Did Exposure to Soviet Communism Spur Pro-Social Preferences?

Joan Costa-Font, London School of Economics, CESIfo, IZA Anna Nicińska, University of Warsaw

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Preview

We study the effect of exposure to communism (EC) on **pro-social preferences** in two realms

- private, such as preference for support to family members
- public, such as preference for income equality, generalized trust

We examine the effect of EC during 'impressionable years' using DiD strategy comparing EC in several Eastern European to Western Europe.

Preview

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We examine the effect of EC during 'impressionable years' using DiD strategy comparing EC in several Eastern European to Western Europe.

We find that EC during people's impressionable years *crowds* out *pro-social behaviours in the public realm* due to reduced confidence in public institutions, increased traditional gender roles and religiosity, and *crowds in pro-social behaviour in private realm*

Research problem

Background question

Are individual's social preferences endogenous to political regimes?

- The case of post-war Soviet communism
- Social preferences (oriented towards others) in public and private realm (Arendt 1958)
- We confirm previous findings with regards to total EC
- Privilege in communist societies reflected in 'internal family connections' allowing access to education and elite positions

More specifically...

- Did EC shape widely defined pro-social preferences?
- Certain periods of life seem to be particularly relevant for preference formation (impressionable years: ages 18-25)
- Communist countries were characterized by different institutions, but it is unclear whether they persist after communism collapsed in terms of cultural persistence

ENGELS

The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State



Research question

- If political regimes had no effect on individual preferences, difference between post-communist and other countries would not be persistent
- The effect of EC could take two forms:
 - crowding in: people internalize collectivism (pro-social preferences) in the public realm due to inertia or indoctrination (e.g., state control over schools, press, elections), and hence weaker family ties
 - crowding out: people can turn against collectivism (pro-social preferences) in the public realm and switch to stronger pro-social preferences in the private realm

Related literature: Preferences

Social formation of preferences

- Culture and institutions (Alesina and Guliano 2015; Butler and Fehr 2018; Shayo 2009)
 - Formal and informal institutions coevolve (Greif 2006; Schelling 2006)
 - Identity influences (Akerlof and Kranton 2010; Cooter 2000) survive the contemporaneous effect of institutions
- Reference point effects (Coppock and Green 2017)
- Life course perspective on individual behaviour (Elder et al. 2003; Osborne et al. 2011) Experiences in impressionable years are critical for shaping political beliefs (Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2013)

Related literature: Communism

'Wall in the head' theory and indoctrination effect (Corneo and Gruner 2002; Alesina et al. 2001; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007)

- Markets crowd out pro-social behaviours (Marx and Engels 1848; Sandel 2012)
- There is no evidence that communism made impact (Shiller et al. 1992)
 - Egalitarian alternatives to markets bring welfare effects depending on specific country institutions and underlying incentives (Besley 2013)

item Current literature strongly focuses on Germany (e.g. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007; Campa and Serafinelli 2018)

Related literature: Social behaviour

Factors shaping pro-social behaviour

- Private realm
 - Familiarism (Becker 2009) as a club good important for social inclusion and social esteem (Manzi et al. 2006)
 - Positive effects: strong family ties in less developed countries boost economic performance (Alesina and Guliano 2010) and caregiving
 - 'Amoral familism' reduces generalized trust in society (Banfield 1967) and can have detrimental effects for society (Putnam 2001)
- Public realm
 - Preference for income redistribution (Alesina et al. 2001; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007)
 - Strong 'bridging' social capital reduces transaction costs (Putnam 2001)

Empirical strategy: Exogenous 'political regime' shock after the second world war

5 decades of communism in Europe allow for variation across cohorts



Empirical strategy: Two data sources

Generations and Gender Survey

GGS: familiarism, gender etc.

- 2 waves (2002-2013; 2006-2013) of panel data
- 10 post-communist countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia)
- 7 West-European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden)
- 167 thousand individuals

World Values Survey

WVS: income equality, trust etc.

- 5 waves (1981-1984; 1989-1993; 1994-1998; 2005-2009; 2010-2014)
- wave 1 excluded
- cross-section series
- the same set of 10 post-communist countries
- set of control countries analogous to GGS (lack of Austria, Norway, and Belgium)
- 47 thousand individuals

Empirical strategy: Identification

Table 1. Entry and exit into Soviet communism in selected post-communist countries

Entry										
Exit	1936	1947	1948	1949	1952					
1989			Romania		Poland					
1990	Lithuania	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Germany						
	Georgia			Hungary						
1992	Estonia									
1995	Russia									

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on dates of socialist constitution and first free democratic elections

Empirical strategy: Cohort variation in post-communist countries

Table 2. Sample size by 5-year cohort group and country

	Czech	Republic	Esto	onia	Geo	orgia	East 0	ermany	West	Germany	Hur	igary	Lith	uania	Pol	land	Ron	nania	Ru	ssia
Birth cohort	WVS	GGS	WVS	GGS	WVS	GGS	WVS	GGS	WVS	GGS	WVS	GGS	WVS	GGS	WVS	GGS	WVS	GGS	WVS	GGS
1990-94	0	0	100	0	162	0	53	0	64	0	30	0	0	0	82	774	90	0	160	0
1985-89	0	817	135	0	260	1,069	114	50	141	251	102	0	0	932	152	1,392	172	352	514	393
1980-84	22	1,044	121	574	228	1,605	129	148	122	512	90	1,963	0	973	173	1,577	285	591	421	1,323
1975-79	85	1,262	183	682	441	1,601	202	132	177	567	169	2,779	117	991	267	1,733	419	856	454	1,424
1970-74	127	1,259	192	717	549	1,709	211	137	276	666	183	2,287	89	967	223	1,583	406	1,092	622	1,495
1965-69	187	1,083	218	604	402	1,776	286	188	379	1,03	158	1,994	114	1,05	229	1,342	431	1,301	724	1,49
1960-64	167	1,061	209	580	487	1,995	325	263	306	1,112	115	1,898	108	1,081	273	1,442	394	912	855	1,836
1955-59	207	1,065	219	572	401	1,855	264	228	248	960	136	2,357	100	1,091	335	2,007	448	1,122	959	1,814
1950-54	243	1,121	234	512	379	1,472	304	245	250	786	174	2,496	78	934	330	2,305	432	1,315	851	1,749
1945-49	195	1,121	183	479	320	1,139	234	179	192	672	125	2,229	71	796	251	1,998	353	1,118	626	1,266
1940-44	194	955	165	411	245	1,011	280	231	226	802	120	2,048	71	883	177	1,224	295	889	473	972
1935-39	161	752	157	387	303	1,317	277	196	188	742	81	1,757	70	1,005	196	1,321	305	1,026	620	1,504
1930-34	193	686	105	379	194	860	161	142	106	483	61	1,46	84	739	167	787	247	870	409	1,024
1925-29	136	421	77	267	103	547	92	86	103	414	61	906	65	289	131	3	146	527	373	868
1920-24	99	0	40	27	63	0	54	1	58	0	30	0	31	0	61	0	64	0	168	50
1915-19	30	0	6	0	20	0	18	0	16	0	13	0	7	0	30	0	13	0	94	0
1910-14	19	0	0	0	10	0	8	0	8	0	7	0	4	0	21	0	6	0	58	0
1905-09	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	0	1	0	0	0	6	0	3	0	17	0
1900-04	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0

Source: Authors' own tabulations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18) and GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3)

Empirical strategy

$$Y_{it}^{m} = \beta_0 + \beta_{g1} E C_{git}^{tot} + \beta_{g2} E C_{git}^{imp,n} + \beta_1 \sigma_t + \beta_1 \theta_g + \beta_2 c_{it} + \beta_3 X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Extensive and intensive margin of pro-social preferences
- Communism effects:
 - EC in impressionable years: intensive (dummy for EC in ages 18-25) and extensive margin
 - EC in total: total number of years under communism
- Controls (year, country, 5-year cohort groups) and:
 - demographics (age, gender)
 - income status (ability to make ends meet)
 - education (highest education level attained)
- Migrants are excluded from the research sample

Empirical strategy: Measures of pro-social preferences

Private realm Particular familarism Internalized family support norms

- upwards care children should take care of their elderly parents
- upwards money children should provide financial help for their elderly parents
- downwards care grandparents should look after grandchildren
- downwards money parents should provide financial help to their adult children

General familiarism Task for society or task for family

- upwards care care for older persons in need of care
- upwards money financial support for older people below subsistence level
- downwards care care for pre-school children
- downwards money financial support for vounger people who have children below subsistence level

Public realm Social preferences Generalized behaviours

- income equality incomes should be made more equal
- generalized trust most people can be trusted
- left-wing self-identification how would you place your views on a scale
- equality over freedom personal freedom more important than equality

Baseline results: EC in impressionable years and social preferences

- Significant negative effect on both margins of the preferences for income equality (redistribution) and for equality over freedom, left-wing self-identification, and generalized trust more
- EC in impressionable years reduced the preference for income equality by 2 pp, and for equality over freedom by 22 pp

Results: Negative effects of EC in impressionable years on both margins of social preferences

Table 3. Effects of EC in impressionable years on social preferences

	E	xtensive Marg	in	Intensive Margin				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)		
	INCOME EQUALITY							
EC IMP	-0.0137	-0.0179	-0.0232*	-0.0976	-0.125*	-0.161**		
	(0.0128)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.0730)	(0.0724)	(0.0723)		
			LEFT WI	NG				
EC IMP	-0.0287*	-0.0337**	-0.0355**	-0.154**	-0.170**	-0.166**		
	(0.0157)	(0.0156)	(0.0157)	(0.0679)	(0.0676)	(0.0677)		
		G	ENERALIZED	TRUST				
EC IMP	-0.0395***	-0.0358***	-0.0325***	-	-	-		
	(0.0120)	(0.0120)	(0.0119)	-	-	-		
		EQU.	ALITY OVER	RFREEDON	1			
EC IMP	-0.232**	-0.217**	-0.217**	-0.471**	-0.438**	-0.438**		
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.187)		

Baseline results: EC in impressionable years and familiarism

EC during impressionable years increases familiarist preferences



Baseline results: EC in impressionable years and familiarism

EC during impressionable years increases familiarist preferences

- Probability of agreement with statement that the family rather than the state is responsible for care over older generations increased by 8 per cent due to EC in impressionable years.
- Effect size: If we consider individuals exposed to communism in their last impressionable year, upwards care familiarism would be completely crowded out by communism after reaching age of 92, if communism did not collapse before

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- The effects of EC in impressionable years are stronger for general than for particular familiarism ▶ more

