# Globalization, Gender, and the Family

Wolfgang Keller and Hâle Utar

NBER Summer Institute Gender in the Economy July 25, 2020

#### Women's Wage Relative to Men: Children



Source: US, 1991; Goldin (2014), Waldfogel (1998)



Source: Kleven, Landais, Sogaard 2019; New York Times 2018

#### The Missing Earnings of Young Women



Import Competition Effect: 2 x annual pre-shock earnings over 8 years

Gender Adjustment to Labor Shock and the Biological Clock

- ▷ Plausibly exog. labor demand shock
  - Can rule out child penalty b/o career planning, selection
- Labor mkt-family margin in a unified individual-level analysis of trade adjustment
  - men and women's labor market outcomes
  - household formation/dissolution and fertility
- Biological fertility clock
  - true for women across jobs, occupations, educations

# Fertility Response 1 as Biological Clock Runs Out



• Highest gender differential in fertility is for 39 yrs old

• the shock hits in 2002

- Administrative data from Denmark
  - Population register: all births, marriages, divorces
  - Matched employee-employer data (1.6m workers)
- Worker-level, longitudinal analysis, covering 1999-2009
  - cohort analysis prevent endogenous re-sorting
  - panel structure control for unobservable individual characteristics
- Causal impact of labor market shock (China)
  - natural-experimental setting
  - The entire Danish labor force using IV

- Estimation Framework
  - Removal of Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA) quotas for China as an experiment
  - 2 Instrumental variable strategy w/ entire private sector workers

# Import Shock- Removal of Import Quotas

- The Multi-fiber arrangement (MFA)
  - Governed world trade in textile and clothing (T&C) since 1974
  - Negotiated at EC/EU level, Denmark not a major player
- Phase out Agreement under WTO in 1995
- China, not in WTO, benefited from Jan 2002, after joining WTO

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Identifying Trade's Causal Effect in Quasi-Experiment

- Match import quotas with 8-digit products
- Identify firms w/ domestic production in quota goods, in 1999 (before the shock)

Π	Domestically produce goods covered by the MFA quotas e.g. knotted fishing nets, bras
	1111



QuotaFirm

Exposed Workers 4,743 Control Workers 5,255

Control for worker FEs / detailed pre-shock worker characteristics
 Workers differ only in their exposure to exogenous import shock



# Labor Market Outcomes: Men vs Women -Earnings

$$X_{i\tau} = \beta_0 + \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_1} \underbrace{CompExp_i * PostLib_{\tau} + \tau}_{\text{ImpComp}} + \frac{\tau}{i} + \frac{i}{i} + \epsilon_{i\tau}, \quad \tau = pre(99 - 01), post(02 - 09).$$

Robust SEs are clustered for initial firm. Solid borders of bars indicate statistical significance.

### Import Competition and Newborn Children

• Single, fertile age sample





### Import Competition and Parental Leave Take

• Single, fertile age sample



Worker + Time + Female x Time FEs. Shown is 95% confidence interval. SEs are clustered at the firm-level. • RegressionTable

# Import Competition and Marriage Decisions

Gender	(1) All	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) All	(5) Men	(6) Women	(7) All	(8) Men	(9) Women
Sample		Not married	/ <mark>/</mark>	Fertile	e Age (18	<mark>– 39)</mark>		Single	
ImpComp	-0.019 (0.027)	-0.019 (0.027)	0.058** (0.03)	-0.012 (0.034)	-0.012 (0.034)	0.080** (0.037)	-0.026 (0.033)	-0.026 (0.033)	0.094** (0.042)
ImpComp × Female	<b>0.077**</b> (0.036)			<b>0.092**</b> (0.046)			<b>0.119**</b> (0.051)		
Observations Worker FE Time FE Female x Time	8,216	3,876 √ √	4340 ✓ ✓	5,784	2,808 ✓ ✓	2,976 ✓ ✓	3,160	1,708	1,452 ✓ ✓

Notes: Unmarried in 1999. Robust s.e. clustered at firm in parentheses.

- Import competition  $\uparrow$  the probability of marriage 30% for women
- especially single, fertile age (18-39) women

#### Year 1999, somewhere in Denmark ...



#### • Fem Occs

After MFA quotas were removed for China ...



By 2009, Dorthe (Treated) has **12 pp** higher chance of giving birth, **8pp** higher chance of taking a parental leave, **8.4 pp** higher chance of getting married in comparison to Sofie

# Import Competition and Divorce Decisions

Gender	(1) All	(2) All	(3) Men	(4) Women		(5) All	(6) All	(7) Men	(8) Women
							Fertile Age	(18 - 39	)
ImpComp	-0.030*** (0.009)	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.040*** (0.011)	_	-0.057*** (0.018)	-0.024 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.026)	-0.086*** (0.022)
ImpComp × Female		-0.019 (0.017)					-0.062* (0.032)		
Observations Worker FE Time FE Female × Time	11,780	11,780 ✓ ✓	4,934 ✓ ✓	6,846 ✓ ✓		4,634 ✓ ✓	4,634 ✓ ✓	1,840 ✓ ✓	2,794 ✓ ✓

Notes: Married in 1999. Robust s.e. clustered at firm in parentheses.

- Import competition causes  $\uparrow$  50% lower divorce likelihood
  - Driven by women **↑ 74%**
  - Especially younger women (18-39)

Alternative Age Limits

Probit

# Family Adjustment comes in Adjustment to Hardship

	Birth		Parental	Leave	Marriage	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Women
Any Labor Market Position	<mark>0.077**</mark>	0.053	<mark>0.067*</mark>	0.044	0.058**	-0.019
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.027)
At the Initial Job	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.023	0.000	-0.037
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.021)
After Leaving Initial Job	<b>0.093***</b>	0.039	<b>0.099***</b>	0.013	<b>0.057</b> (0.022)	0.018
Of which:	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.023)		(0.022)

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Of which:	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Out of Labor Force	<b>0.041**</b>	0.001	<b>0.034**</b>	-0.004	<b>0.014*</b>	0.002
	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.005)

Notes: Each cell gives DiD results for "ImpComp" separate regressions. Worker, Time FEs.

