Foreseen Risks*

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Abstract

Large crises tend to follow rapid credit expansions. Causality, however, is far from obvious. We show how this pattern arises naturally when financial intermediaries optimally exploit economic rents that drive their franchise value. As this franchise value fluctuates over the business cycle, so too do the incentives to engage in risky lending. The model leads to novel insights on the effects of unconventional monetary policies in developed economies. We argue that bank lending might have responded less than expected to these interventions because they enhanced franchise value, inadvertently encouraging banks to pursue safer investments in low-risk government securities.

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1 Introduction

Motivated by the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and subsequent Great Recession several empirical studies find that major collapses in economic activity tend to occur in the aftermath of large credit expansions.\footnote{See Borio and Lowe (2002); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2011); Schularick and Taylor (2012); Mian and Sufi (2009); Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017); Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017).} This evidence led some economists to argue that credit booms are the primary cause of severe downturns. Specifically, studies argue that competitive pressures to lend, combined with perverse incentives or behavioral biases, are the underlying source for both uncontrolled credit expansions, and the subsequent downturns.\footnote{Work by Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978) already emphasizes the potential for overoptimism to destabilize the economy. Behavioral explanations include neglected risks (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2012) and extrapolative beliefs (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Greenwood and Hanson, 2013).}

In this paper, we propose an alternative explanation of the link between credit booms and economic crisis. We build a model in which the propensity of banks to engage in “riskier lending” over the cycle is a result of exogenous variation in macroeconomic conditions and their impact on the bank’s own franchise value. As a result, there is no concept of a credit cycle that “causes” the business cycle. Instead, in our model, bank credit co-moves with – and precedes – macro aggregates such as investment and output, even if these variables are, by design, fully independent of bank lending behavior.

Our model is motivated by a number of key facts related to banks’ behavior in the lead up to the 2007–2008 crisis. First and foremost is the rising pessimism about future house prices in the lead up to the crisis (Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Mian and Sufi, 2019) suggesting credit risks were perceived to be rising during this period. Thus, instead of suffering from irrational exuberance, our bank managers correctly forecast future economic growth and optimally respond to changes in the economic environment. Moreover, they make investment and financing decisions with the aim of maximizing shareholder value.\footnote{Our model requires that risks be foreseen by some but not all investors, bank executives, or bank employees. This is then consistent with evidence of Cheng, Raina, and Xiong (2014), Chernenko, Hanson, and Sunderam (2016) and Richter and Zimmermann (2019) that some within the banking sector might have been overoptimistic. The question to us is not why bank executives acted in a way that failed to avoid risk, but rather why informed equity holders did not curtail, and perhaps even encouraged, risky practices.}
The key assumption in our model is that banks benefit from economic rents, arising from a wedge between the expected return on assets and the cost of debt. Although this wedge is formalized as subsidized deposit insurance, alternative, and equally compelling, sources of rents could be imperfect competition in the banking sector or a limited regulatory oversight relative to other institutions that provide similar services. Our main result, however, is that regardless of their source, the economic value of these rents will fluctuate over time as local and aggregate economic conditions change and this will generally lead banks to accept more risks when franchise values are low.

Our description of the banking sector builds on Merton (1978). Specifically, we treat banks as entities with access to an exogenous supply of deposits, paying a deposit rate priced to reflect the presence of a government guarantee. To this basic structure, we add an investment decision: banks must decide in each period on the size and composition of their loan portfolio. They invest their assets in a mixture of risky loans to the private sector and safer floating-rate government notes.

Government guarantees on deposits provide banks with a source of economic rents. The discounted value of this stream of rents is effectively the bank’s franchise value and its fluctuations over the business cycle drive lending behavior. During expansions, the franchise value is generally large and banks protect it by avoiding excessive risks that may lead to early bankruptcy. Over time however, as aggregate risks eventually build, franchise values begin to fall while risk premia rise and the bank’s equity holders may find it preferable to exploit the additional reward from investing in risky assets.

Our model matches a number of key stylized facts about the behavior of US banks in the lead up to the 2007-08 crisis. Notably, shareholder payouts and leverage rise in anticipation of a crisis just as they did before 2008. Similarly market to book ratios begin to fall as the likelihood of a crisis increases, again just as was seen in 2007-08.

To study the links between bank lending and aggregate economic activity, we expand the

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4Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) document that deposit insurance premia are subsidized in the US. Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017) provide recent evidence for the lack of competition in the banking sector. A weak regulatory oversight may capture the shadow banking sector in the period before the crisis.
baseline model to include a corporate sector that makes investment decisions. We assume banks lend only to households, ensuring corporate behavior remains fully independent of bank lending. We then confront our quantitative implications with recent evidence on the relationship between bank lending and financial crises. In particular, we show our model replicates the patterns in Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2016) documenting that crises often follow periods of very fast credit growth, the finding of Baron and Xiong (2017) that fast lending growth predicts bank equity crashes, and the findings in Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017) on the strong predictability of future GDP growth by the growth in household debt. Notably, we also document that, in the data, this predictability holds only for countries and periods with deposit insurance, thus independently validating our model’s main mechanism.

Beyond these findings, our model also provides lessons for the evaluation of recent unconventional monetary policy interventions. After the 2008 crisis, policy makers in many advanced economies responded by providing the banking sector with additional guarantees on funding. The dominant policy rhetoric was that poor bank balance sheets lied behind the sharp reduction in credit. Although these interventions were designed to encourage private sector lending, banks instead preferred to invest heavily in government bonds or increase excess reserves in central banks. This behavior however is entirely consistent with our model, since these stabilization policies effectively worked as subsidies, reducing the cost of financing for banks, increasing their franchise values and reinforcing their incentives to hold safe assets.

Our work is related to several bodies of literature on banking, corporate finance and macroeconomics. Starting from the empirical evidence that the banking industry is both highly regulated and subject to limited entry, an early literature suggests that competition reduces banks’ franchise value and induces banks to assume more risk. Marcus (1984), Keeley (1990), and Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) use comparative statics to argue for a link between franchise value and a preference for risky investments, motivated by increases in competition in the banking industry.5 Like us, they build on the idea of risk shifting in

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5Boyd and De Nicoló (2005), however, presents an argument that less competition can lead banks to take on greater risk.
Jensen and Meckling (1976), originally formulated as a conflict between overall claimholders and equityholders in the context of corporations. The key difference in our work is that we argue franchise values will also fluctuate endogenously over time with local and aggregate economic conditions. This in turn induces important changes in bank lending behavior over the business cycle.

Our work also relates to more recent studies analyzing the specific impact of regulatory policies on bank balance sheets, lending, and franchise values. Some of these studies are mainly qualitative in nature (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007, 2008; Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Sarin and Summers, 2016). Others are similar to ours in that they explicitly model the bank’s maximization problem (Van den Heuvel, 2008; Kisin and Manela, 2016; Egan, Hortaçsu, and Matvos, 2017; Gourio, Kashyap, and Sim, 2018; Begnau and Landvoigt, 2018; Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2018) or work with quantitative accounting identities (Atkeson, d’Avernas, Eisfeldt, and Weill, 2018). While these papers focus on ex-ante optimal policy to deal with financial crises, our model offers a novel perspective on the unintended consequences of policy that might either promote or destroy oligopolistic rents in the financial sector.

Finally, and more broadly, this paper is also connected to the recent literature examining the causal links between credit market conditions and economic fluctuations. In particular, our paper relates to Santos and Veronesi (2016) and Gomes, Grotteria, and Wachter (2018) who show how endogenous co-movements between leverage and several macroeconomic aggregates are the natural outcome of standard models without requiring financial frictions or behavioral biases. This literature focuses on risk premia as driving asset prices and lending to rational agents based on risk-sharing motives or on investment opportunities. These papers cannot, however, explain the observed negative relation between household credit growth and future adverse economic outcomes.6

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the key patterns in US

6The distinction between growth in corporate lending and growth in household lending appears to be important in the data: growth in corporate lending does not predict adverse outcomes, and is even associated with positive economic conditions, at least in the short term. This suggests that growth in corporate lending is driven by investment opportunities, perhaps in a way that is associated with changes in risk.
bank behavior in the lead-up to the 2007-2008 crisis that motivate our approach. Section 3 presents the baseline theoretical framework used to study the optimal composition of bank lending in the presence of deposit insurance and time variation in economic rents. We augment the model with a corporate sector and its results are quantitatively assessed in Section 4. Section 5 then studies our key policy implications while Section 6 discusses novel empirical evidence in support of the role deposit insurance in financial crises. Section 7 concludes.

2 Motivation: Beliefs and US Bank Behavior Leading up to the 2007-2008 Crisis

Our theoretical approach is motivated by a number of patterns in the behavior of US banks in the lead up to the 2007–2008 crisis. In this section we survey some of the most important ones. This evidence complements the findings of Jordà et al. (2016) and Mian et al. (2017), which we discuss later and form the basis for our quantitative analysis. While this behavior undoubtedly reflects a multitude of perhaps complementary forces, these facts help to highlight the importance of the specific mechanism we describe in this paper.

2.1 Rising Pessimism

Pessimism concerning future house prices rose sharply from 2004 to 2007. As Figure 1 shows, the percentage of respondents to the Michigan Survey of Consumers answering that “now is a bad time to buy a house” reached a peak in 2007 (Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Mian and Sufi, 2019). Thus, while it is possible that some investors may have failed to fully appreciate the risks they faced (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2018) there was clearly a general expectation that economic conditions would deteriorate in the build up to the crisis. Clearly macroeconomic risks were foreseen by many.
2.2 Bank Dividends, Leverage and Investment

As Figure 2 shows bank dividend payouts were high before and even during the crisis. Even more strikingly however, each of the 12 largest bank holding companies repurchased stock extensively just before the crisis (Hirtle, 2016).\(^7\)

Figure 3 shows that average bank leverage increased steadily from 2004. Leverage was relatively moderate in the early 2000s but increased significantly, especially after 2006. By contrast the share of safe assets (Treasuries, agency securities, and cash) in banks’ balance sheet decreased before the crisis. As Figure 4 shows the average holdings of these assets by commercial banks decreased steadily until the 3rd quarter of 2008, then spiked back after the subprime mortgage crisis spiraled into a full-blown financial collapse.