Table 4a. Effects of EC in impressionable years on familiarism

		<u> </u>					
	GENERAL		PARTICULAR				
(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)		
UPWARDS CARE EXTENSIVE MARGIN							
0.0562***	0.0567***	0.0563***	0.036***	0.0356***	0.0356***		
(0.0051)	(0.0051)	(0.0051)	(0.0081)	(0.0081)	(0.0081)		
	DOWNW	ARDS CARE	EXTENSIVE	MARGIN			
0.0478***	0.0479***	0.050***	0.0353***	0.0350***	0.0331***		
(0.0073)	(0.0073)	(0.0073)	(0.0076)	(0.0076)	(0.0076)		
	UPWARI	OS MONEY	EXTENSIVE	MARGIN			
0.0293***	0.0301***	0.0284***	0.0154**	0.0151**	0.0162**		
(0.0060)	(0.0060)	(0.0060)	(0.0060)	(0.0060)	(0.0060)		
	DOWNWA	RDS MONE	Y EXTENSIV	'E MARGIN			
0.0529***	0.0533***	0.0533***	0.0128**	0.0126**	0.0133**		
(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)	(0.0052)	(0.0052)	(0.0052)		
	0.0562*** (0.0051) 0.0478*** (0.0073) 0.0293*** (0.0060) 0.0529***	(1) (2) UPWAF 0.0562*** 0.0567*** (0.0051) (0.0051) DOWNWA 0.0478*** 0.0479*** (0.0073) (0.0073) UPWARI 0.0293*** 0.0301*** (0.0060) DOWNWA 0.0529*** 0.0533***	(1) (2) (3) UPWARDS CARE E 0.0562*** 0.0567*** 0.0563*** (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) DOWNWARDS CARE 0.0478*** 0.0479*** 0.050*** (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) UPWARDS MONEY 0.0293*** 0.0301*** 0.0284*** (0.0060) (0.0060) DOWNWARDS MONEY 0.0529*** 0.0533*** 0.0533***	(1) (2) (3) (1) UPWARDS CARE EXTENSIVE N 0.0562*** 0.0567*** 0.0563*** 0.036*** (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0081) DOWNWARDS CARE EXTENSIVE 0.0478*** 0.0479*** 0.050*** 0.0353*** (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0076) UPWARDS MONEY EXTENSIVE 0.0293*** 0.0301*** 0.0284*** 0.0154** (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) DOWNWARDS MONEY EXTENSIVE 0.0529*** 0.0533*** 0.0533*** 0.0128**	(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) UPWARDS CARE EXTENSIVE MARGIN 0.0562*** 0.0567*** 0.0563*** 0.036*** 0.0356*** (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0081) (0.0081) DOWNWARDS CARE EXTENSIVE MARGIN 0.0478*** 0.0479*** 0.050*** 0.0353*** 0.0350*** (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0076) UPWARDS MONEY EXTENSIVE MARGIN 0.0293*** 0.0301*** 0.0284*** 0.0154** 0.0151** (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) DOWNWARDS MONEY EXTENSIVE MARGIN 0.0529*** 0.0533*** 0.0128** 0.0126**		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3)

Results: Positive effects of EC in impressionable years on intensive margin of familiarism •••••

Table 4b. Effects of EC in impressionable years on familiarism										
		GENERAL		PARTICULAR						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)				
	UPWARDS CARE INTENSIVE MARGIN									
EC IMP	0.154***	0.155***	0.154***	0.0857***	0.0845***	0.0804***				
	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0178)	(0.0178)	(0.0178)				
		DOWNW	ARDS CAR	RE INTENSIV	'E MARGIN					
EC IMP	0.123***	0.124***	0.128***	0.0706***	0.0700***	0.0654***				
	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)				
		UPWAR	DS MONE	Y İNTENSIVI	E MARGIN					
EC IMP	0.109***	0.109***	0.106***	0.0484**	0.0462**	0.0489**				
	(0.0140)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0195)	(0.0194)	(0.0194)				
		DOWNWA	ARDS MON	EY INTENSI	VE MARGIN					
EC IMP	0.123***	0.124***	0.125***	0.0215	0.0210	0.0245				
	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0161)				

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3)

Results: Effects of EC in total on top of EC in impressionable years for extensive margins of selected pro-social preferences

Table 5. Effects of EC in total on selected preferences

The state of the s										
	Extensive margin									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)				
	INC	OME EQUAL	LITY	PARTIC	JLAR UPWAR	DS CARE				
EC TOT	0.0039***	0.0033***	0.0037***	-0.0020***	-0.0017***	-0.0017***				
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)				
		LEFT WING		PARTICULAR DOWNWARDS CARE						
EC TOT	0.0042***	0.0038***	0.0039***	-0.0025***	-0.0025***	-0.0024***				
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)				
	GENE	RALIZED T	RUST	GENERAL DOWNWARDS CARE						
EC TOT	-0.0010**	-0.0006	-0.0010**	0.0023***	-0.0024***	-0.0025***				
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)				
	EQUALI'	TY OVER F	REEDOM	GENERAL	DOWNWARD	S MONEY				
EC TOT	0.00839**	0.00890**	0.00890**	-0.00282***	-0.00268***	-0.00271***				
	(0.00386)	(0.00391)	(0.00391)	(0.000236)	(0.000237)	(0.000237)				

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18) and GGS wave_1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3)

Threads to the identification

Effects remain when using:


- alternative dates of entry and exit to communism
- experiences of war and recession in impressionable years
- income (with imputations for missing data) instead of ability to make ends meet
- alternative (1- and 10-year) cohort grouping
- occupation, also interacted with graduation age
- age at the communism collapse and rural versus urban area
- alternative clusters (country, wave, year)

Robustness checks

Effects usually remain when using:

- alternative control groups
- panel random effects for familiarism
- binary models for dichotomized pro-social preferences
- sample selection correction with propensity score matching for social preferences
- sub-sample of Eastern and Western Germany
- intensive margin of EC in impressionable years

Earlier and later impressionable years



Heterogeneity analysis

- demography
 - crowding out of social preferences stronger for men than women
 - crowding in of familiarism similar for men and women
 - crowding in of familiarism is driven by cohorts born in the 1950's and 1960's
- geography
 - heterogeneity in the size of effects for different countries
 - effects on preferences for income equality and equality over freedom stronger in urban than rural areas
 - effects on familiarism weaker in urban than rural areas
- history
 - distinction between Prussia versus Habsburg empire and Russia with respect to effects on preference for income equality
 - effects on preference for equality over freedom strongest in historically orthodox Christian countries

Mechanisms

We find EC effects that might explain mechanisms leading to our results:

- EC reinforces family ties (family trust and importance)
- EC reduces confidence in state institutions (press, labour unions, political parties, police, courts)
- EC reduces membership in organizations (passive and active)
- EC enhances ritual religiosity (despite EC reduces spirituality)
- EC enhances traditional gender roles (female care-giver and male bread-winner)

Discussion: Summary

EC in impressionable years influences both:

- Private realm crowding in of pro-social preferences
- Public realm crowding out of pro-social preferences

Mechanisms that might help to explain main results:

- Reduced confidence in public institutions such as press, labour unions, police and justice system
- Reinforced family ties and reduced equality with respect to gender roles in public and private realm

Conclusion

Our results suggest that political regimes affect individual's pro-social preferences

EC in impressionable years leads to crowding-out of pro-social behaviours in public realm and crowding-in in private realm

Contribution

- We confirm results found in previous studies on EC effects on pro-social behaviours
- We show the crucial and distinct role of impressionable years in preferences' formation
- We show that comparisons between Eastern and Western Germany fail to fully represent EC effects for all post-communist countries

Discussion: Further analysis

- Other mechanisms

 - Other social preferences using 'Life in Transition' survey
- Institutions (such as education system) or culture
 - Second generation migrants from post-communist countries to Western Europe using ESS
 - The other companion project of ours concerned with later-life well-being and effect of different regimes' education systems
- External validity
 - Differences between communist regimes

Preview
Research question
Literature
Empirical strategy
Results
Discussion



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Thank you for your attention We are looking for your feedback

Did Communism Affect Individual Behaviours? BACK



Table A1. EC effects on outcomes

			Intern	al Margin		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	SAVI	NG BEHAVIO	DUR	SELF-I	REPORTED H	EALTH
EC IMP	-0.0830***	-0.0692**	-0.0663**	-0.0591***	-0.0479**	-0.0391*
	(0.0286)	(0.0279)	(0.0279)	(0.0206)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)
EC TOT	-0.00225***	0.000625	0.000279	-0.00641***	-0.00488***	-0.00579***
	(0.000843)	(0.000824)	(0.000827)	(0.000673)	(0.000668)	(0.000667)
	INTENDED	NUMBER OF	CHILDREN	IMPORTA	ANCE OF DEM	1OCRACY
EC IMP	0.124***	0.125***	0.131***	0.0871	0.106	0.131*
	(0.0392)	(0.0392)	(0.0394)	(0.0743)	(0.0743)	(0.0740)
EC TOT	0.0307***	0.0298***	0.0290***	-0.0141***	-0.0128***	-0.0156***
	(0.00569)	(0.00564)	(0.00565)	(0.00229)	(0.00229)	(0.00228)

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015 04 18) and GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) Notes: Savings - spent savings and borrowed money, spent some savings and borrowed money, just get by, save money; Children - 0, 1, 2, 3 or more; Health - 5 point scale, Democracy - 4 point scale. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Social preferences: fixed communism entry and exit TBACK



Table F5. Estimation results for social attitudes with fixed communism entry and exit dates.

	1	Extensive Margin	ı	Ir	itensive Margii	1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
		•	INCOME EQ	UALITY	•	•
EC in an	-0.00757***	-0.00875***	-0.00825***	-0.0361**	-0.0428***	-0.0399***
impressionable year	(0.00262)	(0.00260)	(0.00259)	(0.0142)	(0.0141)	(0.0141)
Years of EC	0.00524***	0.00471***	0.00491***	0.0307***	0.0276***	0.0288***
in total	(0.000597)	(0.000593)	(0.000592)	(0.00322)	(0.00320)	(0.00319)
		•	LEFT W	ING	•	
EC in an	-0.0107***	-0.0120***	-0.0120***	-0.0486***	-0.0532***	-0.0528***
impressionable year	(0.00295)	(0.00293)	(0.00293)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)
Years of EC	0.00587***	0.00553***	0.00557***	0.0269***	0.0256***	0.0254***
in total	(0.000664)	(0.000663)	(0.000663)	(0.00283)	(0.00282)	(0.00282)
		. 1	EQUALITY OVER	FREEDOM *		
EC in an	0.0105	0.0107	0.0107	-0.0146	-0.0154	-0.0154
impressionable year	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.0250)	(0.0251)	(0.0251)
Years of EC	0.0230+	0.0210*	0.0210*	-0.0354	-0.0320	-0.0320
in total	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0232)	(0.0232)	(0.0232)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015 04 18), Notes: Attitudes on: income

Familarism: fixed communism entry and exit (BACK)



Table F6. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes with communism entry and exit dates.

