right]^{-1} \left[ \mathbf{I} - \alpha \right] \hat{\mathbf{p}}_{t}^{\vee} \\ &+ \underbrace{\left( \frac{1}{\eta - 1} \right) \gamma \left[ \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}' \right]^{-1} \left[ \mathbf{A}' \circ \left( \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{M} \right)' \right]}_{\text{Offshoring}} \iota + \underbrace{\left( \frac{1}{\eta - 1} \right) \gamma \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{C}}_{\text{C Imports}}, \end{split}$$

where  $\gamma$  is a row vector with elements  $\gamma(s)$  and  $\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{C}$  is a column vector with elements  $\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{C}(s)$ . Use industry CEX shares from IO data for  $\gamma$ . Set  $\eta_{C}(s) = \eta_{M}(s) = 2$ .

# Trade & the Consumer Price Level



Offshoring  $\approx 40\%$  of total impact of trade.

All together, results *suggest* imports restrain inflation. Plus, both trade in inputs and final goods matter.

Big Caveat: this is accounting, not counterfactual analysis.

Two major threats to interpretation:

1. Domestic costs (value-added deflator) are endogenous to trade.

2. Inflation depends on monetary policy!

We need a model...

# Model Sketch

Small Open Economy with:

- Continuum of producers under monopolistic competition (1 sector).
- CES production and demand structure.
- Representative consumer; separable consumption/leisure preferences.
- Complete international financial market.
- Pricing rigidities: Rotemberg adj. costs for domestic producers. Note: no assumption about currency invoicing of imports.
- Inflation targeting central bank.

Given historical trade shares, we can characterize retrospective impact of trade on inflation  $\rightarrow$  sufficient statistics in the model.

Log-linear approximation to solve the model.

### Production and Consumption

Let  $\hat{x}_t = \ln X_t - \ln X_0$ , where  $X_0$  is initial steady state value.

Domestic Sourcing Shares:

$$\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{C} = (1 - \eta) \left( \hat{p}_{Ht} - \hat{p}_{Ct} \right)$$
$$\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{M} = (1 - \eta) \left( \hat{p}_{Ht} - \hat{p}_{Mt} \right)$$

**Consumption & Input Use:** 

$$\hat{c}_{Ht} = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{C} + \hat{c}_{t}$$
$$\hat{m}_{Ht} = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{M} + \hat{m}_{t}$$
$$\hat{m}_{t} = (\widehat{mc}_{t} - \hat{p}_{Ht}) + \hat{y}_{t} - \frac{1}{\eta - 1} \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{M}$$
$$\widehat{mc}_{t} - \hat{p}_{Ht} = (1 - \alpha) \left[ \hat{w}_{t} - \hat{p}_{Ht} \right] + \frac{\alpha}{\eta - 1} \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{M} - \hat{z}_{t}$$

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## Labor and Goods Markets

Labor Market:

$$egin{aligned} \hat{l}_t &= -rac{
ho}{\psi}\hat{c}_t + rac{1}{\psi}\left(\hat{w}_t - \hat{
ho}_{Ht}
ight) - rac{1}{\psi(\eta-1)}\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{\mathcal{C}}\ \hat{l}_t &= -lpha\left[\hat{w}_t - \hat{
ho}_{Ht}
ight] + rac{lpha}{\eta-1}\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{\mathcal{M}} + \hat{y}_t - \hat{z}_t \end{aligned}$$

Goods Market:

$$\begin{split} \hat{y}_t &= \left(\frac{C_{H0}}{Y_0}\right) \hat{c}_{Ht} + \left(\frac{M_{H0}}{Y_0}\right) \hat{m}_{Ht} + \left(\frac{X_0}{Y_0}\right) \hat{x}_t \\ \hat{x}_t &= \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{\mathcal{C}} + \eta \hat{q}_t + \hat{c}_t^* \end{split}$$

## Closing the Model

Euler Equation:  $\hat{c}_t = E_t \hat{c}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\rho} (\hat{r}_t - E_t \pi_{Ct+1})$ Monetary Policy Rule:  $\hat{r}_t = \omega \pi_{Ct}$ Domestic Phillips Curve:  $\pi_{Ht} = \left(\frac{\epsilon-1}{\phi}\right) (\widehat{mc}_t - \hat{p}_{Ht}) + \beta E_t (\pi_{Ht+1})$ Consumer Price Inflation:  $\pi_{Ct} = \pi_{Ht} + \frac{1}{\eta-1} \left(\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^C - \hat{\lambda}_{Ht-1}^C\right)$ Risk Sharing:  $\hat{c}_t = \hat{c}_t^* + \frac{1}{\rho}\hat{q}_t$ 