Finally, the aggregate market-to-book ratio for US bank holding companies, dropped precipitously before the crisis, as documented in Figure 5, once again suggesting investors perceived risks to this sector to be rising significantly.

Taken together, these facts suggest a picture of increased risk-taking by banks in the face of rising pessimism about aggregate economic prospects in the years just before the 2007–2008 crisis. Next, we show how these facts can be reconciled in a model of optimal bank behavior.

The model matches the sharp increase in pessimism, dividend payouts, leverage, and lending and also accounts for the relation between the sharp increase in credit spreads and implied volatilities observed in 2007 (Kelly, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2016; Krishnamurthy and Muir, 2017). Although our aim is to provide a benchmark quantitative model that connects a wide range of facts it remains far from providing a full account of all credit-cycle related phenomena.\(^8\) We discuss further empirical implications in Section 4.2.

\(^7\)Unlike broker-dealers (Adrian and Shin, 2010), commercial banks seem to actively manage equity. Figure 6 shows the relation between asset and leverage (assets over equity) growth for commercial banks. Along the 45-degree line assets and leverage adjust one-for one so equity remains unchanged. The data however lines up more closely to the vertical line suggesting banks adjust both equity and asset growth to keep leverage more or less constant.

\(^8\)It does not, for example, account for the period of high lending and very low credit spreads that prevailed roughly between 2004 and 2007.
3 Model

The model economy consists of three elementary units: a banking sector, a representative investor/consumer and a productive sector. They all share a common exposure to an extreme economic adverse event, or "crisis," that occurs with a time-varying probability, $p_t$. To avoid clouding on our key underlying mechanism, we do not fully integrate these sectors in a general equilibrium setting.

The representative investor owns both banks and the production sector; all of these entities’ decisions are made in a manner consistent with this agent’s pricing of risk. Banks lend to households which may differ from the representative investor, and may also lend to the firms in the productive sector. However, the productive sector faces no financial frictions and may equivalently be financed with equity alone.

3.1 The Stochastic Discount Factor

We assume that all financial claims are owned and priced by an infinitely-lived representative investor with an Epstein and Zin (1989) utility function. The representative agent’s utility is identified by a time preference rate $\beta \in (0, 1)$, a relative risk aversion parameter $\gamma$, and an elasticity of intertemporal substitution $\psi$.

3.2 Consumption and Uncertainty

We assume the following stochastic process for the representative investor’s consumption:

$$C_{t+1} = C_t e^{\mu + \sigma \epsilon_{t+1} + \xi x_{t+1}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $\epsilon_{ct}$ is a standard normal random variable that is iid over time. Importantly, this process allows for the possibility of a rare collapse in economic activity when consumption drops by a large fraction, $\xi$, as in Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006). If a crisis materializes, an event that occurs with probability $p_t$, we set $x_{t+1} = 1$. Otherwise $x_{t+1} = 0$. The realization of $x_{t+1},$
conditional on \( p_t \), is independent of \( \epsilon_{c,t+1} \).

The natural log of the crisis probability \( p_t \) follows a first-order autoregressive process with persistence \( \rho_p \) and mean log \( \bar{p} \):

\[
\log p_{t+1} = (1 - \rho_p) \log \bar{p} + \rho_p \log p_t + \sigma_p \epsilon_{p,t+1},
\]

where \( \epsilon_{pt} \) is standard normal, iid over time, and independent of \( \epsilon_{ct} \) and \( x_t \).\(^9\) Let \( S(p_t) \) denote the ratio of aggregate wealth to aggregate consumption. It is well-known that the stochastic discount factor (SDF) satisfies

\[
M_{t,t+1} = \beta \theta e^{-\gamma (\mu_c + \sigma_c \epsilon_{c,t+1} + \xi x_{t+1})} \left( \frac{S(p_{t+1}) + 1}{S(p_t)} \right)^{-1+\theta},
\]

where the wealth-consumption ratio \( S(p_t) \) solves the equation

\[
E_t \left[ \beta \theta \left( \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{1-\gamma} \left( S(p_{t+1}) + 1 \right)^{\theta} \right] = S(p_t)^{\theta}.
\]

Following Barro (2006), we consider a government bill that is subject to default in times of crisis. We let \( q \) denote the loss in case of default. The price of the government bill is thus given by

\[
P_{Gt} = E_t[M_{t,t+1}(1 - qx_{t+1})].
\]

The ex-post realized return on government debt is given by

\[
r_{Gt}^{G} = \frac{1 - qx_{t+1}}{P_{Gt}} - 1.
\]

### 3.3 Banks

Key to our analysis is the definition of a bank:

\(^9\)In our simulations, we discretize the process (2) so that \( p_t < 1 \).
Definition 1. A bank is a licensed investment management company whose risky investments or loans are financed by equity and guaranteed deposits.

In our model, a bank is able to extract rents from subsidized deposits and takes advantage of stochastic investment/lending opportunities by responding optimally to unexpected changes in the economic environment.\textsuperscript{10}

Every period, bank managers maximize the value of the equity holders by making optimal investment and payout decisions. More specifically, managers decide how much capital to allocate to a portfolio of risky loans and to holdings of government securities as well as on the amount of equity to fund these investments. A bank’s risky loan portfolio consists of a diversified pool of collateralized loans which is subject to bank specific and aggregate shocks.

3.3.1 The Bank’s Balance Sheet

Bank $i$ enters time $t$ with book equity $BE_{it}$ and deposits $D_{it}$. Following Merton (1978), we assume $D_{i,t+1} = D_{it}e^g$, namely that deposits grow at a constant rate.\textsuperscript{11,12}

When a bank is not in default (discussed below), it decides on the overall size of its current loan portfolio (its assets) denoted by $A_{it}$ and on how much to repay its equity holders, $Div_{it}$. A bank must also pay operational, or non-interest expenses, $\Phi_{it}$ in every period, so that its resource constraint at time $t$ is:

$$A_{it} = BE_{it} + D_{it} - Div_{it} - \Phi_{it}. \quad (8)$$

The evolution of book equity over time depends on the ex-post rates of return between $t$ and $t+1$ on the bank’s assets, $r_{i,t+1}^A$, and liabilities, $r_{i,t+1}^D$. Given these ex post returns, book

\textsuperscript{10}Deposit guarantees are funded with taxes on the aggregate economy and their impact is not internalized by the bank managers.

\textsuperscript{11}It is easy to allow the demand for deposits to be stochastic but this feature is not essential to our results.

\textsuperscript{12}We calibrate $g$ to equal expected consumption growth:

$$g = \log((1 - Ep_t)e^{\mu_c+\sigma_c^2/2 + Ep_t e^{\mu_c+\sigma_c^2/2+\xi}}). \quad (7)$$
equity in the next period equals

$$BE_{i,t+1} = (1 + r_{i,t+1}^A)A_{it} - (1 + r_{t+1}^D)D_{it}. \quad (9)$$

### 3.3.2 Loans and the Return on Assets

Asset returns depend on the banks' loan portfolio and overall economic conditions. If $\varphi_{it} \in [0, 1]$ is the share of bank $i$'s total assets that is allocated to a pool of private sector loans, and $r_{i,t+1}^L$ is the ex-post rate of return on this portfolio, the return on the bank's assets equals:

$$r_{i,t+1}^A = \varphi_{it} r_{i,t+1}^L + (1 - \varphi_{it}) r_{i,t+1}^G. \quad (10)$$

Each bank's portfolio of private sector loans is made of a large number of individual loans within a local economy. We think of these as collateralized loans (e.g., mortgages) to households that are not the marginal investor and thus price no assets.\(^\text{13}\) We let the time-$t$ collateral value for each individual loan $j = 1, \ldots, n$ of bank $i$ equal

$$W_{ijt} = e^{\sigma_c \epsilon_{ct} + \epsilon_{jt} + \omega_{it} + \sigma_j \epsilon_{jt}}. \quad (11)$$

Note that this value depends on the state of the aggregate economy ($\epsilon_{ct}, x_t$), a borrower-specific shock, $\epsilon_{jt}$, and a measure of the health of local market conditions, $\omega_{it}$.

As an example, the bank-specific variable $\omega_{it}$ could represent a local determinant of house prices. A persistent bank-specific determinant of loan performance ensures the cross-section of banks will remain non-trivial. We assume $\omega_{it}$ evolves according to the Markov process:

$$\omega_{i,t+1} = \rho_\omega \omega_{it} + \sigma_\omega \epsilon_{\omega_{i,t+1}}. \quad (12)$$

We assume both $\epsilon_{jt}$ and $\epsilon_{\omega_{it}}$ to be iid over time, independent of each other and also of $\epsilon_{ct}, x_t$.

\(^\text{13}\)Yeager (2004) shows the vast majority of the U.S. banks remain small and geographically concentrated and 61% have operated within a single county. Mortgages (and other household loans) account for the majority of most bank’s assets.
and $\epsilon_{pt}$. Shocks to all these variables will change both the collateral value of an individual loan and the probability it will default.

We assume a common face value of each individual loan of $\kappa$ so that borrower $j$ is said to default at time $t$ if $W_{ijt} < \kappa$. In this case the bank recovers a fraction $1 - \mathcal{L}$ of the collateral value. In Appendix A we use the central limit theorem to integrate out borrower risk and derive the distribution of the ex-post return on the bank’s pool of private sector loans, $r_{i,t+1}^L$. As a result, the ex-ante distribution of $r_{i,t+1}^L$ depends only on $p_t$ and $\omega_{it}$.