### Trade Adjustment Costs: Young vs Old



# No advantage of being young, if women



# Missing Earnings of Young Women

Gender earnings gap due to trade accrued only when young (18-39)



- Are the effects generalizable?
  - Yes, we confirmed with the entire private sector workers using IV • More
- Women, more than men, adjust their family life. Why?
  - Biological differences between men and women or 'biological clock' ?
    Heterogeneity
    Age
  - The shock initially affects women more? No. More
     Stage Of Life
  - Social policies? Yes More
    - Income effect is muted by the social policies
    - Opportunity cost effect > Income effect for women
  - Gender roles? Yes ▶ more
    - Men and women act similarly both in the labor mkt but also in family when they are older

- Estimation Framework
  - A Quasi-Experiment
  - 2 Instrumental variable strategy w/ economy-wide data

 $Outcome_{i}^{2000-2009} = \alpha_{0} + \alpha_{1}\Delta IP_{i}^{CH} + \alpha_{2}\Delta IP_{i}^{CH} x Female + Z_{i}^{W} + Z_{i}^{F} + Z_{i}^{P} + \epsilon_{i},$ 

• initial (1999) characteristics of full-time private sector workers:

#### Worker $Z^W$

gender, age, gender  $\times$  age, immigration status

children (linear +square), education level

marital/partner status, homosex.

hourly wage

unemployment history

labor market experience

Union membership, UI membership

**Two-digit Occupation FEs** 

Business Line Z<sup>F</sup>

skill-intensity (college share ) at 6-digit NACE

employment pre-trends, 1993-1999 at 6-digit NACE

Firm  $Z^F$  Two-digit (NACE) industry FEs

avg. hourly wage

firm size

separation rate

Partner  $Z^P$ 

age, salary, citizenship spouse has a higher salary age difference≥ +10 manufacturing, same 6-digit product line

exposure to import competition

	(1) Earnings	(2) Earnings 1999 Job	(3) Hours	(4) Hours 1999 Job	(5) Unem- ployment	(6) Personal Income
$\Delta IMP_i$	2.946 (2.713)	-10.220* (5.66)	0.968 (1.575)	-8.401* (4.711)	10.070* (5.253)	3.171 (2.158)
$\Delta IMP_i \times Female$	-13.050** (6.055)	1.035 (2.495)	-8.038** (3.518)	0.531 (1.946)	18.530** (8.835)	2.455 (6.546)
Observations	1,651,774	1,651,777	1,642,413	1,642,413	1,651.77	1,651,757
Two dig. industry FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Two dig. occupation FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Worker, firm, partner charac.	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
S-W F-stat ( $\Delta IMP_i$ )	13.45	13.45	13.44	13.44	13.45	13.45
S-W F-stat ( $\Delta IMP_i \times$ Female)	14.90	14.90	14.93	14.93	14.90	14.90
Hansen J-stat	0.898	3.106	0.609	2.649	0.754	1.217
Hansen J P-value	0.638	0.212	0.737	0.266	0.686	0.544
No. of Clusters	761	761	761	761	761	761

- Women incur larger long-run losses in the lab mkt.
- Import comp causes displacement from manufacturing sector

# Economy-Wide Results: Family Responses

	(1) Birth	(2) Parental Leave	(3) Marriage	(4) Divorce
ΔΙΜΡ;	-0.190* (0.103)	-0.293** (0.122)	0.073 (0.115)	-0.025 (0.076)
$\Delta IMP_i \times Female$	0.314*** (0.092)	0.116 (0.102)	0.451*** (0.108)	
Wife's Δ <i>IMP</i> ;				-0.142*** (0.047)
Observations Sample Two dig. industry FE Two dig. occupation FE Worker, firm, partner charac. SW F-stat ( $\Delta IMP_i$ ) SW F-stat ( $\Delta IMP_i$ ) SW F-stat (Spouse's $\Delta IMP_i$ ) Hansen J Hansen J P-value No. of Clust	903,629 Age 18-39 ✓ ✓ 12.79 15.08 15.08 3.781 0.151 756	903,629 Age 18-39 ✓ ✓ 12.79 15.08 15.08 0.83 0.66 756	757,302 Unmarried	478,354 Married Men 9.95 - 806.44 7.962 0.093 752

# Fertility Response 1 as Biological Clock Runs Out



Estimation on rolling age cohort sample. Horizontal axis shows the average age of the sample. Worker + Time FEs.

# Heterogeneous Fertility Effects among Women

- Fertility impact  $\uparrow$  w/ higher cost of re-establishing careers
  - **1** greater time commitment (e.g. top-ranked professionals)
  - 2 loss of specific human capital (e.g. machine operators)

	(1) Education	(2) Within Firm Job Ranking	(3)	(4) Occupation	(5)
$\Delta IMP_i$	-0.067 (0.118)	-0.031 (0.117)	-0.031 (0.117)	0.006 (0.122)	-0.097 (0.136)
$\Delta IMP_i \times College$	0.356***				
$\Delta IMP_i \times \text{Top Ranked Positions}$	(0.129)	0.782**			
$\Delta IMP_i \times \text{Professionals}$		(0.508)	$0.913^{**}$		
$\Delta IMP_i \times Office Clerks$			(0.401)	-0.055	
$\Delta IMP_i \times Machine Operator$				(0.115)	<mark>0.424*</mark> (0.252)
Observations	398,530	398,530	398,530	398,530	398,530

2SLS estimation results among women who, initially, are between 18-39 years old. Industry, Occupation FEs and other individual controls.

### Fertility Response and Women's Age

- the biological clock matter more for women
  - closer to the end than for women who are far away from it

	(1) Birth	(2) Parental Leave	(3) Log Number of Births	(4) Log Number Par'Leave Days
$\Delta IMP_i$	-1.399**	-1.665**	-2.069***	-11.380***
	(0.563)	(0.674)	(0.773)	(4.268)
$\Delta IMP_i \times Age$	0.044**	0.050**	0.067***	0.345**
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.136)
Observations	398,530	398,530	398,530	398,530

2SLS estimation results among women who, initially, are between 18-39 years old. Industry, Occupation FEs and other individual controls.