			Extensive Ma	rgin			Intensive Margin					
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
•						UPWARD	S CARE					
EC in an	0.00845***	0.00850***	0.00854***	0.00631***	0.00633***	0.00638***	0.0249***	0.0249***	0.0249***	0.0162***	0.0162***	0.0156***
impressionable year	(0.00133)	(0.00133)	(0.00133)	(0.00163)	(0.00163)	(0.00163)	(0.00287)	(0.00287)	(0.00287)	(0.00366)	(0.00366)	(0.00367)
Years of EC	0.000733**	0.000938***	0.000908***	-0.0026***	-0.0023***	-0.0023***	-0.000206	0.000257	0.000205	-0.00489***	-0.00398***	-0.00380***
in total	(0.000329)	(0.000329)	(0.000329)	(0.000423)	(0.000423)	(0.000424)	(0.000710)	(0.000710)	(0.000710)	(0.000959)	(0.000959)	(0.000960)
		DOWNWARDS CARE										
EC in an	0.00905***	0.00908***	0.00944***	0.00384**	0.00389**	0.00362**	0.0252***	0.0252***	0.0259***	0.00670*	0.00679*	0.00595+
impressionable year	(0.00147)	(0.00147)	(0.00147)	(0.00154)	(0.00154)	(0.00154)	(0.00325)	(0.00325)	(0.00325)	(0.00362)	(0.00362)	(0.00361)
Years of EC	-0.00316***	-0.00320***	-0.00330***	-0.0025***	-0.0024***	-0.0023***	-0.00979***	-0.00991***	-0.0101***	-0.00617***	-0.00605***	-0.00575***
in total	(0.000353)	(0.000353)	(0.000354)	(0.000400)	(0.000400)	(0.000400)	(0.000780)	(0.000780)	(0.000781)	(0.000943)	(0.000945)	(0.000944)
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in an	0.0105***	0.0105***	0.0103***	0.00206*	0.00202*	0.00228*	0.0273***	0.0274***	0.0271***	0.00912**	0.00904**	0.00958**
impressionable year	(0.00155)	(0.00154)	(0.00154)	(0.00122)	(0.00122)	(0.00122)	(0.00331)	(0.00330)	(0.00330)	(0.00426)	(0.00424)	(0.00424)
Years of EC	-0.00124***	-0.000859**	-0.000855**	-0.0023***	-0.0020***	-0.0021***	-0.00214***	-0.00135	-0.00140*	-0.00834***	-0.00685+++	-0.00695++
in total	(0.000391)	(0.000391)	(0.000391)	(0.000321)	(0.000321)	(0.000321)	(0.000822)	(0.000821)	(0.000821)	(0.00112)	(0.00111)	(0.00111)
						DOWNWARI						
EC in an	0.0126***	0.0126***	0.0127***	0.00347***	0.00348***	0.00364***	0.0255***	0.0254***	0.0258***	0.0128***	0.0129***	0.0134***
impressionable year	(0.00143)	(0.00143)	(0.00143)	(0.00111)	(0.00111)	(0.00111)	(0.00289)	(0.00289)	(0.00289)	(0.00392)	(0.00391)	(0.00391)
Years of EC	-0.00446***	-0.00426***	-0.00429***	-0.0034***	-0.0032***	-0.0032***	-0.00934***	-0.00900***	-0.00913***	-0.0125***	-0.0113***	-0.0115***
in total	(0.000357)	(0.000358)	(0.000358)	(0.000310)	(0.000310)	(0.000309)	(0.000710)	(0.000711)	(0.000711)	(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00105)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country & cohort FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Source: Authors' own e	stimations base	d on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and	2 (release 1.3)	. Notes: Parti	cular familiar	ism: upwards c	are - "children	should take res	ponsibility for	caring for their	r parents wh

Social preferences: recession in impressionable years **GRACK**



Table G1. Estimation results for social attitudes controlling for the experience of recession in the impressionable years.

	1	Extensive Margir	1	Ir	itensive Margii	1					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)					
		•	INCOME EQ	UALITY	•						
EC in an	-0.0133	-0.0176	-0.0229*	-0.0932	-0.121*	-0.157**					
impressionable year	(0.0128)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.0730)	(0.0725)	(0.0724)					
Years of EC	0.00388***	0.00323***	0.00372***	0.0250***	0.0212***	0.0242***					
in total	(0.000409)	(0.000408)	(0.000409)	(0.00229)	(0.00228)	(0.00228)					
		•	LEFT W	ING	•	•					
EC in an	-0.0289*	-0.0339**	-0.0357**	-0.157**	-0.173**	-0.169**					
impressionable year	(0.0157)	(0.0156)	(0.0157)	(0.0678)	(0.0676)	(0.0676)					
Years of EC	0.00421***	0.00375***	0.00384***	0.0195***	0.0176***	0.0173***					
in total	(0.000491)	(0.000491)	(0.000493)	(0.00213)	(0.00213)	(0.00214)					
	EQUALITY OVER FREEDOM *										
EC in an	-0.232**	-0.217**	-0.217**	-0.471**	-0.438**	-0.438**					
impressionable year	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.187)					
Years of EC	0.00852**	0.00902**	0.00902**	0.0203***	0.0217***	0.0217***					
in total	(0.00394)	(0.00400)	(0.00400)	(0.00748)	(0.00760)	(0.00760)					
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes					
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes					
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes					
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes					
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes					
Cohort effects	ves	ves	ves	ves	ves	ves					

Familarism: recession in impressionable years BACK

Table G2. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes controlling for the experience of recession in the impressionable years.

			Extensive Mar	rgin			Intensive Margin					
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
						UPWARD	CARE					
EC in an	0.0376***	0.0389***	0.0391***	0.0305***	0.0321***	0.0305***	0.0879***	0.0910***	0.0902***	0.0712***	0.0758***	0.0729***
mpressionable year	(0.00400)	(0.00400)	(0.00401)	(0.00610)	(0.00609)	(0.00611)	(0.00851)	(0.00850)	(0.00852)	(0.0133)	(0.0133)	(0.0133)
lears of EC	0.00127***	0.00145***	0.00144***	-0.0020***	-0.0017***	-0.0017***	0.00234***	0.00272***	0.00273***	-0.00315***	-0.00238***	-0.00226**
n total	(0.000167)	(0.000167)	(0.000168)	(0.000235)	(0.000235)	(0.000235)	(0.000361)	(0.000361)	(0.000361)	(0.000528)	(0.000528)	(0.000529
						DOWNWAR	DS CARE					
EC in an	-0.00678	-0.00687	-0.00777	0.0340***	0.0340***	0.0313***	-0.0118	-0.0124	-0.0140	0.0711***	0.0714***	0.0654***
mpressionable year	(0.00539)	(0.00539)	(0.00539)	(0.00549)	(0.00549)	(0.00550)	(0.0108)	(0.0108)	(0.0109)	(0.0120)	(0.0119)	(0.0120)
ears of EC	-0.000959***	-0.000977***	-0.00102***	-0.0023***	-0.0022***	-0.0022***	-0.00367***	-0.00375***	-0.00383***	-0.00607***	-0.00593***	-0.00573**
n total	(0.000195)	(0.000196)	(0.000196)	(0.000218)	(0.000218)	(0.000218)	(0.000410)	(0.000411)	(0.000412)	(0.000499)	(0.000499)	(0.000500
	UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in an	0.0208***	0.0233***	0.0236***	0.0123***	0.0137***	0.0135***	0.0569***	0.0618***	0.0621***	0.0414***	0.0488***	0.0482***
mpressionable year	(0.00488)	(0.00487)	(0.00488)	(0.00414)	(0.00414)	(0.00414)	(0.00914)	(0.00913)	(0.00914)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0140)
fears of EC	0.000424**	0.000726***	0.000737***	-0.0020***	-0.0018***	-0.0018***	0.00193***	0.00256***	0.00257***	-0.00682***	-0.00562***	-0.00569**
n total	(0.000201)	(0.000201)	(0.000201)	(0.000167)	(0.000167)	(0.000167)	(0.000402)	(0.000402)	(0.000402)	(0.000585)	(0.000583)	(0.000583
						DOWNWARD	S MONEY					
C in an	0.00149	0.00271	0.00188	0.00741**	0.00842**	0.00793**	0.00547	0.00758	0.00601	0.0281**	0.0335**	0.0316**
mpressionable year	(0.00537)	(0.00537)	(0.00538)	(0.00377)	(0.00376)	(0.00377)	(0.00997)	(0.00997)	(0.00998)	(0.0136)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)
rears of EC	-0.00155***	-0.00139***	-0.00140***	-0.0025***	-0.0024***	-0.0024***	-0.00355***	-0.00327***	-0.00331***	-0.00928***	-0.00830***	-0.00835**
n total	(0.000200)	(0.000201)	(0.000201)	(0.000166)	(0.000166)	(0.000166)	(0.000381)	(0.000382)	(0.000382)	(0.000573)	(0.000572)	(0.000572
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
ncome controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
ducation controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country & cohort FE	ves	ves	ves	ves	ves	ves	ves	ves	ves	ves	ves	ves

Social preferences: alternative control group (BACK)

Table E1. The effects of exposure to communism (EC) on social attitudes using alternative control country groups.

		1	Extensive Margir	1	In	itensive Margii	1
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
				INCOME EQ	UALITY		•
EC in IY, excluding	- Italy	-0.0123	-0.0163	-0.0221*	-0.103	-0.129*	-0.168**
_		(0.0129)	(0.0128)	(0.0128)	(0.0737)	(0.0732)	(0.0731)
	- Sweden	-0.0162	-0.0176	-0.0233*	-0.112	-0.122	-0.162**
		(0.0131)	(0.0130)	(0.0130)	(0.0752)	(0.0747)	(0.0746)
Years of EC in total, exc	luding - Italy	0.00391***	0.00323***	0.00371***	0.0254***	0.0215***	0.0244***
		(0.000413)	(0.000412)	(0.000412)	(0.00231)	(0.00230)	(0.00230)
	- Sweden	0.00385***	0.00325***	0.00382***	0.0261***	0.0227***	0.0262***
		(0.000429)	(0.000429)	(0.000430)	(0.00241)	(0.00240)	(0.00240)
	-			LEFT W	ING		
EC in IY, excluding	- Italy	-0.0289*	-0.0343**	-0.0364**	-0.161**	-0.178***	-0.175**
		(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0684)	(0.0682)	(0.0683)
	- Sweden	-0.0330**	-0.0352**	-0.0362**	-0.145**	-0.150**	-0.146**
		(0.0162)	(0.0162)	(0.0162)	(0.0697)	(0.0696)	(0.0696)
Years of EC in total, exc	luding - Italy	0.00428***	0.00382***	0.00392***	0.0199***	0.0180***	0.0178***
		(0.000495)	(0.000495)	(0.000497)	(0.00215)	(0.00215)	(0.00216)
	- Sweden	0.00433***	0.00388***	0.00389***	0.0187***	0.0170***	0.0164***
		(0.000516)	(0.000517)	(0.000520)	(0.00221)	(0.00221)	(0.00222)
	_			EQUALITY OVER	FREEDOM *	•	-
EC in IY, excluding	- Italy	-0.232**	-0.217**	-0.217**	-0.471**	-0.438**	-0.438**
		(0.1000)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.187)
	- Sweden	-0.232**	-0.217**	-0.217**	-0.471**	-0.438**	-0.438**
		(0.1000)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.187)

Table E2. The effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) on familiaristic attitudes using alternative control country groups.