Figure 7 shows how the spread between the rates of return on these two investments changes with macroeconomic conditions. Like other risky spreads this is increasing in the probability of a crisis, $p_t$. In addition, risk premia on the bank loan portfolio decline when local market conditions improve, as measured by collateral values, $\omega_{it}$. An improvement in local market conditions decreases the chance/severity of default in the loan portfolio, given a crisis, and hence lowers the exposure to $p_t$.

### 3.3.3 The Deposit Rate

Following Merton (1978), we assume that the interest rate on deposits is constant over time and below the unconditional average of government bill rate, so that $r^D < E[r^G_{i,t+1}]$.

As is well known, this wedge can readily arise when deposits provide liquidity services as in Sidrauski (1967) or Van den Heuvel (2008). Here we prefer instead to invoke the existence of deposit insurance guaranteeing that bank depositors receive at least partial compensation in the event of a bank default. More generally, however, this wedge also arises in any imperfectly competitive model where banks have the ability to earn excess rents on their operations (Drechsler et al., 2017).

Regardless of the precise reason, the notion that deposit rates are both sticky and below the rates on money market accounts and government bills is well-grounded in data. Figure 8 shows the rate on the three-month Treasury bill and the average deposit rate earned on large-denomination interest checking accounts over the last 20 years. Although not constant, deposit rates are very slow moving and, on average, well below those on Treasuries.
3.3.4 Regulation and Termination

Bank regulation takes two forms. First, banks face regulatory requirements on their use of leverage: whenever the bank’s chosen debt-to-asset ratio at time \( t \), \( D_t/A_t \), exceeds the regulatory threshold, \( \chi \), the bank must incur an additional cost \( f \) per unit of deposits.\(^{14}\) Generally, even a small cost will be enough to ensure that banks comply with the regulatory constraint.

Second, as in Merton (1978), we assume that regulators monitoring the bank intervene and seize the bank’s operating license whenever the value of its book equity at the beginning of the period, \( BE_{it} \), drops below 0. Formally, this means that whenever \( BE_{it} < 0 \) a bank cannot raise equity (\( Div_{it} < 0 \)) to avoid being shut down. If the bank is terminated, its assets are seized, the deposits are paid and its equity holders receive nothing. As a result, from the perspective of its equity holders, excessive risk taking by the bank may result in sub-optimal termination.

3.3.5 The problem of the bank

It follows from the description above that the market value of bank \( i \)’s equity at time \( t \) is given by:

\[
V_{it} = \begin{cases} 
E_t \left[ \sum_{s=t}^{T_i^*-1} M_{t,t+s} Div_{is} \right], & t < T_i^* \\
0, & t \geq T_i^* 
\end{cases}
\]  

(13)

where

\[
T_i^* = \inf \{ t : BE_{it} < 0 \}
\]

(14)

denotes bank \( i \)’s (stochastic) termination time, and \( M_{t,t+s} \) denotes the SDF between times \( t \) and \( t + s \).\(^{15}\)

\(^{14}\)Note that this cost is fixed except for the scale factor.

\(^{15}\)Specifically, \( M_{t,t+s} = \prod_{\tau=t}^{t+s-1} M_{\tau,\tau+1} \), for the one-period SDF \( M_{\tau,\tau+1} \) defined in (3).
Conditional on survival at time $t$, the market value of bank $i$ satisfies the recursion

$$V_i(BE_{it}, A_{i,t-1}, D_{it}, p_t, \omega_{it}) = \max_{\varphi_{it}, \text{Div}_{it}} Div_{it} + E_t \left[ M_{t,t+1} V_i(BE_{i,t+1}, A_{it}, e^g D_{it}, p_{t+1}, \omega_{i,t+1}) I_{BE_{i,t+1} > 0} \right],$$

subject to (9),

$$r_{i,t+1}^A = \varphi_{it} r_{i,t+1}^L + (1 - \varphi_{it}) r_{t+1}^G,$$

$$\log p_{t+1} = (1 - \rho_p) \log \bar{p} + \rho_p \log p_t + \sigma_p \epsilon_{p,t+1}$$

$$\omega_{i,t+1} = \rho_p \omega_{it} + \sigma_\epsilon \epsilon_{\omega_{i,t+1}},$$

and

$$A_{it} = BE_{it} + D_{it} - \text{Div}_{it} - \Phi(A_{it}, D_{it}, A_{i,t-1}),$$

where

$$\Phi(A_{it}, D_{it}, A_{i,t-1}) = \eta_B A_{i,t-1} \left( \frac{A_{it} - A_{i,t-1}}{A_{i,t-1}} \right)^2 + f D_{it} I_{D_{it} > \chi A_{it}}.$$  

The cost function $\Phi$ summarizes the non-interest expenses, inclusive of regulatory charges, incurred by the bank. Operating expenses are assumed to depend on the growth of bank assets over time.

We greatly simplify the computation of the bank’s problem using two economic insights. First, the problem is jointly homogeneous of degree 1 in assets and deposits, because both the current stream of cash flows and the constraints are linear in $A_{i,t}$ and $D_{i,t-1}$. Second, we solve for the gap between (scaled) market and book equity:

$$\tilde{v}(a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_{it}) = \frac{V_i(BE_{it}, A_{i,t-1}, D_{it}, p_t, \omega_{it}) - BE_{it}}{D_{it}},$$

where $a_{it} = \frac{A_{it}}{D_{it}}$ and $b_{it} = \frac{BE_{it}}{D_{it}}$. Appendix B shows that (17) is indeed a function of lagged
scaled assets \((a_{it-1})\), crisis probability \((p_t)\), and local conditions \((\omega_{it})\).\(^{16}\) We refer to (17), the (scaled) difference between market equity and book equity, as the bank’s \textit{franchise value}.

In our model, franchise value is driven by the ability of the bank to earn greater returns, in a risk-adjusted sense, on its asset portfolio, than it is required to pay to its debtholders. In what follows, we show that banks seek to protect this franchise value; this mitigates the moral hazard problem resulting from deposit insurance. When franchise value falls, however, incentives change.

Figure 9 depicts scaled franchise value as a function of the crisis probability, \(p_t\), for alternative values of (scaled) lagged assets. Franchise value is strictly decreasing in the crisis probability. The negative relation between the franchise value and the crisis probability arises endogenously. When \(p_t\) rises, safe asset values rise because of precautionary savings. Risky asset values might either rise or fall, depending on whether the negative effect of the crisis probability on expected cash flows and on the risk premium outweighs the precautionary savings effect. For the bank, there is an additional consideration: the bank can choose its portfolio and therefore its level of risk in response to changes in \(p_t\). The net effect is that an increase in \(p_t\) leads to a decrease in franchise values.

3.4 \textit{Bank Risk-Taking}

Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the two key choices of a bank. Figure 10 depicts the bank’s decision with respect to the size of its overall loan portfolio, \(a_{it}\). Given an exogenous supply of deposits, this is also the optimal leverage decision of the bank, with a higher \(a_{it}\) corresponding to lower leverage. As Figure 10 shows, current leverage choices will be generally increasing in past leverage. This is because asset growth is costly. The nature of the bank’s operating costs generates a plausibly strong persistence in lending and leverage decisions.

Figure 10 also shows the rich dynamics generated by the model as the previous leverage choice interacts with the crisis probability. For banks beginning the period with low leverage, the optimal level of assets (relative to deposits) decreases as a function of the crisis probability;

\(^{16}\)Technically, (17) is well-defined only when \(BE_{it} \geq 0\). See Appendix B for details.
for low values of the crisis probability the slope is relatively flat, and then steepens as the probability rises. For banks beginning the period with moderate leverage, optimal assets increase, and then decrease. Finally, for highly levered banks, optimal assets in the next period are virtually flat in $p_t$.

How does the relatively simple model of Section 3 generate these patterns? All else equal, assets are costly to the bank (this is modeled through the cost function $\Phi$). However, the main business of the bank, taking deposits and investing in assets, is profitable, so the bank would like to avoid being shut down. Thus the bank would like to maintain positive book equity, not only in the present, but also in the future (provided that the benefits are high, and the costs are sufficiently low). When the probability of a crisis, $p_t$, is low, this effect dominates for all banks but the ones with the highest leverage. If a bank happens to start the period with a high level of assets, it slowly reduces assets to gradually get to the (stochastic) steady state.\footnote{For low values of $p_t$, $a_t$ declines as a function of $p_t$. This is because of the usual trade off between the income and substitution effect. At higher $p_t$, investment opportunities are less favorable and the bank returns capital to its equity holders.} This is shown by the dotted line in Figure 10. If a bank happens to start the period at moderate leverage, it increases assets (decreasing leverage). The higher is $p_t$, the more it seeks to increase assets. This effect, illustrated by the dashed line in Figure 10, is due to precautionary motives specific to the bank – mainly the desire to have high book equity in the future. Thus, when $p_t$ is low, the bank’s primary incentive is to stay in business, not just in the present period, but in the future, to protect its franchise value. It is noteworthy that this occurs despite the presence of the moral hazard problem due to deposit insurance.

