Exports, Imports, and Earnings Inequality: Micro-Data and Macro-Lessons from Ecuador

Trade and Earnings Inequality

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- > Who is *exposed* to international trade, either through exports or imports?
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➤ This Paper:

- Theory: Export Channel vs. Import Channel
- ➤ Measurement:
 - ➤ New dataset from Ecuador (Customs + VAT + social security + ownership registers)
 - Individuαl-level exposure to exports and imports (labor + capital)
- > Main Findings: Largest gains from trade for middle class, mostly through export channel

- > Inspired by original factor content approach:
 - Deardorff and Staiger (1988), Krugman (2000), Leamer (2000)
 - ➤ Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997)

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> What we like about it:

Intuitive supply and demand framework, sufficient statistics

> What we hope to improve on:

➤ Robustness of theoretical foundations, granularity of the data fed into the analysis, tighter relationship between theory and data

Theory

- ► Home + ROW endowed with factors of production
- Perfectly competitive factor markets

> Assumptions:

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No restrictions on:

Technology, preferences, good market structure


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
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Global factor demand




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
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In terms of relative domestic factor demand and relative export exposure: $rac{L_f(w,w_T^*)}{L_0(w,w_T^*)} imes REE_{f,T}$

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
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
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


with
$$REE_{f,T} = \frac{1 + L_f^*(w_T, w_T^*)/L_f(w_T, w_T^*)}{1 + L_0^*(w_T, w_T^*)/L_0(w_T, w_T^*)}$$


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
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


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
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



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
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


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








Need **net exports**: What is factor content of imports?





- \triangleright Nested CES preferences: CES between firms within sectors (σ) + Cobb-Douglas between sectors
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- \succ Export Exposure (EE_f):

$$\{\textit{EE}_f\} = \frac{(\text{Matrix Factor shares}) \times (\text{Leontief Inverse}) \times (\text{Vector of Gross Exports})}{\text{Total Factor Earnings}}$$

- ➤ Granular version of Leontief's factor content of exports (definition of factor + IO matrix)
- \succ Model does not restrict *levels* of firm demand and supply \longrightarrow EE_f unrestricted
- ightharpoonup Higher relative factor demand Higher relative price under trade

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 - $\succ IE_f^C$ measures consumer expenditure switching in response to cheaper foreign factors (data!)
 - If no intermediates IE_f^C = Average import share across sectors, weighted by factor f's share of domestic demand in each sector
 - \blacktriangleright If $\sigma > 1$, higher IE_f^C Lower relative factor demand Lower relative price under trade

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 - ➤ If no intermediates \longrightarrow $IE_f^L = 0$
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Measurement



Firms

- Corporate Income Tax
 - Firm revenues, costs, profits
- VAT (matched firm-to-firm data)
 - Transactions between all formal firms
 - Transaction-level imports & exports by firm

Workers

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Capital Owners

- Civil Registrar (matched firm-owner)
 - Share of each private firm owned by each taxpayer
 - Profits of firms = return on "capital" (self-employed treated as labor)

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
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
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
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
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Factors = 73 Labor groups (24 Province x 3 Education + others) + 1 Capital














Pro-rich through most of the income distribution...














Estimation

Ecuador's Factor Demand System

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- \succ 3 micro-elasticities: η , ε , and σ
 - > Standard nested CES demand estimation using firm-level micro-data
 - ➤ Generic example ("factor/good" j, "firm/consumer" m, time t):

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\ln(\text{expenditure})_{jm,t} = (1 - \epsilon) \times \ln(\text{price})_{jm,t} + (\text{fixed effect})_{m,t} + (\text{demand residual})_{jm,t}
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- > OLS biased (simultaneity) IV
 - > Shift-share variation based on foreign demand/supply shocks (CEPII BACI data)
 - Control for (sum of shares)x(time fixed effect) (Borusyak-Hull-Jaravel '19)

Elasticity of substitution between	Para- meter	Estimate (SE)	Expenditure measure	Price measure	IV based on $\sum_{v} (\mathbf{shift})_{v,t} \times (\mathbf{share})_{v,t_0}$	Unit of observation (N)	Fixed effects (clustering)	First- stage F-stat


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domestic factors	η	0.86 (0.46)	firm expenditure on factor	factor price	(foreign demand for product) × (factor export of product)	factor- firm-year (189,283)	firm-year & factor (factor)	9.6


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domestic and foreign intermediates	ε	1.10 (0.19)	firm expenditure on domestic/foreign intermediates	intermediates price (domestic price inferred from factor prices of suppliers)	(foreign price of product) × (firm import of product)	firm-year (7,232)	firm-year (firm)	31.4


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domestic and foreign intermediates	${\cal E}$	1.10 (0.19)	firm expenditure on domestic/foreign intermediates	intermediates price (domestic price inferred from factor prices of suppliers)	(foreign price of product) × (firm import of product)	firm-year (7,232)	firm-year (firm)	31.4
domestic firms (within-industry)	σ	1.37 (0.18)	consumer expenditure on firm	firm price (as inferred from factor prices of suppliers)	(foreign demand for product) × (firm use of factors that export product)	firm-year (80,216)	industry-year & firm (firm)	13.7

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Counterfactuals










➤ What happens to factor prices as we go from counterfactual autarky to trade equilibrium?

$$(\Delta \ln w)_{trade} = (\Delta \ln w)_{exports} + (\Delta \ln w)_{imports}$$







Distribution of the gains from trade (Labor only)




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
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Distribution of the gains from trade (Total)



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	Change in t	otal income	Change in labor income			
	Estimates	Shapley	Estimates	Shapley		
		$% R^2$		$% R^2$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
\overline{EE}	1.454	76.0 %	1.468	77.3 %		
	(0.000)		(0.000)			
IE^{C}	-4.097	11.2 %	-4.111	12.7 %		
	(0.001)		(0.001)			
IE^L	-1.267	12.8 %	-1.217	10.0 %		
	(0.002)		(0.002)			
R^2	93.2 %	100 %	92.5 %	100 %		
Obs.	2,702,120		2,612,925			

All three measures of exposure have expected sign

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... and mostly driven by export exposure

Sensitivity to Factor Mobility, Demand Estimates

	Pa $(\eta =$	Factors as in baseline (K: national; L: education+province), Parameters set to				
	K: national	K: national K: national				
	L: education + province	L: education	L: education +province +6-digit industry	High η	$High \varepsilon$	High σ
Relative trade impact at income percentile	(74 factors)	(5 factors)	(26,354 factors)	$(\eta = 1.4, \ \varepsilon = 1.10, \ \sigma = 1.37)$	$(\eta = 0.86, \\ \varepsilon = 2.3, \\ \sigma = 1.37)$	$(\eta = 0.86, \ \varepsilon = 1.10, \ \sigma = 4)$
50^{th} 10^{th} 90^{th}	0.00% -0.75% -0.80%	0.00% 0.31% -0.68%	0.00% -5.37% -4.78%	0.00% -0.63% -0.54%	0.00% 0.02% -2.12%	0.00% -0.52% -0.27%

Concluding Remarks

Summary

- How does trade affect earnings inequality?
 - Export channel \neq in export exposure $REE \neq 1$ simply measure REE
 - Import channel \neq in import exposure $\frac{d \ln RD}{d \ln w^*} \neq 0$ estimate $RD(w^*)$ flexibly ($IE, \eta, \varepsilon, \sigma$)
- Estimates from admin. micro-data (formal sector firms, workers, owners) in Ecuador
 - Largest earnings gains from trade to middle class
 - Mostly driven by the export channel
 - Export exposure (factor content of gross exports) a strong predictor

Thank you!