# Conclusion

- Family-labor mkt margin: globalization affects gender inequality
  - Same lab mkt shock moves women more towards family
    - Import competition: Fertility ↑ Marriage ↑ Divorce rate ↓
  - Adjustment costs in lab mkt higher for women
- Why? Biological clock 
   higher reservation value to stay in lab mkt

  Given shock, cannot have both kids and career
- Evidence: gender differential is
  - Age dependent & higher close to end of biological clock
  - Highest for women needing to invest most for new career
- Relevant for other LM shocks than globalization (Covid-19?)

- The revenue share of MFA quota products of firms as exposure Here
- 2 Timing of the shock? 2002 versus 2005 Here
- S China's share in 2002 quota goods ● Here
- Technological factors Occupation × Time
  RTI × Time
- Semale occupations in the textile sample .....
- 6 China vs EEC
- Worker characteristics by gender and age 
  Women
  All
- 8 Evolution of the fertility differential during the pre-sample Here
- Probit Analysis of Family Outcomes Birth
- Unemployment in the service sector Unemployment

- Characteristics of workers • EW
- EW Heterogeneity Results
- Labor Market Outcomes among the Fertile Age in the EW sample Results
- Becker Link
- JD Link
- Agg. Family Trends

# $\downarrow$ in manufacturing jobs and $\uparrow$ in Chinese exports



# Data: Likelihood of Staying in the Manufacturing

#### Female Workers


# Data: Likelihood of Staying in the Manufacturing

#### Female and Male Workers



#### Being a first-time mother- full-time production workers

 $\textit{FirstTimeMother}_{is} = \alpha_0 + \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_1}\textit{CompExp}_i * \textit{PostLib}_s + \alpha_2\textit{PostLib}_s + \alpha_3\textit{CompExp}_i + \Lambda_i + \epsilon_{is}$ 

•  $\alpha_1$ : Exposure to imp comp raises prob to be first-time mother by 40%





## Spells of Productive Unemployment

• Dep. var. Marriage and Birth events in years w/ unemployment

Sample	Women	Men	Women
Dep. Var.	Marriage	Marriage	Birth
Import Comp from China	0.139**	-0.054**	0.101***
	(0.071)	(0.027)	(0.036)
Partner's Import Comp	-0.055*	0.029**	-0.036***
	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Worker Characteristics	yes	yes	yes
Employer Characteristics	yes	yes	yes
Product Line Characteristics	yes	yes	yes
Partner's Characteristics	yes	yes	yes
N	369,720	439,956	450,752

 Women turn unemployment spells into productive spells in terms of hh work



# Family Responses to Trade Exposure across Labor Market Positions

	Bir	th	Parental	Leave		Mar	riage	Divo	rce
	(1) Women	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Men	W	(5) omen	(6) Men	(7) Women	(8) Men
Any Labor Market Position	0.077**	0.053	0.067*	0.044	0.0	)58**	-0.019	-0.040***	-0.021
-	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0	.029)	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.014)
At the Initial Job	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.023	0	.000	-0.037	-Ò.014**	-0.013
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0	.018)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.010)
After Leaving the Initial Job	0.093***	0.039	0.099***	0.013	0	.057	0.018	 -0.026***	-0.008
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0	.022)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Of which:									
Unemployed	0.005	-0.011	0.020	-0.007	-0	.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0	.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Out of Labor Force	0.041**	0.001	0.034**	-0.004	0.	014*	0.002	-0.006	0.002
	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0	.008)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)

# The opportunity cost of having and raising children

	Maternity Leave	Unemployment	Maternity Leave
	_	followed by	followed by
		Maternity Leave	Unemployment
Import Comp from China	0.185**	0.108*	-0.017
· ·	(0.094)	(0.057)	(0.031)
Ν	472,649	472,649	472,649
Clusters	749	749	749

- Import competition does not lead to maternity leave from exposed firms
- $\bullet \ {\sf Import \ competition} \Longrightarrow {\sf unemployment} \Longrightarrow {\sf maternity \ leave}$

► More

#### Pre-shock (1999) characteristics of workers in exposed and control group

	<b>Treated</b> $N = 4,743$	Untreated $N = 5,255$		
Variables	Mean	Mean	Diff.	t-stat
Age	39.206	39.228	-0.022	-0.111
Immigrant	0.053	0.076	-0.023	-4.607
Labor Market Experience	14.912	14.491	0.421	3.694
Log Annual Earnings	12.165	12.154	0.011	0.843
Married	0.604	0.576	0.028	2.802
No of Children	1.448	1.480	-0.032	-1.387
Birth Event	0.040	0.045	-0.004	-1.099
Parental Leave Take	0.053	0.050	0.003	0.687
College Educated	0.130	0.107	0.023	3.580
Vocational Educated	0.361	0.360	0.001	0.127
Machine Operator	0.353	0.359	-0.007	-0.685
Manager	0.059	0.052	0.008	1.680



Image:	Return	
• •	Return	

	<b>Treated</b> Mean	<b>Control</b> Mean	Diff	t-stat
Panel A. Women	N=3,067	N=2,521		
Age	39.29	39.22	0.07	0.26
Hourly Wage	134.88	134.23	0.65	0.55

Image:	Return	
• •	Return	

	<b>Treated</b> Mean	<b>Control</b> Mean	Diff	t-stat
Panel A. Women	N=3,067	N=2,521		
Age	39.29	39.22	0.07	0.26
Hourly Wage	134.88	134.23	0.65	0.55
Panel B. Married Women	N=1,889	N=1,533		
Age	42.18	41.90	0.28	0.91
Hourly Wage	136.02	135.11	0.91	0.59

N	Datom	
	Return	

	<b>Treated</b> Mean	<b>Control</b> Mean	Diff	t-stat
Panel A. Women	N=3,067	N=2,521		
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Age	42.18	41.90	0.28	0.91
Hourly Wage	136.02	135.11	0.91	0.59
Panel C. Unmarried Women	N=1,178	N=988		
Age	34.66	35.06	-0.40	-0.91
Hourly Wage	133.05	132.87	0.19	0.11

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Panel C. Unmarried Women	N=1,178	N=988		
Age	34.66	35.06	-0.40	-0.91
Hourly Wage	133.05	132.87	0.19	0.11
Panel D. Men	N=1,672	N=2,730		
Age	39.08	39.24	-0.16	-0.53
Hourly Wage	189.53	181.64	7.89	2.66
Panel E. Married Men	N=974	N=1,492		
Age	43.01	43.16	-0.15	-0.44
Hourly Wage	206.98	193.55	13.44	3.04
Panel F. Unmarried Men	N=698	N=1,238		
Age	33.60	34.52	-0.53	-2.07
Hourly Wage	165.17	167.28	-2.11	-0.60