As the probability of a crisis rises, however, the bank’s incentives change in a dramatic way. The probability of shutdown increases, and avoiding it entirely becomes too costly. The bank shifts from being a “good bank”, making safe investments and seeking to stay in business, to being a “bad bank,” in effect taking advantage of the subsidy offered to depositors. This is illustrated by the kinks in the policy functions shown in Figure 10. The threshold for $p_t$ at which this occurs depends on leverage from the previous period. For the bank with low leverage the shift does not occur until the probability of a crisis is as high as 5%. For the
bank with the middle value, it occurs at 2%. For the bank with the highest leverage, all values of $p_t$ lead it to maintain assets at their lowest value.\textsuperscript{18}

We can see the same mechanisms at work in the optimal portfolio allocation of the bank, as Figure 11 shows. When the probability of a crisis is low, well-capitalized banks avoid risky loans to households; these are made, however, by poorly capitalized banks (contrast the solid line with the dotted and dashed lines in Figure 10). At a threshold level of $p_t$, however, the loan portfolio shifts toward the risky household loans. This shift occurs at the same point at which the bank decides to hold less equity in Figure 10.

What explains the shift from “good bank” to “bad bank” at higher levels of the crisis probability? As discussed above, franchise value decreases in the crisis probability.\textsuperscript{19} At higher levels of $p_t$, the bank is not as incentivized to protect this lower value, and so engages in risk shifting. That is, the claim of bank equity holders resembles a call option, which benefits from increased volatility in a way that the overall assets do not. By increasing leverage and investing in risky household loans, the bank “gambles for resurrection.” A good outcome generates high returns for the equity holders. A bad outcome results in being shut down; however, if shutdown is likely regardless, equityholders cannot be further penalized. As for any call option, the sensitivity to volatility increases the more the underlying asset is out of the money. Thus the greater is $p_t$, the lower is franchise value, and the greater the incentive to gamble for resurrection. Exacerbating this effect is an endogenous decline in the market interest rate as $p_t$ rises, due to the precautionary motive of the representative agent. It becomes costlier for the bank to protect its franchise value, even as the bank has less of an incentive to do so. This realistic mechanism leads to behavior sometimes referred to as “reaching for yield.” Furthermore, consistent with empirical evidence, in our model a credit boom emerges when bank profitability is relatively high, so that accounting profitability prior to the crisis is associated with higher systematic tail risk (Meiselman, Nagel, and Purnanandam, 2018; Richter and Zimmermann, 2019).

\textsuperscript{18}Recall that this maximum leverage position is defined by need to pay a fine proportional to deposits when leverage exceeds this value.

\textsuperscript{19}The argument in this paragraph shows why this is in fact an equilibrium outcome.
Figure 12 summarizes our findings by showing the implications of optimal bank behavior to its overall probability of default. For well-capitalized banks the expected failure rate remains essentially at 0 as long as a crisis is somewhat unlikely. As \( p_t \) rises however, risk premia widens, expected returns on government debt fall and even well-capitalized banks can no longer be assured of survival. Increased risk taking exposes these banks to more and more systematic risk and raises overall default probabilities until they become indistinguishable from \( p_t \) itself.

3.5 Firms, Production and Output

As we will show, the model has realistic implications for the relation between leverage, risky lending, and growth in GDP. These implications arise naturally from a production sector. For simplicity, we assume a representative firm maximizing the present value of cash flows, taking the investors’ stochastic discount factor (3) as given. We assume this sector faces no financial frictions, and is all-equity financed.

3.5.1 Technology

A firm uses capital \( K_t \) to produce output \( Y_t \) according to the Cobb-Douglas production function

\[
Y_t = z_t^{1-\alpha} K_t^\alpha,
\]

where \( \alpha \) determines the returns to scale of production and \( z_t \) is the productivity level. We assume \( z_t \) follows the process

\[
\log z_{t+1} = \log z_t + \mu_c + \epsilon_{c,t+1} + \phi \xi x_{t+1}.
\]

During normal-times, productivity grows at rate \( \mu_c \) and is subject to the same shocks as consumption (\( \epsilon_{c,t+1} \)). Importantly, this process implies that the productive sector is exposed to the same Bernoulli shocks as consumers and banks through the term \( \phi \xi x_{t+1} \). \( \phi \) is the sensitivity of TFP to an economic crisis.
3.5.2 Investment Opportunities

The law of motion for the firm’s capital stock is

\[ K_{t+1} = \left[ (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t \right]e^{\phi x_{t+1}}, \]  

(20)

where \( \delta \) is depreciation and \( I_t \) is firm’s investment at time \( t \). Equation (20) captures the depreciation cost necessary to maintain existing capital. Following the formulation of Gabaix (2011) and Gourio (2012), it also captures the impact of a possible destruction of productive capital during a crisis. This can proxy for either literal capital destruction (in the case of war), or simply misallocation due to economic disruption.

Finally, to allow us to match the relative volatility of investment and output in the data the firm is assumed to face convex costs when adjusting its stock of capital (Hayashi, 1982). To be precise, we assume that each dollar of added productive capacity requires \( 1 + \lambda(I_t, K_t) \) dollars of expenditures, where

\[ \lambda(I_t, K_t) = \eta_F \left( \frac{I_t}{K_t} \right)^2 K_t, \]  

(21)

and the parameter \( \eta_F > 0 \) determines the severity of the adjustment cost.

Optimal production and investment decisions, can then be constructed by computing the total value of the firm, \( V^F \), which obeys the recursion

\[ V^F(K_t, z_t, p_t) = \max_{I_t, K_{t+1}} \left[ z_t^{1-\alpha}K_t^{\alpha} - I_t - \lambda(I_t, K_t) + E_t[M_{t,t+1}V^F(K_{t+1}, z_{t+1}, p_{t+1})] \right], \]

subject to (20) and (21).
4  Crisis, Bank Lending and the Predictability of Macro Aggregates

The joint exposure of consumers, firms and banks to common aggregate shocks generates interesting co-movements between the various macroeconomic aggregates and bank lending over the business cycle. In this section we investigate the implications of a quantitative version of our model for these movements with a special focus on the role of bank risk-taking decisions.

4.1  Parameter Values

We begin by selecting a set of values for our model’s parameters. We calibrate the model at an annual frequency. Tables 1-3 summarize our choices for the parameters used to solve the problems of investors, banks and firms, respectively.

The representative investor prices all risky claims in our economy. Thus, we choose the preference parameters ($\beta, \gamma, \psi$) and consumption parameters to match key asset pricing moments and well-established macro patterns. We take the values for the parameters $\gamma$ and $\psi$ from the recent literature on asset pricing with rare events (e.g. Gourio (2012) and Gomes, Grotteria, and Wachter (2018)), while the values chosen for the parameters $\mu_c, \sigma_c$ and $\beta$ follow from a long tradition in extant macro literature (e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995)).

Due to their rare nature, precise calculations of the probabilities and distributions implied by (2) are difficult. We generally follow Barro and Ursua (2008) and set the average probability of an economic collapse $\bar{p}$ to be 2% per annum and an associated drop in consumption of $\xi = 30\%$.\footnote{Our estimate of $p_t$ is slightly below Barro and Ursua (2008) estimates of an average probability of disaster of 2.9\% on OECD countries and 3.7\% for all countries.} Next, we set the autoregressive coefficient to be 0.8 (annually) with an unconditional standard deviation of 0.42, values that are consistent with those used by Gourio (2013). Finally, we assume the government bills experience a loss of $q = 12\%$ during a crisis.
To solve the problem of the bank, we set the loss given default on private loans to 60% so that it matches the observed average recovery rate on secured senior debt (Ou, Chlu, and Metz, 2011). The face value of an individual private loan $\kappa$ is set so that the average loan-to-value ratio equals 80%, the typical value for newly originated or refinanced residential mortgages (Korteweg and Sorensen, 2016). The parameters governing the evolution of local conditions, $\sigma_\omega$ and $\rho_\omega$, are determined from volatility and persistence U.S. house prices, at the individual state level. The value for the idiosyncratic component of volatility, $\sigma_j$, is borrowed from Landvoigt, Piazzesi, and Schneider (2015) who estimated an annual volatility of individual house prices between 8% and 11%.

The regulatory capital requirement parameter $\chi$ is set to be 0.92, corresponding to an 8% equity to asset ratio, in accordance to Basel rules. Finally, the value of the operating cost parameter $\eta_B$ is chosen to generate a plausible cross sectional dispersion in the asset-to-debt ratio in the model that approximates that for US bank holding companies.

Parameter values used to solve the problem of the firm are either in line with standard choices in the macroeconomics literature ($\alpha$ and $\delta$) or chosen to match specific facts, like the relative drop in GDP during crises ($\phi$) or the volatility of investment growth relative to the volatility of output growth in the data ($\eta_F$).

### 4.2 Quantitative Results

To quantify the links between bank lending and macroeconomic activity we focus on a well-known set of empirical results that have been interpreted to indicate a causal relation between credit and poor subsequent economic performance (e.g. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2018)). We show that our model can quantitatively account for these findings, though the interpretation is quite different.

To do this, we first simulate 10,000 years of artificial data from our model economy with a cross-section of 1,000 (ex-ante identical) banks (see Appendix C for details). Following Schularick and Taylor (2012) we next define a crisis as an event where realized GDP growth is in the bottom 4% of our simulated time series. This definition captures not only periods
in which \( x_t = 1 \) but also a number during which the probability of a crisis, \( p_t \), rose sharply, leading firms to reduce investment and thus output to fall. Importantly, it addresses the key concern that the econometrician, in identifying crises, does not observe the variable \( x_t \); indeed there may be no clear line between \( x_t = 1 \) events and events in which there is a large positive shock to \( p_t \) in terms of observables.\(^{21}\)

In what follows we define aggregate bank lending to the private sector as

\[
L_t = \sum_i \varphi_{it} a_{i,t}
\]

where \( \varphi_{it} a_{it} \) is the dollar value of the private loans made by bank \( i \) in period \( t \).