<u> </u>			Extensiv	e Margin			Intensive Margin					
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL		•	PARTICULAR	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
						UPV	VARDS CARE					
EC in IY, excluding - Italy	0.0628***	0.0631***	0.0630***	0.0364***	0.0360***	0.0356***	0.154***	0.155***	0.154***	0.0857***	0.0845***	0.0804**
	(0.00608)	(0.00608)	(0.00608)	(0.00806)	(0.00806)	(0.00807)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0178)	(0.0178)	(0.0178)
- Sweden	0.0595***	0.0599***	0.0601***	0.0316***	0.0312***	0.0307***	0.148***	0.149***	0.149***	0.0689***	0.0679***	0.0638**
	(0.00619)	(0.00618)	(0.00619)	(0.00845)	(0.00844)	(0.00845)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0184)	(0.0184)	(0.0184)
						DOW	WARDS CARE					
EC in IY, excluding - Italy	0.0478***	0.0479***	0.0500***	0.0353***	0.0350***	0.0331***	0.123***	0.124***	0.128***	0.0706***	0.0700***	0.0654***
	(0.00730)	(0.00730)	(0.00730)	(0.00760)	(0.00760)	(0.00760)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)	(0.0170)
- Sweden	0.0438***	0.0438***	0.0457***	0.0293***	0.0290***	0.0267***	0.108***	0.109***	0.113***	0.0583***	0.0576***	0.0520**
_	(0.00748)	(0.00748)	(0.00749)	(0.00774)	(0.00774)	(0.00774)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)
							ARDS MONEY					
EC in IY, excluding - Italy	0.0387***	0.0391***	0.0376***	0.0154***	0.0151***	0.0162***	0.109***	0.109***	0.106***	0.0484**	0.0462**	0.0489**
	(0.00697)	(0.00696)	(0.00696)	(0.00569)	(0.00569)	(0.00569)	(0.0140)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0195)	(0.0194)	(0.0194)
- Sweden	0.0364***	0.0367***	0.0357***	0.0107*	0.0106*	0.0116*	0.102***	0.103***	0.101***	0.0230	0.0213	0.0240
	(0.00716)	(0.00715)	(0.00715)	(0.00598)	(0.00598)	(0.00598)	(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0204)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)
						DOWN	WARDS MONE	Y				
EC in IY, excluding - Italy	0.0529***	0.0533***	0.0533***	0.0128**	0.0126**	0.0133**	0.123***	0.124***	0.125***	0.0349*	0.0325*	0.0350*
	(0.00719)	(0.00720)	(0.00720)	(0.00525)	(0.00525)	(0.00525)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0185)	(0.0185)	(0.0185)
- Sweden	0.0567***	0.0570***	0.0568***	0.0103*	0.0102*	0.0108**	0.129***	0.129***	0.130***	0.0195	0.0170	0.0197
	(0.00732)	(0.00732)	(0.00733)	(0.00543)	(0.00543)	(0.00543)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: IY - an impressionable years. Particular familiarism: upwards care - "children should

Social preferences: propensity score matching (BACK)



Tab	le	J1	. /	Average	treatment	effe	ct

	Extensive	e Margin	Intensive	Margin
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
		INCOME E	QUALITY	
EC IMP	-0.0576316	-0.0408426	-0.538324	-0.4572473
	(0.0099343)	(0.0107512)	(0.0845202)	(0.075982)
z-test	-5.80***	-3.80***	-6.37***	-6.02***
		LEFT-	WING	
EC IMP	0.0791387	0 .0599137	0.0559445	0. 1052834
	(0.0103927)	(0. 021754)	(0.0446092)	(0.0973395)
z-test	7.62***	2.75***	1.25	1.08
		EQUALITY OV	ER FREEDOM	
EC IMP	-0.1158102	-0.4995824	-0.1613233	-0.9353518
	(0.03466551)	(0.0374445)	(0.06885366)	(0. 074442)
z-test	-0.33	-13.34***	-0.23	-12.56***

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) Notes: Propensity score generated using dummy for being over thirty years old and NUTS-2 regional rate of employees or the self-employed in farmer and fishery occupations, byear, and (2) NUTS-2 regional rate

Social preferences: Eastern vs Western Germany (BACK)



Table K1. Estimation results for social attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany.

	- I	Extensive Margir	1	In	tensive Margir	1					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)					
			INCOME EQ	UALITY							
EC in an	-0.0971**	-0.105**	-0.109***	-0.277	-0.327	-0.357*					
impressionable year	(0.0423)	(0.0422)	(0.0421)	(0.217)	(0.215)	(0.214)					
Years of EC	0.00645***	0.00610***	0.00643***	0.0332***	0.0312***	0.0330***					
in total	(0.00120)	(0.00120)	(0.00119)	(0.00614)	(0.00609)	(0.00608)					
	GENERALIZED TRUST (WVS)										
EC in an	-0.120***	-0.112**	-0.105**	-	-	-					
impressionable year	(0.0454)	(0.0451)	(0.0441)	-	-	-					
Years of EC	-0.000830	-0.000695	-0.00129	-	-	-					
in total	(0.00128)	(0.00128)	(0.00125)	-	-	-					
			LEFT W	ING							
EC in an	-0.0424	-0.0438	-0.0322	-0.347**	-0.341**	-0.283*					
impressionable year	(0.0427)	(0.0428)	(0.0426)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.167)					
Years of EC	0.00553***	0.00539***	0.00506***	0.0262***	0.0256***	0.0233***					
in total	(0.00123)	(0.00123)	(0.00122)	(0.00487)	(0.00488)	(0.00477)					
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes					
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes					
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes					
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes					
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes					
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes					

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015_04_18). Notes: Attitudes on: income

Familarism: Eastern vs Western Germany (BACK)

Table K2. Estimation results for familiaristic attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany.

			Extensive Ma	rgin			Intensive Margin						
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	
						UPWARD:							
EC in an	0.00520	0.00991	0.00955	0.0721	0.0843	0.0859	0.0630	0.0681	0.0658	0.189	0.216	0.215	
impressionable year	(0.0463)	(0.0462)	(0.0463)	(0.0895)	(0.0889)	(0.0888)	(0.0871)	(0.0869)	(0.0869)	(0.179)	(0.176)	(0.176)	
Years of EC	0.00135	0.00142	0.00146	-0.00238	-0.00254	-0.00252	0.000248	0.000483	0.000612	-0.00709	-0.00750	-0.00749	
in total	(0.00125)	(0.00125)	(0.00125)	(0.00249)	(0.00247)	(0.00247)	(0.00237)	(0.00237)	(0.00237)	(0.00495)	(0.00488)	(0.00488)	
		DOWNWARDS CARE											
EC in an	0.121**	0.120**	0.117**	-0.00176	-5.31e-05	-0.00896	0.150	0.145	0.142	-0.0838	-0.0738	-0.0900	
impressionable year	(0.0501)	(0.0501)	(0.0500)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.0940)	(0.0942)	(0.0942)	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.234)	
Years of EC	-0.00202	-0.00207	-0.00195	-0.00323	-0.00332	-0.00292	-0.00292	-0.00291	-0.00270	-0.00454	-0.00497	-0.00425	
in total	(0.00134)	(0.00134)	(0.00134)	(0.00284)	(0.00285)	(0.00284)	(0.00257)	(0.00257)	(0.00257)	(0.00657)	(0.00657)	(0.00656)	
		UPWARDS MONEY											
EC in an	0.0691	0.0746	0.0750	-0.0147	-0.0140	-0.0119	0.0685	0.0820	0.0828	0.405**	0.435***	0.436***	
impressionable year	(0.0549)	(0.0548)	(0.0547)	(0.0210)	(0.0212)	(0.0210)	(0.0986)	(0.0979)	(0.0976)	(0.167)	(0.164)	(0.164)	
Years of EC	-0.00239	-0.00233	-0.00237	-0.000427	-0.000316	-0.000318	-0.00321	-0.00307	-0.00321	-0.0193***	-0.0191***	-0.0192***	
in total	(0.00152)	(0.00151)	(0.00151)	(0.000699)	(0.000698)	(0.000694)	(0.00271)	(0.00270)	(0.00269)	(0.00463)	(0.00457)	(0.00456)	
						DOWNWARD							
EC in an	0.0974*	0.100*	0.0971*	-0.0283	-0.0225	-0.0186	0.0851	0.0910	0.0859	0.487**	0.523**	0.519**	
impressionable year	(0.0528)	(0.0528)	(0.0528)	(0.0527)	(0.0533)	(0.0532)	(0.0922)	(0.0920)	(0.0920)	(0.209)	(0.207)	(0.207)	
Years of EC	-0.00108	-0.00109	-0.00106	-0.000859	-0.000732	-0.000753	-0.000467	-0.000476	-0.000449	-0.0244***	-0.0244***	-0.0241***	
in total	(0.00144)	(0.00143)	(0.00143)	(0.00152)	(0.00153)	(0.00153)	(0.00252)	(0.00252)	(0.00252)	(0.00586)	(0.00581)	(0.00581)	
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
Income controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	
Country & cohort FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Particular familiarism: upwards care - "children should take responsibility for caring

Social preferences: intensive margin of EC IMP (BACK)



Table C3. Linear effects of EC in impressionable years and in total on social attitudes.

	1	Extensive Margir	1	In	itensive Margii	1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
			INCOME EQ	UALITY	•	
Years of EC in	-0.00235	-0.00314	-0.00353*	-0.0215*	-0.0263**	-0.0291**
impressionable years	(0.00200)	(0.00198)	(0.00198)	(0.0114)	(0.0113)	(0.0113)
Years of EC	0.00405***	0.00343***	0.00387***	0.0272***	0.0237***	0.0264***
in total	(0.000465)	(0.000464)	(0.000464)	(0.00262)	(0.00261)	(0.00261)
Lincom t-test	1.03	0.18	0.21	0.61	-0.28	-0.30
			LEFT W	ING	•	
Years of EC in	-0.00600**	-0.00697***	-0.00714***	-0.0318***	-0.0353***	-0.0347***
impressionable years	(0.00240)	(0.00240)	(0.00240)	(0.0108)	(0.0107)	(0.0108)
Years of EC	0.00470***	0.00429***	0.00438***	0.0223***	0.0206***	0.0204***
in total	(0.000554)	(0.000554)	(0.000555)	(0.00246)	(0.00246)	(0.00247)
Lincom t-test	-0.66	-1.37	-1.41	-1.08	-1.67*	-1.64
			EQUALITY OVER	FREEDOM a	•	•
Years of EC in	-0.00235	-0.00314	-0.00353*	-0.0384**	-0.0370**	-0.0370**
impressionable years	(0.00200)	(0.00198)	(0.00198)	(0.0187)	(0.0186)	(0.0186)
Years of EC	0.00405***	0.00343***	0.00387***	0.0186**	0.0202**	0.0202**
in total	(0.000465)	(0.000464)	(0.000464)	(0.00797)	(80800.0)	(0.00808)
Lincom t-test	-0.97	-0.89	-0.89	-0.96	-0.81	-0.81
Demographic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Income controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Education controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Cohort effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Familarism: intensive margin if EC IMP (BACK)



Table C4. Linear effects of EC in impressionable years and in total on familiaristic attitudes.