## Pre-shock characteristics by gender and marital status • Return

Keller (Colorado, NBER) & Utar (Grinnell) Globa

Globalization, Gender, and the Family

# Occupation of female workers







Pre-shock (1999) characteristics of workers in exposed and control group

	Wo	omen	Men		
	Treat. Control		Treat.	Control	
Age	39.28	39.21	39.07	39.24	
Earnings (log)	12.05	11.94	12.38	12.35	
Married	0.62	0.61	0.58	0.55	
No. of children	1.51	1.55	1.34	1.42	
College	0.13	0.10	0.13	0.11	
Vocational	0.31	0.32	0.46	0.40	
Manager	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.09	
Office Workers	0.14	0.14	0.08	0.03	
Ν	3,069	2,524	1,674	2,731	

► Return

#### The Evolution of the Pre-Sample Annual Fertility Effect





#### Family Activities in the Pre-Sample Period by Gender



## Potential Pre-Trends Using Annual Data

	(1) Earnings	(2) Income	(3) Hours	(4) Hourly Wage	(5) Unemp- loyment	(6) Divorce	(7) Marriage	(8) Birth
Exposure x Y95	0.004	0.009	0.012	-0.010	-0.014	0.003*	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.088)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Exposure x Y96	0.002	0.008	0.000	-0.006	0.039	-0.001	0.003	-0.001
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.100)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Exposure x Y97	0.011	-0.001	0.011	-0.006	-0.020	0.001	0.005*	0.011*
	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.084)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Exposure x Y98	0.005	-0.004	0.002	0.002	-0.029	0.001	0.005	0.003
	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.101)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Exposure x Y99	0.024	0.011	0.003	0.004	0.080	0.000	0.003	-0.002
	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.093)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)
N	84,227	84,227	80,548	80,548	84,227	84,227	84,227	84,227
Worker FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	<i>✓</i>	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	<i>✓</i>	✓	✓	✓

# **Falsification Test**

#### • Potential pre-trends? Sample Period: 1990-1999

$$\ln X_{is} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Exposure_{i,99} * Post95_s + \delta_i + \tau_s + \epsilon_{is},$$
$$Post95_t = 1 \text{ if } t >= 1995$$

Dep. Var. (in logs)	Earnings	Personal Income	Hours Worked	Hourly Wage	Unemployed Time
Men					
$E \times posure_{i,99} * Post95_s$	0.009 (0.033)	0.019 (0.028)	-0.009 (0.014)	0.017 (0.020)	-0.085 (0.107)
Ν	8,248	8,248	7,964	7,964	8,248
Women					
<i>Exposure<sub>i,99</sub> * Post</i> 95 <sub>s</sub>	0.013 (0.028)	-0.012 (0.025)	$0.015 \\ (0.015)$	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.052 (0.117)
Ν	10,374	10,374	9,850	9,850	10,374



#### Placebo Test

• Potential pre-trends? Sample Period: 1990-1999

$$X_{is} = \delta_0 + \frac{\delta_1}{Exposure_{i,99}} * Post95_s + \delta_i + \tau_s + \epsilon_{is},$$
  
$$Post95_s = 1 \text{ if } if year >= 1995$$

Dep. Var.	Earnings	Personal Income	Divorce	Marriage	Birth
Men					
Exposure <sub>i,99</sub> * Post95 <sub>s</sub>	<b>0.003</b> (0.024)	<b>0.009</b> (0.019)	<b>0.003</b> (0.007)	<b>0.013</b> (0.014)	<b>0.006</b> (0.018)
Ν	8,550	8,542	8,550	8,550	8,550
Women					
$E \times posure_{i,99} * Post95_s$	<b>0.024</b> (0.027)	- <b>0.007</b> (0.013)	- <b>0.003</b> (0.006)	<b>0.012</b> (0.013)	<b>0.017</b> (0.016)
Ν	10,954	10,946	10,954	10,954	10,954



## Placebo Test

#### Triple DiD

Dep. Var.	Earnings	Personal Income	Divorce	Marriage	Birth
Sample: Married Workers as of 199	9				
$E \times posure_{i,99} * Post95_s$	- <b>0.014</b> (0.032)	<b>0.020</b> (0.025)	<b>0.003</b> (0.007)	<b>0.029</b> (0.023)	<b>0.005</b> (0.027)
$Exposure_{i,99} * Post95_s * Woman_i$	<b>0.042</b> (0.039)	- <b>0.028</b> (0.025)	- <b>0.002</b> (0.008)	- <b>0.017</b> (0.029)	<b>0.007</b> (0.034)
Ν	11,548	11,548	11,548	11,548	11,548

## Placebo Test

#### Triple DiD

Sample: Married Workers as of 1999 $Exposure_{i,99} * Post95_s$ -0.014         0.020         0.003         0.029 $Exposure_{i,99} * Post95_s * Woman_i$ -0.042         -0.028         -0.002         -0.014 $(0.039)$ (0.025)         (0.008)         (0.025)         -0.012         -0.012	Dep. Var.	Earnings	Personal Income	Divorce	Marriage	Birth
Exposure_{i,99} * Post95_s-0.0140.0200.0030.029Exposure_{i,99} * Post95_s * Womani $0.042$ $0.025$ $(0.007)$ $(0.025)$ $(0.039)$ $(0.025)$ $(0.008)$ $(0.029)$	Sample: Married Workers as of 199	9				
Exposure $Post95_s * Woman_i$ 0.042 $-0.028$ $-0.002$ $-0.01$ (0.039)(0.025)(0.008)(0.025)	$E \times posure_{i,99} * Post95_s$	- <b>0.014</b> (0.032)	<b>0.020</b> (0.025)	<b>0.003</b>	<b>0.029</b> (0.023)	<b>0.005</b> (0.027)
	$Exposure_{i,99} * Post95_s * Woman_i$	<b>0.042</b> (0.039)	- <b>0.028</b> (0.025)	- <b>0.002</b> (0.008)	- <b>0.017</b> (0.029)	<b>0.007</b> (0.034)
N 11,548 11,548 11,548 11,54	Ν	11,548	11,548	11,548	11,548	11,548