Table 4 compares our model’s results with those in Schularick and Taylor (2012) regarding the relation between increases in lending and the probability of a crisis event, by regressing crisis occurrences on lagged values of bank loans. Both in the model and the data we see that an increase in lending is a statistically significant predictor of a crisis with similar economic magnitudes. The standard interpretation of the empirical evidence is that increased bank lending causes a crisis. In our model, however, time-varying exogenous risk drives both, and the relation between lagged bank lending and crises is merely a correlation.

Figure 13 compares our model’s findings with the related evidence in Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2016) showing that financial crises often follow periods of very fast credit growth. Here we break down the frequency of a crisis across each quintile of lagged credit growth. As the figure shows, both in the model and in the data, crises frequencies increase significantly after periods of fast credit-to-GDP growth. Panel B, taken from our artificial dataset, confirms that we can substantively replicate these same facts, even if we assume the crisis is independent of changes in bank lending.\(^{22}\)

Next, we examine our model’s implications for the related findings in Mian, Sufi, and

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\(^{21}\)We use this definition of crisis only for comparison with existing empirical results. In later sections of the paper, we will continue to use the terminology “crisis” to refer to the exogenous event that \( x_t = 1 \).

\(^{22}\)In the model, we look directly at growth in credit \( L_t \), rather than growth in credit scaled by GDP. This is because, as we have defined it, credit growth is stationary. However, theoretically, the ratio of loans to GDP may not be stationary in our model.
Verner (2017), documenting the strong predictability of future GDP growth by the lagged growth in household debt for 30 countries. Figure 14 replicates and updates their work to show negative relation between growth in lagged household debt (scaled by GDP) and GDP growth over a three-year window. In our model, the growth rate in bank loans also negatively predicts the growth rate in GDP. Once again, this empirical exercise has no explicit link to financial crises. In our model it is the increased probability of a crisis that leads to lower growth.

Finally, Table 5 compares predictions of the model with evidence in Baron and Xiong (2017) that an increases in lending are associated with higher probability of bank crashes. A probit regression of bank equity crashes on lagged increases in lending yields significant coefficients in the data. Model coefficients are similar in magnitude. Thus in both model and data, increases in lending significantly predict sharp declines in bank stock market valuations.

Why is the model able to match this evidence? The key mechanism is the endogenous fluctuating value of the bank’s franchise, which falls during periods of high probability of crises. As a result, some banks, and in particular those with poor balance sheets, find it optimal to gamble for resurrection, taking on risky household loans. Thus growth in risky loans predicts crises (Schularick and Taylor, 2012), and future sharp declines in bank stocks (Baron and Xiong, 2017). It also predicts lower GDP growth because non-financial firms, perceiving the same economic instability, reduce their investment, leading to lower output (Mian et al., 2017).

More broadly, our model is qualitatively consistent with a number of other recent findings linking credit growth, valuations, and financial crises. Consistent with Muir (2017), the model predicts that when banks are close to default, equity valuations are low, and future risk premia are high. Specifically, large declines in bank stocks (as opposed to a panic aspect of a crisis), imply higher risk premia, as Baron, Verner, and Xiong (2019) show in recent work. This large decline in bank stocks, through the channel of a higher probability of disaster, depresses investment, and therefore GDP growth. Mean reversion in $p_t$ then implies that credit offered by banks shrinks following expansions of credit. Baron et al. (2019) show that
both of these results also hold in the data.\textsuperscript{23}

To conclude then, our quantitative model is broadly consistent with the observed empirical patterns in bank credit that generally precedes economic collapses. In the model, however, these patterns merely reflect optimal decisions taken in response to \textit{exogenous} fluctuations in the probability of a financial and economic collapse and thus, by construction, have no effect on the odds that this event will occur.

\section{Policy Evaluation}

In response to the recent financial crisis, fiscal and monetary authorities unleashed an array of polices aimed at influencing the behavior of the banking sector. These included the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the first round of quantitative easing measures (QE1) in the United States, and the long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) in Europe.

Much of the recent theoretical literature on unconventional interventions prefers to highlight the role of large-scale asset purchases of long-term government bonds and private securities in the context of segmented markets. It concludes that these policies could generate a large increase in bank credit to the private sector (Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Curdia and Woodford, 2010; Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki, 2017; Williamson, 2012).

While these models seem compelling, empirically, the ultimate impact of the extraordinary amount of government support on bank lending is much less clear. In the US, institutions that were included in the Capital Purchase Program did not increase their loans (Duchin and Sosyura, 2014; Bassett, Demiralp, and Lloyd, 2017). Similarly, Carpinelli and Crosignani (2018) conclude that LTROs in Europe were equally ineffective in boosting bank lending.

\textsuperscript{23}The model cannot explain every feature of intermediary valuations around crises. For example, it predicts that, on average, declines in bank equity valuations should co-occur with rising household credit, and that both should predict higher returns (and higher future crash risk). In the data, on the other hand, rising household credit appears to lead declining valuations on average (Baron and Xiong, 2017). It may be that bank equity holders did not fully incorporate the risks of lending; so that while the risks were foreseen by some, they were not foreseen by all. The model does explain, however, that once a crisis is realized, it is those banks that lent the most that are most effected, broadly consistent with Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2017).
By contrast, our model suggests to examine these interventions through their impact on bank franchise value. In effect, several of these policies worked to provide banks with funding at very favorable terms, in effect subsidizing the banking sector (CPP and LTROs were explicitly designed to do just that). By highlighting an alternative mechanism that is consistent with the available evidence, our paper offers a novel perspective on the impact of these policies on banks.

Formally, we examine the impact of government interventions by considering the effects of a reduction in banks' cost of funding below its current market value, \( \tilde{r}^D < r^D \).\(^{24}\) Unsurprisingly, in our model, as Figure 15 shows, this intervention directly leads to an increase in the franchise value of banks, since they can now secure better terms to fund themselves. Figure 16 then shows that a further consequence of this intervention is that banks will now rely (relatively) more on equity. This is because with increased franchise values, default will trigger larger losses for equity holders. As a result this policy intervention will produce a decline in expected bank failure rates.

However, this increased conservatism by equity holders also manifests itself in the optimal portfolio composition of banks. We can see in Figure 17 that the optimal asset composition now generally tilts more towards government bonds and away from risky private loans. Only poorly-capitalized banks eschew this behavior to remain fully invested in private sector loans.

Thus policies that effectively subsidize bank equity holders by allowing them to tap debt markets at below-market rates lead many banks to reduce overall risk taking. Moreover, Figures 16 and 17 show that this effect is particularly strong when the likelihood of a crisis is high.

We believe these findings add a fresh perspective to the ongoing debate about the effects of unconventional monetary policies on bank lending. In particular they suggest an explanation for the perceived limited success of unconventional monetary policies in stimulating bank credit to the private sector during the economic recovery after the recent financial crisis. As Bocola (2016) shows, European banks mainly used LTROs to cheaply substitute liabilities,

\(^{24}\)Although our model offers a simple description of bank liabilities a lower cost of deposit should be interpreted more broadly as a reduction in the bank’s cost of debt.
while in the US Di Maggio, Kermani, and Palmer (2016) describe a “flypaper effect” in which banks chose to hold excess reserves with the central bank rather than expand credit to the private sector.

Our results are also consistent with the evidence of Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017), who find that U.S. banks with mortgage-backed securities on their books increased lending relative to their peers after QE1. In our model this is unsurprising since those are the banks who optimally chose $\varphi = 1$. These banks will remain the most eager to replace safe assets with risky ones.

### 6 Evidence on the Role of Deposit Insurance

Rent-seeking behavior from banks is a crucial ingredient in delivering many of our results. Although, in practice, this behavior can also arise from a lack of competition in the sector, our model focuses on rents derived from explicit government guarantees on bank deposits. As we have shown above, access to subsidized financing can meaningfully alter a bank’s incentives to hold risky securities in its loan portfolio over time.

In this section we provide independent supporting evidence on the link between the availability of deposit insurance and economic crises. We combine several databases to create a country-level unbalanced panel dataset that contains observations on aggregate household and non-financial firm debt to GDP, macro quantities and the availability of deposit insurance in both advanced and emerging economies. Effectively, this extends the sample used by Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017) to include more countries, a longer time period and data on the use of deposit insurance.\(^{25}\)

Our basic procedure is adapted from Mian et al. (2017). Let $\Delta_3 y_{t+3}$ be the three year change in log real GDP per capita in local currency between year $t + h - 3$ and $t + h$. Similarly, define $\Delta_3 d_{i,t-1}^{HH}$ and $\Delta_3 d_{i,t-1}^{F}$ as the three year rates of growth in the household and firm debt

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\(^{25}\)Our data adds together the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) “Long series on total credit to the non-financial sectors”, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database and the Global Financial Database.
to GDP ratios. Our baseline regression, reported in Panel A in Table 6, reports the estimates for the following equation:

\[ \Delta_3 y_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i + \beta_H \Delta_3 d_{i,t-1}^{HH} + \beta_F \Delta_3 d_{i,t-1}^{F} + u_{it}, \]  

(22)

when \( h = -1, \ldots, 5 \). Consistent with prior evidence (Mian et al., 2017) we find that a 1 percentage point increase in household debt to GDP ratio is correlated with a 0.4 percentage point drop in GDP per capita after 3 years.

We next combine our data with the country-level database on deposit insurance schemes, constructed by Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven (2005). For countries where no explicit scheme was reported before 2005, we hand collected the dates of enactment, if any. Overall, we find that in about 25% of our country-year observations there is no deposit insurance scheme in place.

We then interact a zero-one dummy variable for the presence of explicit deposit insurance in the past three years to (22) and estimate the following equation:

\[ \Delta_3 y_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i + (\beta_H + \beta_{DI}^H I_{DI}) \Delta_3 d_{i,t-1}^{HH} + (\beta_F + \beta_{DI}^F I_{DI}) \Delta_3 d_{i,t-1}^{F} + u_{it}, \]  

(23)

for \( h = -1, \ldots, 5 \).