**Equilibrium**: Given  $\{\hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{C}, \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{M}, \hat{z}_{t}, \hat{c}_{t}^{*}\}$ , an equilibrium is a collection of prices  $\{\hat{q}_{t}, \pi_{Ct}, \pi_{Ht}, \hat{r}_{t}, \hat{w}_{t} - \hat{p}_{Ht}, \widehat{mc}_{t} - \hat{p}_{Ht}\}$  and quantities  $\{\hat{c}_{t}, \hat{c}_{Ht}, \hat{l}_{t}, \hat{m}_{t}, \hat{m}_{Ht}, \hat{x}_{t}, \hat{y}_{t}\}$  that satisfies the previous equations.

# The Experiment

Domestic sourcing shares change permanently.


 $\Rightarrow$  the equilibrium is non-stationary.

We will solve for linear dynamics under perfect foresight.

- Date 0 in initial steady state. Agents assume domestic sourcing shares will remain constant.
- Date 1 agents learn that globalization is happening i.e., they learn future path for domestic sourcing shares.
- Reoptimize and converge to new long run equilibrium.


For reference:  $\eta = 3$ , which scales the size of the shocks. Macro-parameters are standard; others set to match US in 1996Q4.

### The Shocks: Domestic Sourcing Shares



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# Inflation



Cumulatively, price level rises by 8% (40bps/yr).

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# Model vs. Conventional Wisdom

#### In the model:

Pre-Great Recession: globalization triggers inflation. Post-Great Recession: retreat of globalization dampens inflation.

#### Model results $\neq$ conventional wisdom:

Carney (2017) "The integration of lower-cost producers into the global economy acts like an increase in potential supply for advanced economies...The series of positive shocks from increased...integration cause parallel shifts down in the **Phillips Curve**."

See also IMF WEO (2006), Yellen (2006), Bean (2007).

# The Supply Side: Phillips Curve

**Consumer Price Inflation**:  $\pi_{Ct} = \pi_{Ht} + \frac{1}{\eta - 1} \Delta \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{C}$ .

**Domestic Price Inflation**:  $\pi_{Ht} = \Gamma \left( \hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^n \right) + \beta E_t \left( \pi_{Ht+1} \right).$ 

Phillips Curve:  $\pi_{Ct} = \Gamma\left(\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^n\right) + \beta E_t \pi_{Ct+1} + \frac{1}{\eta - 1} \left(\Delta \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^C - \beta E_t \Delta \hat{\lambda}_{Ht+1}^C\right).$ 

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Phillips Curve: 
$$\pi_{Ct} = \Gamma\left(\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^n\right) + \beta E_t \pi_{Ct+1} + \frac{1}{\eta - 1} \left(\Delta \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^C - \beta E_t \Delta \hat{\lambda}_{Ht+1}^C\right).$$

Expected result for domestic sourcing for consumer goods.

- $\Delta \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^{C} < 0$  shifts Phillips Curve down.
- This is manifestation of supply shock (terms of trade) story.

Unexpected result: Input sourcing doesn't matter.

- Foreign sourcing lowers costs, but doesn't directly change  $\pi_{Ht}$ .
- ▶ Phillips Curve logic is incomplete: globalization  $\leftrightarrow$  offshoring.

### The Demand Side: IS Curve

IS Curve: 
$$(\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^n) = -\frac{1}{\theta \rho} \left( \hat{\tilde{r}}_t - \hat{\tilde{r}}_t^n \right) + E_t \left( \hat{y}_{t+1} - \hat{y}_{t+1}^n \right).$$
  
Real Interest Rate:  $\hat{\tilde{r}}_t \equiv \hat{r}_t - E_t \pi_{Ct+1}.$ 

Real Natural Interest Rate:  $\hat{r}_t^n \equiv -E_t \left( \Upsilon_M \Delta \hat{\lambda}_{Ht+1}^M + \Upsilon_C E_t \Delta \hat{\lambda}_{Ht+1}^C \right).$ 

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Trade shocks are embedded in the real natural interest rate.