#### Sample: Unmarried Workers as of 1999

$E \times posure_{i,99} * Post95_s$	<b>0.042</b> (0.032)	<b>0.010</b> (0.021)	<b>0.006</b> (0.013)	- <b>0.011</b> (0.009)	<b>0.014</b> (0.020)
$Exposure_{i,99} * Post95_s * Woman_i$	- <b>0.021</b> (0.054)	- <b>0.012</b> (0.023)	- <b>0.012</b> (0.019)	<b>0.022</b> ´ 0.014	` <b>0.012́</b> 0.031
Ν	7,956	7,940	7,956	7,956	7,956

Labor Market Outcomes: DID with individual FEs, 1999-2009

$$\begin{aligned} X_{i\tau} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \underbrace{Exposure_i * PostLib_{\tau}}_{\text{ImpComp}} + i + \tau + \epsilon_{i\tau} \\ & \bullet \quad Exposure_i = 1 \text{ if worker } i \text{ is employed in a firm in 1999 that domestically produced a quota product} \\ & \bullet \quad PostLib_{\tau} = 0 \quad \text{if 1999-2001} \qquad \text{worker } FEs \end{aligned}$$

 $PostLib_{\tau} = 1$  if 2002-2009

period FEs /



۲

Labor Market Outcomes: DID with individual FEs, 1999-2009

$$X_{i\tau} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \underbrace{Exposure_i * PostLib_{\tau}}_{\text{ImpComp}} + i + \tau + \epsilon_{i\tau}$$
• Exposure\_i = 1 if worker i is employed in a firm in 1999 that domestically produced a quota product
• PostLib\_{\tau} = 0 if 1999-2001 worker FEs
PostLib\_{\tau} = 1 if 2002-2009 period FEs

**2** Gender Differences: Triple DID

$$\begin{aligned} X_{i\tau} &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \textit{ImpComp}_{i\tau} + \alpha_2 \textit{ImpComp}_{i\tau} \times \textit{Female}_i + \\ &+ \alpha_4 \textit{Post}_{\tau} \times \textit{Female}_i + i + \tau + \nu_{is}, \end{aligned}$$



۲







- Many MFA Quota 2002 (MFAQ2) and 2005 (MFAQ5) firms overlapped!
- Significant employment response to both of the removals!

	(1) Sales	(2) Value Added	(3) Employ- ment	(4) FTE	(5) Empl High School Education	(6) oyees w/ Tex. Production Education
MFAQ2xPost2002	-0.075	-0.081	-0.123***	-0.146**	-0.164***	-0.201***
	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.046)
MFAQ5xPost2005	-0.158***	-0.187***	-0.081	-0.125**	-0.152***	-0.049
	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.037)
Firm FEs	√	√	√	√	√	√
Year FEs	√	√	√	√	√	√
N	4,555	4,536	4,503	4,545	4134	4,134

Note: All variables in log. FTE: full-time equivalent number of employees.

#### • Exposure: Revenue Share of MFA Quota Products as of 1999

Gender	(1)	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4)	(5) Women	(6) Men	(7)	(8) Women	(9) Men
Dep Var.	Birth	Birth	Birth	ParL	ParL	ParL	Marriage	Marriage	Marriage
PostxRevShare	-0.139 (0.119)	0.302** (0.145)	-0.139 (0.119)	-0.151 (0.097)	0.346** (0.134)	-0.151 (0.097)	-0.228** (0.111)	0.193 (0.145)	-0.228** (0.111)
PostxRevSharexFemale	<b>0.441**</b> (0.189)			<b>0.497***</b> (0.165)			<b>0.421**</b> (0.179)		
Observations Worker FE Time FE Female × Time FE	3,160	1,452 ✓ ✓	1,708 ✓ ✓	3,160	1,452 ✓ ✓	1,708 ✓ ✓	3,160	1,452 ✓ ✓	1,708 ✓

Return

## Import Shock–Removal of MFA Quotas

• China's Import Share in Denmark's Textile Industry





#### Import from Eastern European Countries





#### Share of China in 2002 Quota Goods

Return
 Return



• The quotas have varying degrees of coverage in terms of CN products.



 Quotas do NOT cover technologically or materially homogeneous group of products. e.g.

#### Quota

#### Non-Quota

Shawls and scarves of silk or silk waste Brasseries of all types of textile material Knotted netting of twine, cordage or rope Shawls and scarves of wool and fine animal hair Corsellettes of all types of textile materials Twine, cordage, ropes and cables

► Return

Keller (Colorado, NBER) & Utar (Grinnell) Globalization, Gender, and the Family

▶ Return

	(1) Earnings	(2) Earnings 1999 Job	(3) Birth Event	(4) Parental Leave	(5) Marriage	(6) Divorce
Imp Comp	-0.180	-1.213***	-0.021	-0.028	-0.031	-0.020
	(0.391)	(0.366)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.014)
ImpComp × Female	-0.874*	0.144	0.127**	0.123**	0.096***	-0.020
	(0.479)	(0.274)	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.035)	(0.017)
Occupation x Time FEs Female x Time FEs Worker FEs Time FEs N	√ √ ↓ 19,526	√ √ 19,526	√ √ 3,160	ý 3,160	√ √ 8,216	√ √ 11,780

• Even when we attribute all occupation-time variation to tech change, the results are robust!

▶ Return

	(1) Earnings	(2) Earnings 1999 Job	(3) Birth Event	(4) Parental Leave	(5) Marriage	(6) Divorce
Imp Comp	0.306 (0.470)	-1.239*** (0.384)	-0.028 (0.042)	-0.028 (0.035)	-0.037 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.016)
ImpComp × Female	-1.166** (0.545)	0.102 (0.290)	0.144** (0.064)	0.143** (0.056)	0.097** (0.039)	-0.024 (0.019)
<b>RTI x Time FEs</b> Female x Time FEs Worker FEs Time FEs N	√ √ √ 16,552	√ √ √ 16,552	√ √ √ 2,468	√ √ √ 2,468	√ √ √ 6,752	√ √ √ 10,196

• Results are robust even when we attribute all occupation-time variation to tech

# Fertility- Import Competition and Newborn Children

#### Dep. var. Birth Event

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Gender	All	All	All	Men	Women
Sample			Not m	narried	
ImpComp	0.022	0.061**	0.053	0.053	0.077**
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.037)
ImpComp x Female	0.008		0.024		
	(0.034)		(0.05)		
Observations	10,418	5,784	5,784	2,808	2,976
Worker FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Time FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
$Female \times Time \; FE$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$		

Note: Fertile age workers. Robust s.e. clustered at firm level.