Panel B in Table 6 shows that the coefficients on the interaction between growth in household credit and the presence of deposit insurance are generally statistically significant, suggesting that the variation captured by our regressors is mostly concentrated in periods and countries where deposit insurance is in place. Notably, the relation between credit and GDP is essentially flat and not significant in countries without explicit government insurance.\(^{27}\) By contrast, we find that when deposit insurance schemes are present, a 1 percentage point increase in household debt is correlated with a 0.51 percentage drop in GDP after 3 years.

\(^{26}\)While US introduced deposit insurance as early as 1934, it became common in most countries only in the late 80s.

\(^{27}\)It is also noteworthy that there is no significant relation between firm credit and subsequent economic growth. The relation is confined to growth in the riskiest form of credit, that is, household credit. This is consistent with our model.
While a detailed empirical assessment of the role of deposit insurance in crises is outside the scope of this paper, Table 6 strongly suggests that the relation between credit growth and crises is mediated through deposit insurance.

7 Conclusions

A large literature, motivated by empirical linkages between leverage and crises, argues that excessive household leverage is a cause of subsequent crises, and specifically the crisis of 2008. However, leverage is itself an outcome of endogenous decision-making. While it may be plausible that households, perhaps based on lack of experience, overoptimism, or simply rule-of-thumb behavior, took more risk than, ex post, proved optimal, it is harder to believe that banks, en masse, decided to lend to such households purely based on overoptimism, as economic conditions worsened.

This paper offers a quantitative resolution of this conundrum based on a dynamic model of risk-shifting by banks. In our model, banks endogenously provide more leverage to households in times of worsening economic conditions. The subsequent economic decline is in no way caused by household’s over-leveraging. Rather, leverage and the subsequent crises are caused by the same economic phenomenon: in this model, a time-varying likelihood of an economic crisis.

Our study suggests that recent policy toward banks might have effects counter to what is intended. Banks’ decisions over time are driven by fluctuations in their franchise value. Methods to strengthen banks, while conferring long-run benefits, might actually result in less lending because they increase the franchise value. On the flip side, any policy with the side effect that weakens banks might actually result in more undesirable lending, and further bank instability, as banks gamble for resurrection. In both cases, ignoring the incentive effects of policy on banks, which operate through fluctuating franchise values, could itself exacerbate underlying risks.
References


Appendix A Bank Lending

Following Vasicek (2002), and Nagel and Purnanandam (2017), we assume an exogenous process for bank loans. Define a payoff on an individual loan based on the random variable

$$W_{ijt} = e^{\sigma c_t x_t + \xi + \omega t + \sigma j \epsilon_{jt}}, \quad (A.1)$$

where \( j \) indexes the borrower and \( i \) indexes the bank. Define a constant default threshold \( \kappa \).

If we assume (A.1) is a two-period process that has the value 1 at time \( t - 1 \), then \( \kappa \) has the interpretation of the loan-to-value ratio. The lender receives repayment

$$\text{Rep}_j(\epsilon_{c,t}, x_t, \omega_t, \epsilon_{j,t}) = \kappa I_{W_{j,t} \geq \kappa} + (1 - \mathcal{L})W_{j,t}I_{W_{j,t} < \kappa},$$

for a constant \( \mathcal{L} \), interpreted as the loss given default. In what follows, we suppress the bank-specific \( i \) subscript.

Define

$$\text{Rep}(\epsilon_{c,t}, x_t, \omega_t) = \kappa \text{Prob}(W_{j,t} \geq \kappa | \epsilon_{c,t}, \omega_t, x_t)$$

$$+ (1 - \mathcal{L})E[W_{j,t}I_{W_{j,t} < \kappa} | \epsilon_{c,t}, \omega_t, x_t]. \quad (A.2)$$

It follows from the law of large numbers that

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \text{Rep}_j(\epsilon_{c,t}, x_t, \omega_t, \epsilon_{j,t}) = \text{Rep}(\epsilon_{c,t}, x_t, \omega_t). \quad (A.3)$$

We assume, for simplicity, that the bank holds an equal-weighted portfolio of an arbitrarily large number of loans. Equation A.3 justifies the use of (A.2) as the repayment on the loan portfolio.
We now discuss the computation of (A.2). Define

\[
\begin{align*}
    f(\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\omega}, 0) &= \log(\kappa) - \sigma_c \bar{\epsilon} - \bar{\omega} \\
    f(\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\omega}, 1) &= \log(\kappa) - \sigma_c \bar{\epsilon} - \xi - \bar{\omega}.
\end{align*}
\]

Note that the function \( f \) is the inverse of the normal cumulative density function (cdf), applied at the default probability. The probability of default conditional on no crisis at time \( t \) equals

\[
\begin{align*}
p(\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\omega}, 0) &= \Pr(\log W_{jt} < \log \kappa \mid \epsilon_{ct} = \bar{\epsilon}, \omega_t = \bar{\omega}, x_t = 0) \\
&= \mathcal{N} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma_j} (\log(\kappa) - \sigma_c \bar{\epsilon} - \bar{\omega}) \right) \\
&= \mathcal{N} (f(\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\omega}, 0)),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \mathcal{N}(\cdot) \) denotes the normal cdf. Similarly, the probability of default conditional on a crisis at time \( t \) equals

\[
\begin{align*}
p(\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\omega}, 1) &= \Pr(\log W_{jt} < \log \kappa \mid \epsilon_{ct} = \bar{\epsilon}, \omega_t = \bar{\omega}, x_t = 1) \\
&= \mathcal{N} \left( \frac{1}{\sigma_j} (\log(\kappa) - \sigma_c \bar{\epsilon} - \xi - \bar{\omega}) \right) \\
&= \mathcal{N} (f(\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\omega}, 1)).
\end{align*}
\]

Note that \( p(\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\omega}, 1) > p(\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\omega}, 0) \). Default is more likely if a crisis occurs. It is also the case that \( f(\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\omega}, 1) > f(\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\omega}, 0) \); there is a higher effective threshold for avoiding default if a crisis occurs.
To compute repayment (A.2), note that

$$E[W_{j,t}1_{W_{j,t}<\kappa}\epsilon_{c,t},\omega_t, x_t] = \begin{cases} e^{\sigma \epsilon_{c,t} + \omega_t + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}} \int_{-\infty}^{0} f(\epsilon_{c,t},\omega_t,0) (2\pi)^{-1/2} e^{-\frac{z^2}{2}} dz & x_t = 0 \\ e^{\sigma \epsilon_{c,t} + \xi + \omega_t + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}} \int_{-\infty}^{1} f(\epsilon_{c,t},\omega_t,1) (2\pi)^{-1/2} e^{-\frac{z^2}{2}} dz & x_t = 1, \end{cases}$$

where we use the result that, for any $a$,

$$\int_{-\infty}^{a} e^{z\sigma_{j} - \frac{z^2}{2}} dz = e^{\frac{\sigma^2}{2}} \int_{-\infty}^{a} e^{-\frac{(z-\sigma_j)^2}{2}} dz. \quad (A.4)$$

A loan portfolio is thus an asset whose time-$t$ payoff is defined by the random variable (A.2). Consider a time-$t$ investment in the time-$(t+1)$ loan portfolio. The price of the loan portfolio equals

$$P^L(p_t, \omega_t) = E_t [M_{t,t+1}\text{Rep}(\epsilon_{c,t+1}, x_{t+1}, \omega_{t+1})]. \quad (A.5)$$

It follows that the ex-post return on the portfolio of loans equals

$$r^L_{t+1} = \frac{\text{Rep}(\epsilon_{c,t+1}, x_{t+1}, \omega_{t+1})}{P^L(p_t, \omega_t)} - 1. \quad (A.6)$$

Note that $p_t$ and $\omega_t$ are sufficient statistics for the distribution of the return on the loan portfolio.

**Appendix B  Franchise value**

Define scaled franchise value:

$$\tilde{v}(a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_{it}) = \frac{V(BE_{it}, A_{i,t-1}, D_{it}, p_t, \omega_{it}) - BE_{it}}{D_{it}}, \quad (B.1)$$

where we conjecture that the left-hand side is a function of $a_{i,t-1}, p_t$ and $\omega_{it}$. The definition (B.1) holds as long as $BE_{it} \geq 0$. In this Appendix, we derive a recursion for (B.1), thereby
verifying the conjecture.

First, substituting (8) into (15) implies that, conditional on \( BE_{it} \geq 0 \),

\[
V_i(BE_{it}, A_{i,t-1}, D_{it}, p_t, \omega_{it}) = 
\max_{\varphi_{it}, A_{it}} BE_{it} + D_{it} - A_{it} - \Phi(A_{it}, D_{it}, A_{i,t-1}) + 
E_t \left[ M_{t,t+1} V(BE_{i,t+1}, A_{it}, D_{it} e^g, p_{t+1}, \omega_{i,t+1}) \mathbb{1}_{BE_{i,t+1} > 0} \right],
\]

(B.2)

subject to (9) and (16). Otherwise \( V_{it} = 0 \).

Define scaled market value and conjecture that this is a function of \( be_{it}, a_{it}, p_t, \) and \( \omega_{it} \):

\[
v_i(be_{it}, a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_{it}) = V(BE_{it}, A_{i,t-1}, D_{it}, p_t, \omega_{it}) / D_{it}.
\]

(B.3)

We further define

\[
\phi(a_{it}, a_{i,t-1}) \equiv \eta_B a_{i,t-1} e^{-g} \left( \frac{a_{it} - a_{i,t-1} e^{-g}}{a_{i,t-1} e^{-g}} \right)^2 + f \mathbb{1}_{a_{it} < \chi}.
\]

Note that \( \phi(a_{it}, a_{i,t-1}) = \frac{\Phi(A_{it}, D_{it}, A_{i,t-1})}{D_{it}} \).