			Extensiv	e Margin					Intensi	ve Margin		
		GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR	l
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
							RDS CARE					
Years of EC in	0.00987***	0.00997***	0.00993***	0.00652***	0.00654***	0.00652***	0.0265***	0.0267***	0.0265***	0.0160***	0.0161***	0.0155**
impressionable years	(0.00109)	(0.00109)	(0.00109)	(0.00138)	(0.00138)	(0.00138)	(0.00236)	(0.00236)	(0.00236)	(0.00309)	(0.00309)	(0.00310
Years of EC	0.000367	0.000576**	0.000567**	-0.00250***	-0.00224***	-0.00224***	-0.000718	-0.000274	-0.000286	-0.00461***	-0.00379***	-0.00356*
in total	(0.000260)	(0.000260)	(0.000260)	(0.000354)	(0.000354)	(0.000354)	(0.000567)	(0.000567)	(0.000567)	(0.000795)	(0.000796)	(0.00079
Lincom t-test	11.44***	11.79***	11.71***	3.59***	3.84***	3.81***	13.33***	13.67***	13.52***	4.57***	4.94***	4.78***
						DOWNW	ARDS CARE					
Years of EC in	0.00796***	0.00796***	0.00840***	0.00297**	0.00296**	0.00278**	0.0210***	0.0209***	0.0219***	0.00573*	0.00571*	0.00531
impressionable years	(0.00124)	(0.00124)	(0.00124)	(0.00131)	(0.00131)	(0.00131)	(0.00269)	(0.00269)	(0.00269)	(0.00301)	(0.00301)	(0.00301
Years of EC	-0.00283***	-0.00289***	-0.00303***	-0.00231***	-0.00228***	-0.00220***	-0.00867***	-0.00886***	-0.00916***	-0.00619***	-0.00611***	-0.00590
in total	(0.000290)	(0.000291)	(0.000292)	(0.000327)	(0.000327)	(0.000327)	(0.000629)	(0.000629)	(0.000630)	(0.000759)	(0.000760)	(0.00076
Lincom t-test	5.07***	5.00***	5.29***	0.62	0.64	0.54	5.57***	5.47***	5.74***	-0.18	-0.16	-0.24
						UPWAR	DS MONEY					
Years of EC in	0.00887***	0.00906***	0.00865***	0.00183*	0.00187*	0.00214**	0.0251***	0.0255***	0.0246***	0.00642*	0.00661*	0.00737
mpressionable years	(0.00126)	(0.00126)	(0.00126)	(0.00102)	(0.00102)	(0.00102)	(0.00267)	(0.00266)	(0.00267)	(0.00352)	(0.00351)	(0.0035)
Years of EC	-0.00084***	-0.000489	-0.000425	-0.00228***	-0.00202***	-0.00210***	-0.00182***	-0.00107*	-0.000981	-0.00820***	-0.00670***	-0.00686
n total	(0.000312)	(0.000312)	(0.000312)	(0.000267)	(0.000267)	(0.000267)	(0.000647)	(0.000646)	(0.000645)	(0.000917)	(0.000913)	(0.00091
Lincom t-test	7.75***	8.29***	7.94***	-0.55	-0.18	0.05	10.65***	11.18***	10.79***	-0.62	-0.03	0.18
						DOWNWA	RDS MONEY					
Years of EC in	0.00861***	0.00868***	0.00871***	0.00231**	0.00236**	0.00250**	0.0180***	0.0182***	0.0185***	0.00652*	0.00668**	0.00730
impressionable years	(0.00123)	(0.00123)	(0.00123)	(0.000970)	(0.000970)	(0.000972)	(0.00245)	(0.00245)	(0.00245)	(0.00336)	(0.00335)	(0.00336
Years of EC	-0.00331***	-0.00318***	-0.00322***	-0.00318***	-0.00300***	-0.00306***	-0.00731***	-0.00707***	-0.00723***	-0.0115***	-0.0103***	-0.0105*
in total	(0.000296)	(0.000297)	(0.000297)	(0.000267)	(0.000267)	(0.000266)	(0.000583)	(0.000584)	(0.000584)	(0.000892)	(0.000890)	(0.00088
Lincom t-test	5.31***	5.51***	5.49***	-1.12	-0.82	-0.72	5.39***	5.56***	5.65***	-1.84	-1.33	-1.17
Demographic controls	yes	yes										
ncome controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Education controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Country effects	yes	yes										
l'ear effects	yes	yes										
Cohort effects	yes	yes										

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: EC - exposure to communism. Particular familiarism: upwards care - "children should

Social preferences: gender differences • BACK

			Extensive Margin	1	Ir	itensive Margii	1
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
				INCOME EQ	UALITY		
EC in impressinable year	- women	-0.00954	-0.00547	0.000926	-0.0137	0.0112	0.0537
		(0.0154)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0895)	(0.0890)	(0.0888)
	-men	-0.0423***	-0.0468***	-0.0510***	-0.231**	-0.262***	-0.292***
		(0.0163)	(0.0162)	(0.0162)	(0.0943)	(0.0935)	(0.0933)
Years of EC in total	- women	0.00335***	0.00262***	0.00310***	0.0236***	0.0193***	0.0223***
		(0.000464)	(0.000464)	(0.000464)	(0.00265)	(0.00264)	(0.00263)
	- men	0.00466***	0.00408***	0.00458***	0.0279***	0.0246***	0.0277***
		(0.000493)	(0.000490)	(0.000490)	(0.00279)	(0.00278)	(0.00277)
				LEFT W	ING		
EC in impressinable year	- women	0.0246	0.0303	0.0319*	0.131	0.149+	0.143*
		(0.0193)	(0.0193)	(0.0193)	(0.0816)	(0.0813)	(0.0813)
	-men	-0.0331*	-0.0374*	-0.0394**	-0.179**	-0.193**	-0.191**
		(0.0200)	(0.0199)	(0.0200)	(0.0885)	(0.0883)	(0.0884)
Years of EC in total	- women	0.00382***	0.00332***	0.00341***	0.0167***	0.0146***	0.0143**
		(0.000572)	(0.000573)	(0.000575)	(0.00246)	(0.00246)	(0.00247
	- men	0.00468***	0.00423***	0.00434***	0.0232***	0.0214***	0.0213**
		(0.000588)	(0.000588)	(0.000589)	(0.00262)	(0.00262)	(0.00263
				EQUALITY OVER	FREEDOM *		
EC in impressinable year	- women	0.279**	0.258**	0.258**	0.538**	0.489**	0.489**
		(0.120)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.216)	(0.222)	(0.222)
	-men	-0.163	-0.157	-0.157	-0.382	-0.376	-0.376
		(0.160)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.301)	(0.302)	(0.302)
Years of EC in total	- women	0.00779**	0.00825**	0.00825**	0.0189**	0.0203***	0.0203**
		(0.00392)	(0.00397)	(0.00397)	(0.00746)	(0.00755)	(0.00755
	- men	0.00949**	0.0100**	0.0100**	0.0231***	0.0246***	0.0246***
		(0.00399)	(0.00404)	(0.00404)	(0.00757)	(0.00768)	(0.00768)

Familiarism: gender differences (*BACK)

Table D2. Gender heterogeneity exposure to communism (EC) effects for familiaristic attitudes.

				Extensiv	e Margin					Intensi	ve Margin		
			GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR	t
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
								RDS CARE					
C in IY	-women	0.0482***	0.0494***	0.0499***	0.0438***	0.0447***	0.0428***	0.111***	0.114***	0.114***	0.113***	0.116***	0.112***
		(0.0101)	(0.0100)	(0.00934)	(0.00692)	(0.00674)	(0.00668)	(0.0213)	(0.0210)	(0.0204)	(0.0208)	(0.0204)	(0.0209)
	-men	0.0402***	0.0414***	0.0389***	0.0265*	0.0277**	0.0251*	0.103***	0.106***	0.0995***	0.0602**	0.0639**	0.0615**
		(0.0129)	(0.0128)	(0.0122)	(0.0118)	(0.0116)	(0.0114)	(0.0267)	(0.0263)	(0.0244)	(0.0207)	(0.0205)	(0.0210)
ears of EC in total	- women	0.00198**	0.00219**	0.00147**	-0.00200***	-0.00174***	-0.00175***	0.00372*	0.00417**	0.00273	-0.00378**	-0.00297**	-0.00209
		(0.000778)	(0.000746)	(0.000629)	(0.000489)	(0.000499)	(0.000534)	(0.00174)	(0.00170)	(0.00153)	(0.00118)	(0.00117)	(0.00116)
	- men	0.000496	0.000689	0.00147**	-0.00194**	-0.00173**	-0.00162**	0.000252	0.000669	0.00225	-0.00246	-0.00181	-0.00233
		(0.000596)	(0.000564)	(0.000649)	(0.000663)	(0.000655)	(0.000641)	(0.00151)	(0.00145)	(0.00159)	(0.00144)	(0.00137)	(0.00140
								ARDS CARE					
C in IY	-women	0.0108	0.0107	0.0102	0.0396***	0.0394***	0.0353***	0.0144	0.0137	0.0126	0.0848***	0.0844***	0.0754**
		(0.0152)	(0.0150)	(0.0140)	(0.00956)	(0.00941)	(0.0101)	(0.0371)	(0.0367)	(0.0353)	(0.0246)	(0.0240)	(0.0257)
	-men	0.00414	0.00402	-0.000519	0.0501***	0.0502***	0.0426***	0.0291	0.0285	0.0192	0.107**	0.107***	0.0905**
		(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.0117)	(0.0147)	(0.0144)	(0.0120)	(0.0252)	(0.0252)	(0.0235)	(0.0352)	(0.0344)	(0.0296)
ears of EC in total	- women	-0.000476	-0.000521	-0.00118	-0.00174***	-0.00169***	-0.00239***	-0.00253	-0.00267	-0.00402**	-0.00512***	-0.00501***	-0.00636*
		(0.000649)	(0.000671)	(0.000657)	(0.000511)	(0.000544)	(0.000554)	(0.00148)	(0.00151)	(0.00150)	(0.00111)	(0.00119)	(0.00109
	- men	-0.00178**	-0.00182**	-0.00112*	-0.00370***	-0.00368***	-0.00263***	-0.00610***	-0.00624***	-0.00483***	-0.00925***	-0.00920***	-0.00700*
		(0.000553)	(0.000572)	(0.000570)	(0.000482)	(0.000525)	(0.000476)	(0.00114)	(0.00118)	(0.00119)	(0.000896)	(0.000983)	(0.000784
								DS MONEY					
C in IY	-women	0.0282***	0.0303***	0.0308***	0.0267**	0.0278***	0.0276***	0.0740***	0.0782***	0.0789***	0.0926**	0.0984**	0.0973**
		(0.00685)	(0.00664)	(0.00688)	(0.00835)	(0.00842)	(0.00830)	(0.0191)	(0.0188)	(0.0205)	(0.0342)	(0.0336)	(0.0336)
	-men	0.0259	0.0279	0.0271*	0.00375	0.00489	0.00353	0.0763+	0.0804*	0.0786*	0.00756	0.0141	0.0106
		(0.0158)	(0.0156)	(0.0146)	(0.00489)	(0.00482)	(0.00478)	(0.0380)	(0.0373)	(0.0351)	(0.0290)	(0.0295)	(0.0301)
ears of EC in total	- women	0.000993	0.00133*	0.000713	-0.00242***	-0.00218***	-0.00230***	0.00291	0.00362**	0.00234	-0.00866**	-0.00723**	-0.00713
		(0.000721)	(0.000694)	(0.000585)	(0.000581)	(0.000555)	(0.000525)	(0.00161)	(0.00155)	(0.00136)	(0.00315)	(0.00301)	(0.00280
	- men	-0.000357	-2.89e-05	0.000652	-0.00194**	-0.00172**	-0.00162**	8.13e-05	0.000766	0.00211	-0.00628+	-0.00504*	-0.00511
		(0.000638)	(0.000620)	(0.000708)	(0.000614)	(0.000576)	(0.000614)	(0.00164)	(0.00158)	(0.00175)	(0.00291)	(0.00273)	(0.00298
								ARDS MONEY					
C in IY	-women	0.0218	0.0228	0.0218	0.0169**	0.0176**	0.0172**	0.0397	0.0415	0.0398	0.0778***	0.0817***	0.0797**
		(0.0176)	(0.0176)	(0.0176)	(0.00626)	(0.00634)	(0.00632)	(0.0409)	(0.0406)	(0.0404)	(0.0201)	(0.0190)	(0.0194
	-men	0.0169	0.0177	0.0126	0.00388	0.00462	0.00312	0.0428	0.0442	0.0342	0.00528	0.0101	0.00521
		(0.0188)	(0.0188)	(0.0181)	(0.00521)	(0.00516)	(0.00502)	(0.0332)	(0.0332)	(0.0317)	(0.0201)	(0.0206)	(0.0186

Familiarism cocerning care: cohort differences BACK



Table D5a. Cohort heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) for familiarism (support with care).