• Import competition  $\uparrow$  the probability of birth 20% among unmarried workers

# Fertility- Import Competition and Newborn Children

#### Dep. var. Birth Event

Gender	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) Men	(5) Women	(6) All	(7) Men	(8) Women
Sample			Not n	narried			Single	
ImpComp	0.022	0.061**	0.053	0.053	0.077**	-0.019	-0.019	0.109***
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.041)
ImpComp x Female	<b>0.008</b> (0.034)		<b>0.024</b> (0.05)			<b>0.128**</b> (0.055)		
Observations	10,418	5,784	5,784	2,808	2,976	3,160	1,708	1,452
Worker FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Time FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
$Female \times Time \; FE$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$			$\checkmark$		

Note: Fertile age workers. Robust s.e. clustered at firm level.

- Import competition  $\uparrow$  the probability of birth 20% among unmarried workers
- Unmarried women: ↑ (23%), Single women ↑ (48%)
- Back FirstTimeMother

# Fertility- Import Competition and Birth Events

Gender	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All Not m	(4) Men arried	(5) Women	(6) All Single (N	(7) All lot Marrie	(8) Men d and Not	(9) Women Co-habiting)
ImpComp	0.04 (0.081)	0.164** (0.077)	0.137 (0.094)	0.156 (0.11)	0.208* (0.111)	0.162 (0.121)	0.021 (0.141)	-0.079 (0.177)	0.411** (0.167)
Marg. Effect	0.013	0.058	0.048	0.053	0.075	0.042	0.054	-0.018	0.117
ImpComp × Female Marg. Effect	0.031 (0.082) 0.01		0.035 (0.101) 0.012				0.247* (0.133) 0.067		
Observations	9,864	5,749	5,749	2,779	2,970	3,144	3,144	1,695	1,449
Worker, firm, partner vars	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Time FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Obs Prob	0.278	0.31	0.31	0.29	0.328	0.21	0.21	0.194	0.228
Pseudo R-Sq	0.092	0.09	0.09	0.086	0.1	0.166	0.168	0.165	0.185



#### Dep. var. Parental Leave Take

Gender Sample	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All Not m	(4) Men arried	(5) Women	(6) All	(7) Men Single	(8) Women
ImpComp ImpComp x Female	0.035 (0.023) 0.0001 (0.029)	<b>0.059**</b> (0.023)	0.044 (0.028) <b>0.023</b> (0.046)	<b>0.044</b> (0.028)	<b>0.067*</b> (0.037)	-0.028 (0.030) <b>0.122**</b> (0.048)	- <b>0.028</b> (0.030)	<b>0.095**</b> (0.039)
Observations Worker FE Time FE Female x Time FE	10,418	5,784 ✓ ✓	5,784 ✓ ✓	2,808 ✓ ✓	2,976 ✓ ✓	3,160	1,708 ✓ ✓	1,452 ✓ ✓

Note: Fertile age workers. Robust s.e. clustered at firm level.

- Import competition  $\uparrow$  the probability of taking parental leave 23%
- Single women **↑** 46 %

▶ Probit
#### Dep. var. Parental Leave Take

Gender Sample	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All Not m	(4) Men arried	(5) Women	(6) All	(7) Men Single	(8) Women
ImpComp ImpComp x Female	0.035 (0.023) 0.0001 (0.029)	<b>0.059**</b> (0.023)	0.044 (0.028) <b>0.023</b> (0.046)	<b>0.044</b> (0.028)	<b>0.067*</b> (0.037)	-0.028 (0.030) <b>0.122**</b> (0.048)	- <b>0.028</b> (0.030)	<b>0.095**</b> (0.039)
Observations Worker FE Time FE Female x Time FE	10,418	5,784 ✓ ✓	5,784 ✓ ✓	2,808 ✓ ✓	2,976 ✓ ✓	3,160	1,708 ✓ ✓	1,452 ✓ ✓

Note: Fertile age workers. Robust s.e. clustered at firm level.

- Import competition  $\uparrow$  the probability of taking parental leave 23%
- Single women **↑** 46 %

▶ Probit

## Fertility- Import Competition and Parental Leave

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	All	All	All	Men	Women	All	All	Men	Women
			Not m	arried		Not N	larried and	Not Co-h	abiting
ImpComp	0.03	0.148**	0.041	0.165	0.17	0.096	-0.117	-0.187	0.303*
	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.089)	(0.106)	(0.11)	(0.123)	(0.142)	(0.182)	(0.164)
Marg. Effect	0.009	0.048	0.013	0.045	0.06	0.021	-0.024	-0.029	0.083
ImpCompxFemale	0.051		0.082				0.295**		
	(0.086)		(0.105)				(0.137)		
Marg. Effect	0.015		0.026				0.07		
Observations	9,864	5,749	5,749	2,779	2,970	3,144	3,144	1,695	1,449
Worker, firm, partner vars	$\checkmark$								
Time FE	$\checkmark$								
Obs Prob.	0.241	0.258	0.258	0.193	0.32	0.159	0.159	0.12	0.205
Pseudo R-Sq	0.072	0.062	0.069	0.054	0.07	0.107	0.12	0.107	0.128