Recursively define \( v_i(be_{it}, a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_{it}) \) as

\[
v_i(be_{it}, a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_{it}) = \max_{\phi_{it}, a_{it}} be_{it} + 1 - a_{it} - \phi(a_{i,t-1}, a_{it}) + 
E_t \left[ M_{t,t+1} e^g v(be_{i,t+1}, a_{it}, p_t, \omega_{i,t+1}) \mathbb{1}_{be_{i,t+1} > 0} \right],
\]

(B.4)

subject to

\[
be_{i,t+1} = e^{-g} \left( (1 + r_{i,t+1}^A)a_{it} - (1 + r_{i,t+1}^D) \right),
\]

(B.5)

and (16), for \( be_{it} \geq 0 \); otherwise \( v_{it} = 0 \). Dividing both sides of (15) by \( D_{it} \) and applying the law of motion for deposits shows that the definitions (B.4) and (B.3) are consistent, verifying the conjecture.
Finally, define \( \tilde{v}(a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_t) \) as the solution to the recursion

\[
\tilde{v}(a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_t) = \max_{\phi_{it}, a_{it}} 1 - a_{i,t-1} - \phi(a_{i,t-1}, a_{it}) + 
E_t \left[ M_{t,t+1} e^g (b_{e_{i,t+1}} + \tilde{v}(a_{i,t}, p_{t+1}, \omega_{i,t+1})) \mathbb{1}_{b_{e_{i,t+1}} > 0} \right], \tag{B.6}
\]

subject to (B.5) and (16). Then

\[
v(b_{e_{it}}, a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_t) = \begin{cases} 
\tilde{v}(a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_t) + b_{e_{it}} & \text{if } b_{e_{it}} \geq 0 \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

It follows that, provided that \( b_{e_{it}} \geq 0 \), we can define scaled franchise value as

\[
\tilde{v}(a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_t) = v(b_{e_{it}}, a_{i,t-1}, p_t, \omega_t) - b_{e_{it}}.
\]
Appendix C  Solution Algorithm

We discretize the stochastic processes for the probability of crisis $p$, the collateral value $\omega$, and the i.i.d. $\epsilon_c$ shocks following the method developed by Rouwenhorst (1995). For $p$ we use a 10-node Markov chain, while for $\omega$, and $\epsilon_c$ we use 5 nodes.

We then calculate asset prices. The equilibrium wealth-consumption ratio is found solving the fixed-point problem in (4). Under the assumptions described in the main text, the wealth-consumption ratio is function of $p$ only. The investor’s stochastic discount factor is computed from (3). Prices and returns for the Treasury bill and the loans to households are derived from the Euler equations presented in (5) and (A.5), respectively.

With this information at hand, we solve the problem of the bank. We solve for scaled franchise value on the discretized state space, by iterating on (B.4). The bank takes prices as given, and jointly decides on its capital and portfolio allocation to maximize the sum of current cash-flows and continuation value.

The solution to the firm’s problem is given in Appendix C of Gomes, Grotteria, and Wachter (2018).

We obtain model-implied moments by simulating 10,000 banks for 10,000 periods. The burn-out sample consists of the first 1,000 periods. Simulations yield a series for the exogenous state variables $\omega_{j,t}$, $p_t$, the endogenous state variables, $a_{j,t}$ and firm capital, as well as a series of shocks that determine the ex-post return on the bank investments and the ex post output of the firm.\footnote{We assume, for simplicity, that when a bank defaults, an identical bank is created with the same state variables. This implies we do not need to keep track of past defaults (the bank’s optimal decisions depend only on the current value of the state variables). This assumption allows us to maintain a stationary distribution of banks.} Using these series, we can calculate all quantities of interest based on the functions for the value of the bank and the value of the firm.
### Table 1. Parameter Values – Representative Investor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of intertemporal substitution</td>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative risk aversion</td>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of time preference</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average growth in log consumption (normal times)</td>
<td>$\mu_c$</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility of log consumption growth (normal times)</td>
<td>$\sigma_c$</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average probability of crisis</td>
<td>$\bar{p}$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of crisis on consumption size</td>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>$\log(1 - 0.30)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistence in crisis probability</td>
<td>$\rho_p$</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility of crisis probability</td>
<td>$\sigma_p$</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government bill loss given crisis</td>
<td>$q$</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** The table shows the parameter values used to solve the representative investor’s problem. The investor has Epstein and Zin (1989) utility with risk aversion $\gamma$, elasticity of intertemporal substitution $\psi$, and time discount factor $\beta$. Her consumption process is given by

$$ C_{t+1} = C_t e^{\mu_c + \epsilon_{c,t+1} + \xi x_{t+1}}, $$

where $x_{t+1}$ is a crisis indicator that takes a value of 1 with probability $p_t$. We assume that the logarithm of $p_t$ follows a Markov process with persistence $\rho_p$ and volatility $\sigma_p$. Conditional on a crisis realization, government bills experience a loss of $q$ per unit invested. The model is calibrated at annual frequency.
Table 2. Parameter Values – Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return on deposits</td>
<td>(r_D)</td>
<td>0.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss given default on loans to households</td>
<td>(L)</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan-to-value ratio</td>
<td>(\kappa)</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility of local market component of collateral</td>
<td>(\sigma_\omega)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistence of local market component of collateral</td>
<td>(\rho_\omega)</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility of household component of collateral</td>
<td>(\sigma_j)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital regulation requirement</td>
<td>(\chi)</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment cost on capital</td>
<td>(\eta_B)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table shows the parameter values used to solve the problem of an individual bank. Each bank \(i\) has access to a portfolio of \(n\) infinitesimal one-period loans with the same loan-to-value ratio (\(\kappa\)) at issuance. Let \(j = 1, \ldots, n\) index borrowers for bank \(i\). Let

\[
W_{ijt} = e^{\sigma_c \epsilon_{ct} + \xi \epsilon_{xt} + \omega_{it} + \sigma_j \epsilon_{jt}}
\]

denote the time-\(t\) collateral value for borrower \(j\) of bank \(i\) (assuming a time-\(t-1\) value of 1). If a loan defaults, the bank recovers \(1 - L\) of its collateral value \(W_{ijt}\). The dividends for bank \(i\) are:

\[
Div_{it} = BE_{it} + D_{it} - A_{it} - \Phi(A_{it}, D_{it}, A_{i,t-1}).
\]

where \(\Phi(\cdot)\) are non-interest costs, inclusive of regulatory charges. They are given by:

\[
\Phi(A_{it}, D_{it}, A_{i,t-1}) = \eta_B A_{i,t-1} \left(\frac{A_{it} - A_{i,t-1}}{A_{i,t-1}}\right)^2 + fD_{it} 1_{D_{it} > \chi A_{it}}.
\]

The bank \(i\) deposits grow exogenously according to:

\[
D_{i,t+1} = D_{i,t} e^g.
\]

The model is calibrated at annual frequency.
Table 3. Parameter Values – Representative Firm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returns to scale</td>
<td>( \alpha )</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation rate</td>
<td>( \delta )</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity to crises</td>
<td>( \phi )</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment cost on capital</td>
<td>( \eta_F )</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table shows the parameter values used to solve the firm’s problem. The firm has a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form

\[
Y_t = z_t^{1-\alpha} K_t^\alpha ,
\]

where the logarithm of the firm productivity level, \( z_t \), follows a random walk process given by:

\[
\log z_{t+1} = \log z_t + \mu_c + \epsilon_{c,t+1} + \phi \xi x_{t+1}.
\]

The law of motion for each firm’s capital stock is: \( K_{t+1} = \left[ (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t \right] e^{\phi \xi x_{t+1}} \). The model is calibrated at annual frequency.
### Table 4. Predicting crises in data and model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LPM – Data</th>
<th>LPM – Model</th>
<th>Logit – Data</th>
<th>Logit – Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta L_{t-1} )</td>
<td>-0.0182</td>
<td>0.1579</td>
<td>-0.0917</td>
<td>3.4280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta L_{t-2} )</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.1580</td>
<td>6.641</td>
<td>3.4335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta L_{t-3} )</td>
<td>0.0638</td>
<td>0.0200</td>
<td>1.675</td>
<td>0.5877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta L_{t-4} )</td>
<td>-0.00423</td>
<td>0.0807</td>
<td>0.0881</td>
<td>1.9856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta L_{t-5} )</td>
<td>0.0443</td>
<td>0.0347</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>0.9774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of lag coefficients</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0.4513</td>
<td>9.311</td>
<td>10.4122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.0126</td>
<td>0.0048</td>
<td>0.0379</td>
<td>0.0047</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** The table reports the coefficients and \( R^2 \) for the crises prediction equation as estimated by Schularick and Taylor (2012). Let the crisis event be identified by a binary variable equal to 1 if a crisis occurs and 0 otherwise. The first two columns report estimates from the following linear probability model (LPM)

\[
\text{crisis}_{it} = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{5} \beta_j \Delta L_{t-j} + \epsilon_{it}.
\]