				Extensiv	e Margin					Intens	ve Margin		
			GENERAL		•	PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
							UPWAI	RDS CARE					
C in IY	- 1970-79	0.00629	0.00702	0.00720	5.48e-05	0.000909	-5.82e-06	0.0271	0.0288	0.0289	-0.0139	-0.0111	-0.0130
		(0.00958)	(0.00958)	(0.00954)	(0.00673)	(0.00663)	(0.00675)	(0.0199)	(0.0196)	(0.0194)	(0.0242)	(0.0243)	(0.0240)
	- 1960-69	0.0336	0.0301	0.0316	0.0186	0.0118	0.00913	0.0379	0.0313	0.0337	0.0660	0.0452	0.0385
		(0.0357)	(0.0358)	(0.0353)	(0.0538)	(0.0548)	(0.0575)	(0.0756)	(0.0751)	(0.0737)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.110)
	- 1950-59	0.0727	0.0744	0.0749	0.0429	0.0382	0.0303	0.196**	0.201**	0.199**	0.202**	0.189*	0.175+
		(0.0520)	(0.0519)	(0.0516)	(0.0484)	(0.0496)	(0.0489)	(0.0836)	(0.0829)	(0.0840)	(0.0828)	(0.0882)	(0.0921)
	- 1940-49	0.157**	0.158**	0.153**	-0.0192	-0.0224	-0.0268	0.231**	0.234**	0.216*	0.0336	0.0245	0.0190
		(0.0661)	(0.0679)	(0.0660)	(0.0395)	(0.0392)	(0.0402)	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.135)
	- 1930-39	0.172***	0.177***	0.170***	0.0286	0.0305	0.0323	0.323***	0.336***	0.317***	0.118	0.126	0.142
		(0.0253)	(0.0247)	(0.0240)	(0.0470)	(0.0461)	(0.0461)	(0.0583)	(0.0572)	(0.0572)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.118)
	- 1910-29	0.217*	0.227**	0.222**	-0.0665*	-0.0470	-0.0398	0.408	0.430	0.413	-0.168	-0.105	-0.0994
		(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.0982)	(0.0342)	(0.0287)	(0.0264)	(0.250)	(0.243)	(0.236)	(0.209)	(0.195)	(0.201)
							DOWNW	ARDS CARE					
C in IY	- 1970-79	-0.00382	-0.00427	-0.00579	-0.00266	-0.00256	-0.00355	-0.0346	-0.0356	-0.0390	-0.0154	-0.0154	-0.0183
		(0.0145)	(0.0145)	(0.0149)	(0.00901)	(0.00890)	(0.00892)	(0.0250)	(0.0254)	(0.0264)	(0.0178)	(0.0174)	(0.0174)
	- 1960-69	0.0212	0.0228	0.0232	0.0480	0.0462	0.0370	0.103	0.108	0.111	0.125	0.121	0.100
		(0.0264)	(0.0270)	(0.0251)	(0.0457)	(0.0467)	(0.0482)	(0.0883)	(0.0883)	(0.0823)	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.107)
	- 1950-59	0.0754	0.0753	0.0688	0.0613	0.0587	0.0484	0.373**	0.373**	0.359**	0.188**	0.182**	0.161**
		(0.0684)	(0.0686)	(0.0684)	(0.0359)	(0.0360)	(0.0304)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.0625)	(0.0624)	(0.0529)
	- 1940-49	0.0930	0.0940	0.0968	0.0174	0.0145	0.0185	0.196	0.198	0.203	0.0889	0.0835	0.100
		(0.0970)	(0.0971)	(0.0971)	(0.0381)	(0.0381)	(0.0435)	(0.277)	(0.278)	(0.282)	(0.0990)	(0.0976)	(0.118)
	- 1930-39	0.0871	0.0873	0.0907	-0.0309	-0.0336	-0.0204	0.134	0.134	0.139	-0.0238	-0.0282	0.0143
		(0.0730)	(0.0736)	(0.0711)	(0.0616)	(0.0610)	(0.0607)	(0.196)	(0.198)	(0.195)	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.138)
	- 1910-29	0.127	0.124	0.138	-0.0959	-0.0942	-0.0573	0.277	0.269	0.295	-0.282**	-0.277**	-0.188
		(0.0800)	(0.0818)	(0.0768)	(0.0673)	(0.0721)	(0.0961)	(0.263)	(0.267)	(0.259)	(0.0996)	(0.109)	(0.174)

Familiarism concerning money: cohort differences (BACK)

Table D5b. Cohort heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) for familiarism (support with money).

				Extensi	ve Margin					Intens	ive Margin		
			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		•	GENERAL			PARTICULAR	ł.
	_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	_						UPWARD:	MONEY					
EC in IY	- 1970-79	-0.000942	0.000746	0.00206	-0.00956	-0.00859	-0.00929	0.00198	0.00556	0.00817	-0.0756**	-0.0699**	-0.0728**
		(0.0109)	(0.0111)	(0.0110)	(0.00769)	(0.00746)	(0.00761)	(0.0211)	(0.0214)	(0.0210)	(0.0256)	(0.0245)	(0.0249)
	- 1960-69	-0.00295	-0.0105	-0.00721	0.0279	0.0224	0.0217	-0.00999	-0.0261	-0.0173	0.0996	0.0632	0.0613
		(0.0326)	(0.0323)	(0.0305)	(0.0264)	(0.0264)	(0.0263)	(0.0653)	(0.0646)	(0.0634)	(0.102)	(0.0989)	(0.0974)
	- 1950-59	0.120**	0.122**	0.129**	0.0958***	0.0937***	0.0913***	0.257**	0.261**	0.273**	0.407***	0.388**	0.381**
		(0.0443)	(0.0443)	(0.0437)	(0.0237)	(0.0252)	(0.0250)	(0.0961)	(0.0956)	(0.0947)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.123)
	- 1940-49	0.00295	0.00585	-0.00197	0.00249	0.00318	0.00543	0.102	0.106	0.0798	0.118	0.113	0.128
		(0.0474)	(0.0478)	(0.0477)	(0.0508)	(0.0505)	(0.0504)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.216)	(0.212)	(0.212)
	- 1930-39	0.0246	0.0342	0.0226	0.000620	0.00614	0.00950	0.108	0.127	0.0916	0.0225	0.0462	0.0700
		(0.0386)	(0.0366)	(0.0357)	(0.0488)	(0.0480)	(0.0486)	(0.0757)	(0.0732)	(0.0695)	(0.197)	(0.190)	(0.192)
	- 1910-29	0.0514	0.0696	0.0571	-0.0331	-0.0140	-0.00497	0.212*	0.249**	0.212*	-0.256	-0.145	-0.114
		(0.0637)	(0.0591)	(0.0595)	(0.0493)	(0.0464)	(0.0426)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.284)	(0.260)	(0.249)
							DOWNWAR	DS MONEY					
EC in IY	- 1970-79	-0.0225*	-0.0222*	-0.0226*	-0.00775	-0.00706	-0.00744	-0.0397	-0.0392	-0.0402	-0.0450*	-0.0402*	-0.0426*
		(0.0108)	(0.0107)	(0.0109)	(0.00461)	(0.00436)	(0.00448)	(0.0259)	(0.0256)	(0.0265)	(0.0206)	(0.0202)	(0.0196)
	- 1960-69	0.0337	0.0327	0.0323	-0.00600	-0.00964	-0.0104	0.0910	0.0896	0.0888	0.0174	-0.0125	-0.0153
		(0.0533)	(0.0530)	(0.0538)	(0.0160)	(0.0158)	(0.0159)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.0859)	(0.0829)	(0.0818)
	- 1950-59	0.0440	0.0462	0.0420	0.0871***	0.0856***	0.0830***	0.193	0.198	0.186	0.315***	0.297**	0.285**
		(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.0225)	(0.0240)	(0.0239)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.194)	(0.0964)	(0.0948)	(0.0974)
	- 1940-49	-0.0442	-0.0409	-0.0422	-0.0181	-0.0172	-0.0185	-0.0522	-0.0453	-0.0492	0.0551	0.0477	0.0511
		(0.0913)	(0.0912)	(0.0929)	(0.0463)	(0.0456)	(0.0456)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.227)	(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.200)
	- 1930-39	0.0205	0.0257	0.0218	-0.0182	-0.0141	-0.0149	0.0357	0.0457	0.0371	-0.0869	-0.0707	-0.0591
		(0.0898)	(0.0893)	(0.0865)	(0.0598)	(0.0587)	(0.0590)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.168)	(0.200)	(0.195)	(0.195)
	- 1910-29	0.0719	0.0790	0.0853	-0.0460	-0.0320	-0.0259	0.177	0.190	0.205	-0.348	-0.255	-0.227
		(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.115)	(0.0293)	(0.0294)	(0.0280)	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.245)	(0.218)	(0.195)	(0.190)

Social preferences: country differences BACK

		Extensive Margi	n	I	ntensive Margi	n
_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
_		•	INCOME EQ	UALITY	•	
EC in impressionable year - Russia	0.00129	0.0111	0.0176	0.00672	0.0585	0.0931
	(0.0309)	(0.0309)	(0.0309)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.191)
- Germany	-0.0440	-0.0519	-0.0465	-0.0634	-0.113	-0.0828
	(0.0419)	(0.0419)	(0.0418)	(0.234)	(0.233)	(0.232)
- Poland	-0.00902	-0.0170	-0.0260	0.105	0.0530	-0.000566
	(0.0453)	(0.0451)	(0.0450)	(0.272)	(0.271)	(0.272)
- uprisings	0.0692*	0.0723*	0.0479	0.314	0.333	0.185
	(0.0382)	(0.0379)	(0.0377)	(0.224)	(0.222)	(0.221)
- former USSR	0.0493	0.0347	0.0184	0.216	0.127	0.0224
	(0.0337)	(0.0336)	(0.0336)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.203)
- Baltic countries	-0.0416	-0.0156	0.000125	-0.101	0.0445	0.129
_	(0.0371)	(0.0368)	(0.0368)	(0.210)	(0.208)	(0.207)
			LEFT W	ING		
EC in impressionable year - Russia	0.0184	0.0175	0.0199	0.0103	0.0139	0.0146
	(0.0457)	(0.0457)	(0.0456)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)
- Germany	0.0675	0.0650	0.0648	0.342*	0.331*	0.338*
	(0.0455)	(0.0454)	(0.0454)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.193)
- Poland	-0.0331	-0.0382	-0.0406	0.249	0.227	0.243
	(0.0551)	(0.0551)	(0.0552)	(0.246)	(0.245)	(0.245)
- uprisings	0.0521	0.0551	0.0510	0.212	0.224	0.236
	(0.0458)	(0.0455)	(0.0455)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.193)
- former USSR	0.0463	0.0384	0.0350	0.414**	0.379**	0.392**
	(0.0420)	(0.0418)	(0.0418)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.193)
- Baltic countries	-0.0284	-0.00749	-0.00492	0.0287	0.124	0.122
_	(0.0462)	(0.0460)	(0.0460)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.193)
			EQUALITY OVER			
EC in impressionable year - Russia	-0.413***	-0.391***	-0.401***	-0.733***	-0.666***	-0.688***
	(0.0926)	(0.0966)	(0.0948)	(0.176)	(0.182)	(0.178)
- uprising	-0.169	-0.159	-0.160	-0.334	-0.309	-0.312
	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.218)	(0.222)	(0.224)
				4 0 1	4 (58) 4	= 6 4 =

Familiarism concerning care: country differences BACK



Table D11a. Country heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) for familiarism (support with care).

