



# Modeling the Impacts of Agricultural Support Policies on Emissions from Agriculture

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## Research question

How might the vast amount of agricultural support be repurposed to better serve environmental, economic and resilience goals?






# *A global public good issue*



## **Agriculture matters for GHG emissions**

Sources of global emissions (2010) in percentage





# Impacted by a global shift in public policies



Source: OECD




# Extended set of instruments

## Data

GHG database

- Based on FAOSTAT (Tubiello and al.)
- Extended for energy and fertilizers



2019 release

+ Extensions for domestic support policies

With reclassification of payments

## Model

**MIRAGRODEP**

**141** COUNTRIES *and* REGIONS

**65** SECTORS *and up to* **80** GOODS *and* SERVICES

More **than 300,000** HOUSEHOLDS


+ GTAP 10 database

+ Extensions / adaptation



# A proper dataset

# GHG Database: Reconstruct with bottom-up approach



\* Tier I: Default emission factors from IPCC guidelines

\*\* Using disaggregation space and linkage matrix



## Emissions by commodity & source 2015 % of total Ag. Production emissions

	Rice	Other Cereals	Milk	Beef	Pigmeat	Poultry	Total
Crop residues	1.5	3.6	0	0	0	0	5.1
Enteric fermentation	0	0	<b>11</b>	<b>30.5</b>	0.6	0	<b>42.1</b>
Manure	0	0	<b>6.2</b>	<b>16.8</b>	3.7	2.9	<b>29.6</b>
Pesticides	0.2	0.8	0	0.1	0	0	1.1
Rice cultivation	<b>12.6</b>	0	0	0	0	0	12.6
Synthetic Fertilizers	2.4	6.5	0	0.7	0	0	9.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>17.2</b>	<b>48.1</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>100</b>






# Domestic support policies dataset

Annual coupled subsidies and GSSE, 2014-16 (US\$ billion)

Producer Assistance, \$bn, 2014-16




	Narrow	Broader		All		
	Environmental	Environmental	Fertilizer	Coupled	Decoupled	GSSE
	Conditionality	Conditionality	Subsidies	Subsidies	Subsidies	
Australia	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.4	1.0
Brazil	0.0	2.9	0.0	4.5	0.0	2.7
Canada	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	1.8
Switzerland	0.8	2.6	0.0	1.4	1.1	0.8
Chile	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.4
China	0.0	7.2	0.0	53.7	5.9	39.9
Colombia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.6
Costa Rica	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
EU28	8.8	65.0	0.0	36.2	44.4	12.9
Indonesia	0.0	0.0	1.4	1.9	0.0	1.2
India	0.0	0.0	11.0	28.0	0.0	12.2
Iceland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Israel	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2
Japan	2.4	5.8	0.0	4.8	3.0	8.4
Kazakhstan	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.5
Korea	0.8	0.9	0.1	1.0	0.8	2.9
Mexico	1.1	1.1	0.0	3.7	0.0	0.8
Norway	0.1	0.1	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.2
New Zealand	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
Philippines	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Russia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Turkey	0.1	0.1	0.3	3.1	0.0	2.9
Ukraine	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.2
USA	5.1	24.9	0.0	16.8	11.2	8.7
Vietnam	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.7
South Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>110.8</b>	<b>12.8</b>	<b>163.3</b>	<b>66.8</b>	<b>99.7</b>

Source: OECD



# Method on domestic support





# Nominal rate of protection (NRP), 2016

(as a percent of world price, weighted average)

	<b>GLOBAL</b>	<b>High Income Countries</b>	<b>Middle Income Countries</b>	<b>Low Income Countries</b>
Oilseeds and products	-1.78	-0.26	-2.71	-6.66
Fruits and vegetables	-1.03	12.33	-2.28	28.46
Sugar	15.84	15.66	17.63	-38.28
Bovine Meat	11.12	8.70	13.75	13.95
Maize	9.15	-0.54	26.00	-47.78
Milk	8.21	15.87	1.09	-55.96
Poultry meat	13.22	10.88	14.88	
Rice	30.36	109.31	22.96	17.98
Wheat	19.67	4.58	34.48	-25.86
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7.00</b>	<b>9.50</b>	<b>7.20</b>	<b>-41.18</b>



# Measuring (international) market access distortions

- Two potential approaches:
  - Direct measures of border protection for imports (Bouet and al. 2008, RIE) and for exports (Laborde and al., 2013, World Economy)
  - Indirect approach through price gaps: OECD (PSE manual, 2016)
- First approach well suited for trade policy reforms but could omit other distortions e.g. NTBs
- We select the second approach building on the Ag-Incentives Consortium data → Nominal Rate of Protection, both positive and negative
- But, NRP are not bilateral!
  - Issue of preferences and relevance for the “where it comes from”
- “Bilateralisation” of NRPs
  - Split of NRP information into two instruments:
    - $NRP < 0$  : export taxes
    - $NRP > 0$  : import duties
  - Rescaling of the bilateral tariff structure to reproduce unilateral NRP (trade weighted)