## Import Competition Increases Marriage Likelihood

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8) Fertile Ag	(9)
Gender	All	Men	Women	All	Fertile Age Men	e Women	Not marr All	ied, and no Men	t cohabiting Women
ImpComp Marg. Effect	-0.059 (0.094) -0.014	-0.088 (0.112) -0.021	0.188 (0.114) 0.048	-0.008 (0.108) -0.002	-0.054 (0.129) -0.015	0.255** (0.13) 0.078	-0.01 (0.16) -0.002	-0.04 (0.186) -0.008	0.378* (0.229) 0.084
ImpCompxFemale Marg. Effect	0.221*** (0.084) 0.059			0.22** (0.096) 0.067			0.343** (0.134) 0.078		
Observations Probit Worker, firm, partner vars Obs Prob Pseudo R-Sq	8,166 0.19 0.097	3,838 0.185 0.084	4,328 ✓ 0.194 0.115	5,749 0.226 0.081	2,779 0.213 0.078	2,970 0.238 0.088	3,144 0.157 0.147	1,695 0.146 0.133	1,449 ✓ 0.17 0.177

Return

## Import Competition Reduces Divorce Likelihood

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) Fortile	(7)	(8)
VARIABLES	All	All	Men	Women	All	All	Men	Women
ImpComp	-0.283*** (0.104) -0.018	-0.243* (0.124) -0.016	-0.212 (0.146) -0.016	-0.391*** (0.146) -0.021	-0.466*** (0.131) -0.053	-0.390** (0.168) -0.045	-0.276 (0.199) -0.033	-0.681*** (0.191) -0.070
ImpCompxFemale		-0.120 (0.103) -0.008				-0.192 (0.139) -0.023		
Observations Worker, firm, partner vars Sample Prob Pseudo R2	10,287 ✓ 0.058 0.173	10,287 ✓ 0.058 0.174	4,008 ✓ 0.06 0.153	6,279 0.056 0.195	4,115 v 0.098 0.13	4,115 ✓ 0.098 0.133	1,478 ✓ 0.099 0.134	2,637 0.098 0.144



#### Family Responses for Workers between 20 and 40 Years

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Men	irth Women	Parenta Men	Women	Mar Men	riage Women	D Men	Women
	wich	women	wich	women	wich	women		women
ImpComp	-0.023 (0.033)	0.104*** (0.039)	-0.023 (0.030)	0.091** (0.038)	-0.008 (-0.033)	0.062* (-0.034)	-0.020 (0.025)	-0.087*** (0.022)
Worker FEs Time FEs Observations R-squared	Y Y 1,680 0.597	Y Y 1,466 0.586	Y Y 1,680 0.592	Y Y 1,466 0.611	Y Y 2,802 0.436	Y Y 3,020 0.414	Y Y 2,002 0.490	Y Y 2,964 0.500

Sample in columns (1) to (4) is single, in columns (5) and (6) unmarried, and in columns (7) and (8) married workers, all as of

1999.

▶ Return

## Gender Difference – Earnings from the Initial (Exposed) Firms





### Gender Difference –Earnings from all jobs



## Hours Worked: Men vs Women

 $X_{i\tau} = \beta_0 + \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_1} CompExp_i * PostLib_{\tau} + \frac{\tau}{\tau} + \frac{i}{i} + \epsilon_{i\tau}, \ \tau = pre, post.$ 



Robust SEs are clustered for initial firm. Solid borders of bars indicate statistical significance.





Robust SEs are clustered for initial firm. Solid borders of bars indicate statistical significance.



# **Income Transfers**



Robust SEs are clustered for initial firm. Solid borders of bars indicate statistical significance.



# Personal Income



Robust SEs are clustered for initial firm. Solid borders of bars indicate statistical significance.



# Unemployment in the Service Sector



Robust SEs are clustered for initial firm. Solid borders of bars indicate statistical significance.



### Income



Robust SEs are clustered for initial firm. Solid borders of bars indicate statistical significance.

► Income Transfers → Return

# Earnings Differential by Age and Stage of Life

Sample	(1) All	(2) Fertile Age	(3) Not Fertile Age	(4) Married	(5) Not Married					
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Earnings from all employment										
ImpComp ImpComp x Female	0.051 (0.425) -1.274** (0.515)	0.822 (0.599) - <b>1.921**</b> (0.841)	-0.919*** (0.352) - <b>0.483</b> (0.464)	-0.491 (0.457) -0.508 (0.545)	0.906 (0.608) -2.440** (0.966)					
Panel B. Dependent \	/ariable: Ear	nings from er	nployment at	the 1999 fir	rm					
ImpComp ImpComp x Female	-1.134*** (0.368) 0.083 (0.278)	-0.876** (0.380) - <b>0.009</b> (0.292)	-1.423*** (0.418) <b>0.198</b> (0.369)	-1.421*** (0.418) 0.331 (0.336)	-0.784** (0.365) -0.215 (0.318)					
For both panels:										
Observations Worker FE Time FE Female × Time FE	19,526 ✓ ✓	10,234	9,292 ✓ ✓	11,490 ✓ ✓ ✓	8,036					



More

			Men		Wo	nen	
	Mean	SD	Μ	lean	SD	 Mean	SD
	N=1,651,774			N=915,702		N=73	6,072
Age	38.194	9.868	38	3.039	10.051	38.387	9.632
Immigrant	0.041	0.199	(	).044	0.206	0.038	0.190
Labor Market Experience	14.440	5.807	14	1.498	5.898	14.368	5.691
Married	0.543	0.498	(	).521	0.500	0.570	0.495
Number of Children	1.337	1.152	1	L.264	1.179	1.428	1.112
Log Earnings	12.255	0.669	12	2.362	0.665	12.128	0.626
College	0.280	0.449	(	).246	0.431	0.322	0.467
Vocational Educated	0.411	0.492	(	).437	0.496	0.380	0.485
Birth Event	0.046	0.208	(	).048	0.215	0.042	0.201
Divorce Event	0.008	0.088	(	0.007	0.085	0.008	0.092
Marriage Event	0.026	0.159	(	0.026	0.158	0.026	0.160
Managers	0.037	0.188	(	0.051	0.219	0.020	0.139
Professionals	0.143	0.350	(	).147	0.354	0.138	0.345
Office Workers	0.129	0.335	(	).059	0.235	0.216	0.412
Machine Operators	0.056	0.230	(	).061	0.240	0.049	0.217

# Import Shock

#### ٢

$$\Delta IP_{j}^{CH} = \frac{\Delta M_{j}^{CH}}{C_{j,1999}} = \frac{M_{j,2009}^{CH} - M_{j,1999}^{CH}}{C_{j,1999}}$$