				Extensiv	e Margin					Intens	ive Margin		
			GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
							UPWA	RDS CARE					
EC in IY	- Russia	-0.00921**	-0.00750*	-0.00694	-0.00126	0.00112	0.00735*	-0.0293	-0.0258	-0.0231	0.0231	0.0305	0.0378+
		(0.00369)	(0.00378)	(0.00439)	(0.00403)	(0.00405)	(0.00382)	(0.0229)	(0.0233)	(0.0243)	(0.0172)	(0.0171)	(0.0199)
-	Germany	-0.0824***	-0.0763***	-0.0803***	0.00356	0.0105	0.0117	-0.115*	-0.102	-0.110+	-0.00264	0.0207	0.0307*
		(0.0101)	(0.00998)	(0.00961)	(0.0164)	(0.0173)	(0.0181)	(0.0594)	(0.0578)	(0.0575)	(0.0152)	(0.0128)	(0.0157)
	- Poland	0.00293	0.00581	0.00816	0.00722	0.0109	0.00963	-0.00517	0.000557	0.00351	-0.0370	-0.0255	-0.0255
		(0.0148)	(0.0152)	(0.0147)	(0.00806)	(0.00785)	(0.00792)	(0.0189)	(0.0193)	(0.0179)	(0.0212)	(0.0204)	(0.0194)
	- uprising	-0.0432	-0.0414	-0.0423	0.0127	0.0152	0.0184	-0.0892	-0.0858	-0.0887	-0.00911	-0.00182	0.0123
		(0.0266)	(0.0264)	(0.0247)	(0.0123)	(0.0130)	(0.0134)	(0.0546)	(0.0538)	(0.0506)	(0.0196)	(0.0219)	(0.0253)
- fort	mer USSR	0.0370***	0.0395***	0.0381***	0.0262***	0.0299***	0.0275***	0.0907***	0.0951***	0.0891***	0.00505	0.0162	0.0184
		(0.00533)	(0.00545)	(0.00489)	(0.00451)	(0.00501)	(0.00635)	(0.0238)	(0.0236)	(0.0239)	(0.0228)	(0.0231)	(0.0306)
	- Baltic	0.0341*	0.0346*	0.0350*	-0.0577***	-0.0574***	-0.0568***	0.0555	0.0565	0.0578	-0.0814**	-0.0804***	-0.0859***
		(0.0176)	(0.0173)	(0.0175)	(0.00908)	(0.00822)	(0.00806)	(0.0464)	(0.0456)	(0.0455)	(0.0255)	(0.0228)	(0.0254)
							DOWNW	ARDS CARE					
EC in IY	- Russia	-0.0729**	-0.0736**	-0.0682**	-0.0337**	-0.0331**	-0.0232*	-0.169**	-0.171**	-0.159**	-0.0444	-0.0431	-0.0218
		(0.0235)	(0.0236)	(0.0227)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.0121)	(0.0552)	(0.0551)	(0.0540)	(0.0381)	(0.0380)	(0.0385)
-	Germany	0.0159	0.0136	0.0125	-0.00824	-0.00628	-0.00487	-0.00863	-0.0155	-0.0193	-0.0378*	-0.0332	-0.0267
		(0.0211)	(0.0209)	(0.0196)	(0.0108)	(0.0120)	(0.0145)	(0.0653)	(0.0646)	(0.0610)	(0.0200)	(0.0250)	(0.0321)
	- Poland	0.0239	0.0229	0.0195	0.00183	0.00267	0.00440	0.0741**	0.0711**	0.0630+	0.0257	0.0278	0.0337
		(0.0136)	(0.0138)	(0.0129)	(0.0130)	(0.0134)	(0.0149)	(0.0309)	(0.0310)	(0.0308)	(0.0238)	(0.0254)	(0.0294)
-	- uprising	-0.0604*	-0.0606*	-0.0645**	-0.00109	-0.000100	0.00919	-0.170*	-0.171*	-0.180*	-0.0950**	-0.0926**	-0.0676
		(0.0280)	(0.0280)	(0.0275)	(0.0129)	(0.0133)	(0.0159)	(0.0893)	(0.0894)	(0.0881)	(0.0335)	(0.0351)	(0.0417)
- fort	mer USSR	0.0456	0.0453	0.0423	0.0181*	0.0189*	0.0205	0.138**	0.136**	0.127**	-0.00240	-0.000191	0.00846
		(0.0259)	(0.0259)	(0.0244)	(0.0101)	(0.0103)	(0.0135)	(0.0455)	(0.0451)	(0.0410)	(0.0177)	(0.0193)	(0.0293)
	- Baltic	-0.0746*	-0.0747*	-0.0699*	-0.0345**	-0.0346**	-0.0366**	-0.182**	-0.182**	-0.171**	-0.0948***	-0.0949***	-0.102***
		(0.0359)	(0.0363)	(0.0350)	(0.0133)	(0.0131)	(0.0129)	(0.0766)	(0.0773)	(0.0748)	(0.0295)	(0.0294)	(0.0309)

Familiarism concerning money: country differences BACK



Table D11b. Country heterogeneity in the effects of exposure to communism (EC) in impressionable years (IY) for familiarism (support with money).

			· ·	Extensi	e Margin			· ·	· ·	Intensi	ve Margin		
			GENERAL			PARTICULAR		•	GENERAL			PARTICULAR	t .
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	-						UPWARD:	SMONEY					
EC in IY	- Russia	-0.0323	-0.0298	-0.0329	0.00386	0.00579	0.00827	-0.0630	-0.0575	-0.0630	0.0676	0.0798*	0.0869**
		(0.0235)	(0.0232)	(0.0237)	(0.00996)	(0.0101)	(0.00981)	(0.0436)	(0.0430)	(0.0437)	(0.0377)	(0.0375)	(0.0365)
	- Germany	-0.0281*	-0.0181	-0.0225	-0.0421**	-0.0375**	-0.0401**	-0.0950	-0.0736	-0.0870	0.350***	0.382***	0.380***
		(0.0135)	(0.0132)	(0.0127)	(0.0143)	(0.0151)	(0.0161)	(0.0550)	(0.0531)	(0.0543)	(0.0640)	(0.0652)	(0.0675)
	- Poland	-0.0176	-0.0133	-0.00914	0.00282	0.00596	0.00451	-0.0168	-0.00743	-0.000324	-0.00456	0.0147	0.0108
		(0.0162)	(0.0167)	(0.0169)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)	(0.0176)	(0.0178)	(0.0162)	(0.0432)	(0.0423)	(0.0400)
	- uprising	-0.0709***	-0.0685**	-0.0707***	-0.00543	-0.00368	-0.00324	-0.130*	-0.124*	-0.132**	0.0439	0.0555	0.0616
		(0.0218)	(0.0214)	(0.0195)	(0.00771)	(0.00795)	(0.00842)	(0.0614)	(0.0605)	(0.0564)	(0.0427)	(0.0406)	(0.0401)
- fo	rmer USSR	0.0173	0.0210+	0.0175	-0.0137	-0.0108	-0.0105	0.0777***	0.0856***	0.0740***	-0.106**	-0.0878*	-0.0838*
		(0.00951)	(0.00996)	(0.0111)	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.0130)	(0.0224)	(0.0224)	(0.0223)	(0.0460)	(0.0445)	(0.0425)
	- Baltic	-0.00891	-0.00811	-0.0103	-0.000134	0.000362	0.00199	-0.0270	-0.0255	-0.0288	0.0134	0.0158	0.0176
		(0.0169)	(0.0161)	(0.0163)	(0.0216)	(0.0207)	(0.0203)	(0.0360)	(0.0343)	(0.0340)	(0.0697)	(0.0645)	(0.0647)
							DOWNWAR	DS MONEY					
EC in IY	- Russia	-0.0445***	-0.0438***	-0.0386***	0.00778	0.00908	0.0111	-0.102**	-0.101**	-0.0900**	0.0492	0.0594	0.0677
		(0.00861)	(0.00889)	(0.00942)	(0.0170)	(0.0171)	(0.0168)	(0.0378)	(0.0383)	(0.0384)	(0.0406)	(0.0415)	(0.0411)
	- Germany	-0.0445**	-0.0408**	-0.0394**	-0.0230	-0.0198	-0.0225	-0.154***	-0.148***	-0.148***	0.575***	0.604***	0.599***
		(0.0163)	(0.0150)	(0.0143)	(0.0230)	(0.0237)	(0.0243)	(0.0377)	(0.0355)	(0.0332)	(0.0269)	(0.0276)	(0.0306)
	- Poland	0.0375**	0.0389**	0.0395**	-0.00813	-0.00566	-0.00690	0.0550*	0.0576*	0.0561*	-0.0300	-0.0126	-0.0183
		(0.0145)	(0.0139)	(0.0142)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)	(0.0136)	(0.0282)	(0.0271)	(0.0282)	(0.0323)	(0.0319)	(0.0300)
	- uprising	-0.00494	-0.00458	-0.00659	0.00227	0.00370	0.00251	-0.0379	-0.0372	-0.0450	0.0664	0.0770	0.0772*
		(0.0342)	(0.0340)	(0.0347)	(0.8800.0)	(0.00898)	(0.00886)	(0.0367)	(0.0360)	(0.0382)	(0.0442)	(0.0429)	(0.0418)
- fo	rmer USSR	0.0640***	0.0654***	0.0599***	-0.0146	-0.0125	-0.0132	0.130***	0.133***	0.120***	-0.0657	-0.0504	-0.0503
		(0.0126)	(0.0119)	(0.0128)	(0.0146)	(0.0146)	(0.0143)	(0.0252)	(0.0244)	(0.0269)	(0.0372)	(0.0364)	(0.0342)
	- Baltic	-0.118**	-0.118**	-0.115**	0.00615	0.00655	0.00809	-0.264***	-0.263***	-0.255***	0.0538	0.0555	0.0596
		(0.0403)	(0.0401)	(0.0385)	(0.0280)	(0.0273)	(0.0269)	(0.0801)	(0.0798)	(0.0778)	(0.0695)	(0.0652)	(0.0651)

Social preferences: regional differences (BACK)

		I	Extensive Margin	ı	Ir	itensive Margii	1
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
				INCOME EQ	UALITY		
C in impressinable year	- urban	0.0104	-0.00893	-0.00688	0.200	0.0864	0.101
		(0.0320)	(0.0319)	(0.0318)	(0.195)	(0.194)	(0.193)
	- rural	0.0481**	0.0330	0.0340	0.444***	0.356**	0.362**
		(0.0240)	(0.0239)	(0.0239)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.147)
fears of EC in total	- urban	0.00384***	0.00406***	0.00335***	0.0266***	0.0279***	0.0236***
		(0.000834)	(0.000830)	(0.000829)	(0.00509)	(0.00506)	(0.00505)
	- rural	0.00145**	0.00198***	0.00177***	0.0121***	0.0153***	0.0141***
		(0.000634)	(0.000633)	(0.000633)	(0.00389)	(0.00389)	(0.00389)
				LEFT W	ING		
C in impressinable year	- urban	0.0378	0.0303	0.0300	0.200	0.172	0.177
		(0.0438)	(0.0437)	(0.0437)	(0.195)	(0.194)	(0.194)
	- rural	0.0357	0.0322	0.0322	0.217	0.209	0.213
		(0.0341)	(0.0340)	(0.0340)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)
lears of EC in total	- urban	0.000776	0.000960	0.000844	0.00190	0.00297	0.00340
		(0.00114)	(0.00114)	(0.00114)	(0.00511)	(0.00510)	(0.00511)
	- rural	0.000839	0.00123	0.00120	0.00113	0.00293	0.00307
		(0.000890)	(0.000890)	(0.000890)	(0.00393)	(0.00393)	(0.00393)
				EQUALITY OVER	FREEDOM *		
C in impressinable year	- urban	0.0647	0.0521	0.0462	0.0104	-0.00850	-0.0214
		(0.203)	(0.201)	(0.200)	(0.388)	(0.385)	(0.384)
	- rural	-0.231**	-0.217**	-0.219**	-0.470**	-0.439**	-0.444**
		(0.0999)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.184)	(0.186)	(0.188)

Familiarism: regional differences •BACK

Table D8. Region heterogeneity exposure to communism (EC) effects for familiaristic attitudes.