# A Global Model



# What is the impact of current farm policies on GHG emissions?

Decisions	Why it matters for GHG?
<b>Which</b> commodity to produce? “Wheat or Rice?”	Different commodities are associated with different levels of emissions of different GHGs (CO <sub>2</sub> , CH <sub>4</sub> , N <sub>2</sub> O)
<b>Where</b> to produce? “Brazil or Switzerland?”	Different biophysical conditions and different technologies lead to different level of emissions for the same commodity in different countries
<b>How much</b> to produce? “10 million tons or 100 million tons?”	The more we produce, the more we emit
<b>How</b> to produce? “How much fertilizers should we use?”	Input and output prices change the way we adopt technology and produce farm goods, using more intensive or extensive technologies



# The specific role of trade policies

DECISIONS	EFFECT OF TRADE POLICIES
<b>Which</b> commodity to produce	Tariffs vary from one product to another
<b>Where</b> to produce	Tariffs have strong impacts in shifting production around the world
<b>How much</b> to produce	Tariffs increase the price of agricultural products and therefore will deter consumption
<b>How</b> to produce	Tariffs can change the cost of adopting technologies and inputs

# Modelling Framework

## MIRAGRODEP:

- a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, built upon the MIRAGE model.
- It is a multi-region, multi-sector model, dynamically recursive CGE model;
- Government explicitly represented;
- Main source of data: GTAP 10 (base year 2014).

## **Assumptions:**

- Static version of the model
- Public purchases held constant and a variable consumption tax used to hold the deficit to GDP ratio constant,
- Land use held constant to focus on emissions from agriculture
- A constant level of employment.

## **Key closures:**


- **Savings** defined investments;
- Current account surplus/deficit [**net foreign savings**] constant in terms of global GDP:
  - Real exchange rate endogenous
  - Foreign capital flows stable
- **Net Public savings** (government surplus/deficit): constant in terms of domestic GDP
  - Endogenous tax reform
  - No change in public investment








# How do we produce things?





# Where does it come from?


## The role of properly capturing trade deviation effects





# Where does it come from?

Each tree is built for each sector and each importer based on **cluster analysis made at the HS6 level** and done for the specific aggregation of the model





# How much do we produce and which products?



- CES-LES demand system, with a sub CES nest for food products
- The role of price and income elasticities



# Results



## Key scenarios

S1 Domestic support

S2 Market Access

S3 Full policy removal

S4 S3+increase of Multi Factor Productivity

S5 S3+productivity changes that reduces emissions




# Removing coupled subsidies:



**Total Impact**  
-34mt CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent  
-0.6% of Ag. Production  
emissions


## Source of reduction



# Removing border measures



**Total Impact**  
**+128 mt CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent**  
**+2.1% of Ag. Production**  
**emissions**









# Removing coupled subsidies and border measures

## Output changes, %





# Is it surprising that current trade policies are limiting GHG emissions?

Answer: No

- High prices limit consumption, and therefore reduce the scale of production
- Overall, they shift production from developing countries to more advanced, and protectionist economies. The latter have better technologies and lower emissions per unit of output for many products (but not all!)
- Free trade maximize economic efficiency in a system without externalities. With the lack of market for GHG emissions, free trade could not deliver an optimal environmental solution


What should be done: address the externalities at the source

- Develop technologies that directly reduce emissions per unit of output
- Favor technological adoption, especially in developing countries to realign economic and environmental efficiency
- Address the issue of pricing of the GHG emissions



# Global Emission Change, %

**30%  
reduction in  
emissions  
per unit**



Rebound  
effect



# Next steps



Broaden  
coverage of  
measures



More about  
impacts on  
production  
methods



Incorporate land  
use change



Consider broader  
range of  
repurposing  
reforms



## Conclusions & next steps

- Agricultural support is very substantial-- subsidies, trade barriers, public goods
  - Policy reform needs to be guided by implications for key policy outcomes
- Agricultural & land use emissions close to a quarter of global emissions
  - Agricultural emissions strongly concentrated in beef, dairy & rice
- Subsidies to emitting commodities increase global emissions
  - Trade barriers reduce emissions by reducing global demand
  - Productivity enhancement cuts emissions
- Building towards a better understanding of impacts of policy redesign



## References

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