The third and fourth columns report estimates from the following logit model:

\[
P(\text{crisis} = 1) = \frac{e^{\beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{5} \beta_j \Delta L_{t-j}}}{1 + e^{\beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{5} \beta_j \Delta L_{t-j}}},
\]

where crises in the data are as identified by Schularick and Taylor (2012) and \( L_t \) stands for the total dollar value of bank loans in real terms. The data cover 14 developed countries between 1870 and 2008. In the model, a crisis is defined based on contemporaneous GDP growth so that the frequency equals that in the data (4%) and \( L_t \) is defined as the sum of the dollar value of bank loans for each bank, scaled by that bank’s deposits.
Table 5. Credit expansion predicts increased crash risk in the bank equity index: data and model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 yr</th>
<th>2 yr</th>
<th>3 yr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔBank credit</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[2.40]</td>
<td>[3.11]</td>
<td>[4.27]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th pct</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th pct</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th pct</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports coefficients from a probit regression of bank equity index crashes on lagged credit expansion. We examine horizons of 1, 2, and 3 years. The crash dummy takes value 1 if there is a drop of -30% in the next 1, 2 or 3 years and 0 otherwise. The crash indicator is regressed on ΔBank credit, i.e. the three-year change in bank credit, expressed in standard deviation units. The empirical coefficients are computed by Baron and Xiong (2017). In the model, we simulate 100 times 2000 years of artificial data with a burnout sample of 500 years and 500 banks. In each simulated sample we estimate the probit regression model. We report the median, 5th, and 95th percentile of the distribution of estimated coefficients.
Table 6. Dependent Variable: $\Delta_3y_{t+h}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Panel A: Benchmark Estimates</th>
<th>Panel B: Control for Deposit Insurance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( -1) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)</td>
<td>( -1) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta_3d_{i,t-1}^{HH}$</td>
<td>0.15** 0.06 -0.07 -0.25*** -0.41*** -0.45*** -0.42***</td>
<td>0.30 0.29 0.23 0.11 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)</td>
<td>(0.23) (0.22) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta_3d_{i,t-1}^{F}$</td>
<td>-0.04 -0.10** -0.11*** -0.06** -0.02 0.01 0.05*</td>
<td>-0.03 -0.13 -0.15 -0.12** -0.07 -0.03 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)</td>
<td>(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.02 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.13</td>
<td>0.03 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Let $y_{it}$ be the log real GDP per capita in local currency and $d_{it}^{HH}$ and $d_{it}^{F}$ be the household and firm debt to GDP ratios, respectively. $1_{DI}$ is an indicator function equal to 1 if the country had explicit deposit insurance enacted in time $t-3$. For deposit insurance, dates before 2005 are from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005). For countries without a deposit insurance by 2005, scheme dates have been hand collected. Panel A presents the estimated coefficients and $R^2$ of the following equation

$$\Delta_3y_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i + \beta_H \Delta_3d_{i,t-1}^{HH} + \beta_F \Delta_3d_{i,t-1}^{F} + u_{it},$$

for $h = -1, \ldots, 5$. Each column gradually leads the left-hand-side variable by one year. Panel B presents the estimated coefficients and $R^2$ of the following equation

$$\Delta_3y_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i + (\beta_H + \beta_{DI}^{HH} 1_{DI}) \Delta_3d_{i,t-1}^{HH} + (\beta_F + \beta_{DI}^{F} 1_{DI}) \Delta_3d_{i,t-1}^{F} + u_{it},$$

for $h = -1, \ldots, 5$. Each column gradually leads the left-hand-side variable by one year. Reported $R^2$ values are from within-country variation. We control for country fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are dually clustered on country and year. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. The panel is unbalanced and data are from 1960 to 2015.
Fig. 1. Rising Pessimism. The figure shows the fraction of households answering the question “Generally speaking, do you think now is a good time or a bad time to buy a house?” with “now is a bad time.” Data are from the Michigan Survey of Consumers.
Fig. 2. Dividends and Repurchases by large bank holding companies. The figure shows the dividends and share repurchases made by large bank holding companies in the United States between 2005 and 2009. Values are in percentage of the total assets.
Fig. 3. **Market Leverage for Bank Holding Companies.** The figure shows the aggregate market leverage for bank holding companies. Leverage is computed as the sum of total liabilities across banks divided by the sum of market capitalization and total liabilities across banks.
Fig. 4. Relative size of Treasury and cash in the bank portfolio. The ratio is computed as the sum of Treasury and agency securities and cash assets divided by the sum of total assets across commercial banks in the United States. Data are from the Federal Reserve H.8 Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States, and refer to the period ranging from 1992 to 2019.
Fig. 5. Market to Book Value of Equity for Bank Holding Companies. The market to book ratio is the sum of market capitalization across bank holding companies divided by the sum of equity book value across bank holding companies.
Fig. 6. Total Assets and Leverage growth of Commercial Banks. The figure represents assets growth plotted against leverage growth for commercial banks in the United States. Leverage is defined as assets divided by the difference of assets and liabilities. Data are from the Federal Reserve H.8 Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States, and refer to the period ranging from 1973 to 2014.
Fig. 7. Excess Return on Private Loans. The figure shows the ex-ante expected rate of return on bank loans, $r^L_{t+1}$, relative to the rate of return earned on a one-year government bill, $r^G_{t+1}$ for each level of the probability of crisis, $p_t$, and alternative values of the current-period collateral, $\omega_t$. The expected return and the probability are in annual terms.
Fig. 8. Rates on deposits and Treasury bills The figure shows the deposit rate on checking accounts (US average) and the yield on the 3-month Treasury bill from March 1999 to May 2018. Treasury bill rates are from FRED. Data on checking deposits before 2009 are from Drechsler et al. (2017) while after 2009 are from FDIC.
Fig. 9. Bank Franchise Value. The figure shows the bank’s franchise value, scaled by deposits, \( \tilde{v}_t = \left( \frac{\tilde{V}_t}{D_t} \right) \). Alternative levels of crises probability \( p_t \) are plotted on the x-axis. Different lines represent different lagged asset-to-debt ratio \( a_{t-1} = \left( \frac{A_{t-1}}{D_{t-1}} \right) \). \( \omega_t \) is fixed to 0.
Fig. 10. Optimal Bank Lending. The figure shows the optimal amount of bank assets (lending), scaled by deposits. Alternative levels of crises probability $p_t$ are plotted on the x-axis. Different lines represent different lagged asset-to-debt ratio $a_{t-1} = \left(\frac{A_{t-1}}{D_{t-1}}\right)$. $\omega_t$ is fixed to 0.
Fig. 11. Portfolio Allocation. The figure shows the policy for portfolio allocation of an individual bank ($\varphi_t$). Alternative levels of crises probability $p_t$ are plotted on the x-axis. Different lines represent different lagged asset-to-debt ratio $a_{t-1} = \left(\frac{A_{t-1}}{D_{t-1}}\right)$. $\omega_t$ is fixed to 0. $\varphi$ equal to 1 represents investment in the portfolio of household loans, while $\varphi$ equal to 0 stands for investment in the government T-bill.
Fig. 12. **Bank default probability.** The figure shows the endogenous default probability of an individual bank after optimally deciding on the amount of capital and its portfolio allocation. Alternative levels of crises probability $p_t$ are plotted on the x-axis. Different lines represent different lagged asset-to-debt ratio $a_{t-1} = \frac{A_{t-1}}{D_{t-1}}$. $\omega_t$ is fixed to 0.
Fig. 13. Frequency of crises by credit growth. The top figure shows the empirical average frequency of a crisis in year $t$ conditioning on a given quintile of credit-to-GDP growth rates from year $t - 5$ to $t$. Data are from Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2016). For each country, we compute the growth rate in the ratio of total loans to GDP between year $t - 5$ and $t$. Empirically, a crisis is a systemic financial crisis, as identified by Jordà et al. (2016). The bottom figure reproduces the relation in data simulated from the model using quintiles of credit growth rates from year $t - 5$ to $t$. Results are from simulating the model with 10,000 banks for 10,000 periods. A crisis occurs when the 1-year GDP growth rate is in the bottom 4% of its distribution.
Fig. 14. **GDP and Household Debt growth.** The top figure shows the empirical relationship between the (demeaned) GDP growth rate from year $t$ to $t + 3$ and the growth rate of the household debt to GDP ratio from year $t - 4$ to $t - 1$. Data are from the Bank of International Settlements and cover 39 countries between 1961 and 2012. The bottom figure reproduces the same relationship in the model using however the growth rate of aggregate bank’s loans (to household) from year $t - 5$ to $t$. Results are from simulating the model with 10,000 banks for 10,000 periods. The solid line is the estimated regression line from

$$\Delta_3 y_{i,t+3} - \Delta_3 y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_H \Delta_3 d_{HH_{i,t-1}} + u_{it},$$

where $y$ is GDP and $d_{HH}$ is the measure of credit to households.
Fig. 15. Impact of subsidies on bank franchise value. The figure shows bank franchise value scaled by deposits, $\tilde{\nu}_t = \left( \tilde{V}_t / D_t \right)$, as a function of crisis probability $p_t$ for two different levels of bank subsidies. We set $a_{t-1} = 1.12$ and $\omega_t = 0$. The case of low subsidies is our benchmark model. For the high subsidies scenario we lower the benchmark deposit rate by 6 basis points.
Fig. 16. **Impact of subsidies on bank leverage.** The figure shows the optimal ratio of assets to deposits $a_t = (A_t/D_t)$ as a function of crisis probability $p_t$ for two different levels of bank subsidies. We set $a_{t-1} = 1.12$ and $\omega_t = 0$. The case of low subsidies is our benchmark model. For the high subsidies scenario we lower the benchmark deposit rate by 6 basis points.
Fig. 17. Impact of subsidies on bank’s optimal portfolio composition. The figure shows the portfolio allocation of an individual bank ($\varphi_t$) for high and low subsidies (solid and dashed line respectively) and different levels of the probability of criss $p_t$ keeping fixed the last period asset-to-debt ratio $a_{t-1} = (A_{t-1}/D_{t-1})$ to 1.123, and $\omega_t = 0$. $\varphi$ equal to 1 represents investment in the portfolio of household loans, while $\varphi$ equal to 0 stands for investment in the government T-bill. The case of low subsidies is our benchmark model. For the high subsidies scenario we lower the benchmark deposit rate by 0.06%.