				Extensiv	e Margin					Intensi	ve Margin		
			GENERAL			PARTICULAR			GENERAL			PARTICULAR	t
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
								RDS CARE					
C in IY	- urban	0.0851***	0.0857***	0.0866***	0.0187	0.0186	0.0164	0.192***	0.193***	0.194***	0.0319	0.0314	0.0171
		(0.0120)	(0.0121)	(0.0120)	(0.0140)	(0.0145)	(0.0133)	(0.0228)	(0.0226)	(0.0227)	(0.0374)	(0.0391)	(0.0358)
	- rural	0.0569***	0.0571***	0.0571***	0.0405***	0.0399***	0.0393***	0.144***	0.145***	0.144***	0.0992***	0.0975***	0.0940***
		(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0140)	(0.0113)	(0.0113)	(0.0112)	(0.0341)	(0.0339)	(0.0332)	(0.0263)	(0.0263)	(0.0262)
ears of EC in total	- urban	0.000427	0.000704	0.000627	-0.000688	-0.000336	-0.000287	0.000227	0.000817	0.000646	-0.000128	0.000966	0.00180
		(0.000760)	(0.000722)	(0.000704)	(0.000570)	(0.000584)	(0.000558)	(0.00177)	(0.00170)	(0.00164)	(0.00143)	(0.00142)	(0.00127)
	- rural	0.00101	0.00122	0.00115	-0.00239***	-0.00212**	-0.00207**	0.00123	0.00167	0.00155	-0.00423**	-0.00339*	-0.00312+
		(0.000781)	(0.000738)	(0.000737)	(0.000677)	(0.000674)	(0.000681)	(0.00191)	(0.00185)	(0.00186)	(0.00156)	(0.00151)	(0.00148)
							DOWNW	ARDS CARE					
C in IY	- urban	0.0654***	0.0656***	0.0695***	0.0490**	0.0488**	0.0463**	0.157**	0.157**	0.165**	0.0829*	0.0826*	0.0744*
		(0.0198)	(0.0197)	(0.0198)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0180)	(0.0508)	(0.0505)	(0.0511)	(0.0378)	(0.0378)	(0.0411)
	- rural	0.0418**	0.0420**	0.0438**	0.0309**	0.0305**	0.0291**	0.112**	0.112**	0.116**	0.0663**	0.0656**	0.0625**
		(0.0170)	(0.0170)	(0.0164)	(0.0124)	(0.0125)	(0.0124)	(0.0446)	(0.0446)	(0.0435)	(0.0245)	(0.0248)	(0.0248)
ears of EC in total	- urban	-0.00254**	-0.00263**	-0.00298***	-0.00263***	-0.00259***	-0.00256***	-0.00755***	-0.00780***	-0.00856***	-0.00653***	-0.00643***	-0.00616***
		(0.000827)	(0.000845)	(0.000811)	(0.000505)	(0.000492)	(0.000522)	(0.00189)	(0.00191)	(0.00189)	(0.00103)	(0.000974)	(0.00109)
	- rural	-0.00228***	-0.00234***	-0.00242***	-0.00251***	-0.00247***	-0.00247***	-0.00725***	-0.00744***	-0.00761***	-0.00674***	-0.00666***	-0.00662***
		(0.000677)	(0.000696)	(0.000697)	(0.000602)	(0.000639)	(0.000634)	(0.00150)	(0.00154)	(0.00152)	(0.00107)	(0.00114)	(0.00113)
							UPWAR	DS MONEY					
C in IY	- urban	0.0627***	0.0633***	0.0621***	0.00466	0.00451	0.00616	0.158***	0.159***	0.157***	0.0111	0.00971	0.00990
		(0.0103)	(0.00968)	(0.0103)	(0.0147)	(0.0143)	(0.0143)	(0.0195)	(0.0186)	(0.0188)	(0.0487)	(0.0464)	(0.0465)
	- rural	0.0323*	0.0326*	0.0313+	0.0181*	0.0177*	0.0187**	0.0959**	0.0962**	0.0933**	0.0567*	0.0537	0.0556*
		(0.0148)	(0.0145)	(0.0147)	(0.00804)	(0.00797)	(0.00784)	(0.0370)	(0.0362)	(0.0365)	(0.0301)	(0.0296)	(0.0293)
ears of EC in total	- urban	-0.000878	-0.000409	-0.000318	-0.00171*	-0.00137	-0.00150*	-0.000675	0.000322	0.000403	-0.00523	-0.00323	-0.00327
		(0.000498)	(0.000507)	(0.000552)	(0.000823)	(0.000781)	(0.000767)	(0.00118)	(0.00113)	(0.00118)	(0.00315)	(0.00291)	(0.00287)
	- rural	0.000272	0.000632	0.000579	-0.00243***	-0.00217***	-0.00219***	0.00105	0.00181	0.00167	-0.00880***	-0.00727**	-0.00724**
		(0.000625)	(0.000599)	(0.000621)	(0.000567)	(0.000537)	(0.000524)	(0.00151)	(0.00145)	(0.00150)	(0.00263)	(0.00242)	(0.00239)
								RDS MONEY					
C in IY	- urban	0.0591	0.0594	0.0615+	0.00278	0.00268	0.00403	0.138*	0.138*	0.145**	-0.00456	-0.00611	-0.00462
		(0.0331)	(0.0332)	(0.0326)	(0.00793)	(0.00762)	(0.00758)	(0.0660)	(0.0661)	(0.0655)	(0.0412)	(0.0388)	(0.0390)
	- rural	0.0509**	0.0513**	0.0513**	0.0153**	0.0150**	0.0154**	0.118**	0.119**	0.120**	0.0434	0.0402	0.0416
		(0.0227)	(0.0227)	(0.0220)	(0.00562)	(0.00562)	(0.00532)	(0.0523)	(0.0524)	(0.0512)	(0.0240)	(0.0236)	(0.0230)

Social preferences: historical differences BACK

		I	Extensive Margir	1	Ir	itensive Margii	n
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
				INCOME EQ	UALITY		•
EC in impressinable y	ear - Russian	0.0305	0.0281	0.0188	0.0883	0.0676	0.000615
		(0.0253)	(0.0252)	(0.0251)	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.151)
	- Prussian	-0.0282	-0.0341	-0.0317	-0.0310	-0.0668	-0.0542
		(0.0386)	(0.0386)	(0.0385)	(0.218)	(0.217)	(0.217)
	 Habsburg 	0.0662*	0.0711**	0.0466	0.299	0.330	0.181
		(0.0358)	(0.0356)	(0.0355)	(0.210)	(0.209)	(0.208)
Years of EC in total	- Russian	-0.00192**	-0.00160**	-0.000951	-0.00776	-0.00589	-0.00155
		(0.000813)	(0.000808)	(0.000810)	(0.00492)	(0.00489)	(0.00490)
	- Prussian	0.000729	0.00149	0.00150	0.00293	0.00741	0.00763
		(0.00117)	(0.00118)	(0.00117)	(0.00673)	(0.00672)	(0.00672)
	 Habsburg 	-0.00234**	-0.00186	-0.000862	-0.0104	-0.00780	-0.00182
	_	(0.00119)	(0.00118)	(0.00118)	(0.00710)	(0.00707)	(0.00705)
				LEFT W	ING		•
EC in impressinable y	ear - Russian	0.0577*	0.0569*	0.0547*	0.371***	0.371***	0.376***
		(0.0317)	(0.0315)	(0.0316)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.143)
	- Prussian	0.0786*	0.0779*	0.0773*	0.343*	0.340*	0.344*
		(0.0419)	(0.0419)	(0.0419)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.178)
	 Habsburg 	0.0674	0.0721*	0.0681	0.195	0.213	0.221
		(0.0430)	(0.0429)	(0.0429)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.180)
Years of EC in total	- Russian	-0.00293***	-0.00268***	-0.00255**	-0.0212***	-0.0201***	-0.0202***
		(0.000990)	(0.000986)	(0.000990)	(0.00474)	(0.00471)	(0.00473)
	- Prussian	-0.00182	-0.00136	-0.00134	-0.0163***	-0.0143**	-0.0143**
		(0.00129)	(0.00129)	(0.00129)	(0.00572)	(0.00570)	(0.00570)
	- Habsburg	0.000800	0.00115	0.00131	0.00166	0.00326	0.00284
	_	(0.00142)	(0.00142)	(0.00142)	(0.00623)	(0.00621)	(0.00623)

Social preferences: religious differences CBACK

		1	Extensive Margin	ı	Ir	tensive Margii	1
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
			•	INCOME EQ	UALITY		
EC in impressinable y	ear - orthodox	-0.0132	-0.0182	-0.0234*	-0.117	-0.151*	-0.189**
		(0.0139)	(0.0138)	(0.0138)	(0.0804)	(0.0797)	(0.0796)
	- catholic	0.00803	0.00553	-0.0125	0.130	0.115	0.00958
		(0.0282)	(0.0281)	(0.0281)	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.167)
	 protestant 	-0.0889**	-0.0980***	-0.0880**	-0.301	-0.356*	-0.296
		(0.0356)	(0.0357)	(0.0356)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.189)
Years of EC in total	- orthodox	0.00383***	0.00302***	0.00362***	0.0247***	0.0200***	0.0237***
		(0.000444)	(0.000443)	(0.000445)	(0.00251)	(0.00250)	(0.00251)
	- catholic	0.00357***	0.00237**	0.00345***	0.0142**	0.00711	0.0134**
		(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00614)	(0.00613)	(0.00612)
	- protestant	0.00604***	0.00568***	0.00570***	0.0323***	0.0304***	0.0304***
		(0.00101)	(0.00101)	(0.00101)	(0.00537)	(0.00536)	(0.00535)
			•	LEFT W	ING	•	
EC in impressinable ye	ear - orthodox	-0.0259	-0.0311*	-0.0330*	-0.0940	-0.111	-0.109
		(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0752)	(0.0749)	(0.0750)
	- catholic	-0.100***	-0.104***	-0.108***	-0.413***	-0.423***	-0.409***
		(0.0345)	(0.0346)	(0.0346)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.151)
	 protestant 	-0.000822	-0.00692	-0.00653	-0.107	-0.129	-0.125
		(0.0367)	(0.0367)	(0.0368)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Years of EC in total	- orthodox	0.00363***	0.00310***	0.00323***	0.0193***	0.0172***	0.0169***
		(0.000545)	(0.000545)	(0.000548)	(0.00241)	(0.00240)	(0.00242)
	- catholic	0.00556***	0.00473***	0.00494***	0.0246***	0.0211***	0.0205***
		(0.00127)	(0.00127)	(0.00127)	(0.00551)	(0.00551)	(0.00553)
	- protestant	0.00405***	0.00368+++	0.00370***	0.0184***	0.0169***	0.0167***
		(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00105)	(0.00423)	(0.00423)	(0.00422)