 $\Delta M_i^{CH}$   $\Delta$  in imports originating from China

- $C_{j,1999}$  consumption in worker *i*'s six-digit product line (*j*) of employment in initial year, 1999
- Instruments
  - Imports to other high-income countries (US, Japan, Australia, ..)
  - 2 trade costs measures as of 1996
    - distance-based
    - distribution channels
- Identification assumption: China's export growth driven by her productivity growth and falling trade barriers



## Heterogeneous Fertility Effects among Women

	(1)	(2)	(3) Education	(4) Within Firm Job Banking	(5)	(6) Occup	(7) Dations	(8)
$\Delta IMP_i$	-0.309 (0.215)	0.063	-0.067 (0.118)	-0.031 (0.117)	-0.031 (0.117)	0.006	0.009	-0.097 (0.136)
$\Delta IMP_i \times Have a child$	0.511*	()	(***)	()	( )	(- )	()	()
$\Delta IMP_i \times Have a partner$	(0.297)	-0.135						
$\Delta IMP_i \times College$		(0.146)	0.356***					
$\Delta IMP_i \times \text{Top Ranked Positions}$			(0.129)	0.782**				
$\Delta IMP_i \times Professionals$				(0.308)	0.913**			
$\Delta IMP_i \times Office Clerks$					(0.461)	-0.055		
$\Delta IMP_i \times Service Occupations$						(0.115)	-0.841**	
$\Delta IMP_i \times Machine Operator$							(0.304)	0.424*
$\Delta IMP_i \times Earnings 4th Quartile$								(0.252)
$\Delta IMP_i \times Earnings 3rd Quartile$								
$\Delta IMP_i \times \text{Earnings 2nd Quartile}$								
Observations Hansen J statistic Hansen J Pval	398,530 1.248 0.536	398,530 1.184 0.553	398,530 0.807 0.668	398,530 0.772 0.68	398,530 0.734 0.693	398,530 0.932 0.627	398,530 1.054 0.59	398,530 0.609 0.737

## Labor Market Adjustment of the Fertile Age

Donal A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A	Earnings	Earnings Initial 6-dig Ind	Employment	Employment Initial 6-dig Ind
$\Delta IMP_i$	1.613	-12.310*	-0.542	-8.650**
	(3.612)	(6.572)	(0.748)	(4.250)
$\Delta IMP_i$ ×Female	-13.080*	1.305	-3.177**	0.808
	(7.426)	(3.015)	(1.452)	(1.995)
Panel B.	Years in Manufacturing	Years in Service Sector	Outside Labor Mkt	Unemployment
$\Delta IMP_i$	-5.423	6.143***	0.174	9.118*
	(3.578)	(3.121)	(0.341)	(4.659)
$\Delta IMP_i \times Female$	-6.743***	2.109	1.188*	16.570*
	(1.938)	(1.805)	(0.673)	(9.449)

Notes: Sample is all fertile-age workers (between 18 and 39 years old in 1999, N = 903,629). 2SLS results. The full vector of controls + Industry and Occupation FEs.

## Labor Market Adjustment of the Fertile Age

Banal A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Fallel A	Birth	log No. of Births	Parental Leave	Marriage	
$\Delta IMP_i$	-0.190*	-0.173	-0.293**	-0.053	
	(0.103)	(0.114)	(0.122)	(0.094)	
$\Delta IMP_i \times Female$	0.314***	0.307***	0.116	0.495***	
	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.102)	(0.099)	
Panel B.	Earnings	Earnings	Employment	Employment	
	Initial Occupation	Different Occupation	Same Occupation	Diff Occupation	
$\Delta IMP_i$	-0.555	2.167	-2.078	1.536	
	(4.710)	(5.364)	(3.381)	(3.158)	
$\Delta IMP_i \times Female$	-14.820*	1.735	-10.030**	6.856**	
	(6.572)	(2.940)	(3.904)	(2.677)	

Notes: Sample is all fertile-age workers (between 18 and 39 years old in 1999, N = 903,629). 2SLS results. The full vector of controls + Industry and Occupation FEs.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Birth	Birth	ParL	ParL	Marriage	Marriage	Divorce	Divorce	Earn'gs	Earn'gs
	JD	MFA	JD	MFA	JD	MFA	JD	MFA	JD	MFA
ImpComp	-0.219***	-0.019	-0.106***	-0.028	-0.113***	-0.012	0.071	-0.024	-3.490***	0.051
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.071)	(0.026)	(0.341)	(0.425)
ImpComp ×	0.130*	0.128*	0.072	0.122**	0.119**	0.092**	-0.022	-0.062*	-0.448	-1.274**
Female	(0.070)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.076)	(0.032)	(0.455)	(0.515)
Observations Worker FE Time FE Female × Time	3,160	3,160	3,160	3,160	5,784 ✓ ✓	5,784 ✓ ✓	4,634 ✓ ✓	4,634 ✓ ✓	19,526 ✓ ✓	19,526 ✓ ✓

Conditioning on unemployment  $\rightarrow$  overestimates the negative earnings effect

JD approach : income effect > substitution effect

▶ Return

#### Unemployment and HH Condition by Gender (economy-wide)

#### Dep. Var. Cumulative unemployment spells

Women				
Import Competition ( $\Delta IP^{CH}$ )	191.672***	232.222***	156.665**	169.037**
	(71.936)	(88.870)	(74.718)	(67.555)
ΔIP <sup>CH</sup> *Married		-67.515		
		(50.743)		
ΔIP <sup>CH</sup> *w/ Kid			46.406*	
			(24.235)	
ΔIP <sup>CH</sup> *Single w/ Kid				112.615**
				(56.032)
Men				
Import Competition ( $\Delta IP^{CH}$ )	74.504**	94.890**	97.508**	73.227**
	(36.009)	(40.799)	(41.115)	(35.877)
ΔIP <sup>CH</sup> *Married		-38.431*		
		(20.083)		
ΔIP <sup>CH</sup> *w/ Kid			-36.170**	
			(17.922)	
<b>ΔIP<sup>CH</sup>*</b> Single w/ Kid				8.772
				(14.730)

- Gender roles do play a role:
  - Having a kid hinders women's adjustment to the shock, but not men's.



## Globalization: a hand in $\Delta$ of the family-market balance?