- Expected declines in domestic sourcing raise real natural rate. Mechanics run through consumption:  $\Delta \hat{c}_{t+1}^n > 0 \Rightarrow \hat{\tilde{r}}_t^n \uparrow$ .
- $\hat{\tilde{r}}_t^n \uparrow \Rightarrow$  raises "aggregate demand." Think: shifts the IS curve right, raising output gap.

<u>Punchline</u>: expected future globalization raises aggregate demand today, raising output gap and triggering inflation.

- 1. Financial Inflow Shocks (with incomplete markets).
- 2. Variable Markups & Pro-Competitive Effects of Trade.
- 3. Multisector Model: Revisiting stylized facts about prices.

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# **Financial Inflow Shocks**

Motivation: Global Savings Glut.

We have shown that trade integration raises the real natural interest rate; most think that global savings glut forces drove it down.

Does adding shocks to match US trade deficits alter  $\pi$ -results?

Short answer: <u>no</u>.

In fact, anticipated increases in the trade deficit drive up inflation.

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See the paper for concise explanation in three equation model.

# Pro-Competitive Effects of Trade

<u>Motivation</u>: imports lower domestic markups & sector-level price growth. [Auer and Fischer (2010), Feentra and Weinstein (2017), Jaravel and Sager (2019)]

#### Do pro-competitive effects lower inflation? How much?

Allow variable (flex price) markups via Kimball Demand.

Consumption: 
$$\nu \int_0^1 \Upsilon\left(\frac{C_{Ht}(i)}{\nu C_t}\right) di + (1-\nu) \int_0^1 \Upsilon\left(\frac{C_{Ft}(i)}{(1-\nu)C_t}\right) di = 1.$$
  
Inputs:  $\xi \int_0^1 \Upsilon\left(\frac{M_{Ht}(i)}{\xi M_t}\right) di + (1-\xi) \int_0^1 \Upsilon\left(\frac{M_{Ft}(i)}{(1-\xi)M_t}\right) di = 1.$ 

Assume  $\Upsilon(\cdot)$  is incomplete gamma function.

- $\sigma \leftrightarrow$  steady-state elasticity.
- $\epsilon \leftrightarrow$  elasticity of demand elasticity.
- See Klenow and Willis (2016) and Gopinath et al. (2020).

# Three Insights

- 1. Sufficient statistic approach to model analysis goes through.
  - Why? Log-linear approximation to demand has constant elasticity.
  - Nonetheless, markups are variable.
- 2. Trade integration "looks like" a markup shock in Phillips Curve.


$$\pi_{Ht} = -\frac{1}{\phi} \hat{\epsilon}_{Ht} + \left(\frac{\epsilon_{H0} - 1}{\phi}\right) \widehat{rmc}_t + \beta E_t (\pi_{Ht+1}),$$
  
with  $\hat{\epsilon}_{Ht} = -\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\sigma - 1}\right) \left[\frac{C_{H0}}{Y_{H0}} \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^C + \frac{M_{H0}}{Y_{H0}} \hat{\lambda}_{Ht}^M\right]$ 

Think "supply shock" in macro-terminology.

3. Pro-competitive effects manifest as "demand shock" too!

- Markups distort output down, through supply/use of factors. Thus, reductions in markups have expansionary output effects.
- Anticipated declines in markups raise real natural interest rate.


# Inflation with Pro-Competitive Trade Integration



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### Markup Reductions Do Restrain Inflation


But GE Effects on Real Marginal Costs Dominate



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# Multisector Model


Motivation: heterogeneous integration across sectors.



How does heterogeneity influence aggregate  $\pi$ ? Are rel. price and P-level accounting results consistent with  $\pi > 0$ ?

# Inflation in Multisector Model


Skipping details ... model is two sector version of baseline model.



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
### Relative Price of Manufacturing Output

$$\pi_{Ht} = \left[ \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}' \right]^{-1} \left[ \mathbf{I} - \alpha \right] \pi_{Vt} + \left( \frac{1}{\eta - 1} \right) \underbrace{ \left[ \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}' \right]^{-1} \left[ \mathbf{A}' \circ \Delta \hat{\lambda}'_{Ht} \right] \iota}_{\text{Offshoring Shock}}$$



SQ P

# Inflation Accounting



Takeaway: neither relative price changes, nor inflation accounting decompositions are informative about the ultimate impact of trade on inflation.

## **Final Thoughts**

This paper surprised us too!

Offshoring and trade dynamics matter for  $\pi$ -dynamics ... just not the way "we" thought.

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