

2017 Meetings

NBER Market Design Working Group

Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase

Joint with



Juan Camilo Castillo

Stanford University



Dan Knoepfle



Uber





E. Glen Weyl

Microsoft Research & Yale


Ride-hailing: powerful but fragile



Wild goose chases (WGCs) and Vickrey's hypercongestion



Vickrey's “responsive pricing”/ Uber's surge pricing as response





Plan for talk

- I. Describe model
- II. Theoretical illustration of mechanism
- III. Empirical illustration
- IV. Welfare calibration and the costs of rigid pricing

Main model features


- Homogeneous space
- Arbitrary topology (empirically measured)
- Driver supply driven by anticipated earnings per unit time
- Riders care both about wait, price
- Cars can be Idle, Delivering, or En Route
- Time spent En Route = waiting time $T(I)$ based on idle cars available (relative to demand)

Backward-bending “supply”






Empirical analog


- Manhattan, December 2016-February 2017
- Observations: one 30-minute period



Calibration implies breakdown at

$$\text{slack} \equiv \frac{\text{Idle}}{\text{En Route}} \approx .25 - .5$$



Surge pricing appears to be mostly about this




Welfare calibration

- Max waiting time only time effect on demand
- Willingness-to-wait orthogonal to willingness-to-pay
- Pareto log-normal distribution of WTP, log-normal WTW, calibrate to other estimates
- Constant elasticity labor supply, calibrated to other Uber papers
- Space dynamics calibrated to time-distance data
- Busiest and calmest hours of the week
- 20% extraction

Flexible pricing in street hail v. app-based hailing: 92nd v. 58th percentile



(a) Ride-hailing



(b) Traditional street-hail taxis

Other solutions

- Rider queue
- Maximum dispatch radius

Can help, but brand promise, lightly used

- Re-matching, forward dispatch more consistent

Discussion

- Natural monopoly and regulation
- Regulation motive stronger with pool
- Idle car externality and free riding by competition
- Road congestion externalities

For future research:

- Spatial and temporal dynamics (JC)
- Integrating with traffic congestion
- Explicit competition